

Shifting Moralities: Post-9/11 Responses to Shattered National Assumptions

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In the wake of 9/11 Americans experienced a collective trauma. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were deeply disorienting for a nation that had taken for granted its own inviolability. As a group we experienced the extreme anxiety and disequilibrium that accompanied a sense that the world was now threatening and dangerous. The 9/11 attacks were assaults on our buildings, our people, our way of life, our society; they put deep cracks in our myth of American exceptionalism.

Traumatic life events shatter the fundamental assumptions that ordinarily provide us with a sense of safety and relative invulnerability.¹ Individual traumas such as rapes, other criminal assaults, serious accidents, and life-threatening illnesses force survivors to confront their own mortality and fragility, and they experience the terror of their own vulnerability.² Those at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11, and those who lost loved ones that day, experienced the depths of individual trauma. Yet 9/11 was also experienced by the nation as a whole; our collective trauma involved a breakdown of core assumptions, but now our deep anxiety and dread were focused on our lost sense of security as Americans.³

Following instances of individual trauma, survivors struggle to reestablish a sense of safety through *self-regulation* of emotions, cognitions, and behaviors.

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Following collective trauma, efforts to reestablish a sense of security are often accomplished through attempts at *social regulation*. Self-regulation is the domain of psychology, whereas social regulation is the province of politics.

Crises based on national security and foreign threats typically shift politics to the right, and 9/11 was no exception. Whether or not we agree with the conservative shift, we might nevertheless expect national trends in this direction in areas directly related to a newfound sense of national insecurity. Yet following 9/11 this conservative shift expanded far beyond matters of national security and was evident in a new, intense focus on issues seemingly unrelated to American's safety—issues such as legal abortion, same-sex marriage, and stem cell research. This chapter is about the national shift in moral orientation in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, its manifestations and psychological underpinnings.

Conservative Shift

There is considerable evidence that threat and insecurity often produce a conservative shift, whereby both conservative leaders and opinions become more attractive.⁴ Regarding presidential elections, for example, Power notes, "Since 1968, with the single exception of the election of George W. Bush in 2000, Americans have chosen Republican presidents in times of perceived danger and Democrats in times of relative calm... Americans have long trusted the views of Democrats on the environment, the economy, education, and health care, but national security is the one matter about which Republicans have maintained what political scientists call 'issue ownership.'"⁵ Politicians are well aware of this conservative advantage. Thus in a June 2008 *Fortune* interview, a McCain campaign advisor noted that an attack on U.S. soil would "be a big advantage" for McCain. Implicit acknowledgment of this advantage was clear in Bush ads during the 2004 election campaign that encouraged fear-based voting; in "Ashley's story," a teenager is shown being comforted by Bush. She had lost her mother in the 9/11 attacks and says, "He's the most powerful man in the world and all he wants to do is make sure I'm safe...."⁶

Research has explicitly demonstrated this link between threat and political conservatism. A series of studies have shown that reminders of 9/11 led students to be more supportive of conservative (versus liberal) leaders and policies.⁷ Studies in Germany and Spain have also found that the salience of terrorism led to greater endorsement of conservative attitudes.⁸ Further, fully 38 percent of people who were in or near the World Trade Center on 9/11 reported becoming more conservative in the year and a half after the attack, a number three times greater than the percent who reported becoming more liberal.⁹ And increased conservatism in times of strong threat has been supported in archival research.¹⁰ There is considerable evidence, then, that threat

produces a greater preference for politicians on the right; these conservative leaders are typically associated with increased national security.

When national fear and perceived vulnerability are heightened, greater conservatism is also manifested through greater societal acceptance of decreased freedoms and civil liberties, for these restrictions are understood in terms of directly promoting our safety and protection. Thus in the aftermath of 9/11, Americans experienced compromised civil liberties as well the suppression of dissent of government policies in the name of safeguards against terrorism.¹¹ As Lewis writes with regard to the fear of terrorism after the attacks of 9/11, "President George W. Bush used that fear to adopt a series of programs that broke sharply with American law . . . He authorized the use of torture and other hard methods of interrogation on suspected terrorists . . . He ordered wiretapping of Americans' international telephone calls, in violation of criminal law. He detained American citizens suspected of terrorist ties indefinitely, without trial of access to counsel."¹²

Historically, fear has been used to justify repression, as Americans have come to believe that civil liberties need to be sacrificed to protect us from foreign threats. Richard Hofstadter has referred to this as the "paranoid style in American politics."¹³ Just as in the twentieth century the fear of communism was used to justify repression of the rights of many Americans, in 1798 the Federalists used the threat of French terror to justify the Sedition Act.¹⁴ James Madison summed up this threat-based response when, in a letter to Vice President Thomas Jefferson two months before the passage of the Sedition Act, he wrote, "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."¹⁵

Perhaps not surprisingly, in the name of protection post-9/11, as a nation America became more conservative and more accepting of losses of personal freedom in the political spheres of national security and civil liberties. Interestingly, however, there was a parallel movement in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 towards greater conservatism and loss of personal freedoms in the domain of social issues as well, and yet these do not seem to be directly associated with matters of national safety and foreign threats. Our threat-based loss of liberties extended beyond civil liberties to social choices and private behaviors, the agenda of social conservatives.

Moving to the Right: Beyond National Security and Civil Liberties

Following 9/11 there was a great deal of moralizing from the right and a marked shift towards the agenda of social conservatives. Political commentators on the right immediately suggested that the attacks were a moral wake-up call. In the words of a political scientist writing about this period, "Almost as soon as the hijackers brought down the World Trade Center and gouged a hole in the Pentagon, journalists and writers seized on the day's

events as a comment on the cultural miasma and decadent materialism of the United States”¹⁶ “Moral weakness” became a post-9/11 theme in conservative political commentaries. Perhaps the most extreme version was Falwell’s particularly vicious invective: “God continues to lift the curtain and allow the enemies of America to give us probably what we deserved...I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians...I point the finger in their face and say, ‘you helped this happen’.”¹⁷

Consistent with this moralizing, socially conservative response, the Bible Society reported that in the months after 9/11 bible sales were up 45 percent.¹⁸ There was an increased tendency to perceive the world through a moral lens. Anti-abortion, anti-gay marriage, and anti-stem research pronouncements pervaded the media in the early years following 9/11; the voices of strong social conservatives became increasingly loud, vocal, and influential in pushing its “moral values” agenda.¹⁹ Yes, this group was already making its mark to some extent in the 1990s, but the attacks of 9/11 gave their arguments particular traction, potency, and appeal. Thus, for example, the increased focus and success of anti-gay marriage pronouncements was evident at this time. Between 1998 and 2002 a total of four anti-gay marriage initiatives were approved on state ballots. Yet by 2005, state voters passed 15 additional anti-gay marriage initiatives.²⁰

The significance of this moral shift became most apparent in the 2004 election. As Larison notes, the attacks of 9/11 “yielded not a weakening or minimizing of religious and cultural divides, but rather an amplification of them,” and thus gay marriage became a major flashpoint of the 2004 election.²¹

In fact the big news story in the 2004 election was the “moral values vote.” According to National Election Pool exit polls, from a list of options that included economy/jobs, health care, education, and Iraq, the greatest percentage of voters (22 percent) chose “moral values” as the most important issue influencing their vote. Further, this was clearly a preference on the right, because fully 80 percent of those who selected “moral values” as most important also voted for Bush.²² These voters were focused on abortion, same-sex marriage, and stem cell research in the election—issues surely not directly related to national security. By 2004, Bush had the worst job creation record—2.6 million jobs lost—of any president since Hoover and was embattled in a crisis of confidence and trust around the Iraq War²³; yet he won re-election. His success was primarily attributable to the culture war he helped wage. “Bush proposed a constitutional amendment against gay marriage. He dismissed two scientists who dissented on his bioethics board, which he used to ban forms of stem cell research, replacing the dissenters with adherents of the religious right... Then Attorney General John Ashcroft subpoenaed the medical records of women who have had abortions at Planned Parenthood clinics. Bush followed by supporting the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, creating a new federal crime of ‘fetal homicide,’ that passed the Republican-dominated House of Representatives...”²⁴

The nation was transformed into a battleground, not in a fight against terrorism, but against a socially liberal political agenda.

In an attempt to emphasize the importance of “moral values voters” in 2006, the Christian Right held the “Washington Briefing: 2006 Values Voters Summit” before that year’s election. At that meeting Family Research Council President Tony Perkins suggested that our country “was under attack” and pointed to the “subversives” within our country—homosexuals, feminists, liberals, abortionists—as the enemy within.²⁵ Emphasis was placed on the imminent threats facing the nation from those on the left; support for abortion rights and same-sex marriage represented a clear and present danger.

From the perspective of America’s moral zeitgeist, the rightward shift began to retreat five years post-9/11, as evidenced by the results of the 2006 election; the shift to the left was very apparent in the election of Barack Obama two years later. Although no doubt in large part a consequence of the unpopularity of the Bush administration and increasing economic problems, this movement away from the extreme right was also facilitated by the increasing temporal distance from 9/11. Yet the five years following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were nevertheless noteworthy not only for the country’s understandably elevated concern with national security and physical safety, but also with a parallel emphasis on a socially conservative agenda, where abortion and gay rights rather than foreign terrorists became the threats to contend with as a nation.

It is possible that this shift in the nation’s moral agenda was simply an artifact or byproduct of the greater conservatism afforded in the realm of national security and foreign policy; that is, more conservative leaders were elected for national security reasons, and they also happened to be more socially conservative. However, the strong focus and concerted efforts in these social-political domains suggest otherwise. Rather than an unwitting extension, the moral shift beyond the national security sphere appeared to be a psychologically-related, but nevertheless independent, intentional, and intense drive to control Americans’ lifestyles and “private” behaviors. Why was this such a powerful reaction in the aftermath of 9/11? How were 9/11 and this “moral values” agenda related? To more fully understand their associations, we turn to psychology and what it can tell us about politics and, in particular, moral orientations.

Approach versus Avoidance: Motivation and Politics

Research on politics and psychology suggests that political liberalism and conservatism are associated with different psychological motivations, and these different motivations are instructive when attempting to understand moral shifts associated with national politics. The study of motivation is concerned with the “why” of behavior, and the most basic distinction drawn in

this work is between approach and avoidance orientations. More specifically, drawing from early work on reward and punishment in learning and animal conditioning as well as recent research in neuroscience and psychopathology, contemporary psychologists distinguish between two self-regulatory systems: a behavioral activation system, based in approach motivation, and a behavioral inhibition system based in avoidance motivation.²⁶ The activation system involves behaviors that try to approach a desired goal, whereas the inhibition system involves behaviors that try to avoid an undesirable goal (i.e., a threat or anti-goal).²⁷ There is considerable work supporting these two orientations, and this includes recent neuroscience research that provides evidence for distinct neural substrates of approach and avoidance motivation; thus, the approach system is associated in particular with left prefrontal cortex activity, whereas the avoidance system is associated with right prefrontal cortex activity.²⁸ Further, the importance of these approach-avoidance distinctions is evident in recent research in areas as diverse as achievement, interpersonal relationships, attention, morality, and power.²⁹

Most fundamentally, these differences can be understood in terms of motives to *protect* versus *provide*—to protect the individual or group from threats and negative outcomes or to provide for the well-being and advancement of the individual or group. These differences might be thought of in terms of the primary goals of parental responsibility: to protect the child from danger and threats to safety, and to provide for the child's welfare and well-being (e.g., via food, shelter, and nurturance more generally).

Both self-regulatory systems seek optimal outcomes, but they involve different orientations and strategies. There are two defining characteristics that distinguish between these approach (provide) and avoidance (protect) motivations. The first is regulatory focus; the focus of the approach system is positive, in that it involves the promotion of desired outcomes and gains (e.g., rewards, advancement). In contrast, the focus of the avoidance system is negative (e.g., threats, punishments) in that it involves the prevention of undesirable outcomes and losses. The second characteristic is the action tendency associated with each motivational orientation. The action tendency of the approach system is *activation*, for it entails actively moving *towards* a goal. In contrast, the action tendency of the avoidance system is *inhibition*, for it entails *withdrawal* from threats. Psychologically behavioral activation and positive outcomes are linked through the approach motivational system, and behavioral inhibition and the threat of negative outcomes are linked through the avoidance motivational system.

Each of us relies on both approach and avoidance in regulating our own behavior. In the face of threats the avoidance system is activated, whereas the recognition of positive outcomes and rewards activate the approach system. Nevertheless, it is also the case that we differ in the extent to which we emphasize one or the other, for some people focus more on threats and therefore depend primarily on the avoidance system and behavioral inhibition, whereas

others focus more on positive outcomes and therefore depend primarily on the approach system and behavioral activation. As we move from self-regulation to broader social regulation, the domain of politics, these differential emphases are reflected in political orientation; that is, most generally, political conservatism is based in avoidance motivation and the desire to protect societal members, and political liberalism is based in approach motivation and the desire to provide for societal members.³⁰

Conservatives, in other words, focus more on negative outcomes and threats and rely on inhibition as the primary form of social regulation. In contrast, liberals focus more on positive outcomes and gains and rely on activation as the primary form of social regulation. These broad motivational differences are reflected in distinct moral orientations as well, and thus conservatives and liberals differ in their moral motives regarding social regulation.

Conservatives' focus on threat and danger helps us understand why they have "issue ownership" on national security issues. It is not that liberals are unconcerned, but rather that they are more likely to be associated with societal gains to be advanced rather than security losses to be avoided, and they thus have greater issue ownership instead in areas such as health, education, and the economy. Not surprisingly, conservatives are apt to emphasize fear in political campaigns, whereas liberals are more apt to emphasize hope. Conservatism emphasizes strength and toughness, which would be expected when your worldview is based on countering threat and negative outcomes—on protecting. Liberalism emphasizes helping and fairness, which is more in line with an approach orientation and a desire to provide for society's social welfare.

Given that avoidance motivation is a response to perceived danger, and conservatism is based in avoidance motivation, conservative shifts in times of societal threat—as in the case of 9/11—may well be expected. The toughness and strength-based themes of conservative ideology and political platforms are particularly appealing to a populace in times of salient danger. The attacks of 9/11 aroused national fears and an associated preference for conservatives, with their perceived emphasis on national security and protection. But how are we to understand the emphasis on other issues—such as abortion, stem cell research, and same-sex marriage? Why this shift in the importance of particular moral issues?

Social Order versus Social Justice

Morality is essentially a set of rules that facilitate group living. These moral rules are in the service of the group or community and function as counterweights to self-interest.³¹ Despite each side's tendency to minimize the morality of the other, the conservative emphasis on protecting and the liberal emphasis on providing are both moral orientations, designed to serve the larger group. Yet they entail very different approaches to social regulation;

conservatives strive for social order, whereas liberals strive for social justice.³² These two moral motives—*social order* and *social justice*—respectively reflect avoidance and approach orientations. Social order motives are a response to perceived negative outcomes and involve inhibition-based regulation, whereas social justice motives are a response to perceived positive outcomes and involve activation-based regulation.

Those high on social order emphasize shared responsibility for maintaining “community standards”; they believe that societal bonds are threatened when people freely choose how to live their lives. Adherence to the group’s norms and conformity to the group’s rules are regarded as evidence of commitment to the group and deserved belonging. In contrast, those high on social justice emphasize more equal distribution of societal resources and shared responsibility for those worse off in society.³³ These are both “communal visions,” essentially oriented toward community interests rather than self-interests, but they are very different visions of social regulation.

A focus on social order is really a focus on protection, but understood in terms of “dangerous” people and perspectives within one’s own society. It appears that the fear aroused in the attacks of 9/11 led to a general motivation to protect society—from both without and within. The avoidance-based reactions to the threats of 9/11 were reflected in the shift to the right that was driven primarily by social conservatives and the Christian Right. Their perspective gained strong footing and force via the newfound threats to the nation. Their agenda was about protecting society from “deviant” forces primarily by way of suppressing personal freedoms in the social domain. The focus was group protection, fundamentally motivated by fear and perceived threats to society. This threat-based orientation was apparent in the dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia in *Lawrence v. Texas*, the Supreme Court case that overturned the law banning same-sex sodomy. Scalia predicted a similar change in “laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity” and predicted a “massive disruption of the current social order.”³⁴

The avoidance-based nature of social order and approach-based nature of social justice are evident in research on these motives’ relationship with two widely used psychological measures associated with political orientation—specifically right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). Research has demonstrated that RWA is based on the belief in a dangerous, threatening world and reflects a desire for security. SDO, on the other hand, is not threat-based, but rather reflects a belief in a competitive world and a desire for power and dominance. In recent research we found that social order beliefs were strongly associated with RWA, but not SDO, consistent with the proposed greater security concerns underlying this avoidance-based moral motive. In contrast, social justice beliefs were negatively associated with SDO and unrelated to RWA, consistent with the greater activation, resource-distribution concerns of this moral motive. Those high on social justice are not after

dominance and power, but equality and equity. Those high on social order are high on threat and need for security.³⁵

Social order, based in avoidance motivation, entails sensitivity to negative outcomes and an inhibitory orientation regarding one's own behaviors and one's social group (i.e., the minimization of "deviance" at the group level). As such we would expect particular attention to societal issues specifically associated with group norms and lifestyles, such as gay marriage and abortion. Social justice, based in approach motivation, emphasizes activation and advancement of self and others, and thus would be more likely to focus on societal issues related to social distributions and inequities, such as affirmative action and welfare.

Recent research supports these differences. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they approve or disapprove of a range of contemporary social issues, including legal abortion, affirmative action in college admissions, gay marriage, stem cell research, environmental taxes, the death penalty, pornography on the Internet, government welfare programs for the poor, teaching creationism in the classroom, and tax cuts for the rich. Statistical tests found that the contemporary issues represented two distinct factors. One factor (termed *lifestyles* factor), which included legal abortion and gay marriage items, reflected lifestyle and normative concerns. A second factor (termed *equity* factor), which included affirmative action and government welfare items, reflected economic and equity concerns.³⁶

It is important to note that both factors were strongly associated with political orientation; higher scores (stronger approval) on both were positively associated with liberalism. And yet the factors were associated with very different moral motives. The lifestyles factor was strongly associated with social order beliefs, but not social justice; the equity factor was strongly associated with social justice, but not social order. More specifically, the higher your commitment to social order, the greater your *disapproval* of the lifestyle issues—abortion, stem cell research, same-sex marriage; conservatives are high on social order and liberals are low on social order motives. In contrast, the stronger your commitment to social justice, the greater your approval of the equity issues—government welfare, affirmative action, environmental taxes; liberals are high and conservatives are low on social justice. The two factors were differentially associated with approach versus avoidance motives (social justice versus social order, respectively), presumably reflecting the inhibition versus activation based emphases of the two categories of social issues.³⁷

Thus a socially liberal domestic agenda emphasizes economic and social equality and focuses on interventions (i.e., actions) that will advance people's welfare, particularly those worse off in society. Liberals are far more likely than conservatives to support government welfare, social security, and affirmative action.³⁸ There is a strong emphasis on *activation* via interventions that will produce more *positive outcomes*. In contrast, a socially conservative domestic agenda focuses on matters such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and stem

cell research. These were the primary “moral values” issues of the 2004 presidential election. Here the emphasis is on behaviors often associated with the body, health, and intimate relationships, and the action tendency is based in *inhibition* via prohibitions that are believed to minimize *negative outcomes*.³⁹ Conservatives seek to *prohibit* legal abortion, same-sex marriage, and stem cell research; social order is primarily maintained through conformity.

Conservatives and liberals both believe that there are domains that should not be regulated by society—typically the economic domain for conservatives, and lifestyle and personal behaviors for liberals. Of particular interest, however, is not only the domain, but the form of social regulation advocated by each group. Liberals are for *active interventions* that are believed to *provide* for members of society. Conservatives want to place *restrictions* on behaviors *to protect* societal members. Conservatives see threats to society in allowing abortion and same-sex marriage and opt for prohibitions; liberals see rewards for society in fostering economic welfare and equality and opt for new initiatives to foster such outcomes.

In the moral domain, divorced from politics, these differences in actions versus prohibitions can be understood in terms of a distinction we recently drew between two types of morality: proscriptive versus prescriptive morality. Essentially, proscriptive morality focuses on what we *should not* do (i.e., avoidance-based), whereas prescriptive morality focuses on what we *should* do (i.e., approach-based). Thus the proscriptive system involves avoiding temptations and immoral behaviors (e.g., not cheating, lying, “over-indulging”), whereas the prescriptive system involves activating motivation to do the right thing (e.g., helping others, working hard). Research has shown that proscriptive morality is mandatory, harsh, and condemnatory, in contrast to prescriptive morality, which is more discretionary, less harsh, and commendatory. The proscriptive system focuses on transgressions and immorality, whereas the prescriptive system focuses on “good deeds” and morality.⁴⁰

The relevance of these distinctions to the morality of social conservatives versus social liberals should be apparent. The social order focus of the political right, with its emphasis on prohibitions against behaviors regarded as nonconforming and “immoral” reflects proscriptive morality—an emphasis on what we should not do. It is a harsh, condemnatory system that seeks to punish “deviants.” In contrast, the social justice focus of the political left emphasizes prescriptive morality, with its emphasis on activating positive behaviors—what we should do—and consequent focus on rewards rather than punishments.

A Few Final Words

The strong association between threat and social order concerns became apparent in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The newfound emphasis on protecting America expanded from protection against outside dangers to

include a focus on protection against perceived inside threats as well. It is as if conformity to a single, strict set of personal behaviors was regarded as demonstration of commitment to the nation. Prohibitions against behaviors such as legal abortion, same-sex marriage, and stem cell research shifted morality to the right. While liberals continued to make a case for broader caring across society, emphasizing our social interdependence, conservatives made a case for greater social conformity and common group identity. In the face of collective trauma and threat in the aftermath of 9/11, it was the conservative agenda that got more traction, was spoken more loudly, and had more converts among those in the political center. Liberal voices were not strong enough or convincing enough immediately after 9/11 to carry the day. This was a time of perceived threat and a heightened sense of danger; this was a time when avoidance motivation was primed, so the country was focused on protection—both in terms of national security and internal social politics. A conservative agenda was emboldened.

The moral shift to social conservatism following 9/11 reflected psychological motivations very similar to those primed by threats to our national security. Yet the external threats to our nation were clear to all and evident in the physical attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. As fear and protection motives were heightened, a consequence was a different emphasis on security, one that involved societal prohibitions and the punishment of “transgressors.” When James Madison wrote of the loss of liberties at home that resulted from dangers from abroad, he could have been describing the moral shift that occurred in the five years post-9/11, with its sharp focus on social order and the sought-after suppression of freedoms in personal domains.

Notes

1. Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, *Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
2. See Ernest Becker, *The Denial of Death* (New York: Free Press, 1973); Janoff-Bulman, *Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma*; Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and Darren Yopyk, “Random Outcomes and Valued Commitments: Existential Dilemmas and the Paradox of Meaning,” in *Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology*, ed. Jeff Greenberg, Sander L. Koole, and Tom Pyszczynski (New York: Guilford, 2004), 122–138; Robert J. Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967). For relevant work on terror management theory, see Tom Pyszczynski, Jeff Greenberg, and Sheldon Solomon, “A Dual-Process Model of Defense Against Conscious and Unconscious Death-Related Thoughts: An Extension of Terror Management Theory,” *Psychological Review* 106 (1999): 835–845; Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenberg, eds., *In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003).

3. The intensity of post-traumatic symptoms appeared to decrease as physical distance from the attack sites increased, but research suggests that Americans throughout the country showed substantial stress reactions. See Gerry Fairbrother and Sandro Galea, *Terrorism, Mental Health, and September 11: Lessons Learned Providing Mental Health Services to a Traumatized Population* (New York: Century Foundation, 2005); Sandro Galea, Jennifer Ahern, Heidi Resnick, Dean Kilpatrick, Michael Bucuvalas, Joel Gold, and David Vlahov, "Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City," *New England Journal of Medicine* 346 (2002): 982–987; William E. Schlenger, Juesta M. Caddell, Lori Ebert, B. Kathleen Jordan, Kathryn Rourke, David Wilson, Lisa Thalji, J. Michael Dennis, John A. Fairbank, and Richard A. Kulka, "Psychological Reaction to Terrorist Attacks: Findings from the National Study of Americans' Reactions to September 11," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 288 (2002): 581–588; Roxane C. Silver, E. Alison Holman, E.A., Daniel N. McIntosh, Michael Poulin, and Virginia Gil-Rivas, "Nationwide Longitudinal Study of Psychological Responses to September 11," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 288 (2002): 1235–1244.
4. John T. Jost, Brian A. Nosek, and Samuel D. Gosling, "Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology, *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 3 (2008): 126–136; George Bishop, *The Illusion of Public Opinion* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 91–114. Jeffrey M. Jones, "September 11 Effects, Though Largely Faded, Persist," <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9208/Sept-Effects-Though-Largely-Faded-Persist.aspx> (accessed August 29, 2008); also see George A. Bonanno and John T. Jost, "Conservative Shift Among High-Exposure Survivors of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 28 (2006): 311–323; Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and Sana Sheikh, "From National Trauma to Moralizing Nation," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 28 (2006): 325–332; Mark J. Landau, Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, Florette Cohen, Tom Pyszczynski, Jaime Arndt, Claude Miller, Daniel M. Ogilvie, and Alison Cook, "Deliver Us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support of President George W. Bush," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30 (2004): 1136–1150; Stewart J. H. McCann, "Threatening Times, 'Strong' Presidential Popular Vote Winners, and the Victory Margin, 1824–1964," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73 (1997): 160–170.
5. Samantha Powers, 2008, "The Democrats & National Security," *The New York Review of Books* 55, August 14, 2008, 66.
6. Kevin Lanning, "The Social Psychology of the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election," *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 5 (2005): 145–152.
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 9. Bonanno and Jost, "Conservative Shift Among High-Exposure Survivors of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks."
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 11. See, e.g., Richard C. Leone, R. C. and Greg Anrig Jr., G., eds., *The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism* (New York: Century Foundation, 2003); Corey Robin, *Fear: The History of a Political Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
 12. Anthony Lewis, *Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 127.
 13. Ibid.
 14. The Sedition Act made it a federal crime to publish or write "false, scandalous, and malicious writing" against the government or its officials.
 15. Lewis, *Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment*, 21.
 16. Robin, *Fear: The History of a Political Idea*, 156.
 17. J. F. Harris, "God Gave U.S. 'What We Deserve', Falwell Says," *The Washington Post* September 14, 2001, C03.
 18. Patricia Rice, "Religious Books Are Rising to the Occasion," *St. Louis Dispatch*, Religious Section, December 22, 2001, 16.
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36. The items “approval of the death penalty” and “tax cuts for the rich” were reverse-scored, and the ratings of the respective issues were combined to create scores on these two factors, with higher scores indicating greater approval (i.e., more liberal positions on items in both factors).
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 39. There are certainly some exceptions to the prohibition focus of conservatives and activation focus of liberals. Most obvious is their view on guns and gun control. Conservatives want to allow guns, whereas liberals want gun control. Interestingly, however, the support for guns is consistent with conservatives’ protection motives, for they regard guns as a means of protection (whereas liberals do not).
 40. See Janoff-Bulman et al., “Proscriptive versus Prescriptive Morality: Two Faces of Moral Regulation.”