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The Ideological Roots of Elite Political Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia

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IN AUTUMN 1993 RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY stood at a critical historical crossroads. Only two years earlier, the collapse of the hegemonic rule of the Communist Party and dissolution of the Soviet state seemed to have eliminated the last impediments to the process of political, social and economic transformation begun by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. In stark contrast to the euphoria which prevailed after the attempted coup of August 1991, a profound pessimism over the country's political future increasingly pervaded Russian society over the 1992–93 period. In large measure this pessimism was a reaction to a seemingly irresolvable elite conflict. By late 1992 virtually the entire Moscow political elite, as well as segments of regional and local elites, was divided between either the camp supporting President El'tsin or that of his two chief critics, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rutskoi. Ultimately culminating in gun battles on the streets of Moscow, the elite conflict threatened an internal rupture of the Russian state and raised the spectre of the disintegration of the nation itself.

Remarkably, this dangerous conflict arose within an elite group that had only two years earlier presented itself as consensually unified.[1] Not only were El'tsin, Khasbulatov and Rutskoi allies during the 1991 coup, but they comprised the team that led the Russian parliament. This team worked together before the dramatic events of August to establish representative democracy in Russia, strengthen the market, privatise land and state enterprises, and to expand the power of the Russian Federation relative to what it perceived as the 'partocratic' and 'bureaucratic' Soviet state.[2]

What accounts for the complete destruction of a once fruitful political alliance and the polarisation of 'democratic forces' over the period 1991–93? Institutional competition, weak institutionalisation of the Russian state—seen in the absence of clear lines of authority and ill defined relations among institutions—and deeply embedded patterns of elite conflict behaviour were all undoubtedly important contributing factors. However, the content of political speech in 1992–93, the formation of a recognised political spectrum,[3] and the shifting positions and alliances of actors along this spectrum all point toward the central role of an additional factor—ideology. Why and how did ideological disagreement develop within an elite group that saw itself in late 1991 as having triumphed *over* ideology? How did Khasbulatov, Rutskoi and other leaders of the opposition repressed in October 1993 come to acquire the labels 'hardliner', 'communist' or 'nationalist' when in August 1991 they had been 'democrats'?

The results presented in this article from a focus-group interview study of a sample of the Moscow elite conducted in June 1991 suggest that the elite dissension which culminated in the destructive climax of October 1993 arose from differences between discrete attitudinal tendencies which were present within the reformist elite group on the eve of the August coup. While not then expressed in the form of opposing programmes, tensions between these tendencies became fault lines around which post-Soviet elite ideologies emerged. Over the period August 1991 to June 1992 the emerging ideological spectrum led to the development of more or less coherent policy programmes and organised political camps and thus became a basis for elite fragmentation. The apparent inability of the various liberal factions to achieve compromise and a *modus vivendi*, I argue here, led to the creation of deep enmities and further polarisation as El'tsin's opponents repositioned themselves ideologically to attract support from the nationalist/communist fringe.

The origins of post-Soviet elite ideologies: the 1991 elite focus group study

The analysis presented is based on data collected by a team of researchers from the Ohio State University, the Soviet Peace Committee, and the Institute of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences in June 1991.[4] The project was designed to map the dimensions of elite perceptual and attitudinal structures, and to identify the relationships among attitudes toward three dimensions of fundamental change: marketisation, democratisation and the alteration of Russia's (then the Soviet Union's) general relationship to the world community. The project was the only non-survey, open-ended interview study of Russian elites conducted in the *perestroika* period. Since the data comprise a snapshot of elite views on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet state, they are useful for mapping the character of the early post-Soviet ideological spectrum.

The project consisted of focus group interviews[5] of a sample of individuals drawn from eight groups which comprised major vertical divisions of the late Soviet elite structure: military officers, directors of economic enterprises (both state and private), journalists, members of the intelligentsia, diplomats, economists, Communist Party *apparatchiki* and leaders and activists of the non-communist political parties.[6] Each interview group was composed of from six to 12 participants, with an average of nine, for a total sample size of 73.[7]

The demographic profile of the sample was characteristic of the Moscow elite—it was overwhelmingly Russian, male (90.4%) and highly educated. Of the 73 respondents, 95.9% had a complete higher education, and of these, 50.7% had at least some graduate education: 31.5% had achieved candidate status and 13.7% were doctors of science. Since education was an exceptionally precise predictor of individual social status in the Soviet Union, the concentration of individuals with higher education is a good indicator of the 'eliteness' of the group: 96% of our respondents, in comparison with 11.3% of the general adult population of the Russian Federation, had a complete higher education.[8] Another indication of the elite character of the sample is that 50.7% of the respondents were members of the CPSU at the time of the interviews and 12.3% were former members, bringing the total percentage of respondents with past or present ties to the Communist Party to 63%. This is a very

high level of party 'saturation', more than six times the level in the general adult population.[9] The high social status of the group is also shown by the fact that a majority had travelled abroad: almost 60% had travelled at least once outside the countries of the Soviet bloc, and almost 25% had done so three or more times.[10]

In positional terms, this sample generally consisted not of individuals holding the highest positions in organisational hierarchies, but of their deputies and assistants.[11] The average age of our respondents was 42, and approximately two-thirds were between the ages of 31 and 51. The relative youth of the respondents corresponds to their mid- to upper-level status within the elite groups. As such, our sample was drawn from the stratum of potential high office holders. Furthermore, the age and experience profile of this sample is similar to that of the current office holders in the Russian government, whose youth and professional qualifications are frequently noted by observers.

Immediately before the group interviews, we administered a short, 47-item questionnaire to the respondents. The questionnaire was used for three purposes: for the collection of basic demographic information; as a 'back-up' source of measures of perceptions and attitudes against which we could compare responses elicited by discussion; and as the primary source of information on attitudes and perceptions for those individuals who might participate minimally in discussion. Group discussion was structured around participant reactions to two printed sets of 'preferred futures' scenarios distributed to the respondents (see Appendix 1), followed by specific questions concerning the role of the West, particularly the United States, in the process of transformation and the appropriateness of various forms of assistance. The analysis presented here relies on both responses to closed-ended measures on the questionnaire and individual statements made in group discussion.

Ideological profile of the sample

Ideologies are 'maps of problematic social reality' which allow for collective understanding and discourse concerning changes and challenges confronting a society.[12] As maps of reality, ideologies structure meaning and conceptualisation of the political world. Ideologies also offer choices to perceived dilemmas and therefore occupy a central position in political deliberation and decision making.[13] Although ideologies occasionally appear as rigid systems that mechanistically direct individual thought, they are more typically malleable networks of ideas open to the interpretation and innovation of individual and group actors. The dual nature of ideology as both causal factor and human creation means that ideologies may simultaneously shape and express sentiments and preferences.[14]

The formation of a new dominant ideology and ideological spectrum in Russia has been an integral part of the political and social upheaval which began in 1985. *Perestroika* began as a radical reformulation of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and proceeded to the partial embrace of central tenets of Western liberal philosophy, such as the universality of fundamental human rights and the importance of checks on state power.[15] As old institutions crumbled in the late 1980s under the onslaught of reform, and ways of life were drastically transformed, new or revived ideological positions

appeared that challenged the socialist democracy of Gorbachev. These ranged from the strident pro-Westernism of Boris El'tsin to the nationalism of *Pamyat'*.

The appearance of new ideologies in the former Soviet Union is a measure of how fundamental change has been. As Geertz noted, ideologies have historically arisen as a consequence of the complete destruction or disintegration of institutions and the orthodox belief systems associated with them. Institutional collapse engenders social strain and destroys belief systems, thus provoking 'conceptual confusion' about the nature of the social order.[16] Such conditions are highly favourable for the formulation of new ideologies. Indeed, it seems that such conditions demand the birth of ideologies: ideologies provide new cognitive maps for society and may thus assist in the recreation of order.

Given the inherent connection between ideology and sociopolitical change, empirical identification of the post-Soviet ideological spectrum should begin with examination of the general position of the elite group on questions associated with fundamental change. Is there a dominant map of social reality and a preferred path of change which the sample shares? To answer this question, we will first examine the responses on the pre-interview questionnaire to measures of orientations towards the two facets of system transformation in Russia: reform of the command-administrative economy and democratisation.

Responses on measures of attitudes toward economic reform reveal very little support in the elite sample for socialism as a socioeconomic system or for the values historically associated with Soviet socialism. The group responses to five measures of attitudes on various facets of economic restructuring and reform are displayed in Figure 1. The general lack of adherence to orthodox Soviet ideology is strikingly revealed by the largely negative response to the statement 'Socialism, as Lenin understood it, can be the basis for the renewal of Soviet society'. The evaporation of the egalitarianism historically associated with Soviet socialism is evident in the sample's strong disapproval of the notion that limitations should be imposed on individual income. Weak support for features of the socialist economic system is seen in the response to the statement that managers should have the right to dismiss their employees, 'even if it means that they will become unemployed': 90% of the respondents agreed completely or somewhat with this item, thus simultaneously rejecting the tradition of guaranteed employment and that of centralised economic administration. As a set, the responses to measures of attitudes toward economic reform suggest the serious weakening, if not complete collapse, of conventional orthodox economic opinion at the elite level by mid-1991.

From the data, it appears that the void left by the abandonment of socialist belief was filled by the new faith of *laissez-faire* economics. Responses on item after item revealed strong support for private economic activity, some degree of destatisation of enterprises, and decentralisation of economic administration. That this new faith in the market came at the expense of socialist belief is suggested by the cross-tabulations displayed in Tables 1 and 2. As expected, in both tables we find a strong inverse relationship between support for socialist principles and support for features of a market economy. Those who disagreed somewhat or completely that Leninist socialism still had potential were much more supportive of entrepreneurial behaviour than the minority expressing continued devotion to socialism. Those who completely

FIGURE 1. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ECONOMIC REFORM.

TABLE 1

PERCEPTION OF ENTREPRENEURS BY ATTITUDE TOWARDS LENINIST SOCIALISM

	Leninist socialism can renew society			
	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree
Entrepreneurs socially useful				
Fully agree		1	6	17
		7.7%	30.0%	48.6%
Somewhat agree		8	12	14
		61.5%	60.0%	40.0%
Somewhat disagree		1	2	4
		7.7%	10.0%	11.4%
Completely disagree	1	3		
	100.0%	23.1%		

Notes:
chi square = 32.53096
significance = .00016
tau beta = .33255

agreed or somewhat agreed that entrepreneurs perform a socially useful function were more negative about the idea of restrictions on individual income than were those critical of entrepreneurial behaviour.

From the responses on this set of items, and a few others not explored here due to limitations of space,[17] it is possible to conclude that the elite sample occupied a pro-reform, even pro-market position on economic questions. Only a small minority of the respondents, about 12–13%, indicated some opposition to economic reform or a negative attitude toward the features of a market economy.

The rejection of central values associated with the socialist socioeconomic order

TABLE 2

ATTITUDE TOWARDS ECONOMIC INEQUALITY BY PERCEPTION OF ENTREPRENEURS

	Entrepreneurs socially useful			
	Fully agree	*Somewhat agree*	*Somewhat disagree*	*Completely disagree*
Should be an upper limit on income				
Fully agree		1	1	
		2.9%	14.3%	
Somewhat agree	1	2	1	3
	4.0%	5.7%	14.3%	75.0%
Somewhat disagree	7	8	1	1
	28.0%	22.9%	14.3%	25.0%
Completely disagree	17	24	4	
	68.0%	68.6%	57.1%	

Notes:
chi square = 26.19581
significance: .0019
tau beta = .15870

was matched by a general repudiation of the institutions and tenets of the Soviet political order. The distribution of responses on five measures of attitudes toward democratisation and the development of social and political pluralism is shown in Figure 2. Erosion of belief in the right of the CPSU as the revolutionary vanguard to dominate the political process is clearly seen in the response to the first item, 'The CPSU should not have any privileges, rights, and finances which are not possessed by other political parties'. In addition to support for the elimination of the one-party political system, popular political participation was also given unequivocal support by the respondents.

While these measures indicate a significant degree of support for democratisation, several other measures indicate some limitation to this support. First, the evaluation of Soviet representative institutions—the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet—was divided, with a considerable percentage of respondents (33.4%) somewhat or strongly disagreeing that the parliament had 'made a large contribution to the process of democratisation'.[18] Also significant is the mixed response to the statement 'In any society it is necessary to protect the people from the influence of harmful ideas', a manifestly authoritarian view, to which almost 20% of the sample agreed. Similarly, 14 respondents (19.5%) agreed completely or somewhat with the statement 'It is dangerous to compromise with political opponents', which challenges the utility of norms of behaviour and conflict resolution found in representative democracies. Thus, although the weight of responses was on the side of democratisation and democratic values, a significant minority of the respondents, about 20–27%, responded in an anti-liberal, authoritarian manner.

The limits of support for Western-style liberal democracy were also conveyed by an item which asked individuals to select from a set of definitions of democracy the one which was closest to their own understanding. The options were 'Power of the people, guaranteed by the Leninist Party', 'A political order which guarantees the satisfaction of basic material and spiritual needs of the people', 'A political order under which the rights of citizens are guaranteed by law and the people participate in government at the local level', and finally, 'Political order, in which various groups compete with one another in elections, and the basic rights of the citizens are guaranteed by law and by the existence of private property'. The first option paraphrases the official Soviet definition given until the mid-*perestroika* period,[19] while the second expresses the 'social contract' that became the basis for the legitimacy of the Soviet political system in the Brezhnev era.[20] The next two definitions are both non-Soviet, the third describing a liberalised political system, and the fourth representative democracy. Only eight respondents (11%) selected the first two non-liberal definitions of democracy, and 37.1% selected the third definition, indicating support for liberalisation. While over half the sample, 51.4%, selected the fourth option describing the major features of bourgeois liberal democracy, remnants of authoritarian thinking and hesitancy to accept bourgeois liberal democracy prevailed among the other half.

Thus the distribution of attitudes toward political reform indicates solid support in the sample for some aspects of democratisation but disagreement over others, particularly those drawn from the Western liberal tradition. Additionally, there is evidence of more conservative, even authoritarian, attitudes. Although the continued

FIGURE 2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ASPECTS OF POLITICAL REFORM.

domination of the system by the CPSU was clearly untenable for most of the respondents, the rejection of the old regime was not accompanied by an unequivocal embrace of democratic values or acceptance of the contemporary Western liberal understanding of political democracy. It is possible to conclude that the sample more fully accepted features of a market economy than it did aspects of liberal democracy. The difference in the levels of support for market reform and democratisation leads to the obvious deduction that, in the world view of some members of the sample, support for the market and support for liberal democracy were not necessarily linked.

Attitudinal structure and post-Soviet ideology

Having established that the general ideological disposition of our sample was supportive of political and economic reform leading to the Western model, with only a small minority rejecting such a direction of change, the next step in analysis is to explore the data for evidence of identifiable ideological positions within and outside the boundaries of the dominant pro-West reformism of the group.

The analytical reconstruction of ideologies from individual-level data entails the identification of both patterns of variation among attitudes and the primary components or dimensions which serve as central structuring principles of ideology and distinguish ideologies from one another.[21] In order to explore the interconnections among attitudes towards economic and political reform, we designed a measure that allowed respondents to give a more detailed picture of the type of transformation they desired for their society. We framed this question in terms of the evolution of the Soviet system toward the Western model. The question was 'Do you consider that certain features of Western society can be used as examples for the further development of our country?', with simple 'yes' or 'no' response categories. Those respondents who answered affirmatively (72 out of 73) were directed to check off from a list of 11 options those which they saw as useful for their country. The possibilities were 'Market model of the economy', 'Parliamentary activity', 'Principles of the organisation of a multiparty political system', 'Openness of the country to the outside world', 'Integration in the world community', 'The unconstrained activity of social organisations and movements', 'Practice of management and administration', 'Freedom of speech and the press', 'Freedom of private life', 'The role and place of religion in the life of society' and 'The protection of individual rights in the constitution'.

A preliminary analysis of the relationships among these preferences revealed three distinct groups of correlated preferences which, although not mutually exclusive, comprise separate dimensions of preferred social transformation. (See Appendix 2 for correlation matrix). For example, the correlation between preference for the market and preference for Western parliamentary practices is weak and statistically insignificant, pointing to disjuncture between the two preferences. However, both items are strongly correlated with other directions of preferred change. The market is associated with individual rights, Western patterns of management and administration, integration in the world community, the multiparty system and freedom of speech and the press. Support for the application of Western parliamentary practices is highly correlated with the multiparty system, freedom of speech and press, individual rights

and freedom of personal life. We also see that religion, private life, social organisation and openness to the outside world are interconnected and compose a distinct sub-set of items.[22]

These three sets of preferences correspond remarkably well to variations of Western liberal philosophy and ideology. The first set encompasses the market, values of economic freedom and individualism, all central components of the early liberal thought of Hobbes and Locke.[23] The second, with its focus on aspects of representative government, can be seen as a preference for political freedom which corresponds to the 'developmental' liberalism of theorists such as Rousseau and Mill.[24] Finally, the last set of preferences indicates a desire for freedom of individual expression and social activity, the 'post-industrial' values typically supported in the contemporary period by European parties on the left, especially the 'new left'.[25] Thus, the presence of these preference sets in the data suggests a range of ideological positions consistent with various strands of Western liberal thought. Furthermore, such positions presuppose a relatively sophisticated understanding of liberalism for the sample as a whole, perhaps made possible by the public examination and exploration of liberal thought under conditions of *glasnost*'.

In order to identify coherent 'response syndromes' on these items at the individual level, a simple cluster analysis was performed.[26] The analysis produced a four-cluster solution, and the distribution of responses across all items by cluster is shown in Table 3. The largest cluster, cluster two, composed of 39 respondents, or 53% of the sample, consists of individuals sympathetic to most dimensions of Western-oriented reform. Respondents in this category chose almost all the features of Western society as suitable for implementation in their own country. The second largest cluster, cluster three, consists of individuals who were more moderate in their enthusiasm for certain features of Western society, especially for the unconstrained activity of social organisations and movements and the influence of religious belief in society. This group emphasised Western business practices, individual rights and integration into the world community and tended to support the market, openness to the outside world and political competition less than cluster two. Cluster one, containing eight individuals, is composed of those who are very positive about economic reform, particularly the market, favour the protection of individual rights, but are less supportive of political activity, sceptical about the usefulness of freedom of speech and the press, very sceptical of openness to the outside world, and totally non-supportive of social freedom, as represented in the role of religion, unconstrained activity of social organisations and freedom of private life characteristic of Western societies. This cluster appears to express an authoritarian/technocratic tendency, evincing some support for political liberalisation but minimal enthusiasm for personal freedom and autonomous social organisation. Finally, the fourth cluster, consisting of eight individuals, or 12% of the sample, is composed of individuals who favour Russian autarchy from the world economy and view the Western model in almost all its manifestations—economic, political and social—as unsuitable for their country.

In terms of the three sets of preferences identified previously in the correlation matrix, we can see that the second cluster evinces support for all three preference sets of economic, political and individual/social freedom, and the third cluster strongly supports the two sets of economic and political freedom. In the first cluster only

TABLE 3

PREFERENCES FOR ASPECTS OF WESTERN SOCIETY BY CLUSTER

	Clusters			
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
Market model of economy—useful?				
Not checked		17.9%	29.4%	100.0%
Checked	100.0%	82.1%	70.6%	
Parliamentary activity—useful?				
Not checked	50.0%	17.9%	23.5%	87.5%
Checked	50.0%	82.1%	76.5%	12.5%
Organisation of multiparty political system—useful?				
Not checked	25.0%	12.8%	29.4%	100.0%
Checked	75.0%	87.2%	70.6%	
Openness of country to outside—useful?				
Not checked	87.5%	10.3%	35.3%	62.5%
Checked	12.5%	89.7%	64.7%	37.5%
Integration in world economy—useful?				
Not checked	12.5%	5.1%	5.9%	87.5%
Checked	87.5%	94.9%	94.1%	12.5%
Freedom of social organisations—useful?				
Not checked	100.0%	15.4%	100.0%	100.0%
Checked		84.6%		
Practice of management, administration—useful?				
Not checked	25.0%	17.9%		87.5%
Checked	75.0%	82.1%	100.0%	12.5%
Freedom of speech and press—useful?				
Not checked	62.5%	23.1%	23.5%	87.5%
Checked	37.5%	76.9%	76.5%	12.5%
Freedom of private life—useful?				
Not checked	100.0%	12.8%	17.6%	62.5%
Checked		87.2%	82.4%	37.5%
Role and place of religion—useful?				
Not checked	100.0%	15.4%	100.0%	100.0%
Checked		84.6%		
Protection of individual rights—useful?				
Not checked	12.5%	5.1%	5.9%	87.5%
Checked	87.5%	94.9%	94.1%	12.5%

Note: Number of respondents in each cluster: cluster 1, 8; cluster 2, 39; cluster 3, 17; cluster 4, 8.

support for the preference set of economic freedom is seen, with grudging acceptance of some aspects of representative government, while the fourth cluster essentially rejects all three sets of preferences.

The grouping of respondents according to their position on the applicability of various features of Western society thus reveals the predominance in our sample of supporters of Western-oriented economic, political and social transformation. In addition to the whole-hearted advocacy of Westernisation, another significant syndrome of more qualified support for Western-oriented reform was found. Both of these orientations are essentially democratic or liberal. However, the other two

syndromes, support for primarily economic reform with deep scepticism to rejection of the political and social freedoms of Western society, and almost complete rejection of the applicability of the Western model, are illiberal or, at best, pre-liberal—the first authoritarian and the second totalitarian. Sixteen, or almost 22% of the respondents fell into these groups.

Ideological types

By combining the information provided from cluster analysis with qualitative analysis of individual comments in focus group discussion, it is possible to arrive at a more detailed and adequate identification of attitudinal and perceptual structures found in the sample. As noted above, the interviews were structured around three basic questions: the future of inter-republican relations within the Soviet Union; the correct path towards economic and social revitalisation of the country; and the role of the West in economic and/or political restructuring. The first two issues were addressed by means of scenarios of future outcomes, translations of which are contained in Appendix 1 of this article. These scenarios were distributed in printed form to the participants. After participants had read the scenarios, discussion began with the request that they vocally indicate their preferred scenario, even if none of the alternatives corresponded exactly to their personal views. Group discussion subsequently began with individuals explaining why they had selected a particular scenario and commenting on what they liked or disliked about the alternative scenarios.

Close reading of the transcripts of the group interviews made it possible to identify more precisely the ideological orientations of respondents. I constructed a summary evaluation of each individual's ideological stance based upon his or her statements regarding reform and change, conceptualisations of the role of the state, attitudes toward authority and order, evaluations of the outside world, and all uses of ideological concepts and language (such as references to Leninism, socialism, democracy etc.). By augmenting the attitudinal portrait obtained from questionnaire responses with the qualitative evaluation of each individual, I was able to compare and categorise individuals according to the similarity of their beliefs. In this process, five different ideological types or positions emerged. They are 'Westerniser', 'moderate reformer', 'democratic socialist', 'communist' and 'nationalist'. The moderate reform tendency can be further divided into 'liberal moderate reformer' and 'conservative moderate reformer'. The distribution of these tendencies in the elite sample is displayed in Table 4.

Westernisers

As the label indicates, a Westerniser was an unabashed proponent of the Westernisation of society. For such an individual, the Western model in all its dimensions provided the best map for the future transformation of the country. In group discussion, individuals in this category frequently made the argument that the path toward civilisation had already been charted by the West and it was their country's simple task to follow it. Indeed, the Western model was the norm, against which all social orders could be evaluated. This statement by a journalist typified this view:

TABLE 4

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF IDEOLOGICAL POSITION

Ideology	
Westerniser	14
	19.2%
Liberal moderate reformer	9
	12.3%
Moderate reformer	23
	31.5%
Conservative moderate reformer	10
	13.7%
Democratic socialist	9
	12.3%
Communist	3
	4.1%
Nationalist	4
	5.5%
Other	1
	1.4%

Source: 1991 Elite Focus Group Sample

> ... I think we need to strive not to create some sort of ideal society, but to build the most ordinary kind of normal society, one founded on human rights, civil liberties and the granting to people of economic freedoms and all accepted international standards that exist in various advanced countries.

For the Westernisers, the practices and institutions of Western societies had almost universal applicability. They expressed faith in the powers of the market and private property to solve their country's economic crisis. Furthermore, they saw the market and private property as the only means of achieving irreversible social and political transformation. This belief in the market to transform behaviour and society can be seen in the statement of a professor of international relations:

> You know, it seems to me that the way lies in instilling a love of work, or not even love, but a market mentality. A person must understand that it's profitable for him to work ... we need to make a person understand that he has to do better than someone else in order to earn his money. Then you'll see a rebirth of the individual, and the party bureaucrats, the loafers, the parasites who have become typical for our society, will all disappear.

Accompanying the Westernising orientation was an almost total rejection of Soviet tradition in its economic, political and social manifestations. Westernisers were distinguished from other respondents by their fierce criticism of socialism and their propensity summarily to dismiss its accomplishments and viability, as well as its adherents. A colonel justified his choice of the market scenario thus: '... world practice ... has shown that nobody has ever succeeded in realising the first scenario [socialism] in any way'. Similarly, an economist said of the first scenario:

> ... we needn't even discuss it. A person who is not tied to any kind of corporative-clan interests, an ordinary person who has a minimal education even by our country's standards

> ... would reject the first scenario. It is acceptable only to people with a vivid imagination or a very strong class orientation.

Their emphasis on the criminality and failure of the old totalitarian system led them to express support for the maximal development of democracy, considerable decentralisation of authority, and a sharp reduction of the powers of the central state. In the words of a specialist on international relations, '... the system of absolute power must be destroyed'. The belief in the absolute necessity of the rapid dismantling of the old order found its correlate in a lack of concern about the consequences of systemic transformation. Some Westernisers openly discussed the hardship that would be caused by economic reform, but saw suffering as unavoidable. As an entrepreneur phrased it,

> One has to say to hell with social protection ... Either we will all be equally in poverty or we will break out of it and then think about our poor. That's the alternative as I see it.

Their individualistic and anti-system orientation seems to explain why, of all the ideological groupings, the Westernisers were most likely to support the complete independence of the republics from the central government as the appropriate solution to the problem of centre-republican conflicts. Typical of their views was the same entrepreneur's farewell to the Union:

> ... it is perfectly obvious that a renewed Union or one that is not renewed absolutely can no longer exist, and that in any case, this centrifugal tendency is absolutely objective, and therefore the question is to find a civilised solution to this problem.

In sum, the Westerniser position can be described very simply, since it encompassed a starkly black and white view of the world: the West is good, and the Soviet system and its history bad. The Westernisers believed that any support for the old order was thoroughly groundless and evidence of the backwardness of an individual's thought or of his membership in the hostile camp. The end-goal of capitalism and democracy was so absolutely desirable that the ends justified the means of achieving it.

Moderate reformers

A more restrained version of the Westernising tendency is expressed by the individuals I have labeled 'moderate reformers'. Like the Westernisers, the moderate reformers also stressed the importance of Western institutions, particularly economic institutions, as models for the future development. Moderate reformers agreed with the Westernisers that there was no need to chart an independent non-Western course in economic and political development: as many respondents phrased it, reformers did not need to 're-invent the wheel' when it had already been created in the 'civilised' or Western world. Furthermore, moderates shared the impatience of the Westernisers to break out of reform socialism. Typical of such a view was the statement of a professor of scientific communism at the Higher Party School, who, in explaining his support for a transition to the market, argued that it was necessary to depart from the long communist tradition of 'resuscitation of our existing structures' which involves an attempt to 'revive the sick organism, and pump it up for another few years, for a second, third or even fourth childhood'.

What distinguished the moderates from the Westernisers was their preference for what they regarded as more pragmatic or realistic views on reform. Moderates were significantly less optimistic about the feasibility of rapid change, and urged that attention be given to the peculiarities of the Soviet context in the formulation of reform. Their arguments often took into account the institutional or cultural context of the country. A common argument for gradualism in economic reform was voiced by an enterprise manager:

> ... the five-year programme that Yavlinsky dreamed up in the US, I think that's unrealistic. We have to start with a period of at least 15 years, in which we can train cadres ... I mean, train first-class specialists. And I must say that a market makes no sense right now. Who here knows something about a market in practical terms? ... On a practical basis, everything is done through personal connections, not by the laws of the market. Just personal connections.

More sophisticated contextual arguments among the moderates made specific reference to Russia's history. One intellectual raised doubts as to whether the Western model of development could apply to Russia:

> ... there is the Western cumulative type of historical development, in which some sort of matrix emerges, within the framework of which some contradictions and problems of the preceding states are resolved, while at the same time it serves as a stepping stone to the future ... Can we move toward some sort of future today, can we think about the future, do we have the basis for doing so? Because in the final analysis we can also return to some sort of past, which Russia demonstrated successfully over the course of many centuries ...

Later he continued,

> ... the moment that predetermined Western freedom, which we want so badly, may be some unique historical moment that will never be repeated.

Other moderates referred to the miserable condition of Third World states on the periphery of the capitalist world as justification for gradual introduction of the market. A member of the Moscow coordinating council of the Democratic Russia Movement, and a deputy to the Moscow Soviet, combined reference to the Third World with a contextual justification for his refusal completely to embrace the 'market and pluralism' scenario:

> ... anyone who knows about Bangladesh, or Pakistan, or a number of states in India, the many different economic structures in India ... knows what ... the market means for the [Soviet] Union. With a view to our criminal economy and so forth. Big ties, so to speak with mafia structures ... And so I would agree more with some of the measures in Scenario 2, but with the reservation that the market should probably be combined with state regulation, as well.

While supportive of further democratisation, moderates were more likely to insist that central institutions be maintained or strengthened. For them, the stability of the state was a primary concern in the transition process. Their argument for stability occasionally rested on the traditions of the country: as the intellectual cited above said, 'everyone knows that in principle the national tradition, the cultural tradition, is tied to a strong centralised state'. More typically, the emphasis on a strong state was

justified not by reference to tradition but by mention of the dire consequences that would emerge from a break-down of the state. A leader of the Christian Democratic party imagined an alternative, darker scenario than the ones provided for discussion, a scenario that would occur when

> ... destructive elements exceed a certain critical level ... if the economy is totally destroyed, if the disintegration of the Soviet Union accelerates, if nationality conflicts exceed a certain critical level, ... and the country reaches the point of total collapse. Then a new military dictator will probably take over here.

In accordance with their preference for stability, those in the moderate category preferred a slower path of independence for the republics and voiced fears of the potentially negative consequences which might arise from the break-up of the Soviet Union. As a political activist justified the maintenance of some type of union: 'We must keep the resolution of conflicts, by legal means, at the level of the centre, well, of the future centre, of course'. More dramatic was the plea of a journalist for the maintenance of the Union:

> ... there is a certain geopolitical space that in actuality has maintained stability. And if it were to start collapsing, under any scenario, even the most democratic, the whole world will be taken to the brink of chaos.

Moderate reformers can be further divided into 'liberal' and 'conservative' sub-groups, and I have done so where I possessed sufficient information on individual positions. The liberals closely approached the Westernisers in strong commitment to marketisation and democratisation, but urged pragmatic implementation and patience. On the other hand, conservative moderate reformers tended toward the advocacy of a long-term transitional period of a mixed economic system, containing features of both the market and a planned economy. Conservatives were also much more deeply concerned than their liberal counterparts with the possibility of inter-ethnic conflict that might accompany the break-up of the Union.

Democratic socialists

Sharing a centrist position with the conservative moderates were the democratic socialists. In general, individuals in this category adhered to the ideals of the *perestroika* period and the political and social philosophy of Gorbachev. They were adamant about the shortcomings of the old order and the need for a thorough 'restructuring' of the political system, and believed very strongly in the centrality of individual rights and the rule of law.

Democratic socialists were quick to assert their support for democratised socialism, the 'renewed socialism' of the second scenario. As an *obkom* deputy secretary said, '... socialism is a society of social justice ... it is simply the primacy of human rights over everything else and the equality of all people before the law'. For these individuals, the total transition to a market economy signified the abandonment of the highest ideals of social equality and harmony articulated by Marx and Lenin. Typical of the democratic socialist position was the statement made by a military officer who

said he was 'deeply convinced that we have still not exhausted the potential of the "old socialism" because we are not yet living under it in its true form'.

In agreement with the more conservative moderates, democratic socialists were troubled by the disintegrating authority of the central government and expressed a preference for the revitalisation of the Union and its institutions, which they saw as the only solution to the Soviet Union's difficulties. In the words of a journalist,

> ... it seems to me that solving the crisis is possible only if there is coordinated effort and a central government ... the problem is that our country's long history has created ties such that their destruction and the rather abstract idea of total sovereignty and independence for the republics could lead, in my opinion, to a very deep crisis, to the virtual destruction of the whole country.

Communists and nationalists

Although possessing views similar to those of the conservative moderates and democratic socialists on some aspects of change, the two remaining ideological orientations in the elite sample contrast sharply with the centrist orientation, since they are fundamentally illiberal. Both communists and nationalists rejected Western institutions and expressed little admiration for any of the features of the Western model of civilisation, including democratic values and practices, even the liberal understanding of human rights. For the communists, the correct solution to the nation's problems lay in the preservation of central features of the pre-existing order. In contrast, the nationalists focused on the recreation of a strong Russian state and the revival of Russian traditions and ways of life. While only seven individuals, or 9.6% of the sample, evinced a nationalist or communist orientation, they forcefully articulated their views in group discussion, and held their ground in the face of group derision and dismissal of their positions.[27]

Despite their differences, which should not be overlooked, the positions of the nationalists and communists were remarkably similar. In discussion, their primary concern was not what path of reform the country should choose, but rather how to stop the process of decay and disintegration which they perceived and abhorred. Both communists and nationalists shared the conviction that the *perestroika* years had brought nothing to the country but a concomitant economic and military vitiation, reducing Russia to the status of a beggar nation, struggling to survive on its knees. Marketisation was seen by these individuals as a further blow to the country, its stability, and a long-term threat to its sovereignty. A Central Committee *apparatchik* argued that transition to the market was

> fraught with serious negative consequences for us, such as greater dependence or a move into dependence on the West ... then an increase in social tensions, with what I would say are predictable consequences, that is, an increase in social conflicts.

And a party *apparatchik* put it:

> The point is that there is a geopolitical idea of turning our country in general into a country that is entirely dependent economically on Western countries. We know ... that there is an idea ... that our technology, our techniques for extracting raw materials are considered inadequate ... people want to take this away from us, this priority—the use of our own

> energy resources ... There is such a model for conquering our country. For mastering our country.

In the opinion of communists and nationalists, the only solution for the country's deplorable condition was the recentralisation of state control, the recreation of strong institutions and re-assertion of social order and discipline. As an army officer with a nationalist orientation argued,

> In my opinion, the only realistic possible model for our country is as follows: a strong and effectively functioning state, a strong and effective government that guarantees the security of both the state itself and individuals and the exercise of their rights and freedoms.

Consistent with this statism, images of the decomposition or collapse of the Soviet Union provoked strong negative reactions in these individuals. Both groups pointed to the violence and bloodshed which had already begun in some republics in 1991 as evidence of the inevitable consequences of the decline of Soviet power. Furthermore, nationalists and communists perceived that forces hostile to Russia/the Soviet Union were behind separatism. A leader of a nationalist political party commented on the plans to reconstruct the union:

> These scenarios have been in the works for a long time, they are being given to us in order to finish off our state ... They are being planned by those who would like, who have begun developing a Pugachev movement in Russia. They have begun developing them there in the Urals, in order to destroy Russian defence plants, to destroy the power of the Russian state ...

What united the nationalists and communists was thus their obsession with the state and the paranoid belief that hidden forces, mostly foreign, were intent on the destruction of the country. Given these shared views, differences paled in comparison. The similarity of their positions explains the ease of the formation of the infamous red-brown 'irreconcilable opposition' in 1992. Indeed, the ideological bridge that would allow the red-brown position is seen very clearly in a statement made by a CPSU *konsul'tant* which equates Russia with the Soviet Union.

> History developed in such a way that a supernation (*supernatsiya*) took part in the creation of the USSR, a supernation that had not yet entered the political arena as some sort of political unit ... The supernation is the Russian people. So when the Soviet Union was being created, the Russian people also took part in the creation of the USSR, because they had no other choice, living within the territory of Russia and the political state which was tsarist Russia. It was, one could say, the state form that would enable this nation to develop without any damage to the nation. Any other form assumes the disappearance of an independent Russian state.

Conclusion: ideology and the future of Russian politics

The preceding analysis has established that distinct, internally consistent and coherent world views existed among the members of a sample of the Moscow elite taken in 1991. Although our sampling technique did not guarantee the representativeness of the sample, the positions taken by our respondents correspond amazingly well to the present political spectrum in Russian politics.[28] This correspondence provides a

degree of external validity for the results of the study, allowing us to assume with some confidence that the sample contained the general contours and range of ideology within the Moscow elite, if not the actual concentration of support for the various ideological positions on the eve of the August coup.

If we accept this assumption, specific events and the general direction of change in Russian politics since late 1991 become more explicable. First, the responses of our sample suggest that, outside the CPSU apparatus itself, there was almost no support on the eve of the August coup for the continued political hegemony of the CPSU and very little support for the basic features of Soviet-style socialism at the elite level. The virtual absence of adherence to Marxism-Leninism was either a consequence of the re-examination and sustained critique of Soviet socialism conducted in the *perestroika* years or reflected changes in elite world views which had already occurred prior to 1985.[29] Whatever the explanation, the disappearance of Marxist-Leninist ideology and evaporation of support for Soviet socialism certainly contributed to the collapse of the system. The data support the proposition that El'tsin's dismantling of the CPSU and the USSR and his pursuit of rapid economic reform were made possible by the almost total de-legitimation of the old order among elites.

Furthermore, the dynamics underlying central events and directions of post-Soviet Russian politics may plausibly be illuminated by the findings of the focus group study. Since September 1991 Russian politics has largely been the story of the behaviour of the El'tsin government and its position relative to other political actors and groups. It is obvious that the strong pro-West, pro-market tendency identified in our sample as the Westernising position, (currently referred to by the Russians as the 'radical democratic' orientation), has predominated in the El'tsin government and motivated both domestic and foreign policy since autumn 1991.

As observed in the elite sample, the Westernisers favoured the rapid transformation of the system, with little concern for what reform would do to existing institutions. Indeed, Westernisers expressed a desire to eliminate existing institutions and the socialist economy entirely. The Gaidar economic programme of 'shock therapy' can be understood as the policy expression by the El'tsin government of the economic position found among the Westernisers and liberal moderate reformers. The goal of disrupting old economic institutions and rapidly introducing a market economy in their stead is consistent with the Westerniser impatience to achieve a permanent transformation. Furthermore, the lack of concern among the members of the government over the social impact of economic reform is consistent with the willingness of the Westernisers in the focus group study to accept, indeed, even gladly pay, the price of reform. Recall the disdain for the types of people who benefitted from the old system of social guarantees voiced by some of the Westernisers in the sample.

The results of the elite study also provide some insight into why El'tsin's economic reforms have provoked such resistance at the elite level in the last year. Given the range of positions in the sample before the coup, it is easy to see how an anti-El'tsin opposition emerged so quickly: the Westernisers occupied an extreme position within the Moscow elite, located at one end of a political spectrum composed of four other distinct orientations. Once the El'tsin government acquired real state power after the coup and began to initiate reform, its actions directly opposed the preferences of all other ideological positions, from moderate reformers and centrists to the communists

and nationalists. In particular, the El'tsin economic reform programme paid no heed to the centrist preference for moderate, cautious economic change, and therefore prompted centrist resistance.

Additionally, El'tsin's decision to dissolve the USSR, while consistent with the Westernisers' contempt for the Soviet past and Soviet institutions, directly opposed the centrist position on the question of inter-republican relations, which was that some form of central government in the Soviet Union was necessary in the short term, even if the independence of the republics was conceivable over the long run. Given what we know about the pre-existing preferences within various elite ideological tendencies, it is little wonder that the dissolution of the Soviet state quickly provoked opposition even within the reformist camp, not to mention outside it, at the communist and nationalist extreme.

As this opposition to El'tsin's actions solidified quickly in early 1992, those elite groups favouring reform but fearful of the consequences of rapid change appealed to El'tsin to form coalitions with them. The government's failure to create a firm reform alliance which spanned the various shades of democrats deepened the divide within the reformist camp, separating heretofore moderates such as Rutskoi and Khasbulatov from the marketising democrats in the Kremlin. Rather than building bridges to those who began to oppose it, the government chose to remain on the ideological fringe, and therefore contributed to its own political isolation and embattled position.[30] Thus, the El'tsin government was at least partially responsible for the conflict which escalated to the tragic events of October 1993: its unwillingness to compromise with the centrist position, or even to take into account the concerns of the centrists, provoked much of the discord.[31]

There can be no doubt that the opposition to El'tsin's reform programme, the seeds of which were present in the 1991 elite ideological tendencies, was also mobilised and solidified in reaction to the deepening economic crisis and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The disruption to the economy caused by reform and the collapse of the Soviet state brought about a rapidly declining average standard of living, growing economic inequality, the breakdown of economic integration between the former republics, the rise of inter-ethnic conflict in virtually all the former republics, and the considerable problem of a huge Russian diaspora, numbering about 20 million, from the *de iure* attainment of sovereignty by the republics. As conditions worsened, the fears of moderate reformers and democratic socialists were confirmed.

The correlation of events with fears undoubtedly served to reinforce ideological opposition to rapid economic reform and sharpened disagreement of all groups with the Westernisers. As a consequence moderate political organisations of the Democratic Party of Russia, the People's Party of Free Russia and the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs formed into the united centrist opposition of the Civic Union. Within this organisational context, a coherent opposition programme and ideological stance were formulated, and a specific policy alternative to the government's economic programme constructed.[32] During the same period, nationalist and communist forces developed their organisations and also their ideological positions, including an ideological *rapprochement* between the communist and nationalist position. The red/brown coalescence thus achieved found its organisational birth in the Front of National Salvation.[33] Thus, the interplay between individuals and groups occupying

the various ideological positions which existed as early as June 1991, and, in particular, the reaction of all other ideological groups to the actions of Westernisers, solidified the ideological space and cleavages in Russian politics and set the stage for the battle which culminated in the tragic events of October 1993.

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[1] Consensual unity denotes agreement upon the rules of political competition and the norms of political life. See John Higley & Michael G. Burton, 'The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns'. *American Sociological Review*, 54 (1989), pp. 17–32, and John Higley & Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1–37.

[2] A few facts illustrate the extent of this cooperation. After El'tsin was elected Supreme Soviet chairman at the First Congress of People's Deputies in May 1990, he nominated Ruslan Khasbulatov for the position of first deputy Chairman. Khasbulatov won the position and the following year was selected by El'tsin to succeed him in the position of Chairman after El'tsin's victory in the Russian presidential election of June 1991. While in the Supreme Soviet the two men collaborated in fundamentally amending the Russian constitution. They were assisted by Aleksandr Rutskoi, also elected to the Russian Congress of People's Deputies in 1990, who in early 1991 created and led a block of deputies he christened 'Communists for Democracy', which sided with the pro-El'tsin 'Democratic Russia' group of deputies to create a reformist majority in the Congress. Rutskoi's record as a 'democrat' led El'tsin to choose him as his running mate in 1991. Rutskoi was also one of the initiators, along with Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Yakovlev, of the Movement for Democratic Reform in July 1991. Furthermore, during the coup, Rutskoi played a significant role on the El'tsin side as heroic defender of the Russian White House, captor of coup plotters, and deliverer of Gorbachev. For Khasbulatov's 1990–91 political role see G. Ivanov-Smolensk, 'Rossiya: suverenitet i rynok', *Izvestiya*, 1 August 1990, p. 2; I. Demichenko & G. Shipit'ko, 'S"ezd narodnykh deputatov RSFSR prerval rabotu', *Izvestiya*, 28 March 1991, p. 1; and R. I. Khasbulatov, *Byurokraticheskoe gosudarstvo* (Moscow, Megapolis, 1991), a well developed and coherent statement of liberal philosophy. For Rutskoi see the following sources: A. Zuichenko, 'Demokraticheskii Platform v Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 April 1991, p. 2; Lyudmila Aleksandrova, *TASS* in English, 19 July 1991, 'Russian Vice President Calls for New Party', *FBIS Daily Report—Soviet Union*, 19 July 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-139; p. 70); Mikhail Tarasov's interview with Rutskoi, 'DPKR: zashchitit' ne ot rynka, a s pomoshch'yu rynka', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 2 October 1991, pp. 1–2; and V. Stepankov & E. Lisov, *Kremlevskii zagovor* (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Ogonek, 1992), pp. 208–209

[3] See Vyacheslav Nikonov, 'Na blizhnykh podstupakh k vlasti: razmyshleniya o rossiiskom "partstroitel'stve" ', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 7 August 1992, p. 5; Evgenii Krasnikov, 'Mozhet byt', politicheskii tsentr nikuda ne provalilsya?', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 3 July 1993, pp. 1–2.

[4] The American team in this research consisted of Charles Hermann, professor of political science and director of the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, Saundra Jones, a graduate student in the OSU Department of Political Science and a research assistant of the Mershon Center, and the author. Our collaborators in Moscow were Andrei Melville of the Soviet Peace Committee and professor of political studies at the Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Nikitin of the Soviet Peace Committee, and Elena Bashkirova of the Institute of Sociology. The research was supported by a grant from the McArthur Foundation. Analysis and interpretations are solely the author's.

[5] The research team adopted the method of focus group interviews to achieve two ends: first, to simulate the debate and dialogue particular to the in-group context of the various elites, and, second, as a means of identifying themes and concepts contained in elite political dialogue. We decided that an open-ended interview approach was essential for the identification of the underlying structures of elite world-view essential for the future construction of useful standardised measures of attitudes related to the question of integration. An additional reason for the use of the focus group interview is that it is a mechanism for producing more candid comments and statements from participants. In a properly directed focus group, participants perceive themselves as talking with one another, rather than with an interviewer, thus reducing the problem of interviewer bias, which occurs when an individual responds to questions in a way which he or she thinks will be pleasing to, or is

expected by, the interviewer. See Richard A. Krueger, *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research* (Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications, 1988).

[6] Sampling of respondents in targeted groups of mid- to upper-level officials and professionals was conducted by Andrei Melville and Aleksandr Nikitin. They relied on the 'snowball' sampling technique, in which possible respondents are asked to identify others who fit certain parameters. In this case, we asked respondents to identify others within the respondents' institutions or professional reference groups who held views different from their own. In this way our sampling achieved diversity of opinion within the focus groups. Since the sample is not a demographically representative sample of the Moscow elite, the results presented here are not statistically representative of the actual distribution of opinion within the Moscow elite. However, they do provide knowledge of the general range of possible perspectives and the conceptual, perceptual and attitudinal content of those perspectives.

[7] In addition to the elites, a group of ten advanced undergraduate and graduate students from Moscow State University and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Academy was also interviewed as a pre-test for the elite group interviews. The results presented in this article are only from the elite sample.

[8] The Russian population figure is for 1989. *RSFSR v tsifrakh v 1989g* (Moscow, Finansy i statistiki, 1990), p. 128.

[9] In 1991 9.1% of the Soviet adult population were party members. See Politbyuro TsK KPSS, 'O rabote partiinykh organizatsii po ukrepleniyu svoikh ryadov i obnovleniyu sostava KPSS v usloviyakh uglubleniya perestroiki i politicheskoi reformy', in *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika*, 30th ed. (Moscow, Politicheskaya literatura, 1991), pp. 113–116.

[10] Travel was tightly restricted in the pre-Gorbachev period, reserved almost exclusively for those with high position on official business. Although most restrictions were dropped in the late 1980s, foreign travel is still virtually impossible for average citizens because of the prohibitive cost of tickets.

[11] For instance, the individuals in the military group held the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel, the economists worked with Bogomolov, Abalkin or Aganbegyan, the *apparatchiki* were secretaries, deputy secretaries or department heads in Moscow Party *raikomy*, the journalists were editors or deputy editors, and the intellectuals were scientific department heads or project managers. However, a rather high proportion of the sample—about 10%—held the highest positions within their institutions or enterprises, and several individuals in the sample are nationally or even internationally recognised specialists and political figures.

[12] Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', in David E. Apter (ed), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, The Free Press, 1964), p. 64.

[13] The 'dilemmatic' conceptualisation in particular sees ideology as more or less open discourse that is continually altered by the collective input of individuals as conditions and problems of society and personal life change. See Michael Billig, Susan Condor *et al.*, *Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking* (London, Sage Publications, 1988).

[14] See Giovanni Sartori, 'Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems', *The American Political Science Review*, LXIII, 2, June 1969, pp. 398–411.

[15] See Judith Kullberg, *Origins of the Gorbachev Revolution: Industrialization, Social Structural Change, and Elite Value Transformation*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1992.

[16] Geertz, p. 64.

[17] An additional indication of the lack of adherence to fundamental principles of Soviet socialism in the sample was shown by the distribution of attitudes toward property. Respondents were asked 'Which of these statements more closely corresponds to your view of property?' and were offered four options: 'Private property is necessary in the USSR in certain spheres'; 'In the USSR there should only be state and collective property'; 'Almost all property should be private'; and 'Property should be neither state nor private, but collective'. 66.2% of the respondents indicated that private property was necessary in some spheres of the economy, and 31.0% selected the third statement that almost all property should be private. Not one respondent chose the second option of only state and collective property, and only two respondents indicated a preference for collective ownership over other forms.

[18] Obviously, this response indicates some disenchantment with the performance of the revitalised representative institutions. It should be observed, however, that interpretation of the meaning of responses on this item is clouded by the fact that both democrats and conservative communists were critical of the performance of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet under Gorbachev.

[19] See the entry 'Demokratiya' in *Kratkii politicheskii slovar'*, 4th ed. (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1987).

[20] James Millar, 'The Little Deal: Brezhnev's Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism', *Slavic Review*, 44, Winter 1985, pp. 694–706.

[21] See Philip Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in the Mass Public', in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261, especially pp. 206–215, and John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 22–28.

[22] An additional finding worthy of note is that support for individual rights was correlated with almost every other preference. This seems to indicate that the protection of individual rights was seen as a very desirable, even central goal by the majority of the respondents. The origins of the democratic revolution in the West began with the basic acceptance of the universality of individual rights, and a similar acceptance of rights appears to exist among this sample of the Russian elite.

[23] Held refers to early liberalism as the model of 'protective democracy'. David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 36–71.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 72–104.

[25] See Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 21–71.

[26] Since these are dichotomous or binary variables, the cluster analysis was conducted using a simple matching similarity measure. The method of average linking within groups was used to form the clusters. See Mark S. Aldenderfer & Roger K. Blashfield, *Cluster Analysis*, Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Science, series no. 07-044 (Beverly Hills, CA, and London, Sage Publications, 1984).

[27] Not surprisingly, all three of the communists were CPSU *apparatchiki*. Two of the nationalists were members of an extreme right-wing political party, one was a military officer and one was a businessman.

[28] Nikonov.

[29] See Kullberg, especially pp. 266–349.

[30] The justification for this has been that those seeking moderation of reform are in reality the opponents of reform. Just as the Westernisers in the elite sample disparaged those who still believed in elements of the socialist economic system as stooges of the old order, almost as some sort of 'class enemy', members of the El'tsin government have accused their opponents of being closet communists. Indeed, the government has often used the spectre of a return to communism as justification for its failure to compromise. For example, the Economics Minister, Andrei Nechaev, commented in November 1992 that the Civic Union's correctives to the government's economic policy would inevitable lead to the reestablishment of '*raikomy, obkomy* and *gorkomy*', the regional and local organisation units of the old CPSU. Andrei Lekant, 'Prozhekt', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 17 November 1992.

[31] Indeed, there is doubt whether El'tsin can successfully pursue a programme that neglects the preferences of a majority of the political elite. Samuel Huntington argues that successful transitions are to be characterised not only by an elite settlement on the institutional features and powers of the new regime, but an ability of various elite actors to collaborate. 'The stability of democratic regimes depends, first, on the ability of the principal political elites … to work together to deal with the problems confronting their society and to refrain from exploiting those problems for their own immediate material or political advantage.' Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK, The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 259.

[32] The policy alternatives were first packaged as 'correctives' to the Gaidar programme, but later presented as a self-contained programme of reform. For the correctives see Aleksandr Vladislavlev, 'Reformy na poisk realisticheskoi strategii', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 11 July 1992 and 'Kontury grazhdanskogo soglasiya', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 September 1992. The economic programme of the Civic Union was published as Grazhdanskii Soyuz, *Programma deistvii po vyvodu ekonomiki Rossii iz krizisa* (Moscow, 1992)

[33] For examples of the ideology of the red/brown opposition see the interview with Aleksandr Nikolaevich Sterligov, leader of the nationalist Russkii Sobor, N. Zhelnorova, 'General Sterligov', *Argumenty i fakty*, 36, September 1992; and the unsigned editorial, 'Front zashchitit Konstitutsiyu, narod zashchitit Front', *Den'*, 8–14 November, 1992.

Appendix 1

First set of scenarios

A: Independence of the republics
The centralised Union state structure is liquidated. All the power of the union government is transferred to the level of the republic governments. Each republic follows its own models of economic and political development. Russia in practice becomes an independent federative state. The republics regulate their interactions by concluding negotiated agreements on political and economic matters. According to their own decision, certain republics delegate certain rights and powers to a mutually established coordinating body (for example, in such spheres as foreign policy, collective defence, maintenance of a single monetary system and others).

B: Renewed union
A renewed Union overcomes the crisis and reestablishes a central power, authority and influence. All-Union programmes of political stabilisation and economic development operate. The republics receive significant independence within the framework of the Union state, under which the all-Union laws take priority over those of the republics. Political liberalisation and economic reforms are implemented by a strong central government, which guarantees political equality and economic justice. Republics may leave the Union, but only by constitutional means.

C: Federation plus confederation
A combined state structure is built upon the formula of the 'federation of Russia plus a confederation of a number of independent republics plus a system of collective agreements with separate republic-states'. In the framework of a united Russian republic significant independence of the autonomous regions is guaranteed. Several republics form together with the Russian federation a confederation in the framework of which are delegated certain powers to central organs of rule. The separate republic-states continue to act in general economic, political, legal space with this confederation (within the boundaries of the former territory of the USSR), preserving complete state independence and at the same time supporting collaboration on agreed bases.

Second set of scenarios

Scenario 1: New socialism
A return to the formation of a genuine socialist society without distortions. A new Union treaty is concluded with the republics. The all-Union government combines elements of the market with central planning, guarantees social justice, overcomes the now occurring social differentiation of society into the 'new rich' and the 'new poor' through the means of a strong tax policy and a programme of social assistance and benefits. While the competition of politicians and various political parties is permitted, activity disturbing the social order is restricted.

Scenario 2: The market and pluralism
The broad application of world economic and political experience to our conditions. In the economy the elements of the command-administrative system (over-centralisation, planning 'from above', and so forth) are surmounted. The development of market relations on the basis of private property with protection and development in the sphere of state and collective (social) property. The formation of many 'free economic zones', the attraction of foreign capital. The free choice of goods and services brings forth a strengthening of social differentiation. In political life, democratic rights and freedoms of citizens are guaranteed. Through the path of elections political parties and groups are alternated and a parliamentary struggle of political forces and parties occurs.

Appendix 2

CORRELATION MATRIX OF PREFERENCES FOR ASPECTS OF WESTERN SOCIETY

	Market	*Parliament*	*Multiparty*	*Openness*	*Integration*	*Social organisations*	*Management*	*Free speech*	*Private life*	*Religion*	*Rights*
Market	1.000										
Parliament	0.2618	1.000									
Multi-party system	0.4462[b]	0.5310[b]	1.000								
Openness to outside	0.3291[a]	0.2145	0.2618	1.000							
Integration in world	0.5123[b]	0.2212	0.4262[b]	0.3050[a]	1.000						
Social organisations	0.1348	0.2471	0.2593	0.4286[b]	0.2357	1.000					
Management and administration	0.5635[b]	0.2982[a]	0.3398[b]	0.2982[a]	0.6087[b]	0.0233	1.000				
Free speech and press	0.3944[b]	0.4029[b]	0.4595[b]	0.3395[a]	0.2579	0.3196[a]	0.3820[a]	1.000			
Private life	0.1478	0.3704[b]	0.2843[a]	0.5694[b]	0.3220[a]	0.3450[a]	0.3185[a]	0.4306[a]	1.000		
Religion	0.3838[b]	0.3681[b]	0.4460[b]	0.4891[b]	0.3131	0.6643[b]	0.2905[a]	0.4367[b]	0.4676[b]	1.000	
Rights	0.5985[b]	0.3888[b]	0.4262[b]	0.3888[b]	0.4635[b]	0.2357	0.6087[b]	0.4201[b]	0.3220[a]	0.3131[a]	1.000

One-tailed test of significance.
[a] indicates significance at the .01 level
[b] indicates significance at the .001 level