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TRUSTED TYPES AND BUNDLERS
(SCHOOL PROJECT FOR IT SECURITY)

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Chapter 1

Cross site scripting

Cross site scripting (abbr. XSS) is one of the most prevalent security vulnerabilities and the most common one when talking about web applications. When we take into the account only the last year (year 2020), XSS has been ranked on 7th place in the OWASP top 10 vulnerabilities ranking. [11]. When, we look at the bounty programs only, and the money rewarded for each security vulnerability, we can see that XSS is the winner. Total bounty just for XSS in year 2020 was more than 4,2 million USD [22].

Citing very well written introduction from [36].

XSS attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script (for example encoded in URL), to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.

An attacker can use XSS to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. The end user's browser has no way to know that the script should not be trusted, and will execute the script. Because it thinks the script came from a trusted source, the malicious script can access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by the browser and used with that site. These scripts can even rewrite the content of the HTML page.

(Be sure to read the cited article for more information and links [36])

1.1 Types of XSS

There are many types of XSS, although there is no single finite list of XSS types to rule them all [37]. Most experts distinguish at least between non-persistent (*reflected*) and persistent (*stored*) XSS. There is also a third category, *DOM based XSS*, which will be explained in more depth as this is the threat model under which Trusted Types operate.

- **Stored** - The injected script is permanently saved in server database. The client (*user's browser*) will then ask the server for the requested page and the response from the server will contain the malicious script.
- **Reflected** - Typically delivered via email or a neutral web site. It occurs when a malicious script is reflected off of a web application to the victim's browser [18].
- **DOM based** - The vulnerability appears in the DOM - by executing some malicious code. In reflected and stored XSS attacks you can see the vulnerability payload in the response page but in DOM based XSS, the HTML source code and response of the attack will be exactly the same. You can only observe the change at runtime.

1.2 Modern classification of XSS

The classification in the *Section 1.1 - Types of XSS* was created many years back and a lot has since changed. The web got more secure and changed. Heavy server oriented code shifted to client side single page apps and now a combination of client and server emerges. Modern frameworks try to bake in and enforce best security practices for developers. Despite the rapid web evolution, web platform is still mostly preserving the backward compatibility with original JS spec - meaning you could still browse the web page created 20 years ago with subtle differences (*Compare that with running Android app created for version "4.1 Jelly Bean" created in mid 2012 on "Android 11" released 2020 - good luck with that*).

The previous classification is not ideal, because the categories overlap. Citing from [27]:

You can have both Stored and Reflected DOM Based XSS. You can also have Stored and Reflected Non-DOM Based XSS too, but that's confusing, so to help clarify things, starting about mid 2012, the research community proposed and started using two new terms to help organize the types of XSS that can occur:

Instead what they propose is just two categories (again, fully citing [27]):

- Server XSS - Server XSS occurs when untrusted user supplied data is included in an HTTP response generated by the server. The source of this data could be from the request, or from a stored location. As such, you can have both Reflected Server XSS and Stored Server XSS. In this case, the entire vulnerability is in server-side code, and the browser is simply rendering the response and executing any valid script embedded in it.
- Client XSS - Client XSS occurs when untrusted user supplied data is used to update the DOM with an unsafe JavaScript call. A JavaScript call is considered unsafe if it can be used to introduce valid JavaScript into the DOM. This source of this data could be from the DOM, or it could have been sent by the server (via an AJAX call, or a page load). The ultimate source of the data could have been from a request, or from a stored location on the client or the server. As such, you can have both Reflected Client XSS and Stored Client XSS.

Just for completeness, DOM based XSS is a subset of client XSS. The source of the data is client side only. And again, study the full article [27] (*together with further references*) for more information.

1.3 Common examples of XSS

The basic example of XSS (*and probably the easiest to understand*) is to take a page which interpolates data from an URL. This is a common practice - you browse a site, find something of value and you want to share it with your friend. Nothing easier, you just copy the URL and they see the same content (*or at least similar*) to you. This basic example is common for nearly all shopping sites, tourism agencies, accommodation services etc...

This type of attack can be easily demonstrated with the following example page:

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <title>URL XSS</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Try searching something:
      <i> (for example "<img src=x onerror=alert(1) />")</i>
    </p>
    <input id="query" type="text" />
```

```

<button id="submit">Search</button>

<p>You have searched for</p>
<p id="attack-target"></p>
</body>
<script>
  window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {
    const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(location.search)
    document.getElementById('attack-target').innerHTML =
      urlParams.get('query')
  });

  document
    .getElementById('submit')
    .addEventListener('click', () => {
      const query = document.getElementById('query').value
      location.replace(
        `${location.pathname}?query=${encodeURIComponent(query)}`
      );
    })
</script>
</html>

```

This is very small example and XSS is apparent, but once the project is composed of tens of thousands lines and many dependencies, such mistake can easily sneak through. In this case, if you execute this HTML code in the browser and you try searching for something, the result will be interpolated in the page. This allows the attacker to *prepare an evil URL* which they can then send to benign users to exploit.

For more examples, I recommend playing the "*XSS games*" [32] [33] [34] [35].

Finally, there are many cheatsheets with possible attack payloads and polyglots (*code that works for various environments, such as HTML, JS, CSS*). For example: [31].

1.4 Consequences of XSS

So far, we have talked about many types of XSS, saw a basic example and are aware that there are many more. What we haven't covered are the consequences, which can be caused by these attacks.

Citing cypress data defense article about XSS [9]:

The impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities can vary from one web

application to another. It ranges from session hijacking to credential theft and other security vulnerabilities. By exploiting a cross-site scripting vulnerability, an attacker can impersonate a legitimate user and take over their account.

If the victim user has administrative privileges, it might lead to severe damage such as modifications in code or databases to further weaken the security of the web application, depending on the rights of the account and the web application.

Apart from these basic consequences, there are dozens of others. Citing [36]:

Other damaging attacks include the disclosure of end user files, installation of Trojan horse programs, redirect the user to some other page or site, or modify presentation of content. An XSS vulnerability allowing an attacker to modify a press release or news item could affect a company's stock price or lessen consumer confidence. An XSS vulnerability on a pharmaceutical site could allow an attacker to modify dosage information resulting in an overdose.

Also, sites might have more security vulnerabilities and even a benign XSS vulnerability might be used with combination with a different attack vector (*e.g. CSRF*) which has often more severe consequences.

1.5 Protection

There are no definitive measures to protect against XSS, however there are guidelines. XSS is caused by interpolating untrusted data into otherwise trusted environments. It is important to educate developers about the possible attack vectors and vulnerabilities in the underlying platforms (*e.g. DOM and possible attack vectors with HTML/CSS*).

Applications, which need to interpolate uncontrolled user data into their applications need to make sure the input is safe. In practice, this means **encoding** or **sanitizing** the inputs. It is also important to follow the new modern APIs which aim to prevent XSS - these include various security headers (*see [9]*) or modern APIs such as Safe-Types [19] and Trusted Types [15]. The latter will be described in the rest of the paper.

Chapter 2

Introduction to Trusted Types

In this chapter we are going to introduce the concept of Trusted Types (abbr. TT). The threat model under which TT operate is DOM XSS (*subset of client side XSS*). This vulnerability happens when untrusted, user controlled input reaches a *sink* which is function like *eval()* or *innerHTML* property of an HTML element.

The idea is to take all of the sinks and make them secure by default. For example, in DOM you can assign any string value to *innerHTML* property of an element and the browser will parse the string using HTML parser and render the parsed markup. The problem is that HTML *script* tags can parse and execute arbitrary JS code. But that's not all, you can execute code with HTML attributes and CSS too. Instead, we make these sinks accept only *special branded objects* and throw an error on any other value.

This is a breaking change behaviour in DOM spec and is unfortunately not acceptable to change the spec in this way. Instead, users who want to use TT have to explicitly opt-in to enforce this API. As of now, TT are supported in Chromium based browser, but it is likely that the support will increase. You can check out the supported browsers in [23].

Developers are asked to avoid the sinks if possible to reduce the attack surface, however, sometimes there is no way to avoid the sink. For such cases there should be a way for developers to create these *special branded objects* and make them explicitly **trusted** by the DOM APIs and sinks - hence the name *Trusted Types*. Of course, if creating TT would be as easy as wrapping the value in a function call, developers would quickly misuse this behaviour and just wrap the unsafe values in that function call instead of making sure the value can be really trusted. To prevent this, there is a security mechanism guarding how these values can be created.

Refer to the recommended explainer article for more info [15] or the formal spec [26].

2.1 Enforcing Trusted Types

As mentioned, TT is backward incompatible change and must be enforced explicitly by the developers. You can enable it by adding the following response header to the documents which should operate under TT enforcement.

Listing 2.1: Enforcing Trusted Types

```
Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script';
```

2.2 Creating Trusted Types

Most of the times, you can avoid using the sinks altogether and use safe DOM APIs instead (*e.g. create DOM node dynamically instead of innerHTML assignment*). However there are cases when using sinks can't be avoided, or the values are already trusted, sanitized or encoded. You can create trusted type from such value which will be accepted by the DOM sink.

If your browser supports TT, you will have access to *trustedTypes* global object on *window* instance. You can use *trustedTypes.createPolicy* function to create a policy, which acts like a "factory" for creating the trusted values. For example, citing [15]:

Listing 2.2: Creating Trusted Types policy

```
if (window.trustedTypes && trustedTypes.createPolicy) { // Feature testing
  const escapeHTMLPolicy = trustedTypes.createPolicy('myEscapePolicy', {
    createHTML: string => string.replace(/\</g, '&lt;');
  });
}
```

and then you would use the policy simply by (*again citing [15]*):

Listing 2.3: Using the policy to create Trusted value

```
const escaped = escapeHTMLPolicy.createHTML('<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>');
console.log(escaped instanceof TrustedHTML); // true
el.innerHTML = escaped; // '&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
```

However, as you noticed the policies are named. This is because you can restrict which policies might be created by your application. All you need to do is provide additional response header with a whitelist of allowed policy names, separated by comma.

Listing 2.4: Restricting policy names

```
Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types
myEscapePolicy
```

2.3 Report only mode

Before switching to enforcing mode, which will cause an error when untrusted value is assigned to a sink, you can switch to report only mode, which will preserve the original DOM API behaviour (*no error will be thrown and standard sink behaviour will be used*). However, there will be a warning in the console and CSP violation will be triggered. [25].

You will also have to use slightly different CSP response header [15]:

Listing 2.5: Report only CSP

```
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: require-trusted-types-for 'script';
report-uri //my-csp-endpoint.example
```

2.4 Default policy

Creating your own policies and making sure *trusted* values reach the sinks is not always possible. Application code is largely composed of many dependencies and third party code, which the developer can't easily modify. For such cases, there is special **default policy** which will be called when untrusted value reaches is sink. It is the last place where the developer (*specifically, the handler function the developer implemented*) can "bless" the value such that it will be accepted by the DOM API. [15]

Listing 2.6: Creating default policy

```
if (window.trustedTypes && trustedTypes.createPolicy) { // Feature testing
  trustedTypes.createPolicy('default', {
    createHTML: (string, sink) => DOMPurify.sanitize(string,
      {RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: true})
  });
}
```

Note, that *default policy* is still a named policy and must be listed in the allowlist specified by *trusted-types* response header (*of course, this only applies if the application restricts the policy names*).

2.5 Trusted Types integration

TT are being developed and used internally at Google, where they integrate it into their core products. However, many open source projects see the benefit of TT and started doing necessary steps needed for the integration. The amount of work needed to integrate TT to application varies a lot. There are many factors which might contribute to this complexity:

- Choice of a bundler - This is more a developer nuisance than production issue. Main purpose for bundlers is to transpile the code using latest (*and not widely supported*) features to standard version of JavaScript that all browsers understand. Nowadays, bundlers also take care of serving the app in the development phase and providing features such as code reloading (*which refreshes the web page once developer code is saved*) or showing a popup with error message and stack trace. These development features often cause violations when TT are enforced.
- DOM framework - Modern web apps usually use some kind of framework (*examples include: React, Angular, Polymer, Vue, Svelte...*). These frameworks often provide fine security measures, but some frameworks may be more "*TT friendly*" than others. For example, making React or Polymer TT compliant is much easier than integration with Angular [16] [12] [3].
- Other third party dependencies - Many third party dependencies might use sinks under the hood and fixing such violations might be hard.
- Application code - These are the violations in the source code of the developer, these are usually the easiest to fix. You either avoid using the sink or wrap the value in a policy.

Chapter 3

Bundlers and Trusted Types

We have briefly explained the problem with bundlers when TT are enforced in development mode. The purpose of the project was to take a look at example application using many modern bundlers and see how they integrate with Trusted Types. This work was based off my previous experience when doing the integration for Webpack [10].

When bundlers are not TT compatible it often means **hard blocker** for the application developer to start using TT. This is because the application in dev environment might not even load (*this is the case when using webpack*) or some features such as hot reloading and error widgets might not work properly.

The integration for webpack is already in progress and will hopefully get merged soon [17]. I've instead looked at the following:

- ESBUILD [8] - ESBUILD is an extremely fast JavaScript bundler by factor 10-100x compared to popular bundler alternatives. The main reason for such performance is because it's written in Go and heavily uses parallelism [30].
- Snowpack [21] - Snowpack is an alternative to heavier, more complex bundlers like Webpack or Parcel. Snowpack leverages JavaScript's native module system called (*ESM - ES modules*) which makes it scale much better as the project grows on size.
- Vite [29] - Vite is very similar to Snowpack and uses the same idea - *use the native ES modules*. The main difference is that Vite is opinionated about *production builds* and uses *Rollup* under the hood. This provides simpler developer experience and unlocks features which are not natively supported by Snowpack.
- WMR [13] - WMR is a tiny development tool composed in a single 2mb file with no dependencies. It provides a nice integration with Preact, but can be used independently as well.

As a bonus I also tried creating application using the current state of the art React project starters (*which use Webpack as bundler internally*):

- NextJS [14] - NextJS is a React framework, which provides many features such as server side rendering, hosting, deployments, etc...
- CRA (Create React App) [6] - CRA is the official recommended way by React to bootstrap new application which want to use React. It uses very well configured Webpack under the hood and keeps in sync with latest React versions.

In order to demonstrate the bundlers we need an example application. I've come across a great article which compares the bundlers I want to integrate TT with. The article referenced also a github project with an example application that was written using each of the mentioned bundlers. We are not going to compare the bundlers among themselves, but rather focus on TT integration. However, you can check the blog post at <https://css-tricks.com/comparing-the-new-generation-of-build-tools/>.

Unfortunately, the example application didn't cause any XSS on it's own because React avoids using sinks and instead creates DOM elements dynamically. Instead, I've created a sample React component with example attack vectors - one with and the other without trusted types policy.

All of the examples can be run locally, because you can mock CSP policy using HTML meta header which is included in every entry point HTML file. You can find all of the projects (*as well as the sources for this document*) in <https://github.com/Siegrift/bitl-project>.

3.1 ESBuild

ESBuild was the first project examined, however there wasn't much to test regarding TT integration. ESBuild only transpiles and concatenates the JS code which is then included in HTML file and server by sample server. It doesn't provide neither code reloading nor any special error reporting.

This demonstrates that bundling itself is often not a problem, because any advanced operations, such as, *minification or obfuscation* should preserve the code correctness - for example, if a TT policy is enclosed in a module (*and not exported*) then it must be enclosed in the bundled code as well.

However minification impact is a valid concern for bundlers, this seems to not be an issue as the TT code seems to minify well [4].

3.2 Snowpack

Snowpack was the second bundler examined. As mentioned it uses ES modules and avoids module concatenation for development. As mentioned though, module concatenation on it's own isn't the root cause for TT violations.

The pleasant finding was that hot reloading was working out of the box with TT integration. This is because when a source module (*JS file*) changes, it is downloaded by the browser and picked up by the running web page.

*(For example, when webpack is trying to reload the code it first has to create a bundle or chunk, and then it uses dynamically created script to download it from dev server. However **script.src** is a sink and TT disallows such assignment.)*

There was only a single TT violation caused by Snowpack error overlay widget, which is using *Element.innerHTML* internally [20].

3.3 Vite

Vite is very similar to Snowpack and uses ES modules same way as Snowpack. It also doesn't provide an error overlay so there is no violation for this case.

However, I found out that reloading CSS triggers TT violation, because it seems to use dynamic style elements under the hood [28].

3.4 WMR

WMR has basically same results as ESBUILD because it only bundles the code.

3.5 NextJS

Since all of the example projects targeted React and a specific *modern* bundler, I've decided to revisit the integrations with current state of the art project boilerplates/frameworks.

NextJS is a very popular choice these days, because it comes preconfigured with webpack, React, routing, serverless and more. It is also integrated with a great CLI which allows developers to deploy the application in just a single command (*and for free as of now*) [14].

Unfortunately, nextJS is complex and there are many places which cause TT violations:

- HTML violations - For hot reload container which is inject to page using *innerHTML* property.

- Script violations - For webpack hot reload. It downloads chunks, which then execute the updated code using *eval*.
- Script URL violations - Also for webpack hot reload.

Unfortunately, as of now, there is no ideal best practice how to differentiate these benign usages of sinks apart from unsafe usages in developer code [2].

3.6 CRA

Another very popular choice to bootstrap the project is using CRA - Create react app. This is also the official recommended way to start a React single page application.

I've also wanted to test how TT play together with browser extensions. I've created a basic crypto app which integrates with Metamask browser extension, which is used to connect to Ethereum blockchain. There were three types of TT violations:

- HTML violations - Caused by react error overlay component. Unfortunately, you can't suppress this error even with default policy, because the sink assignment happens in another JS realm. You can understand more in [7].
- Script violations - Metamask browser extension is using a Function constructor. I am not sure what for, because the app seems to work even when this code is disallowed. Also, due to a bug in chromium a workaround is needed to suppress this violation [24].
- Script URL violations - Again, needed for webpack hot reload.

The only significant problem was the HTML violation in overlay component. This error can only (*and should*) be fixed by the library.

Chapter 4

Results

I've compared multiple popular bundlers and project starters. Similar types of TT violations repeated among the bundlers.

- Error overlay widget - Snowpack, CRA and NextJS use an error widget to show compile and application error and stacktrace to improve developer experience. Under the hood this uses *innerHTML* property. Developers need to use default policy with *createHTML* function.
- Script violations - Needed for next JS hot reloading which uses webpack under the hood, which uses *eval* to evaluate the updated chunk of code. It was also needed for Metamask widget (*not sure why though*). Developers need to use default policy with *createScript* function.
- Script URL violations - Again, needed for webpack hot reload. The chunks to be reloaded are downloaded using and dynamically created script and by assigning to *script.src* property. Developers need to use default policy with *createScriptURL* function.

Also it can be seen that the bundlers which use ES modules under the hood integrate better with TT. Snowpack doesn't need any policy for code reload and Vite only needs a policy to reload CSS.

4.1 Further work and TT improvements

I feel the biggest problem with TT is the adoption difficulty. Developers are facing difficult issues in third party code (*which is often minified*) and default policy doesn't provide enough context to reliably allow only *Trusted values* [1].

Another aspect of work is to implement TT integrations inside the bundlers and project starters. The future of TT seems bright as React, Angular, VS Code and many

other project start to use and enforce TT in their applications. Maybe in some time TT will be default standard in web development.

You can check out all the sources and run the projects locally in <https://github.com/Siegrift/bitl-project>.

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