代码复现报告

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github: https://github.com/Siestazzz/AiSec Replication Report

DeepFool

注:由于作者源代码使用的是ImageNet训练集 (pytorch预训练的ResNet18) ,而要求用的是cifar10,所以这里使用了https://github.com/ZOMIN28/ResNet18 Cifar10 95.46的预训练模型

攻击思路

大致思路为将超平面泰勒一阶展开,求出其法向量,然后朝着法向量的方向前进一定步长,重复该步骤直至越过超平面,则改变了其分类,实现攻击。

代码解析

项目结构

test_deepfool.py

更改了加载的模型,因此图像预处理也进行了更改

```
# set device
device = 'cuda' if torch.cuda.is_available() else 'cpu'
n_class = 10
batch_size = 100
model = ResNet18() # 得到预训练模型
model.conv1 = nn.Conv2d(in_channels=3, out_channels=64, kernel_size=3, stride=1, padding=1, bias=False)
model.fc = torch.nn.Linear(512, n_class) # 将最后的全连接层修改
# 载入权重
model.load_state_dict(torch.load('checkpoint/resnet18_cifar10.pt'))
model = model.to(device)
model.eval()

im_orig = Image.open('pic.jpg')

# Remove the mean
```

deepfool.py

参数部分,image为干净图像,net为预训练ResNet18,num_class为分类结果的种类数,overshoot为使结果越过决策边界的微小值,max_iter为最大迭代次数(deepfool需要多次迭代)

```
def deepfool(image, net, num_classes=10, overshoot=0.02, max_iter=50):
```

先获取模型对原始图片分类的标签label

```
f_image = net.forward(Variable(image[None, :, :, :],
    requires_grad=True)).data.cpu().numpy().flatten()
I = (np.array(f_image)).flatten().argsort()[::-1]
    print(I)
I = I[0:num_classes]
label = I[0]

input_shape = image.cpu().numpy().shape
    pert_image = copy.deepcopy(image)
w = np.zeros(input_shape)
r_tot = np.zeros(input_shape)

loop_i = 0

x = Variable(pert_image[None, :], requires_grad=True)
fs = net.forward(x)
fs_list = [fs[0,I[k]] for k in range(num_classes)]
k_i = label
```

两层循环,第一层每次增加一部分扰动,第二层在所有改变决策分类的方向中选出一个距离最短的方向。

论文中生成扰动的公式为:

$$\mathbf{r_*}(\mathbf{x_0}) = rac{\left|f_{\hat{l}(\mathbf{x_0})}(\mathbf{x_0}) - f_{\hat{k}(\mathbf{x_0})}(\mathbf{x_0})
ight|}{\|\mathbf{w}_{\hat{l}(\mathbf{x_0})} - \mathbf{w}_{\hat{k}(\mathbf{x_0})}\|_2^2} (\mathbf{w}_{\hat{l}(\mathbf{x_0})} - \mathbf{w}_{\hat{k}(\mathbf{x_0})})$$

其中 $\hat{k}(\mathbf{x}_0)$ 对应label, $\hat{l}(\mathbf{x}_0)$ 对应第二层循环中使扰动最小的k, $f(x_0)$ 对应fs。

内层循环,计算往分类k方向生成的扰动大小,并选出最小的一个存入pert中。

```
for k in range(1, num_classes):
    zero_gradients(x)

fs[0, I[k]].backward(retain_graph=True)
    cur_grad = x.grad.data.cpu().numpy().copy()

# set new w_k and new f_k
```

```
w_k = cur_grad - grad_orig
f_k = (fs[0, I[k]] - fs[0, I[0]]).data.cpu().numpy()

pert_k = abs(f_k)/np.linalg.norm(w_k.flatten())

# determine which w_k to use
if pert_k < pert:
    pert = pert_k
    w = w_k</pre>
```

计算扰动并累加, 直至越过决策边界或超过迭代次数

```
while k_i == label and loop_i < max_iter:
   pert = np.inf
   fs[0, I[0]].backward(retain_graph=True)
   grad_orig = x.grad.data.cpu().numpy().copy()
   for k in range(1, num_classes):
       #calculate pert(省略)
   # compute r_i and r_tot
   # Added 1e-4 for numerical stability
   r_i = (pert+1e-4) * w / np.linalg.norm(w)
   r_{tot} = np.float32(r_{tot} + r_{i})
   if is_cuda:
        pert_image = image + (1+overshoot)*torch.from_numpy(r_tot).cuda()
   else:
        pert_image = image + (1+overshoot)*torch.from_numpy(r_tot)
   x = Variable(pert_image, requires_grad=True)
   fs = net.forward(x)
   k_i = np.argmax(fs.data.cpu().numpy().flatten())
    loop_i += 1
```


运行结果


```
python test_deepfool.py
```

将deepfool攻击过后的图片识别为了ship。

Original label: truck







复现难点

这篇论文的代码其实思路挺简单的,核心代码也就deepfool.py一个文件,结合论文公式很快就能理解了,唯一的难点是一开始没留意pytorch的ResNet预训练模型是用的ImageNet训练的,加上对pytorch的api不是很熟导致折腾了一段时间,还好别人的github仓库给了预训练模型不用自己训练(。

WaNet

攻击思路

通过对输入图像进行不可察觉的扭曲, 同时引入噪声训练, 使得模型在特定输入下输出特定结果, 实现后门攻击。

代码解析

项目结构

train.py

main()

论文生成扭曲场的公式为

```
P=\psi(rand_{[-1,1]}(k,k,2))	imes s为
```

其中 $rand_{[-1,1]}(k,k,2)$ 对应ins,但是将扰动扩展到整个图像,因此需要对扰动做一次上采样得到扰动 noise_grid

```
else:
    print("Train from scratch!!!")
    best_clean_acc = 0.0
    best_bd_acc = 0.0
    best_cross_acc = 0.0
    epoch_current = 0

# Prepare grid
    ins = torch.rand(1, 2, opt.k, opt.k) * 2 - 1
    ins = ins / torch.mean(torch.abs(ins))
    noise_grid = (
        F.upsample(ins, size=opt.input_height, mode="bicubic",
align_corners=True)
        .permute(0, 2, 3, 1)
        .to(opt.device)
)
```

还需要一个初始的控制网格,通过torch.linspace(-1, 1, steps=opt.input_height)生成均匀分布的初始控制网格identity_grid

```
array1d = torch.linspace(-1, 1, steps=opt.input_height)
x, y = torch.meshgrid(array1d, array1d)
identity_grid = torch.stack((y, x), 2)[None, ...].to(opt.device)
```

train()

netC为分类模型, noise_grid为噪声网格, identity_grid为初始网格, opt为配置数据

```
def train(netC, optimizerC, schedulerC, train_dl, noise_grid, identity_grid,
tf_writer, epoch, opt):
```

opt.s即公式里的s,即扰动强度,identity_grid加上扰动经过调整则得到我们需要的扭曲场 $grid_temps_t$

```
num_bd = int(bs * rate_bd)
num_cross = int(num_bd * opt.cross_ratio)
grid_temps = (identity_grid + opt.s * noise_grid / opt.input_height) *
opt.grid_rescale
grid_temps = torch.clamp(grid_temps, -1, 1)
```

这里随机生成了一些扭曲场grid_temps2,作为噪声训练的交叉样本以增强模型的鲁棒性

```
ins = torch.rand(num_cross, opt.input_height, opt.input_height,
2).to(opt.device) * 2 - 1
grid_temps2 = grid_temps.repeat(num_cross, 1, 1, 1) + ins / opt.input_height
grid_temps2 = torch.clamp(grid_temps2, -1, 1)
```

对输入inputs采样得到inputs_bd后门样本和inputs_cross交叉样本

```
inputs_bd = F.grid_sample(inputs[:num_bd], grid_temps.repeat(num_bd, 1, 1, 1),
    align_corners=True)
if opt.attack_mode == "all2one":
        targets_bd = torch.ones_like(targets[:num_bd]) * opt.target_label
if opt.attack_mode == "all2all":
        targets_bd = torch.remainder(targets[:num_bd] + 1, opt.num_classes)
inputs_cross = F.grid_sample(inputs[num_bd : (num_bd + num_cross)], grid_temps2,
    align_corners=True)
```

将输入样本整合训练模型

```
total_inputs = torch.cat([inputs_bd, inputs_cross, inputs[(num_bd + num_cross)
:]], dim=0)
total_inputs = transforms(total_inputs)
total_targets = torch.cat([targets_bd, targets[num_bd:]], dim=0)
start = time()
total_preds = netC(total_inputs)
total_time += time() - start

loss_ce = criterion_CE(total_preds, total_targets)

loss = loss_ce
loss.backward()
```

运行结果

```
python eval.py
```

攻击方式为all2one,训练结果为留有后门的输入样本均是别为plane,准确率为Clean Acc: 94.3100 | Bd Acc: 98.9200 | Cross: 92.1600

Original label: horse



Perturbed label: plane



论文数据如下,总体结果与论文相差不大。

Dataset	Clean	Attack	Noise
MNIST	99.52	99.86	98.20
CIFAR-10	94.15	99.55	93.55
GTSRB	98.97	98.78	98.01
CelebA	78.99	99.33	76.74





(a) Network performance


(b) Sample backdoor images

(c) Physical attack test

Figure 5: Attack experiments. In (b), we provide the clean (top) and backdoor (bottom) images.

模型训练曲线如下(150epochs,数据可见./checkpoints/cifar10/eval_result.pkl),可以看到交叉样本的识别率比干净样本要略低一些,但准确率仍有92.1600,攻击成功率达到98.9200,说明模型学习到了图片的扭曲模式,且具有较强的鲁棒性。

WaNet model training



复现难点

这篇好像还真没什么难点,作者写的代码很漂亮,可以自主选择多种模式,模块化做的也很好,稍作改动可以拿来作为自己研究的框架。(后面的BppAttack就直接用了这篇的代码)

BppAttack

攻击思路

通过图像量化压缩图片颜色深度,然后通过图像抖动消除不自然区域,训练模型使其学习到压缩后的攻击样本。

代码解析

项目结构

bppattack.py

main()

生成对抗训练的负样本,如果要添加图像抖动的话则在量化之后进行Floyd-Steinberg 扩散抖动,否则直接进行量化 $T(\mathbf{x})=rac{round\left(rac{\mathbf{x}}{2^m-1}*(2^d-1)
ight)}{2^d-1}*(2^m-1)$,其中opt.squeeze_num即 2^d-1 ,255即 2^m-1

```
for j in range(n):
    for batch_idx, (inputs, targets) in enumerate(train_dl):
        temp_negetive = back_to_np_4d(inputs,opt)
        temp_negetive_modified = back_to_np_4d(inputs,opt)
        if opt.dithering:
            for i in range(temp_negetive_modified.shape[0]):
                temp_negetive_modified[i,:,:,:] =
torch.round(torch.from_numpy(floydDitherspeed(temp_negetive_modified[i].detach()
.cpu().numpy(),float(opt.squeeze_num))))
        else:
            temp_negetive_modified = torch.round(temp_negetive_modified/255.0*
(opt.squeeze_num-1))/(opt.squeeze_num-1)*255
        residual = temp_negetive_modified - temp_negetive
        for i in range(residual.shape[0]):
            residual_list_train.append(residual[i].unsqueeze(0).cuda())
            count = count + 1
```

train()

residual_list_train用来生成负样本

```
def train(train_transform, model, optimizer, scheduler, train_dl, tf_writer,
epoch, opt, residual_list_train)
```

以同样的方法生成后门样本,然后对residual_list_train随机采样作为负样本(其实挺奇怪的可以直接用 residual_list_train作为后门样本的),最后将所有样本合并。

```
if num_bd!=0 and num_neg!=0:
    inputs_bd = back_to_np_4d(inputs[:num_bd],opt)
    if opt.dithering:
        for i in range(inputs_bd.shape[0]):
            inputs_bd[i,:,:,:] =
    torch.round(torch.from_numpy(floydDitherspeed(inputs_bd[i].detach().cpu().numpy()),float(opt.squeeze_num))).cuda())
    else:
        inputs_bd = torch.round(inputs_bd/255.0*(squeeze_num-1))/(squeeze_num-1)*255

    inputs_bd = np_4d_to_tensor(inputs_bd,opt)

    if opt.attack_mode == "all2one":
        targets_bd = torch.ones_like(targets[:num_bd]) * opt.target_label
    if opt.attack_mode == "all2all":
        targets_bd = torch.remainder(targets[:num_bd] + 1, opt.num_classes)
```

```
inputs_negative = back_to_np_4d(inputs[num_bd : (num_bd + num_neg)],opt)
+ torch.cat(random.sample(residual_list_train,num_neg),dim=0)
    inputs_negative=torch.clamp(inputs_negative,0,255)
    inputs_negative = np_4d_to_tensor(inputs_negative,opt)

    total_inputs = torch.cat([inputs_bd, inputs_negative, inputs[(num_bd + num_neg) :]], dim=0)
    total_targets = torch.cat([targets_bd, targets[num_bd:]], dim=0)
```

运行结果

攻击方式为all2one,训练结果为对所有后门图像识别为plane,成功率为Clean Acc: 94.5 | Bd Acc: 99.9400 | Cross: 94.0300,攻击成功率几乎达100%。





Perturbed label: plane



论文的数据如下, all2one的情况下基本与论文数据一致。


Dataset	Non-attack BA	WaNet		BppAttack	
		BA	ASR	BA	ASR
MNIST	99.67%	99.52%	99.86%	99.36%	99.79%
CIFAR-10	94.88%	94.15%	99.55%	94.54%	99.91%
GTSRB	99.31%	98.97%	98.78%	99.25%	99.96%
CelebA	79.14%	78.99%	99.33%	79.06%	99.99%

Table 2. Effectiveness on all-to-one attacks.

Dataset	Non-attack	WaNet		BppAttack	
	BA	BA	ASR	BA	ASR
MNIST	99.67%	99.44%	95.90%	99.25%	98.46%
CIFAR-10	94.88%	94.43%	93.36%	94.73%	94.32%
GTSRB	99.52%	99.39%	98.31%	99.46%	99.29%
CelebA	79.14%	78.73%	78.58%	78.84%	78.72%

Table 3. Effectiveness on all-to-all attacks.

模型训练图如下 (150epochs, 数据可见./checkpoints/cifar10/eval_result.pkl)



复现难点

作者代码从WaNet改的,因此看完WaNet也没啥难点了,对应的一些修改也可以直接套用WaNet的代码,唯一的难点应该是每次重新跑都要对所有输入样本进行量化和抖动,等的有点久,还有就是作者代码有点小问题,以及疏忽了floydDitherspeed函数里进行了图像量化的处理。