IRESI - SketchMin algorithm

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Outline

- DDoS
 - Simple view
 - Multiple streams
- Programming the algorithm
 - Extraction
 - Computing the codeviance
- 3 Experimental results
 - Real data traces
 - Randomly generated data


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Simple attack




DDoS attack



Computing a correlation indicator

2 DATA STREAMS



 ${\sf Codeviance} \, \longrightarrow \, {\tt if} \, \, {\sf High} \, \, {\sf correlation} \, \, {\tt then} \, \, {\sf DDoS} \, \, {\sf attack} \, \, {\sf ongoing}$

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Extraction on data traces

- Pick an entry on each line (=request), like the source or file requested;
- convert them to integers using an injective function;
- if multiple traces, extract all at once to keep correlation.

Example

Hashing functions

The data trace has integers values which stand between 0 and u. We have to define t universal hashing functions h_i :


$$h_i(x) = ((a_i x + b_i) \mod u) \mod k \quad \forall i \in \{1 \dots t\}$$

where a_i, b_i are randomly generated in $\{1 \dots t-1\}$ for a_i , and $\{0 \dots t - 1\}$ for b_i


Hashing functions

Example

We generated a random data trace of size 10~000, in [0,u=100] following a law of Poisson ($\lambda=u/2^4$). With $t=7,\ k=20,\ a=6,\ b=2$, here is the result :




Using Python 3 language



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
Real data traces




Real data traces

Codeviance matrix of real data traces

$$\varepsilon = 0.001 \quad | \quad \delta = 0.001$$



Exact codeviance




SketchMin algorithm



Generated data traces

size	interval $[0, u]$	ε	δ
10 000	u = 100	0.1	0.001




Histogram of trace 7


	Probabilistic laws	Parameters
Trace 0	Uniform	
Trace 1	Zipfian	$\alpha = 2$
Trace 2	Zipfian	$\alpha = 3$
Trace 3	Zipfian	$\alpha = 4$
Trace 4	Zipfian	$\alpha = 5$
Trace 5	Zipfian	$\alpha = 6$
Trace 6	Poisson	$\lambda = u/(2)$
Trace 7	Poisson	$\lambda = u/(2^2)$
Trace 8	Poisson	$\lambda = u/(2^3)$
Trace 9	Poisson	$\lambda = u/(2^4)$
Trace 10	Poisson	$\lambda = u/(2^5)$
Trace 11	Binomial	p = 0.42
Trace 12	Negative Binomial	p = 0.42

Generated data traces

Codeviance matrix of generated data traces



Exact codeviance



SketchMin algorithm



Conclusion

Algorithm results look the same as the exact entries, on a different scale. Can use the same method to detect attack on exact traces.

Improvements

- Work on flows of data traces instead of only one complete trace;
- put in concurrency the hashing functions computations;
- find a way of detecting attacks without false-detection.

