

Descrizione del Protocollo MPS¹ tramite logica BAN

Protocollo Reale

$$M_1: A \rightarrow S: E_{k_s}(A, B, N_a) || E_{k_a^-}(S(E_{k_s}(A, B, N_a)))$$

$$M_2: S \rightarrow A: E_{k_a}(A, B, N_a, g_b, p_b, k_b, E_{k_s^-}(k_a, N_a)) || E_{k_s^-}(S(E_{k_a}(A, B, N_a, g_b, p_b, k_b, E_{k_s^-}(k_a, N_a))))$$

$$M_3: A \rightarrow B: E_{k_b}(A, B, N_a, N_b, Y_A, E_{k_s^-}(k_a, N_a)) || E_{k_a^-}(S(E_{k_b}(A, B, N_a, N_b, Y_A, E_{k_s^-}(k_a, N_a))))$$

$$M_4: B \rightarrow A: E_{k_a}(A, B, N_b, Y_B, E_{k_{ab}}(N_a)) || E_{k_b^-}(S(E_{k_a}(A, B, N_b, Y_B, E_{k_{ab}}(N_a))))$$

$$M_5: A \rightarrow B: E_{k_{ab}}(N_a - 1)$$

Protocollo Idealizzato

$$M_1: A \rightarrow S: \{A, B, N_a\}_{k_s} || \{S(\{A, B, N_a\}_{k_s})\}_{k_a^-}$$


$$M_2: S \rightarrow A: \left\{A, B, N_a, B \Rightarrow g_b, B \Rightarrow p_b, \xrightarrow{k_b} B, \left\{\xrightarrow{k_a} A, N_a\right\}_{k_s^-}, \#(N_a)\right\}_{k_a} || \left\{S\left(\left\{A, B, N_a, B \Rightarrow g_b, B \Rightarrow p_b, \xrightarrow{k_b} B, \left\{\xrightarrow{k_a} A, N_a\right\}_{k_s^-}\right\}\right)\right\}_{k_s^-}$$

$$M_3: A \rightarrow B: \left\{A, B, N_a, N_b, A \Rightarrow Y_A, \left\{\xrightarrow{k_a} A, N_a\right\}_{k_s^-}, \#(N_a)\right\}_{k_b} || \left\{S\left(\left\{A, B, N_a, N_b, A \Rightarrow Y_A, \left\{\xrightarrow{k_a} A, N_a\right\}_{k_s^-}, \#(\xrightarrow{k_a} A)\right\}_{k_b}\right)\right\}_{k_a^-}$$

$$M_4: B \rightarrow A: \{A, B, N_b, B \Rightarrow Y_B, \#(B \Rightarrow Y_B), \{N_a\}_{k_{ab}}\}_{k_a} || \{S(\{A, B, N_b, B \Rightarrow Y_B, \#(B \Rightarrow Y_B), \{N_a\}_{k_{ab}}\}_{k_a})\}_{k_b^-}$$

$$M_5: A \rightarrow B: \{N_a - 1\}_{k_{ab}}$$

¹ Magherini – Pochiero – Sieni (MPS)



Analisi

Obiettivi

$$A \models A \xleftrightarrow{k_{ab}} B, \quad B \models A \xleftrightarrow{k_{ab}} B \quad \# \text{ Key Authentication}$$

$$A \models B \models A \xleftrightarrow{k_{ab}} B, \quad B \models A \models A \xleftrightarrow{k_{ab}} B \quad \# \text{ Key Confirmation}$$

Assunzioni

$$A \models \xrightarrow{k_s} S, \quad B \models \xrightarrow{k_s} S \quad \# \text{ Server Key Registration}$$

$$S \models \xrightarrow{k_a} A, \quad A \models S \models \xrightarrow{k_b} B \quad \# \text{ Key Registration}$$

$$A \Rightarrow N_a, \quad A \Rightarrow N_b, \quad S \models A \Rightarrow N_a, \quad S \models A \Rightarrow N_b \quad \# \text{ Nonce Authority}$$

$$A \models \#(N_a), \quad A \models \#(N_b) \quad \# \text{ Freshness}$$

$$\frac{S \models B \models (g_b, p_b), \quad S \models B \Rightarrow (g_b, p_b)}{S \models (g_b, p_b)} \quad \# \text{ Jurisdiction Rule}$$

$$A \models B \Rightarrow Y_B, \quad B \models A \Rightarrow Y_A \quad \# \text{ Authority on Y parameters}$$

Dopo M_1 :

$$\frac{S \models \xrightarrow{k_a} A, \quad S \triangleleft \{A, B, N_a\}_{k_a^-}}{S \models A \mid \sim (A, B, N_a)}$$

$$\frac{S \models A \mid \sim (A, B, N_a), \quad S \models \#(N_a)}{S \models A \models (A, B, N_a)}$$

* N_a è un timestamp, il server può verificare la freschezza controllando che il messaggio sia arrivato entro un tempo limite

Dopo M_2 :

$$\frac{A \models \xrightarrow{k_s} S, \quad A \triangleleft \left\{ A, B, N_a, B \Rightarrow g_b, B \Rightarrow p_b, \xrightarrow{k_b} B, \left\{ \xrightarrow{k_a} A, N_a \right\}_{k_s^-}, \#(\xrightarrow{k_a} A) \right\}}{A \models S \mid \sim (A, B, N_a, B \Rightarrow g_b, B \Rightarrow p_b, \xrightarrow{k_b} B, \left\{ \xrightarrow{k_a} A, N_a \right\}_{k_s^-}, \#(\xrightarrow{k_a} A))}$$

$$\frac{A \models S \mid \sim (X), \quad A \models \#(N_a)}{A \models S \models (X)}$$

$$\frac{A \models S \models \xrightarrow{k_b} B, \quad A \text{ trusts } S \text{ on } k_b}{A \models \xrightarrow{k_b} B}$$

$$\frac{A \models S \models (g_b, p_b), \quad A \text{ trusts } S \text{ on } (g_b, p_b)}{A \models (g_b, p_b)}$$

Dopo M_3 :

$$\frac{B \models \xrightarrow{k_s} S, \quad B \triangleleft \left\{ \xrightarrow{k_a} A, N_a \right\}_{k_s^-}}{B \models S \mid \sim \xrightarrow{k_a} A}$$

$$\frac{B \models S \mid \sim \left(\xrightarrow{k_a} A \right), \quad B \models \#(N_a)}{B \models S \models \left(\xrightarrow{k_a} A \right)}$$

$$\frac{B \models S \models \xrightarrow{k_a} A, \quad B \text{ trusts } S \text{ on } k_a}{B \models \xrightarrow{k_a} A}$$

$$\frac{B \models \xrightarrow{k_a} A, \quad B \triangleleft \{X\}_{k_a^-}}{B \models A \mid \sim (X)}$$

$$\frac{B \models A \mid \sim (X), \quad B \models \#(N_a)}{B \models A \models (X)}$$

$$\frac{B \models A \models Y_A, \quad B \models A \Rightarrow Y_A}{B \models Y_A}$$

$$\frac{B \models Y_A, \quad B \Rightarrow Y_B}{B \models A \overset{k_{ab}}{\longleftrightarrow} B}$$

Dopo M_4 :

$$\frac{A \overset{k_b}{\rightarrow} B, \quad A \triangleleft \{X\}_{k_b^-}}{A \models B \mid \sim (X)}$$

$$\frac{A \models B \mid \sim (X), \quad A \models \#(N_b)}{A \models B \models (X)}$$

$$\frac{A \models B \models Y_B, \quad A \models B \Rightarrow Y_B}{A \models Y_B}$$

$$\frac{A \models Y_B, \quad A \Rightarrow Y_A}{A \models A \overset{k_{ab}}{\longleftrightarrow} B}$$

$$\frac{A \models A \overset{k_{ab}}{\longleftrightarrow} B, \quad A \triangleleft \{N_a\}_{k_{ab}}}{A \models B \mid \sim (N_a)}$$

$$\frac{A \models B \mid \sim (N_a), \quad A \models \#(N_a)}{A \models B \models A \overset{k_{ab}}{\longleftrightarrow} B}$$

Dopo M_5 :

$$\frac{B \models A \stackrel{k_{ab}}{\longleftrightarrow} B, B \triangleleft \{N_a - 1\}_{k_{ab}}}{B \models A \mid \sim (N_a - 1)}$$

$$\frac{B \models A \mid \sim (N_a - 1), B \models \#(N_a - 1)}{B \models A \models A \stackrel{k_{ab}}{\longleftrightarrow} B}$$