

Surveying the Moral Landscape: Moral Motives and Group-Based Moralities

Ronnie Janoff-Bulman¹ and Nate C. Carnes¹

Personality and Social Psychology Review
17(3) 219–236
© 2013 by the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology, Inc.
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1088868313480274
pspr.sagepub.com



Abstract

We present a new six-cell Model of Moral Motives that applies a fundamental motivational distinction in psychology to the moral domain. In addition to moral motives focused on the self or another, we propose two group-based moralities, both communal in orientation, but reflecting distinct moral motives (Social Order/Communal Solidarity vs. Social Justice/Communal Responsibility) as well as differences in construals of group entitativity. The two group-based moralities have implications for intragroup homogeneity as well as intergroup conflict. Our model challenges the conclusions of Haidt and colleagues that only conservatives (not liberals) are group oriented and embrace a binding morality. We explore the implications of this new model for politics in particular and for the self-regulation versus social regulation of morality more generally.

Keywords

morality, motivation, politics, social justice, social order

Researchers have recently begun to map the varied contours of the moral landscape. In particular, works by Haidt and his colleagues (Haidt, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) have expanded our conception of the moral domain beyond the justice and rights concerns that had come to define moral psychology (see, for example, Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Turiel, 1983). Their moral foundations theory, with its implications for differences in political ideology, now pervades discussions of morality in academic journals as well as the popular press (see, for example, op-ed pieces by Brooks, 2011, and Edsall, 2011). This article is an attempt to more fully explore the distinct elements of the moral landscape and thereby provide a new way to conceptualize moral concerns.

Our moral map draws on fundamental distinctions already well respected in psychology to create an explanatory framework for understanding multiple moral motives and the relationships among them. In this article, we first discuss the psychological underpinnings of our new taxonomy and present the specific components of the model; we then consider the contributions of this new framework in light of Haidt's moral foundations theory. In the next section of the article, we focus on the novel cells of the model and delve into the nature of group-based morality in particular. Finally, we explore the implications of our new model for political ideology and the social regulation of morality.

The New Explanatory Framework: Psychology's Fundamental Motivational Distinction

Morality is generally recognized as a system of rules that facilitate and coordinate group living; as such it involves behavioral regulation so as to optimize our existence as social beings. In developing our taxonomy of morality, we turned to the most fundamental psychological distinction in the motivation and self-regulation of behavior—approach versus avoidance, or behavioral activation versus inhibition (Carver, 2006; Carver & Scheier, 1998; J. A. Gray, 1982, 1990; Higgins, 1997, 1998; for reviews, see Carver & Scheier, 2008, and Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2003). This dual regulatory system is recognized across multiple areas of psychology, and in recent years this approach–avoidance distinction has proved instrumental in understanding diverse phenomena across psychology, including achievement (e.g., Elliot & Church, 1997), attention (e.g., Forster, Friedman, Ozelsel, & Denzler, 2006), power (e.g., Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), and interpersonal relationships (Gable & Strachman, 2008).

¹University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA

Corresponding Author:

Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA.
Email: janbul@psych.umass.edu

The behavioral inhibition system, based in avoidance, is an aversive motivational system that is sensitive to punishment and negative outcomes. The behavioral activation system, based in approach, is an appetitive motivational system that is sensitive to rewards and positive outcomes. We recently applied these differences to the moral domain and distinguished between proscriptive and prescriptive morality (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; also see Janoff-Bulman, 2011). More specifically, proscriptive morality (based in avoidance) focuses on what we *should not* do; it involves restraining a motivation to do something bad, and thus overcoming temptation or desire. Most generally, proscriptive morality *protects* from harm, and right conduct involves inhibition. Prescriptive morality (based in approach) focuses on what we *should* do; in contrast to inhibition and restraint, it requires overcoming inertia and establishing a motivation to do something good. Most generally, prescriptive morality *provides* for well-being, and right conduct involves activation and engaging in helpful behaviors (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Just as a parent strives to protect the child from harm and provide for the child's basic needs, the motivations to protect and provide are fundamental moral motives that broadly reflect a dual system of moral regulation (i.e., proscriptive vs. prescriptive regulation, respectively).

Research on the development of morality in young children by Kochanska and colleagues (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005; Kochanska, 2002; Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001) supports this motivational distinction in moral regulation. These researchers distinguished between "do's" and "don'ts," with the former involving activation and sustaining an activity (e.g., toy cleanups) and the latter involving prohibitions and suppressing behaviors (e.g., not playing with a forbidden attractive toy). Kochanska and colleagues (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005; Kochanska, 2002; Kochanska et al., 2001) found that young children (i.e., 14, 22, 33, and 45 months) complied with prohibitions (don'ts) more readily than with do's, which were more challenging. Furthermore, fearfulness was positively associated with children's success at refraining from prohibited behaviors (don'ts), but not with success in the domain of do's (which is consistent with the greater sensitivity of the proscriptive system to negative outcomes). Based on their findings, Kochanska et al. (2001) concluded that there is "impressive evidence of substantial differences" between do's and don'ts in early self-regulation (p. 1106).

Our own recent research provides further support for "substantial differences" between proscriptive and prescriptive morality, or avoidance/inhibition and approach/activation in the moral domain. Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009; seven studies are reported) found that proscriptive morality is focused on transgressions and is responsive to threat; it is mandatory and emphasizes blameworthiness. In contrast, prescriptive morality is focused on good deeds and is not responsive to threat; it is more discretionary and emphasizes

creditworthiness. Linguistically, proscriptive morality is represented in relatively concrete terms, particularly verbs that specify particular behaviors; in contrast, prescriptive morality tends to be more abstract linguistically, in adjectives reflecting broad categories of behavior (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009, Study 2). These linguistic differences represent regulatory differences based on approach and avoidance (e.g., see Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005). The greater threat of error in the proscriptive system requires greater specificity of actions to be inhibited, whereas the more discretionary prescriptive system can provide more general directives and standards for behavior.¹

Overall, proscriptive moral regulation is condemnatory and strict, whereas prescriptive morality is commendatory and less strict.² Thus, the negativity bias in psychology (for reviews, see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008), which entails greater motivational potency of negative (vs. positive) outcomes, is evident in the moral domain as well. Proscriptive regulation is harsher and more demanding than prescriptive regulation.

These differences suggest natural affinities to deontological versus consequentialist perspectives on morality. Deontology is predicated on rules of right and wrong and is a strict, mandatory morality—one has a duty to behave in particular ways. Consequentialism posits that the morality of an act is based on its consequences. This is essentially utilitarianism, which argues for the greatest good for the greatest number. The more discretionary nature of prescriptive morality may be inherent in the nature of prescriptions; we know we should help others in need, but it is impossible to help everyone who is in need. We can, however, always refrain from cheating or killing. "Not harming" can be applied universally, but "helping" cannot. The very nature of prescriptions (e.g., "help others") therefore requires choices and decisions about whom to help (and perhaps how), and standards such as "the greatest good for the greatest number" provide guidance.

Interestingly, the harsher, more mandatory nature of proscriptive (vs. prescriptive) morality can account for the findings in the classic footbridge and trolley problems in moral psychology, which essentially pit proscriptive and prescriptive morality against one another. Five lives can be saved (prescriptive morality) by forfeiting the life of one (proscriptive immorality); or restraint from harming the one (proscriptive morality) will sacrifice the lives of five (prescriptive immorality). Given the stricter, more mandatory proscriptive system, it is not surprising that when forfeiting a life involves direct physical harm (i.e., pushing a stranger off the footbridge), restraint carries the day and five lives are sacrificed. To reverse this pattern, the harm must be "defanged" by becoming distal and impersonal. Only then can prescriptive regulation, with its reliance on consequences, take over; then saving a total of four lives seems like the moral path to follow.

	Self (personal)	Other (interpersonal)	Group (collective)
Protect/ Inhibition (proscriptive regulation)	self-restraint/ moderation	not harming	social order/ communal solidarity
Provide/ Activation (prescriptive regulation)	industriousness	helping/ fairness	social justice/ communal responsibility

Figure 1. Model of moral motives.

Differences between proscriptive and prescriptive morality may also help us better understand findings by Knobe (2005, 2010), in which negative side effects in moral dilemmas are perceived as more intentional than positive side effects. The more discretionary nature of helping requires evidence of specific intention on the part of the helper to get credit for positive outcomes; in the scenarios this intention is not present, and it is not accorded by research participants. However, the mandatory nature of avoiding harm-doing suggests that people are more obligated to intervene and stop negative, foreseen consequences. The Knobe dilemmas that involve instances of failing to refrain from harm naturally engage an attribution of intentionality, because we are required to intervene to “not harm.”

Model of Moral Motives (MMM): A New Taxonomy

Given the fundamental nature of the activation-approach and inhibition-avoidance systems across psychology and the distinct attributes associated with proscriptive versus prescriptive morality, we believe it is an important dimension to consider in creating a comprehensive model of the moral landscape. The two forms of moral regulation, and in particular their representation in the broad moral motives to protect (via inhibition) and provide (via activation), define the two rows of our model (see Figure 1).

Each of the three columns of our model represents a distinct focus of moral concern, from self (personal) to other(s) (interpersonal), to the group (collective). This tripartite classification represents different levels of analysis in social psychology. The self-focus involves the impact of individuals' behavior on themselves. The interpersonal column refers to moral concerns focused on another individual or individuals; and the group category involves a focus on the collective (one's group) as a whole. Social-psychological phenomena have been categorized as intrapersonal, interpersonal, and collective (Gilbert, Fiske, & Gardner, 1998). And the considerable work on social identity by Brewer and colleagues (Brewer & Gardner, 1996;

Sedikides & Brewer, 2001) relies on the same three categories; that is, they distinguish between the individual self, the relational self, and the collective self as three fundamental ways people establish self-representations—in terms of their own unique traits, their dyadic relationships, and their group memberships (also see Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). Morality, too, can operate at each of these levels; moral motives can be directed toward the self, another person or persons, or one's group. Our model therefore has three columns, each devoted to a particular focus of moral concern.³

The 2 × 3 MMM

We thus propose six cells in our taxonomy, based on the inhibition-based motive to protect the self, another, and the group and the activation-based motive to provide for the self, another, and the group. More specifically, the following six moral motives are identified in our MMM.

Self-Restraint/Moderation (Self-Protect). Here, morality is focused on protecting the self through behavioral inhibition and resisting temptations. This is the domain of many of the “seven deadly sins” (e.g., gluttony), and the proximal outcome is benefit to the self in terms of physical and psychological health. Given that all morality involves rules that facilitate group living and contribute to group survival, moral concerns that focus on the self surely have important implications for the wider group. Not surprisingly, then, Self-Restraint/Moderation also has important distal ramifications, ultimately serving to protect the group's resources and counter wastefulness.

Industriousness (Self-Provide). This moral motive provides for the self's advancement through the activation of hard work, conscientiousness, and persistence. This ethic of applying oneself reduces the individuals' burden on the larger group and ultimately contributes to the group's resources and competencies; these are the distal benefits of self-focused industriousness.

Not Harming (Other-Protect). This is no doubt the most basic rule for group living and serves to protect the other members of one's group in interpersonal interactions (see K. Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). Here, morality is based on inhibiting self-advantaging behaviors; it involves proscriptions to not physically harm and to not harm by taking advantage of another through lying, cheating, stealing, and the like.

Helping/Fairness (Other-Provide). This moral motive involves personal efforts to help and care so as to provide for another's welfare and well-being. It entails the activation of behavior that aids others. Both helping and fairness have been linked to reciprocity as a root form of social obligation. Locating a basis for fairness in reciprocity emphasizes the role of perceived personal deservingness in determinations of fair treatment at the interpersonal level.

Social Order/Communal Solidarity (Group-Protect). This group-based morality protects the group from dangers and threats, from both outside and inside the group. This includes physical threats to safety and stability as well as psychological threats to identity. The importance of order and solidarity is evident in the emphasis on conformity behaviors and group loyalty, which serve to maximize group cohesion.

Social Justice/Communal Responsibility (Group-Provide). Here, the moral concern is providing for the welfare of the group. It activates group-based efforts to help, with a particular focus on equality-oriented distributional justice. Group bonds are strengthened through a shared sense of responsibility.

Moral Regulation: Constraining Selfishness and Enabling Altruism

The three proscriptive motives—Self-Restraint/Moderation, Not Harming, and Social Order/Communal Solidarity—reflect efforts to constrain the bad, whereas the three prescriptive motives—Industriousness, Helping/Fairness, and Social Justice/Communal Responsibility—reflect efforts to activate the good. Importantly, the proscriptive motives involve inhibitory regulation focused on reining in self-interest and selfishness, whereas the prescriptive motives seek to activate and enable our better natures. The two forms of regulation, then, highlight the two sides of human nature—selfishness and altruism.

For years, the evolutionary story underlying morality focused on the thoroughly self-interested nature of human behavior, with altruism viewed as selfishness in disguise (see, in particular, W. Hamilton, 1964, on kin selection; Trivers, 1971, on reciprocal altruism; and Alexander, 1987, on indirect reciprocity).⁴ Recently, however, we have begun to witness a sea-change, with altruism acknowledged as a true and fundamental side of human nature (see, for example, Batson, 1998; Bowles, 2006; Boyd, 2006; de Waal, 2008; Keltner, 2009; Nowak & Highfield, 2011; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 2012). Recent neuroscience research has found that giving to charity and helping others activate parts of the brain that are associated with pleasure and reward (see, for example, Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; Rilling et al., 2002), and children as young as 18 months try to help another, even a stranger, who is having trouble accomplishing a goal (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Interestingly, a number of scientists have turned to group selection to help solve the “puzzle” of altruism. Foremost among them is E. O. Wilson (2012), who believes in “authentic altruism” and maintains that it enhances the strength and survival of groups. From this evolutionary perspective, we are the products of multilevel selection: Our selfishness is shaped by individual selection, which involves ingroup competition, whereas our altruism (focused on ingroup

members) derives from group selection, which involves competition between groups.⁵

We thus have the makings of “saints” and “sinners,” with culture working to reinforce the former and minimize the latter. We are motivated to act selfishly, for our own benefit, and altruistically, for the benefit of others, and distinct types of moral regulation focus on each motivation. That is, group living requires rules to constrain our selfishness; this is proscriptive regulation, which serves to inhibit behaviors based on self-interest. Moral societies also call for rules that activate our better angels; this is prescriptive regulation, which has an enabling function in tapping altruistic motives to provide for the welfare of others. Together these two forms of moral regulation—inhibiting the bad and activating the good—facilitate group living, encourage cooperation, and maximize the well-being of society.

It should be noted that the proscriptive and prescriptive motives are *not* distinguished in terms of virtues and vices. It might seem natural to regard virtues as prescriptive and vices as proscriptive, but this simply is not the case. Rather, both virtues and vices are associated with each form of moral regulation. Virtues are qualities or traits associated with “goodness” or morality. There are prescriptive and proscriptive virtues, because there are prescriptive and proscriptive forms of morality (see Carnes & Janoff-Bulman, 2012); that is, there are virtues that help us by enabling good deeds as well as virtues that help us in our efforts to inhibit bad behaviors. Thus, generosity and courage are prescriptive moral virtues, which are associated with doing the right thing, whereas self-discipline and humility are proscriptive moral virtues, because they are associated with refraining from doing the wrong thing. Similarly, there are proscriptive and prescriptive vices, which are qualities or traits associated with “badness” or immorality (Carnes & Janoff-Bulman, 2012) because they both facilitate the bad (proscriptive vices) and obstruct the good (prescriptive vices). Thus, greed and gluttony are associated with doing the wrong thing (i.e., proscriptive immorality) whereas apathy and sloth are associated with not doing the right thing (i.e., prescriptive immorality). It is not virtues or vices that distinguish the two types of moral regulation, but rather the more fundamental orientation of the motive. Proscriptive morality inhibits the bad, thereby constraining human selfishness and protecting the group and its members. Prescriptive morality activates the good, thereby enabling human altruism and providing for the group and its members.

Comparison With Haidt’s Moral Foundations

Currently, the dominant map of the moral domain is the moral foundations theory of Haidt and colleagues, which posits five psychological foundations: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity (Haidt, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt

& Joseph, 2004, 2007). Haidt and Joseph (2004) were explicit in acknowledging that they initially derived these five psychological foundations from their reading of five works⁶ (also see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and these same five modules constitute Haidt's moral foundations in his subsequent articles.⁷ In terms of Shweder and colleagues' (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), earlier "three ethics" account of morality, Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity roughly correspond to the ethic of autonomy, Ingroup/Loyalty and Authority/Respect correspond to the ethic of community, and Purity/Sanctity corresponds to the ethic of divinity.

Haidt and colleagues refer to Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity as the *individualizing* foundations because they involve "individual-focused contractual approaches to society" (Graham et al., 2011, p. 369). In contrast, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity are regarded as the *binding* foundations, because they "are about binding people together into larger groups and institutions" (Graham et al., 2011, p. 369). The individualizing foundations focus on the rights and welfare of individuals, whereas the group is the locus of moral concern for the binding foundations.

The "interpersonal" column in our model parallels Haidt's individualizing classification; that is, it focuses on other individuals as the locus of moral concern. From the perspective of our MMM, Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity fall in this interpersonal column, Harm in the "Not Harming" (proscriptive/protect) cell and Care and Fairness/Reciprocity in the Helping/Fairness (prescriptive/provide) cell; here, there is virtually complete correspondence between the two perspectives in terms of content, although we classify that content slightly differently from Haidt based on our addition of approach/avoidance motivation to the MMM framework. We have placed the foundations in cells that we believe reflect the self-regulatory motives underlying the modules.

We believe Haidt and colleagues' binding foundations, with their focus on the group, have a natural home in the "group" column of our model. Placing the binding foundations in the "self" or "other" columns of our model would mischaracterize them as being focused on something other than the group as the locus of moral concern. Loyalty, Authority, and Purity reflect concerns with order and solidarity, and we therefore locate them in the Social Order/Communal Solidarity (proscriptive) group cell. Our group column includes two distinct types of binding moralities, but several modules in Haidt's model are reflected in a single group-based morality cell of MMM (see Figure 2).

Given Haidt's own label of purity as a binding morality, we include it in the group solidarity cell as well (also see Graham & Haidt, 2010, on the role of purity practices in religion). However, it should be noted that purity involves proscriptive morality more broadly in terms of inhibition or avoidance of "dangerous" stimuli, and can be represented in

	Self (personal)	Other (interpersonal)	Group (collective)
Protect/ Inhibition (proscriptive regulation)		INDIVIDUALIZING	BINDING
Provide/ Activation (prescriptive regulation)			

Figure 2. Haidt's moral foundations and the model of moral motives.

all three proscriptive cells of our model (i.e., self, other, and group foci of moral concerns). Thus, purity regarding one's own body (e.g., matters related to sexuality, drinking, or drugs) concerns the self, the desire to avoid contagion associated with another would involve the interpersonal context, and the motivation to maintain group purity through the regulation of deviance (via avoidance and punishment) implicates group-based morality. In many ways, given the distinct origins of the purity foundation of morality,⁸ from our perspective it can be regarded as a broad-based proscriptive form of morality that coexists with the other proscriptive moral motives.

Self-Focused Additions

In the 6-cell MMM, the motives focused specifically on the self—Self-Restraint/Moderation and Industriousness—appear as a discrete entity (the "self" column) to distinguish them from behaviors directed at another (the "other" column) or focused on the group (the "group" column). Although these moral motives are proximally focused on the self, it is important to recognize that how we deal with our own bodies, temptations, and desire to succeed not only implicates beliefs about right and wrong but also has important ramifications for the success and coordination of group living. As such, the self-focused moral motives are consistent with the characterization of morality that emphasizes the facilitation of group living. Moderation and self-restraint temper self-interest and help protect group resources, whereas industriousness and conscientiousness help the group through the development and advancement of goods and competencies.

Other people and the group are the foci of moral concern in Haidt's moral foundations theory, and thus the self-focused moral motives do not appear in his model. Interestingly, they also do not appear in the recent model of morality proposed by Rai and Fiske (2011), who identify four moral motives that follow from specific kinds of social relationships (Fiske, 1991). Specifically, Unity, Hierarchy,

Equality, and Proportionality follow, respectively, from communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. Rai and Fiske (2011) do not address self-focused moral motives, but rather specifically focus on social relationships of “two or more persons” (p. 60).

The major philosophies, East and West and through the ages, have recognized the crucial role of Self-Restraint/Moderation for a moral life. Thus, Dahlsgaard, Peterson, and Seligman (2005), in their search for universal virtues, found that temperance, involving strengths that “protect against excess” (p. 205), is a core virtue in Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Athenian philosophy (e.g., Aristotle, Plato), Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. From Confucius in the *Analects* advocating self-control and the “avoidance of extravagance” to Alfarabi in *Fusul Al-Madami* positing the importance of moderation, this self-focused morality is a widely acknowledged component of the moral landscape (Dahlsgaard et al., 2005). Furthermore, in their attempt to explore naturalistic conceptions of “moral maturity,” Walker and Pitts (1998) found that self-discipline was regarded as a central attribute of highly moral people. Again, although the focus is on the self, self-control and moderation protect the larger community as well through minimization of wastefulness and safeguarding of community resources.

Industriousness, with its connotations of hard work, conscientiousness, and persistence, also has implications far beyond the self, because ultimately these attributes contribute to the advancement of the community’s skills, knowledge, and resources. Walker and Pitts (1998) found that a very important cluster of responses fell under the heading “has integrity,” and here “hard-working” and “conscientious” were two highly valued attributes. Often associated with the Protestant ethic, industriousness per se did not arise as a core virtue in the investigations of Dahlsgaard et al. (2005). However, it could be viewed as a component of “Courage,” a universal virtue defined as “emotional strengths that involve the exercise of will to accomplish goals in the face of opposition, external or internal”; here, perseverance is specifically mentioned as an example of courage. No doubt bravery, another example, seems far closer to courage in people’s minds because courage seems associated with the heroic and acts that may seem larger than life. Nevertheless, hard work, conscientiousness, and perseverance are attributes that reflect “exercise of will to accomplish goals,” especially goals “in the face of opposition.” As such, they are in part the more mundane, less grandiose aspects of what Dahlsgaard et al. collectively refer to as courage.

Self-Restraint and Industriousness are personal concerns that do not involve others; as such, on their face they may not appear to be *moral* motives. Yet their self-focus belies their fundamental importance for group living, because they serve to preserve and advance the group’s goods, skills, and resources.

Group-Focused Addition

A comparison with Haidt’s moral foundations theory also points to a further addition in our MMM—that of a prescriptive group-based morality (i.e., Social Justice/Communal Responsibility). Interestingly, in their recent model Rai and Fiske (2011) seem to recognize that there are proscriptive and prescriptive bases of group-based morality, because they note that “eliminating threats of contamination” as well as “providing aid” enable ingroups to maintain their integrity (p. 57). In positing a single moral motive (i.e., Unity) to represent both, they importantly emphasize the broad binding function of any group-based morality, but do not make further distinctions that seem to be of fundamental importance, particularly as we move to the domain of social regulation and politics.

It is our prescriptive group-based cell—Social Justice/Communal Responsibility—that is apt to be most controversial from the perspective of moral foundations theory, especially given the claims of Haidt and colleagues regarding moral differences between liberals and conservatives. According to Haidt and his colleagues (Graham et al., 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007), liberals value the individualizing foundations—Harm and Fairness—more than conservatives, and conservatives value the binding foundations—Ingroup, Authority, and Purity—more than liberals. Furthermore, the authors note that liberals rely on (only) two moral foundations, whereas conservatives rely on all five foundations,⁹ and thus, conservatives understand liberals better than liberals understand conservatives (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2007, 2012); thus, in his recent book, Haidt (2012) labels the chapter on political ideology and morality “The Conservative Advantage.”

The provocative implication of this work is that liberals are not group oriented and do not have group-based moral concerns. In other words, a liberal group-based morality is absent from the moral foundations framework of Haidt and his colleagues. Is there a liberal group-based morality? That is, is there another kind of binding group-based morality? And are liberals really more individualizing than conservatives and conservatives more group oriented than liberals?

Microjustice Versus Macrojustice: Focus on the Individual Versus the Group

We argue that there is a group-focused prescriptive (provide) morality and claim that it is based in a Social Justice orientation derived from a sense of shared communal responsibility. From our perspective, Haidt concludes that conservatives rely on both the individualizing and binding foundations, whereas liberals rely only on the individualizing foundations because he has limited his binding foundations to those reflecting a constraint-based (proscriptive) group morality.

Interestingly, some of his own research findings, regarding gender in particular, should raise a few red flags about his conclusions. Thus, there is a large literature in psychology addressing gender differences, and one difference that is well acknowledged is the communal versus agentic orientations associated with females versus males, respectively (see, for example, Eagly, 1987; Wood & Eagly, 2010). Although women are group oriented, focused on communal binding, Graham et al. (2011) nevertheless find that men score higher than women on their important binding foundations of Ingroup/Loyalty and Authority/Respect. If these are the communal-based foundations, one would expect women to be stronger or at least equal advocates of these moralities. Surely there could be some binding, group-based morality that reflects a type of communal orientation currently absent from the moral foundations model of morality.

In positing that communal responsibility, and in particular Social Justice, is at the core of this group-based morality, we anticipate an immediate response and critique suggesting that Social Justice is really a form of fairness. In other words, liberals rely on fairness and simply apply this “individualizing” foundation at the group level. While on its face this seems like a valid criticism, we believe that group-based Social Justice is not the same as the individualizing foundation, interpersonal fairness, applied at the group level. We may have a paucity of language and thus necessarily link the constructs through fairness and justice, but these are actually quite different phenomena and moral concerns.

More specifically, interpersonal fairness is based on considerations of another’s deservingness, whereas Social Justice is based on group-level considerations that are focused on the overall distribution of resources in a group. The former is focused on specific individuals or group members, whereas the latter is focused on the group as a whole. These are the differences between microjustice and macrojustice described in a classic article by Brickman, Folger, Goode, and Schul (1981) and recognized as “qualitatively different principles” (p. 174). Interpersonal fairness is individuating and requires the assessment of individuals’ attributes (e.g., need, merit). In contrast, Social Justice is deindividuating and group-focused, and specifies a priori constraints on the pattern or form of a distribution. Interpersonal fairness is based on the particular deservingness of another (or others), whereas Social Justice is based on societal-level considerations focused on minimizing inequality across the distribution. Specific knowledge about individuals’ attributes is superfluous to Social Justice concerns; instead they entail “specifying a desirable property of a distribution rather than an empirical property of a set of individuals” (Brickman et al., 1981, p. 179). Thus, Rawls (2005) in his theory of justice first proposes a veil of ignorance to deindividuate people, and only then does his second principle act as a distributional rule for the group: “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are . . . to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.” (p. 266).

Rawls sees this unambiguously as “to everyone’s advantage” (p. 53)—that is, to the advantage of the group as a whole. The group is the primary focus of moral concern.

Rai and Fiske’s (2011) Proportionality motive, which involves fairness calibrations associated with merit, is an example of a microjustice motive, and thus is a (prescriptive) interpersonal motive in our taxonomy and an individualizing motive in Haidt’s moral foundations model. However, Equality is more ambiguous in the Rai and Fiske conceptualization. Equality is defined as the motive for in-kind reciprocity and equal treatment; the former maps onto our Helping/Fairness motive, which resides in the interpersonal domain, whereas “equal treatment” can be group-focused, indicating an interest in greater equality across a distribution. Thus, Rai and Fiske’s Equality motive could potentially operate at the interpersonal and group levels, although they do not make these distinctions; these would reflect microjustice concerns with fairness and reciprocity at the individual level and macrojustice concerns at the group level.

That interpersonal fairness and Social Justice reflect two distinct moral concerns becomes evident as we consider cases in which they clearly clash. An example is affirmative action. Interpersonal fairness and group-based Social Justice are often at odds here, and different outcomes are advocated depending upon whether one uses interpersonal fairness (i.e., the individual’s merit is what matters) or Social Justice (i.e., distribution of resources—jobs, education, etc.—should be more equally distributed across society) as the basis for one’s position (see, for example, Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002). The moral disagreement here is about the focus of moral concern and whether it should be on the individual or the group as a whole. Similarly, faculty members are likely to be familiar with the two different moral concerns when grading exams. Students receive a grade based on their individual performance, but then the test may be curved to reflect a “fairer” distribution across the class (also see Brickman et al., 1981, for other examples). Interestingly, Bar and Zussman (2012) found that the grade distributions of professors identified as Democrats are more egalitarian, with professors identified as Republicans assigning more very low and very high grades.

Individualizing fairness operates between individual members of groups; in contrast, a group-based morality based on Social Justice is not about interpersonal fairness, but rather concerns about the group as a whole. As Jost and Kay (2010) note, “social justice is a property of social systems” (p. 1122); it is a group-level rather than individually oriented moral concern. The focus is the well-being and integrity of the group.¹⁰ Haidt notes that these are served by adherence to the binding foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Purity, and a liberal moral orientation, focused on his individualizing foundations of Care and Fairness, threatens “*e pluribus unum*.” Interestingly, however, there is increasing evidence that the integrity and well-being of a group are served by a binding morality based on Social Justice and

egalitarianism. Thus, researchers have found that societal equality is associated with social harmony (see Kesebir, 2011). More specifically, inequality is associated with low social capital, low social trust, lower community participation, and higher levels of violent crime (e.g., Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, & Prothrow-Stith, 1997; Uslaner, 2002), and societal equality is associated with greater happiness and health (e.g., Deaton, 2003; Oishi, Kesebir, & Diener, 2011).

Furthermore, recent research based on more than 200 data sets from sources such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the U.S. Census found that among 23 of the world's wealthiest countries and individual U.S. states, those with the greatest equality (the smallest wealth differentials between rich and poor) are also those that have the highest quality of life for their citizens as a whole and not simply their poorest citizens (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). On virtually every index of well-being, deprivation, and quality of life, these researchers found a strong correlation between a country's economic level of equality and its social outcomes. Inequality has a pernicious effect on a society; it unravels the social ties that bind members of a healthy society. Paradoxically, given Haidt's perspective, Noah (2012) specifically notes that maintaining the spirit of *e pluribus unum* is particularly difficult in the context of growing income inequality (also see Stiglitz, 2012). There appears to be more than one moral route to binding a group—one focused on Social Order and the other on Social Justice.

Two Group-Based Moralities

We propose that there are two distinct group-based moralities, both communal in orientation, but reflecting different moral motives. In the case of Social Order and Social Justice moral motives, the integrity of the group is primary, but how to reach this goal differs considerably. The emphasis on order versus justice reflects fundamentally different concerns associated with protecting the group (proscriptive morality) versus providing for it (prescriptive morality), but both Social Order and Social Justice bind people into meaningful groups.

Perhaps it is not surprising that Haidt has focused on a single proscriptive group-based morality, because he strongly emphasizes human selfishness and self-interest in his work. In particular, he notes that the role of moral systems is to constrain selfishness (Haidt, 2007, 2008, 2012). Thus, he and his coauthors write of the individualizing and binding approaches to morality:

Haidt described two common types of moral systems—two ways of suppressing selfishness . . . Some cultures try to suppress selfishness by protecting individuals directly . . . Other cultures try to suppress selfishness by strengthening groups and institutions and by binding individuals into roles and duties in

order to constrain their imperfect natures. (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1030)

Furthermore, in his recent book, despite his acknowledgment of group selection, Haidt (2012) explicitly argues for a Glauconian perspective, one based on recognizing the primary role of individual self-interest and the desire to appear good rather than be good; that is, we are selfless and caring when our reputations are at stake.¹¹ His focus on a single restrictive, proscriptive group morality follows naturally from his emphasis on human selfishness and our “imperfect natures” (see Sowell, 2007, who would regard this as the constrained, vs. more positive and unconstrained, vision of human nature). In our own model we do not deny the selfish side of human nature but instead acknowledge the altruistic side as well; the former is regulated via proscriptive morality, and the latter via prescriptive morality.

Haidt (2008) views “morality as the glue that binds”; crediting Durkheim, he notes that “morality constrains individuals and ties them to each other to create groups” (Haidt, 2007, p. 1000). Durkheim (1893/1984) proposed that morality holds societies together, forming group entities with emergent properties. Although Durkheim emphasized the constraining aspects of moral groups, he nevertheless identified two ways in which a society could be “glued” together: mechanical solidarity, which is characterized by homogeneity, and organic solidarity, which is typified by interdependence. Recent work on entitativity, the degree to which a group is an entity, roughly resembles Durkheim's dual conception in that there appear to be two qualitatively different ways of achieving this end (e.g., Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000, 2002; Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006; Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sack, 2008; Wilder & Simon, 1998).

Entitativity “is the glue that holds (or is perceived as holding) a group together” (D. L. Hamilton, 2007, p. 1087). Essence theories of groups are based on perceived common attributes and are characterized by ingroup homogeneity and impermeable group boundaries, because all group members share some essential quality. In contrast, agency theories of groups are based on common goals and purpose, and are characterized by ingroup heterogeneity and permeable group boundaries (see Brewer et al., 2004). Common group identity underlies essence theories of group entitativity, whereas group interdependence around shared goals underlies agency theories. Empirical work has found that either approach can account for group entitativity; more specifically, reflecting differences between essence and agency theories of group, respectively, researchers have found that a category construal (emphasizing category membership) or a dynamic construal (emphasizing interacting members of a group) increases perceived entitativity (e.g., Rutchick et al., 2008). There are different ways of binding people into groups, and these correspond to the two group-based moralities in our model.

Social Order is consistent with an essence theory of groups. Group features such as hierarchy and homogeneity,

and indices such as loyalty and conformity, all contribute to an increased sense of order and security. For purposes of protection and avoiding harm, a major concern of this proscriptive group-based morality is identifying who is in and who is not in the group. As Graham et al. (2009) note, binding qualities of loyalty and patriotism are combined with an “extreme vigilance for traitors” (p. 103). Group conformity reflects the desire for homogeneity, and the importance of common social identity (and markers of this identity) underlies a restrictive and relatively impermeable intergroup boundary. Engaging in particular behaviors, and more importantly, inhibiting particular behaviors and lifestyles regarded as “deviant” by the group or society (see Blanton & Christie, 2003, on deviance regulation in negative incentive systems), is of crucial importance in Social Order morality.

In contrast, Social Justice is consistent with an agency theory of groups. A major concern of Social Justice-based morality is greater equality in the distribution of social resources and public goods, and thus the emphasis here is on interdependence and common goals rather than identity. The just distribution of public goods and social resources across group members is evidence of societal sharing and communal responsibility; here, the focus is on social welfare and economics, and the emphasis is on the shape of the distribution in providing public goods. Interdependence rather than common identity allows for group heterogeneity and a relatively nonrestrictive, permeable intergroup boundary.

Not surprisingly, then, the two group-based moralities are concerned with distinct social issues. Research on contemporary issues finds that they factor into two clusters (Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, & Weisberg, 2008; also see Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008). One cluster, a “Public Goods” factor, includes issues related to economic resources and opportunities such as government welfare and affirmative action, and research has found that this factor is associated with Social Justice, but not Social Order; the other cluster, a “Lifestyles” factor, includes more “personal” issues such as gay marriage and abortion, and is associated with Social Order but not Social Justice (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). Group-based moralities involve the regulation of behavior for all members of the group, and thus entail not simply self-regulation, but more broadly, social regulation.

Intragroup Heterogeneity Versus Homogeneity

The two group-based moralities—Social Order and Social Justice—implicate distinct orientations toward ingroup and outgroup members, particularly with regard to heterogeneity of ingroup members and hostility toward outgroup members. In first considering intragroup variability, it is instructive to recall an insight by Brickman et al. (1981) regarding macro-versus microjustice. They note that the presence of categorical distinctions within a group is likely to heighten the salience of macrojustice concerns. From an intragroup perspective, these “categorical distinctions” are likely to be

subgroups defined in terms of race, ethnicity, class, or whatever categories are salient in a given society. At first glance, it seems paradoxical that recognizing differences emphasizes macrojustice concerns, but this paradox resolves itself once we realize that it is acceptance of such differences, and their perceived interdependence, that may prompt the concern for communal responsibility associated with macrojustice—that is a group-based morality focused on Social Justice.

A morality based on Social Justice recognizes the importance of a superordinate category (e.g., American), but acknowledges and accepts the existence of societal subgroups. This is an orientation reflected in “multiculturalism.” Interestingly, these subgroups are often used as the units of import in determining inequalities and striving for greater equity in a society. In many ways, those who emphasize Social Justice value greater economic and resource-based homogeneity, as reflected in equality as the form of distribution across society. This binds society via communal responsibility and sharing.

In contrast, those who emphasize Social Order value greater identity-based homogeneity, which binds communities via conformity and uniformity. A morality based on Social Order places considerable emphasis on homogeneity of group members, reflecting social identity-based considerations for legitimate group membership; a single defining category for all (e.g., American) is optimal. Thus, “colorblindness” is a group value intended to blur or eliminate differences across societal subgroups (including differences that are important to subgroup members themselves and differences arising from societal inequalities). Colorblindness is consistent with a “melting pot” orientation, which is really not about melding differences but assimilating to the dominant group.

Implications of the Group-Based Moralities: Intergroup Aggression

Perhaps not surprisingly, the two group-based moralities are associated with different emphases on intergroup boundaries. Social Order morality highlights the importance of allegiance and loyalty; these are in the service of protecting group members and facilitating determinations of ingroup (vs. outgroup) membership. The boundary separating the ingroup from the outgroup is likely to be thick and relatively impermeable, relatively restrictive rather than open, thereby minimizing threat and danger. For Social Justice morality, the emphasis is on intragroup differences (i.e., minimizing inequality) rather than intergroup differences. Intergroup boundaries are likely to be far more permeable and less restrictive, and similarly, loyalty and allegiance are not apt to be emphasized.

These distinct orientations have important implications for the treatment of outgroups. Although ingroup loyalty may function to bind groups, research by Cohen, Montoya, and Insko (2006) alerts us to its dangers as well. These

	Self (personal)	Other (interpersonal)	Group (collective)	Outgroup (intergroup)
Protect/ Inhibition (proscriptive regulation)	self-restraint/ moderation	not harming	social order/ communal solidarity	increased aggression, violence
Provide/ Activation (prescriptive regulation)	industriousness	helping/ fairness	social justice/ communal responsibility	decreased aggression, violence

Figure 3. Intergroup implications of the model of moral motives.

researchers examined data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, a database of primarily preindustrial societies chosen from across the globe to be maximally cultural independent (Murdock & White, 1969). Cohen et al. (2006) found that greater loyalty to the ingroup was associated with greater aggression and violence directed toward outgroups, as well as greater valuing and enjoyment of war. Outgroup-directed moralities are implied cells in the MMM, as shown in Figure 3. We would expect that loyalty that manifests as patriotism, particularly blind patriotism and nationalism, would be especially dangerous vis-à-vis outgroup-directed violence. It represents a darker side of Social Order-based morality (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). Similarly, recent work on ingroup glorification versus attachment (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) suggests the dangers of glorification for outgroup members as well. Thus, Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, and Giner-Sorolla (2010) found that ingroup glorification, but not attachment, was associated with resistance to justice and moral disengagement for ingroup-committed atrocities of outgroup members. Although attachment to the ingroup may reflect a fundamental need of individuals, this work suggests that it is not attachment that matters for outgroup-focused atrocities, but rather a form of loyalty and allegiance based on comparison with other groups. Subjective identification with the group (i.e., attachment) is part and parcel of belonging to groups, but glorification entails feelings of ingroup superiority and emphasizes obedience and loyalty to the ingroup (Leidner et al., 2010). Again, these attributes are underscored in morality-based groups focused on Social Order rather than Social Justice.

Of course there may well be vulnerabilities associated with the latter group-based morality as well; thus, an argument from the Right is that liberals are likely to underestimate true dangers and real external threats. This suggests a need to more closely consider the relationship between the two group-based moralities and political ideology. Group-based moralities are focused on the group as a whole; although they implicate an individual's behaviors, they importantly involve the regulation of behavior for members of the group, and thus entail not simply self-regulation, but more broadly, social regulation, which is the domain of politics.

Political Ideologies: Reconsidering Individualizing and Binding Moralities

Based on the MMM, Haidt's moral foundations theory supports a false dichotomy that pits individualizing liberals against conservatives who evidence individualizing and binding moralities. In our taxonomy, liberals and conservatives are individualizing and binding in orientation; they engage in interpersonal (individualizing) moral actions as well as group-based morality. Not surprisingly, the two group-based moralities are associated with different political ideologies, with Social Order associated with political conservatism and Social Justice with political liberalism (Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008; also see, for example, Bobbio, 1996; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Kerlinger, 1984; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Skitka, 1999; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Haidt and colleagues recognize a proscriptive group-based morality reflecting conservatives' communal concerns; however, once a prescriptive group-based morality is acknowledged, liberals' communal concerns become evident as well. Interestingly, it is libertarians, and not liberals, who lack a group-based morality. Libertarians are low on both Social Order and Social Justice, whereas, communitarians are high on both.

That liberals and conservatives have communal concerns is supported by data we collected using Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) Individualism–Collectivism Scale. Paralleling the two group-based moralities, Triandis (2001) distinguishes between horizontal and vertical collectivism; individuals high on horizontal collectivism emphasize equality, sharing, and cooperation, whereas those high on vertical collectivism emphasize hierarchy and readily submit to authority. Based on the responses of 1,015 respondents, we found that that liberalism–conservatism was not associated with overall collectivism scores ($B = .057, p = .471$), but was associated with the horizontal–vertical dimension of the scale. More specifically, greater conservatism (i.e., decreased liberalism) was positively associated with vertical collectivism ($B = .333, p < .001$) and negatively associated with horizontal collectivism ($B = -.254, p < .001$); liberalism was thus positively associated with horizontal collectivism and negatively associated with vertical collectivism. The differences between horizontal and vertical collectivism reflect differences (i.e., equality vs. hierarchy) that are associated with Social Justice and Social Order, respectively.

As noted above, Social Order and Social Justice moral motives focus on different factors in the interest of satisfying goals that ultimately serve fundamental motives to protect versus provide for group members. Social Justice morality, focused on communal responsibility and the distribution of group resources, seeks to regulate public resources, which largely represent the economic domain. In contrast, Social Order seeks regulation in the domain of lifestyles and

personal behaviors, which essentially serve as social identity markers of group belonging.¹² When we consider these orientations politically, we see that we are dealing with powerful Left–Right differences in terms of government involvement versus autonomy. We typically think of conservatives as those who want limited government and a strong emphasis on personal liberty, and liberals as those who want a stronger government, with a more limited emphasis on personal liberty. However, these are surely false distinctions, because the domain of regulation is of paramount importance. That is, liberals and conservatives want strong government regulation (i.e., social regulation), but in different domains; and they both want personal liberty and autonomy—no regulation—but again in different domains.

Returning to their distinct social regulatory foci, conservatives want strong government regulation and involvement when it comes to personal behaviors (often involving the body) and lifestyles, but want autonomy when it comes to economics and public goods. In contrast, liberals want autonomy—government hands-off—when it comes to personal behaviors (often involving the body) and lifestyles but want strong government regulation of economics and the distribution of public goods and resources. Interestingly, supporting their protection priorities, conservatives also want strong government involvement when it comes to national security and defense, as well as more local security matters such as the size of police forces.

In the domains in which each side prefers regulation, the protect–provide differences between liberalism and conservatism are often manifested in the nature of the desired regulation, particularly with regard to inhibition (proscriptive) and activation (prescriptive). Thus, in recent culture wars, conservatives have emphasized the importance of inhibition (e.g., restriction of abortion, gay marriage, stem cell research), and liberals have emphasized the importance of activation in the establishment of government programs (e.g., welfare, universal health care, affirmative action program).

Moral Regulation, Politics, and the Uniqueness of Group-Based Moralities

To more fully appreciate the nature of group-based moralities, we return to the full six-cell MMM, with its rows defined by protect/proscriptive regulation and provide/prescriptive regulation and its columns defined by the focus of moral concern (i.e., self, other, group). The two forms of moral regulation are derived from work on self-regulation that distinguishes between a behavioral approach/activation system and a behavioral avoidance/inhibition system. Just as highly adaptive organisms rely on approach and avoidance in responding to their environment, we generally operate on the basis of proscriptive and prescriptive regulation in our daily lives. We try to avoid transgressions, inhibit temptations, engage in good deeds, and lead moral lives. Surely we are not

always successful, sometimes failing in self-restraint, other times failing to provide needed help. However, there is nothing antagonistic about the proscriptive and prescriptive systems when dealing with moral regulation of our own behavior (i.e., self-regulation), whether targeting ourselves or others. People who try to avoid harming others are likely to want to help as well, at least some of the time, and vice versa. Similarly, the Self-Restraint/Moderation motive is positively rather than negatively correlated with Industriousness (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). Although people may have a dominant perspective or greater sensitivity to one or the other form of self-regulation, proscriptive and prescriptive regulation in the first two columns of the model, referring to morality directed at the self and another, are wholly compatible. A moral life comprises both types of moral regulation.

However, the comfortable relationship between the two forms of moral regulation seems to break down when we move to the group (i.e., third column). Here, we are dealing with social regulation rather than solely self-regulation; although this social regulation implicates individual behavior, it is really about moral rules and standards applied by and for the group. And here proscriptive and prescriptive regulation take distinct forms that seem more antagonistic than compatible. Advocacy of Social Order and Social Justice are negatively correlated (e.g., Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). This group context is the realm of politics, and as discussed above, Social Order and Social Justice reflect different political orientations. It is intriguing to consider why the two forms of moral regulation (i.e., proscriptive and prescriptive regulation), so compatible at the individual and interpersonal level, become so conflictual at the group level. The two group-based moralities become the battleground for distinct moral orientations focused on protecting versus providing, societal losses versus gains, and stability (inhibition) versus change (activation).

Group-based morality is about societal rules and standards—social regulation rather than self-regulation regarding own behavior toward the self and others. Social regulation implicates one's own behaviors but is focused on the collective and communal obligations or prohibitions. For the self and interpersonal contexts, prescriptive–proscriptive balance resides within the individual. That is, the (im)moral actor is the unit of analysis, and here the two regulatory orientations comfortably coexist, called upon as the person and situation demand, constraining our selfishness and enabling our altruistic impulses. However, the relevant unit of analysis for group-based moralities is not the individual, but rather the group or society as a whole. And just as proscriptive and prescriptive morality are relatively balanced in a healthy individual, the two moralities are also relatively balanced at the societal (group) level, with both well-represented across society, as reflected in political ideologies.

When exploring these differences through political liberals and conservatives, we can see the divergence in moral regulation as we move from self-regulation to social regulation. As discussed below, there is increasing evidence that

political liberals and conservatives differ in their sensitivities to positive and negative outcomes generally, and to prescriptive and proscriptive morality more specifically; prescriptive regulation is more likely to be dominant for liberals, and proscriptive regulation is more likely to be dominant for conservatives. These differences are minimally apparent when the moral focus is on the self or another, but are extremely apparent when the moral focus is the group.

Janoff-Bulman (2009) suggested that conservatism is broadly based in avoidance motivation, and liberalism in approach motivation. It is not simply that societies become more conservative in times of salient dangers and insecurity, which is the case (e.g., Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006; Landau et al., 2004; McCann, 1997), but that liberals and conservatives themselves differ in their sensitivities to positive and negative outcomes, gains, and losses. These links—between conservatism and avoidance motivation and between liberalism and approach motivation—have been demonstrated in a number of quite distinct studies. For example, participants in a study by Shook and Fazio (2009) played a computer game that involved learning whether novel stimuli produced positive or negative outcomes. Conservative participants learned negative stimuli better than positive; furthermore, they used a more cautious, avoidant strategy, whereas liberals used a more open, approach strategy to novel stimuli. Recent work that manipulated message framing demonstrated that conservatives showed greater sensitivity to losses than gains, whereas liberals were more sensitive to gains than losses (Lavine et al., 1999). Furthermore, Oxley et al. (2008) found that conservatives show higher physiological reactivity to threat (i.e., sudden noises and threatening visual images) than liberals. And in their 20-year longitudinal study of personality, Block and Block (2006) found that 23-year-old conservatives were likely to have been described as fearful and overcontrolled preschoolers two decades earlier, whereas 23-year-old liberals were likely to have been described as resilient and energetic as preschoolers. Similarly, Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, and Roisman (2012) found that fearfulness in childhood was associated with conservatism in late adolescence, whereas high activity levels in childhood were associated with liberalism in late adolescence. In general, conservatives are higher on threat sensitivity (Jost et al., 2003), which is associated with inhibition-based avoidance motivation, whereas liberals are higher on Openness to Experience (McCrae, 1996), which is linked to activation-based approach motivation.

In addition, recent research on purity and disgust has found that the tendency to feel disgust (“disgust sensitivity”) is associated with political conservatism (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009). This relationship has been confirmed in voting behavior and in international samples (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2011). Disgust is strongly linked to avoidance motivation (no doubt originally to pathogens and rotten foods) and is particularly apparent

regarding issues such as gay marriage and abortion, which are related to conservatives’ purity perceptions and regarded as “social dangers” (Inbar et al., 2009).

Together these findings provide converging support for different motivational orientations of liberals and conservatives, with liberals emphasizing approach/activation and conservatives emphasizing avoidance/inhibition. Not surprisingly, in the moral domain these differences translate into differences in emphasis on proscriptive versus prescriptive morality. In recent research that included a measure of proscriptive–prescriptive regulation (i.e., Moralisms Scale, Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009), we found greater conservatism positively correlated with proscriptive morality and negatively correlated with prescriptive morality (and thus liberalism, the opposite end of the scale, was positively correlated with prescriptive morality and negatively correlated with proscriptive morality). In addition, differential sensitivity to proscriptive morality was demonstrated in research that primed moral regulation and explored cognitive categorization (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Using categorization of neutral stimuli (e.g., whether “camel” is a member of the category “vehicle”) based on the work of Rosch (1975), when primed with proscriptions, conservatives (but not liberals) used narrower categories; that is, they did not include less prototypical items in the category, thereby raising the bar for inclusion. Liberals were not sensitive to proscriptions but were nonrestrictive regardless of prime.

Recent research on parenting and politics further illustrates these proscriptive–prescriptive differences. In a longitudinal investigation of the antecedents of political ideology, Fraley et al. (2012) found that parents’ authoritarian attitudes (assessed when the child was 1 month old) predicted children’s conservatism 18 years later, whereas parents’ egalitarian attitudes predicted children’s political liberalism. In our own research with parents and their college-aged children, we also found an association between restrictive parenting and greater political conservatism (Janoff-Bulman, Carnes, & Sheikh, 2013). McAdams and colleagues (McAdams et al., 2008) used a very different methodology and explored life narratives of political liberals and conservatives. These researchers found that conservatives emphasized authority figures who were strict enforcers of moral rules, whereas liberals emphasized lessons learned about empathy and openness (also see Lakoff, 2002, on the “strict father” metaphor for conservatism and the “nurturant parent” metaphor for liberalism). Given that the two types of moral regulation reflect broader differences in approach–avoidance regulation, these distinct liberal–conservative sensitivities to proscriptive versus prescriptive regulation are likely to represent more general differences in approach/activation versus avoidance/inhibition orientation.

These differences in approach–avoidance are not very apparent when dealing with moral self-regulation (the first two columns of the model, with the self or another as the focus of one’s moral concern), because the compatibility of

the two forms of moral regulation precludes having to make a choice; one can rely on both, and one's own action (or inaction) will no doubt depend largely on factors such as the particular behavior involved (e.g., gluttony vs. gambling) or the specific other involved (e.g., close friend vs. stranger). Helping, not harming, moderation, and industriousness are likely, in general, to be desired (moral) outcomes in the behavioral repertoires of both liberals and conservatives. However, when we move to the group level, the more antagonistic nature of moral regulation appears to require that we choose one or the other type of group-based morality. And thus conservatives, more sensitive to proscriptive regulation, opt for a restrictive morality that seeks to protect group members, whereas liberals, more sensitive to prescriptive regulation, opt for an enabling morality that seeks to provide for group members.

When we move to the group level of morality, the regulatory balance afforded individuals is now located at the societal level. The balance is represented by the distinct moral orientations represented in Social Order and Social Justice. Given the potent negative reactions to those across the political aisle, it might seem absurd to suggest that the coexistence of the two group-based moralities reflected in our broadest political orientations—liberalism and conservatism—may be important for a healthy society. Of course, the current political paralysis in Washington makes it clear that the differences can produce extreme challenges and difficulties, particularly as the two perspectives get more polarized and the game of politics takes precedence over the moral tasks to be accomplished. It is nevertheless worth considering that in the best of all worlds, each perspective serves as a counterweight to the other—as a corrective to going too far in one direction or the other. Surely a healthy society embraces both tradition and change, stability and innovation, and works to protect and provide for its members.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article is based on work supported by National Science Foundation Grant BCS 1053139 to Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and National Science Foundation Grant S12100000211 to Nate C. Carnes.

Notes

1. This difference between strict rules and guiding principles is evident in the distinction between rules and standards in law (see, for example, Kaplow, 1992; Sullivan, 1992).
2. We have also found that the two forms of moral regulation underlie distinct moral emotions; specifically shame is based

on proscriptive regulation and guilt in prescriptive regulation (see Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010).

3. Given that morality is an ingroup phenomenon, the ingroup and its members (self and others) comprise the columns of our model; we do not include outgroups or intergroup concerns. However, below we discuss the implications of the model for intergroup behavior.
4. Early evolutionary accounts of altruism focused on kin selection (e.g., W. Hamilton, 1964), whereby we incur a cost to ourselves to help family members (i.e., those with whom we share genes). This could not account for altruism toward nonkin, which became the focus of reciprocal altruism (e.g., Trivers, 1971). Here, direct reciprocity is the basis of altruistic helping; that is, I temporarily reduce my own "fitness" in helping another, with the expectation that the other will act similarly toward me in the future. Such a strategy might work in small groups, in which people are likely to have direct interactions, but it cannot account for altruistic behavior in large groups of people who do not directly interact. And thus, a theory of "indirect reciprocity" (e.g., Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005), or signaling theory, was born, with its emphasis on reputation. A good reputation garnered through altruistic behavior is more likely to produce in-kind behavior from another who was not the initial recipient of helping. For many, human altruism and cooperation remained an evolutionary enigma. As Fehr and Gächter (2002) note, "Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reproductive gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signaling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism (p. 137)."
5. This solution is far from new. For example, Darwin (1871/1998) believed in group selection and proposed that groups with altruists have a definite survival advantage.
6. The five works were de Waal (1996), Brown (1991), Fiske (1991), Schwartz and Bilsky (1990), and Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997). As noted by Haidt (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010), the de Waal book describes the "building blocks" of morality found in other primates, and the other four works provide taxonomies of values and practices across cultures. Haidt and Joseph (2004) initially specified four moral modules (suffering/compassion, reciprocity/fairness, hierarchy/respect, and purity/pollution), but recognized loyalty and noted that it could be grounded in reciprocity or hierarchy. In subsequent articles (e.g., Haidt, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007), ingroup/loyalty is presented as a fifth foundation.
7. In his recent book, Haidt (2012) has added a sixth foundation, Liberty/Oppression, "which makes people notice and resent any sign of attempted domination" (p. 185). However, Haidt (2012) himself writes, "The sixth foundation, Liberty/Oppression, is provisional" (p. 347), thus far lacking adequate

empirical tests. Given that all of his previously published (and peer-reviewed) articles and empirical research have been based on the five foundations, in this article, we focus on these, although we briefly discuss his additional foundation, Liberty/Oppression, and its relevance to our argument (see, Note 9). In his book, Haidt (2012) also changed some of the foundation labels and refers to Harm/Care, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation. In this article, we use his original labels, as presented in all of his previous articles and journal publications.

8. Purity concerns (typically reflected in rules and taboos around food and sex), though important for building group commitment, probably involved the “co-opting” of a mechanism that evolved for other purposes, such as avoiding rotten food (see Joyce, 2007; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008).
9. Haidt (2012) notes that his additional provisional foundation, Liberty/Oppression, is embraced by both liberals and conservatives. When considering six rather than five foundations, Haidt again argues that liberals rely on only three, whereas conservatives rely on all six, again giving conservatives the advantage when it comes to understanding each other; only conservatives rely on the three binding, group-based foundations (Loyalty, Authority, and Purity).
10. Similarly, the group-based focus of Social Justice distinguishes it from the individualizing foundation of Care, which entails a response to the specific needs or attributes of individuals. In the case of Social Justice, providing for others in one’s group derives from a moral concern with the well-being of the group as a whole, reflected in the desire for an egalitarian distribution of resources across a society; it is not a reaction to the specific needs of particular group members. Interestingly, in Schwartz and Bilsky’s (1990) highly regarded work on values, Social Justice and egalitarianism fall under “universalism,” which is distinguished from “benevolence.” Of course these are not mutually exclusive moral concerns and in some cases no doubt operate together. Contrary to Rai and Fiske (2011), who see equality as a basic foundation (also see Kesebir, 2011, who sees a preference for egalitarianism as basic to human groups), and our own perspective regarding Social Justice, Haidt (2012) relates any interest in Social Justice to Care/Harm and Liberty/Oppression, which he maintains are embraced by both the Left and the Right. He thereby denies a liberal group-based morality and reinforces his belief in the “conservative advantage” regarding morality and understanding of the other side of the political spectrum.
11. Interestingly, Haidt (2012) argues for group selection, but writes that as a consequence we are “groupish.” Throughout the relevant chapters, he notes we are “selfish and groupish” rather than “selfish and altruistic,” as E.O. Wilson (2012) maintains. Haidt argues that group selection results in our being good at promoting our group’s interests when competing with other groups; we are, however, overwhelmingly selfish (90%), with a “groupish overlay” (p. 191). Thus, whereas E. O. Wilson (2012) believes multi-level selection has resulted

in two sides to human nature—humans who are fundamentally both selfish/self-interested and altruistic/cooperative, Haidt (2012) believes we are fundamentally selfish; we have a conditional hive switch, but only rarely do we transcend self-interest to act in a selfless, cooperative way.

12. Surely not every issue supported by liberals is focused on providing nor every issue supported by conservatives is focused on protecting. Yet the broad political agendas of the two groups reflect underlying differences in these protect–provide orientations. Thus, it is not surprising that in political campaigns, conservatives emphasize fear and liberals emphasize hope (see Zakaria, 2008).

References

- Aksan, N., & Kochanska, G. (2005). Conscience in childhood: Old questions, new answers. *Developmental Psychology*, 41, 506-516.
- Alexander, R. (1987). *The biology of moral systems*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Bar, T., & Zussman, A. (2012). Partisan grading. *American Economics Journal: Applied Economics*, 4, 30-48.
- Batson, C. D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behavior. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., pp. 262-316). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. *Review of General Psychology*, 5, 323-370.
- Blanton, H., & Christie, C. (2003). Deviance regulation: A theory of identity and action. *Review of General Psychology*, 7, 115-149.
- Block, J., & Block, J. H. (2006). Nursery school personality and political orientation two decades later. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 40, 734-749.
- Bobbio, N. (1996). *Left and right*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Bonanno, G. A., & Jost, J. T. (2006). Conservative shift among high-exposure survivors of the September 11th terrorist attacks. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 28, 311-323.
- Bowles, S. (2006). Group competition, reproductive leveling, and the evolution of human altruism. *Science*, 314, 1569-1572.
- Boyd, R. (2006). The puzzle of human sociality. *Science*, 314, 1555-1556.
- Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this “we”? Levels of collective identity and self representations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71, 83-93.
- Brewer, M. B., Hong, Y., & Li, Q. (2004). Dynamic entitativity: Perceiving groups as actors. In V. Yzerbyt, C. M. Judd, & O. Corneille (Eds.), *The psychology of group perception: Contributions to the study of homogeneity, entitativity and essentialism* (pp. 25-38). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
- Brickman, P., Folger, R., Goode, E., & Schul, Y. (1981). Microjustice and macrojustice. In M. J. Lerner & S. C. Lerner (Eds.), *The justice motive in social behavior* (pp. 173-202). New York, NY: Plenum.
- Brooks, D. (2011, May 17). Nice guys finish first. *The New York Times*, A25.

- Brown, D. E. (1991). *Human universals*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Carnes, N. C., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2012). Harm, help, and the nature of (im)moral (in)action. *Psychological Inquiry*, 23, 137-142.
- Carver, C. S. (2006). Approach, avoidance, and the self-regulation of affect and action. *Motivation and Emotion*, 30, 105-110.
- Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). *On the self-regulation of behavior*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (2008). Feedback processes in the simultaneous regulation of affect and action. In J. Y. Shah & W. L. Gardner (Eds.), *Handbook of motivation science* (pp. 308-324). New York, NY: Guilford.
- Cohen, T. R., Montoya, R. M., & Insko, C. A. (2006). Group morality and intergroup relations: Cross-cultural and experimental evidence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32, 1559-1572.
- Dahlsgaard, K., Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2005). Shared virtue: The convergence of valued human strengths across culture and history. *Review of General Psychology*, 9, 203-213.
- Darwin, C. (1998). *The descent of man and selection in relation to sex*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. (Original work published 1871)
- Deaton, A. (2003). Health, inequality, and economic development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 41, 113-158.
- de Waal, F. B. M. (1996). *Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- de Waal, F. B. M. (2008). Putting altruism back into altruism: The evolution of empathy. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 59, 279-300.
- Durkheim, E. (1984). *The division of labor in society*. New York, NY: Free Press. (Original work published 1887)
- Eagly, A. H. (1987). *Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Edsall, T. B. (2011, November 14). The gulf of morality. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/the-gulf-of-morality/>
- Elliot, A. J., & Church, M. A. (1997). A hierarchical model of approach and avoidance achievement motivation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72, 218-232.
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. *Nature*, 415, 137-140.
- Fiske, A. P. (1991). *Structures of social life: The four elementary forms of human relations: Communal sharing, authority ranking, equality-matching, market-pricing*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Forster, J., Friedman, R. S., Ozelsel, A., & Denzler, M. (2006). Enactment of approach and avoidance behavior influences on the scope of perceptual and conceptual attention. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 42, 133-146.
- Fraley, R. C., Griffin, B. N., Belsky, J., & Roisman, G. I. (2012). Developmental antecedents of political ideology: A longitudinal investigation from birth to age 18. *Psychological Science*, 23, 1425-1431.
- Gable, S. L., Reis, H. T., & Elliot, A. J. (2003). Evidence for bivariate systems: An empirical test of appetition and aversion across domains. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 37, 349-372.
- Gable, S. L., & Strachman, A. (2008). Approaching social rewards and avoiding social punishments: Appetitive and aversive social motivation. In J. Y. Shah & W. L. Gardner (Eds.), *Handbook of motivation science* (pp. 561-575). New York, NY: Guilford.
- Gilbert, D. T., Fiske, S. T., & Gardner, L. (Eds.). (1998). *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Graham, J., & Haidt, J. (2010). Beyond beliefs: Religions bind individuals into moral communities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14, 140-150.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. (2009). Liberals and conservatives use different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96, 1029-1046.
- Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101, 366-385.
- Gray, J. A. (1982). *The neuropsychology of anxiety: An inquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Gray, J. A. (1990). Brain systems that mediate both emotion and cognition. *Cognition & Emotion*, 4, 269-288.
- Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012). Mind perception is the essence of morality. *Psychological Inquiry*, 23, 101-124.
- Greenwald, A. G., & Breckler, S. J. (1985). To whom is the self presented? In B. Schlenker (Ed.), *The self and social life* (pp. 126-145). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. *Science*, 316, 998-1002.
- Haidt, J. (2008). Morality. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 3, 65-72.
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. *Social Justice Research*, 20, 98-116.
- Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. *Daedalus*, 133(4), 55-66.
- Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2007). The moral mind: How 5 sets of innate moral intuitions guide the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich (Eds.), *The innate mind* (Vol. 3, pp. 367-391). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Haidt, J., & Ksebir, S. (2010). Morality. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (5th ed., pp. 797-832). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Hamilton, D. L. (2007). Understanding the complexities of group perception: Broadening the domain. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 37, 1077-1101.
- Hamilton, W. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behavior I and II. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 7, 1-52.

- Harbaugh, W. T., Mayr, U., & Burghart, D. R. (2007). Neural responses to taxation and voluntary giving reveal motives for charitable donations. *Science*, 316, 1622-1625.
- Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2000). Essentialist beliefs about social categories. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 39, 127-139.
- Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2002). Are essentialist beliefs associated with prejudice? *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 41, 87-100.
- Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. *American Psychologist*, 52, 1280-1300.
- Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 20, pp. 1-46). New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Hsieh, C. C., & Pugh, M. D. (1993). Poverty, income inequality, and violent crime: A meta-analysis of recent aggregate data studies. *Criminal Justice Review*, 18, 182-202.
- Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D., Iyer, R., & Haidt, J. (2012). Disgust sensitivity, political conservatism, and voting. *Social Psychological & Personality Science*, 3, 537-544.
- Inbar, Y., Pizarro, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted than liberals. *Cognition & Emotion*, 4, 714-725.
- Ip, G., Chiu, C., & Wan, C. (2006). Birds of a feather and birds flocking together: Physical versus behavioral cues may lead to trait-versus goal-based group perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90, 368-381.
- Janoff-Bulman, R. (2009). To provide or protect: Motivational bases of political liberalism and conservatism. *Psychological Inquiry*, 20, 120-128.
- Janoff-Bulman, R. (2011). Conscience: The do's and don'ts of moral regulation. In M. Milkuciner & P. Shaver (Eds.), *The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil* (pp. 131-148). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Janoff-Bulman, R., Carnes, N., & Sheikh, S. (2013). *Parenting style and politics: Early bases of distinct moral orientations*. Manuscript in preparation.
- Janoff-Bulman, R., & Sheikh, S. (2006). From national trauma to moralizing nation (Special issue: In the Era of 9/11: Social Psychology and Security). *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 28, 325-332.
- Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Baldacci, K. G. (2008). Mapping moral motives: Approach avoidance, and political orientation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 44, 1091-1099.
- Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Hepp, S. (2009). Proscriptive versus prescriptive morality: Two faces of moral regulation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96, 521-537.
- Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129, 339-375.
- Jost, J. T., & Kay, A. C. (2010). Social justice: History, theory, and research. In S. T. Fiske, D. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (5th ed, pp. 1122-1165). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Jost, J. T., Nosek, B. A., & Gosling, S. D. (2008). Ideology: Its resurgence in social, personality, and political psychology. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 3, 126-136.
- Joyce, R. (2007). *The evolution of morality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kaplow, L. (1992). Rules versus standards: An economic analysis. *Duke Law Journal*, 42, 557-629.
- Kawachi, I., Kennedy, B. P., Lochner, K., & Prothrow-Stith, D. (1997). Social capital, income inequality and morality. *American Journal of Public Health*, 87, 1491-1498.
- Keltner, D. (2009). *Born to be good: The science of a meaningful life*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. *Psychological Review*, 110, 265-284.
- Kerlinger, F. N. (1984). *Liberalism and conservatism: The nature and structure of social attitudes*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Kesebir, S. (2011). The superorganism account of human sociality: How and when human groups are like beehives. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 16, 233-261.
- Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, E. R. (1986). *Beliefs about inequality: Americans' view of what is and what ought to be*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Knobe, J. (2005). Theory of mind and moral cognition: Exploring the connections. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 9, 357-359.
- Knobe, J. (2010). Person as scientist, person as moralist. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 33, 315-329.
- Kochanska, G. (2002). Committed compliance, moral self, and internalization: A mediational model. *Developmental Psychology*, 38, 339-351.
- Kochanska, G., Coy, K. C., & Murray, K. T. (2001). The development of self-regulation in the first four years of life. *Child Development*, 72, 1091-1111.
- Kohlberg, L. (1981). *The philosophy of moral development* (Essays on moral development: Volume 1). San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row.
- Kohlberg, L. (1984). *The psychology of moral development* (Essays on moral development: Volume 2). San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row.
- Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Towards a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political Psychology*, 10, 257-274.
- Lakoff, G. (2002). *Moral politics: How liberals and conservatives think*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Landau, M. J., Sheldon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., & Cook, A. (2004). Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 on support of President George W. Bush. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30, 1136-1150.
- Lavine, H., Burgess, D., Snyder, M., Transue, J., Sullivan, J. L., Haney, B., & Wagner, S. H. (1999). Threat, authoritarianism and voting: An investigation of personality and persuasion. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 25, 337-347.
- Leidner, B., Castano, E., Zaiser, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2010). Ingroup glorification, moral disengagement, and justice in the context of collective violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36, 1115-1129.

- Lewis-Beck, M. S., Jacoby, W. G., Norpoth, H., & Weisberg, H. F. (2008). *The American voter revisited*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- McAdams, D. P., Albaugh, M., Farber, E., Daniels, J., Logan, R., & Olson, B. (2008). Family metaphors and moral intuitions: How conservatives and liberals narrate their lives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95, 978-990.
- McCann, S. J. H. (1997). Threatening times, "strong" presidential popular vote winners, and the victory margin, 1824-1964. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73, 160-170.
- McCrae, R. R. (1996). Social consequences of experiential openness. *Psychological Bulletin*, 120, 323-337.
- Murdock, G. P., & White, D. R. (1969). Standard cross-cultural sample. *Ethnology*, 9, 329-369.
- Noah, T. (2012). *The great divergence: America's growing inequality crisis and what we can do about it*. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press.
- Nowak, M. A., & Highfield, R. (2011). *Super cooperators: Altruism, evolution, and why we need each other to succeed*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. *Nature*, 437, 1291-1298.
- Oishi, S., Kesebir, S., & Diener, E. (2011). Income inequality and happiness. *Psychological Science*, 22, 1095-1100.
- Oxley, D. R., Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, M. V., Miller, J. L., Scalero, M., & Hibbing, J. R. (2008). Political attitudes vary with physiological traits. *Science*, 321, 1667-1670.
- Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011). Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. *Psychological Review*, 118, 57-75.
- Rawls, J. (2005). *A theory of justice* (2nd ed.). Harvard, MA: Belknap.
- Rilling, J., Gutman, D., Zeh, T., Pagnoni, G., Berns, G., & Kilts, C. (2002). A neural basis for social cooperation. *Neuron*, 35, 395-405.
- Roccas, S., Klar, Y., & Liviatan, I. (2006). The paradox of group-based guilt: Modes of national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the in-group's moral violations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91, 698-711.
- Rock, M., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2010). Where do we draw our lines? Politics, rigidity, and the role of self-regulation. *Social Psychological & Personality Science*, 1, 26-33.
- Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive representations of semantic categories. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 104, 192-233.
- Rozin, P., Haidt, J., & McCauley, C. R. (2008). Disgust. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 757-776). New York, NY: Guilford.
- Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 5, 296-320.
- Rutchick, A. M., Hamilton, D. L., & Sack, J. D. (2008). Antecedents of entitativity in categorically and dynamically construed groups. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 38, 905-921.
- Schatz, R. T., Staub, E., & Lavine, H. (1999). On the varieties of national attachment: Blind versus constructive patriotism. *Political Psychology*, 20, 151-174.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1990). Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: Extensions and cross-cultural replications. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58, 878-891.
- Sedikides, C., & Brewer, M. (Eds.). (2001). *Individual self, relational self, collective self*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Semin, G. R., Higgins, T., de Montes, L. G., Estourget, Y., & Valencia, J. F. (2005). Linguistic signatures of regulatory focus: How abstraction fits promotion more than prevention. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89, 36-45.
- Sheikh, S., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2010). A self-regulatory perspective on shame and guilt. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36, 213-224.
- Shook, N., & Fazio, R. H. (2009). Political ideology, exploration of novel stimuli, and attitude formation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45, 995-998.
- Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The "big three" of morality (autonomy, community, divinity) and the "big three" explanations of suffering. In A. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), *Morality and health* (pp. 119-169). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Skitka, L. J. (1999). Ideological and attributional boundaries on public compassion: Reactions to individuals and communities affected by a natural disaster. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 25, 793-808.
- Skitka, L. J., Mullen, E., Griffin, T., Hutchinson, S., & Chamberlin, B. (2002). Dispositions, scripts or motivated correction? Understanding ideological differences in explanations for social problems. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83, 470-487.
- Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). *Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Son Hing, L. S., Bobocel, D. R., & Zanna, M. P. (2002). Meritocracy and opposition to affirmative action: Making concessions in the face of discrimination. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83, 493-509.
- Sowell, T. (2007). *A conflict of visions: The ideological origins of political struggles*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2012). *The price of inequality: How today's divided society endangers our future*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Sullivan, K. M. (1992). The Supreme Court, 1991 term-forward: The justice of rules and standards. *Harvard Law Review*, 106, 22-123.
- Triandis, H. C. (2001). Individualism-collectivism and personality. *Journal of Personality*, 69, 907-924.
- Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74, 118-128.
- Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. *Quarterly Review of Biology*, 46, 35-57.
- Turiel, E. (1983). *The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Uslaner, E. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Vaish, A., Grossmann, T., & Woodward, A. (2008). Not all emotions are created equal: The negativity bias in social-emotional development. *Psychological Bulletin*, 134, 383-403.
- Walker, L. J., & Pitts, R. C. (1998). Naturalistic conceptions of moral maturity. *Developmental Psychology*, 34, 403-419.
- Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. *Science*, 311, 1301-1303.
- Wilder, D., & Simon, A. F. (1998). Categorical and dynamic groups: Implications for social perception and intergroup behavior. In C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, & C. A. Insko (Eds.), *Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior* (pp. 27-44). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. (2009). *The spirit level: Why more equal societies almost always do better*. New York, NY: Allen Lane.
- Wilson, E. O. (2012). *The social conquest of earth*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Wood, A. H., & Eagly, A. H. (2010). Gender. In S. Fiske, D. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 629-667). New York, NY: John Wiley.
- Zakaria, F. (2008, July 28). Obama abroad. *Newsweek*, 22.