



# Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm

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# Motivations & Results

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- Cheating Strategies in the Stable Marriage problem
  - Gale-Shapley algorithm
    - Deterministic/Randomized strategies
    - Strengthening of Dubins-Freedman theorem
  - Random Stable Matching
    - Group strategies ensuring that every cheating man has a probability which majorizes the original one

# Here Comes the Story...

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Adam

Geeta, Heiki, Irina, Fran



Bob

Irina, Fran, Heiki, Geeta



Carl

Geeta, Fran, Heiki, Irina



David

Irina, Heiki, Geeta, Fran



Fran

Adam, Bob, Carl, David




Geeta

Carl, David, Bob, Adam



Heiki

Carl, Bob, David, Adam



Irina

Adam, Carl, David, Bob

# Search for a Matching



Adam



Geeta



Geeta prefers Carl to Adam!



David



Heiki

## Blocking Pair



Bob



Irina



Carl



Fran

Carl likes Geeta better than Fran!

# Stable Matching




Adam



Heiki



David



Irina

Unfortunately,  
Irina loves David better!

Stable Matching: a matching  
without blocking pairs



Bob



Fran



Carl



Geeta

Bob likes Irina better than Fran!

# Goal

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Adam




Bob




Carl



David



The stable marriage problem  
(Gale and Shapley, American  
Mathematical Monthly, 1962)




Fran



Geeta



Heiki



Irina



# Deciding a Stable Matching

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- Gale-Shapley Stable Matching algorithm
  - Men Propose, women accept/reject
- Random Stable Matching

# Gale-Shapley Algorithm



Adam



Bob



Carl



David

Geeta, Heiki, Irina, Fran

Irina, Fran, Heiki, Geeta

This is a stable matching

Geeta, Fran, Heiki, Irina

Irina, Heiki, Geeta, Fran




Fran



Geeta



Heiki



Irina

Carl > Adam

David > Bob





# Stable Marriage Problem

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# Stable Marriage Problem

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- Given  $N$  men and  $N$  women, each person list in order of preference all the people of the opposite sex who would like to marry.
- Problem:
  - Engage all the women to all the men in such a way as to respect all their preferences as much as possible.

# Stable?

- A set of marriages is unstable if
  - two people who are not married both prefer each other than their spouses
- E.g. Suppose we have A1 B3 C2 D4 E5.  
This is unstable since
  - A prefer 2 more than 1
  - 2 prefer A more than C

A	B	C	D	E
2	1	2	1	5
5	2	3	3	3
1	3	5	2	2
3	4	4	4	1
4	5	1	5	4

1	2	3	4	5
E	D	A	C	D
A	E	D	B	B
D	B	B	D	C
B	A	C	A	E
C	C	E	E	A



# Naïve solution

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- Starting from a feasible solution.
- Check if it is stable.
  - If yes, done!
  - If not, remove an unstable couple.
- Is this work?

# Naïve solution (2)

- Does not work!
- E.g.
  - A1 B3 C2 D4 E5
  - A2 B3 C1 D4 E5
  - A3 B2 C1 D4 E5
  - A3 B1 C2 D4 E5

A	B	C	D	E
2	1	2	1	5
5	2	3	3	3
1	3	5	2	2
3	4	4	4	1
4	5	1	5	4

1	2	3	4	5
E	D	A	C	D
A	E	D	B	B
D	B	B	D	C
B	A	C	A	E
C	C	E	E	A

# Solution

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1. Let  $X$  be the first man.
2.  $X$  proposes to the best woman in the remaining on his list. (Initially, the first woman on his list!)
3. If  $a$  is not engaged
  - Pair up  $(X, a)$ . Then, set  $X$ =next man and goto 1.
4. If  $a$  prefers  $X$  more than her fiancée  $Y$ ,
  - Pair up  $(X, a)$ . Then, set  $X=Y$  and goto 1.
5. Goto 1

# Example

A	B	C	D	E
2	1	2	1	5
5	2	3	3	3
1	3	5	2	2
3	4	4	4	1
4	5	1	5	4

1	2	3	4	5
E	D	A	C	D
A	E	D	B	B
D	B	B	D	C
B	A	C	A	E
C	C	E	E	A

A	B	C	D	E
2	1	2	1	5
5	2	3	3	3
1	3	5		2
	4			



# Time analysis

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- If there are  $N$  men and  $N$  women,
  - $O(N^2)$  time



# Algorithm

- $\text{prefer}[m][s]=w$  means the woman  $w$  is on the  $s$ -th position in the preference list of the man  $m$
- Let  $\text{next}[m]$  be the current best woman in his remaining list. (Initially,  $\text{next}[m]=0$ )
- $\text{fiancee}[w]=m$  means the man  $m$  engaged to woman  $w$ . (Initially,  $\text{fiancee}[w]=0$ )
- Let  $\text{rank}[w][m]$  is the ranking of the man  $m$  in the preference list of the woman  $w$ .
- $\text{For}(m=1;m \leq N;m++) \{$   
     $\text{For}(s=m;s \neq 0;$   
     $\}$