
(In)direct Framing Effects: The Effects of News Media Framing on Public Support for Turkish Membership in the European Union

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Abstract

News framing can exert a strong influence on public opinion. Following a media content analysis, this article investigates the effects of news framing on support for membership of Turkey in the European Union. A first experimental study ($n = 304$) showed a significant difference in the level of support for Turkish membership between respondents who were exposed to a positively valenced news frame and respondents who had received a negative frame. The results of a second survey-embedded experimental study ($n = 1,632$) corroborated the first study, and tested the hypothesis that frames affect the importance of certain considerations and that the valence of the news frames also directly affects opinion. Negative news frames yielded stronger effects than positive news frames, and high political sophisticates were more affected by positive framing. The study demonstrates that (change in) public approval of Turkish EU membership is contingent on the elites' and the media's coverage of the issue in interaction with individual characteristics.

Keywords

media, public opinion, EU, Turkey, news, framing

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Framing can help us to understand how citizens make sense of political, social, and economic issues (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). One very important area for citizens in Europe is the process of European integration. The European Union (EU) is facing a number of challenges that relate to the legitimacy of the Union and the support of its citizens. Turnout in European elections is decreasing, euroskepticism is on the rise, and the Constitutional Treaty and later the Lisbon Treaty were initially rejected in national referendums. Looking ahead, the EU is challenged to accommodate new enlargements. The inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 is not likely to be the end of the road and negotiations about further enlargements are ongoing. One of the most contentious issues on the agenda is the potential membership of Turkey in the EU.¹ As Karp and Bowler (2006) demonstrated, far from all citizens in Europe are charmed by the idea of a further enlarged union.

Extant research and opinion surveys in the EU's current member states bear witness to a substantial degree of public reluctance regarding the membership of Turkey. Eurobarometer data show that 59% of Europeans are against Turkish membership, 28% in favor and 13% are undecided (EB 66, 2007, p. 223). Public opinion on complex topics, however, is volatile (Page & Shapiro, 1992) and it has been demonstrated that opinions on EU matters are not stable and are easily influenced by (new) information (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; de Vreese & Semetko, 2004). Accordingly, citizens' attitudes with respect to Turkish membership are likely to develop in part as a function of the success of the negotiations, the perception of change in Turkey, developments in current EU member states, and the framing of the issue by political elites and news media across Europe. Public support is of key importance for the legitimacy of any decision on the Turkey issue, either indirectly by holding national governments accountable or directly through possible referendums on the issue announced by national governments.

In this article, we analyze the way in which news media frame the issue of Turkish membership in the EU to assess the *impact* of news media framing on public support for Turkish membership. Framing is particularly helpful for understanding the effects of news media content for issues that are subject to different presentations and interpretations. A media frame is *an emphasis in salience of certain aspects of a topic* (de Vreese, 2002, p. 27) and it provides—in a positive, negative, or neutral manner—an organizing principle to the structure of a news story and therefore potentially to citizens' understanding of and thinking about political, economic, and social topics. This article extends previous research by disentangling the effects of *frames* and the *valence* of these frames. We propose, in line with extant research, that framing alters the importance of specific considerations regarding the topic that is framed. Moreover, we suggest that this occurs in addition to the valence of a frame, which also directly affects attitudes toward the topic. We finally consider the nature of this effect being conditioned by individuals' level of political sophistication.

EU Enlargements and the Media

Knowledge about news media coverage of European integration in general is accumulating (Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, Schuck & de Vreese, 2010; Wessler, Peters, Bruggemann, van Koningslow, & Stifft, 2008), but there is relatively scant evidence about the news coverage and framing of previous enlargements of the EU. Based on media monitoring by the European Commission, Norris (2000) reports that "EU development" (including enlargement) was an important issue in the media between 1995 and 1997 and that the coverage was, on average, negative in tone. However, these data say little about the *framing* of the issue in the news and its potential impact on public opinion. A study of the news coverage of the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) found that news media used valenced news frames such as "risk" and "opportunity" frames (Schuck & de Vreese, 2006).

The issue of Turkish membership touches on several aspects. The European Commission lists issues of economic conditions and political criteria as key parts of the negotiations (COM[2004] 656) and also political parties across Europe highlight on the one hand economic framing and on the other hand political framing of the issue. A comparative analysis of news media framing of Turkish accession to the EU identified four dominant frames relating to nationalism, economic consequences, clash of civilization, and liberal multiculturalism (Koenig, Mihelj, Downey, & Bek, 2006). This media analysis suggested that the public debate was neither very European nor public in character. Previous research, however, has not linked the media framing of the "Turkey issue" to dynamics of public opinion.

Linking media content analyses and public opinion data in the case of Turkey is interesting for at least three reasons. First, the issue contains not only economic, political/geostrategic but also cultural dimensions and is therefore particularly interesting in the light of recent research on understanding public support for European integration that now focuses heavily on identity-related indicators along with previously identified utilitarian indicators (de Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2008; Gabel, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2007). Second, the topic provides an interesting case to study how news frames can affect support for a particular *aspect* of European integration (e.g., Carey & Burton, 2004). Third, the issue is of major importance to the future of the EU, and not only may public support be relevant in the sense of providing an indirect expression of legitimacy but also may public opinion play a very direct role if plans to hold national referendums on the issue materialize (Schuck & de Vreese, 2009).

News Framing and Its Impact on Public Opinion

A range of studies has investigated how messages are framed in the news media and whether, under which circumstances, and how these frames affect audience responses. Though journalists may construct news in a variety of ways, scholars (and journalism textbooks) identify a number of features that journalists resort to when covering issues

and events. A distinction is made between *issue-specific news frames* and *generic news frames* (de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001). Generic frames, such as the game and the strategy frame (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993), thematic and episodic frames (Iyengar, 1991), and the conflict frame (Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) transcend thematic boundaries and are typically applied across a range of topics. Issue-specific frames are intrinsically related to certain topics or news events (e.g., Terkildsen & Schnell, 1997).² Studies of the effects of issue-specific news frames looked at the impact on citizens' issue perceptions, cognitive responses, as well as on policy support (e.g., Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Shah, Kwak, Schmierbach, & Zubric, 2004). To render research on framing effects useful, the effects must be related to studies of news production and news content so as to validate the effects research (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; de Vreese, 2002; Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Slater, 2004). This challenge is augmented by studies that do not specifically relate the investigation of framing effects to the presence of news frames, which hampers the validity and generalizability of their conclusions.

Framing Effects: Multiple Routes of Influence

Framing research has presented different models for how framing effects operate. Initial work—following from a model of accessibility—assumed that frames affect opinions not by changing the contents of a person's ideas but by a process of making already existing ideas more accessible so that these considerations were more likely to feed into the opinion (e.g., Iyengar, 1991). The accessibility model of framing effect has not received much empirical support (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Nelson & Willey, 2001, pp. 261-263; Scheufele, 2000) and research was soon enriched with at least two complementary perspectives.

One group of scholars suggests that framing effects are predominantly mediated by *belief importance* (e.g., Nelson et al., 1997). That means that framing affects individuals by altering the perceived importance of some aspects of an issue. This perspective suggests that trade-offs are made between different beliefs or considerations when opinions are expressed. Welfare, for example, may be framed such that considerations pertaining to either spending or budget reduction may be most important (Zaller, 1992). Frames thus highlight one or more cues and by ignoring them cast other beliefs as less important (Price & Tewksbury 1997; see also Chong & Druckman, 2007).

Furthermore, scholars have also stressed that effects of frames can occur in addition to affecting belief importance (e.g., de Vreese, 2010). Slothuus (2008) finds framing to affect *belief content*, which means that the frames offer new considerations to an individual. It is suggested that by presenting information individuals might become aware of connections between beliefs and topics they had not thought about before. Thereby, not only the importance of existing beliefs is altered but also the beliefs themselves are changed—so the two perspectives are rather complementary than mutually exclusive. Indeed, Shah et al. (2004) showed how new information contexts can cause individuals to revise their beliefs. In sum, framing can operate through multiple routes, including both an *indirect*

route of affecting belief importance and a *direct* route of offering new considerations and links between considerations that did not exist in advance. Our model of framing effects builds upon the seminal work laid out by Nelson and colleagues and it advances this research by suggesting that frames do indeed not only affect the importance of beliefs but they can also affect the attitudes directly. The latter can happen by offering new considerations, as suggested by Slothuus (2008) *or* by providing valence to the frame.

Indeed, not all frames are equal nor do they have the same impact. Chong and Druckman (2007) propose that the *valence* of a frame is important to consider along the weight of certain considerations. It is clear that while some frames contain few implicit evaluations, others carry more. For example Entman's (1991) analysis of the framing of an American and a Soviet plane accident as either a "tragedy" (in the U.S. case) or an "attack" (in the Soviet case) is an example of frames with strong valence. Valenced news frames indicate inherent good and positive or bad and negative aspects. They can show variation, ranging from strongly positive over neutral to strongly negative. Shah et al. (2004) considered loss and gain frames in their study of urban growth, and Schuck and de Vreese (2006) investigated risk and opportunity frames. The valence of news frames matters because it can affect both cognitive responses (e.g., Shah et al., 2004) and attitudes (Schuck & de Vreese, 2006).

We take from a (growing) body of research suggesting that responses to negative and positive information are asymmetric and that negative information has a stronger impact on citizens' attitudes than positive information. In economics, loss aversion is a key component of prospect theory suggesting that effects of identical positively or negatively framed information are asymmetric (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It has been shown that negative economic news coverage has a substantially stronger effect on public perceptions of the economy than positive economic information (Soroka, 2006). Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) in their classic studies of voting behavior found that negative information plays a greater role than positive information. A similar pattern has been identified with regard to impression formation of U.S. presidential candidates and political parties (Holbrook, Krosnick, Visser, Gardner, & Cacioppo, 2001; Lau, 1985). Consistently, Cacioppo, Gardner, and Bernston (1997) emphasize the asymmetry when individuals incorporate positive and negative information. Similarly, it has been shown that negative information is more salient and more memorable (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991; Lau, 1985) and that con arguments are more persuasive than pro arguments (Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997). We therefore expect, *ceteris paribus*, negatively valenced news frames to have a stronger effect than positively valenced frames.

One Size Fits All?

Media effects research has repeatedly demonstrated that some messages yield specific effects and that not all individuals react identically to the same message (e.g., Nabi & Oliver, 2009; Zaller, 1992). In our current study, we expect the level of *political sophistication* of the individual that is exposed to a news frame to moderate the effects. Political sophistication has been defined as an individual's "intellectual or cognitive engagement with public affairs"

(Zaller, 1992). As pointed out by Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001), it is an important part of understanding the reasons why frames do not have a universal impact. Highly politically aware individuals think more, and more deeply, about political issues. In addition, more politically aware individuals are more likely to be exposed to frames and to be able to comprehend and integrate the frames in their (re-)formation of opinion. Previous research, however, has not yielded consistent results. Some studies showed that lower levels of political information or sophistication led to higher susceptibility to framing effects (Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001), while others demonstrated a reverse relationship (Nelson et al., 1997). Recent studies indeed seem to dovetail with the latter and find the moderately or most politically aware to be more susceptible to issue framing effects (e.g., Druckman & Nelson 2003; Lecheler & de Vreese, in press; Slothuus, 2008; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). We also expect the more politically aware to be more responsive to news framing, in particular in relation to a multifaceted issue such as Turkish EU accession. High politically sophisticates are typically more able and motivated to understand (new) information and integrate this into their opinion formation.

Hypotheses

In this study, we bring together research on issue-specific news frames and their valence to investigate the effects of such frames, while specifically looking at multiple routes of influence. Our study is set around the 2004 summit of the EU Council, when the start of negotiation talks with Turkey was agreed on. First, with respect to the news framing of the issue, we, following Koenig et al. (2006), expect the potential membership to be framed in economic and cultural terms. However, the issue of Turkish membership also relates specifically to geopolitical security considerations (Bilgin, 2004) and to domestic security (e.g., Guild, 2003). Given the limited scope of previous research, we investigated the research question whether the news media framed the potential membership of Turkey in the EU predominantly in economic, (geopolitical) security, or cultural terms. We pose this question to be able to improve and enhance the realism and external validity of our experimental framing effects study. If frames manipulated in the experiment are also found in real media coverage, this substantially enhances our contribution regarding media effects on the issue of Turkish EU membership. With respect to the effects of news frames, we expect these to occur through two different routes so that the frame affects belief importance (an indirect effect, as suggested by, for example, Nelson et al., 1997) and that the valence of the frame affects opinion (a direct effect, as suggested by de Vreese, in press, and Slothuus, 2008).

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Exposure to issue-specific news frames affects the *importance* of frame-relevant considerations, which in turn affect attitudes (indirect framing hypothesis, IFH).

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Exposure to valenced news frames affects attitudes, with negatively valenced frames exerting a negative influence and positively valenced frames exerting a positive influence (direct framing hypothesis, DFH).

With respect to the differential impact of positively and negatively valenced news frames we expect, corroborating extant research, that the effect of exposure to negative frames is stronger than the effect of positive frames (Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997; Schneider et al., 2001; Shah et al., 2004):

Hypothesis 3 (H3): The impact of valenced issue-specific news frames is asymmetric, so that the impact of negatively valenced news frames is stronger than the impact of positively valenced news frames (asymmetry hypothesis).

In terms of individual-level moderating variables, we expect individuals with higher levels of political sophistication to respond stronger to the frames (e.g., Druckman & Nelson, 2003):

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Political sophistication moderates framing effects, so that high sophisticates are more responsive to frames (moderation hypothesis).

Method and Results

To investigate the presence and impact of issue-specific news frames concerning the debate around a future enlargement of the EU with Turkey, we conducted three studies. First a content analysis of Dutch national news media to identify relevant news frames, thereby validating the choice of issue-specific news frames used in the part of the study focused on framing effects. The impact of these frames was tested in two experimental studies: one among a convenience sample of undergraduate students and another more elaborate study in a survey amongst a representative sample of the Dutch adult population. Details concerning the three data sources and measures are given below.

Content analysis. We first report on the news content analysis. The main evening newscasts of the public broadcaster [NOS] and its main commercial competitor [RTL] were analyzed for a period of 4 weeks leading up to and including the EU summit in December 2004.³ News stories that mentioned Turkey and the European Union were identified and selected for further analysis. Furthermore, all articles appearing in the five most widely read national newspapers [de Volkskrant, NRC, Algemeen Dagblad, Trouw, de Telegraaf] that mentioned Turkey and the EU were identified by means of computer-assisted content analysis. Of these, we selected only those stories that actually dealt with a possible Turkish accession to the EU.⁴ This resulted in a sample of $n = 220$ relevant stories.

Coding was done by a group of five undergraduate students at ASCoR at the University of Amsterdam.⁵ In addition to general story information, items indicating the usage of issue-specific frames in news coverage of the issue of Turkish accession to the EU were employed. The frames were derived following an exploratory analysis of the news content. Specifically, we assessed the presence of five frames: (a) geopolitical security advantages, (b) economic advantages, (c) economic threats, (d) cultural threats, and (e) (national) security threats. The conceptualization of the economic and cultural frames shares an overlap with the frames identified in the study by Koenig et al. (2006) and we additionally focus on (geopolitical) security frames (Bilgin 2004; Guild, 2003). Each of these frames was operationalized using




Figure 1. News framing of Turkish membership

Note: Percentage of stories about Turkey and the EU containing frame (total $n = 220$).

multiple items (see Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). A list of these measures is given in Appendix C. When one or more items were coded as present in a news story, the frame was considered present. We emphasize that the frames were found in actual news media content and the content analysis thereby contributes to validating the manipulation of the stimulus material used in the two experimental studies.

Results content analysis. Figure 1 illustrates the presence of the five issue-specific frames in the news. We see that each frame appears in actual news coverage about Turkish EU membership. In answering our research question, we found that the cultural threat frame was most prominent, appearing in more than 20% of all stories dealing with the issue. However, also the geopolitical security advantages frame featured rather prominently in more than one eighth of all news stories (12%). The economic threat frame came up slightly more often than the economic benefits frame, with 6% and 4% respectively. Five percent of all EU Turkey news stories used a security threat frame. These findings show that frames are positively and negatively valenced and that negative frames were relatively more prominent than positive frames. While none of the five frames can be said to dominate the coverage of Turkish EU membership, all frames were identified in the news, which makes it relevant to assess the possible impact of the different frames on public opinion.⁶

Pilot Effects Study

Participants were asked to read a newspaper article about the accession of Turkey to the EU. Participants were sampled from the ASCoR ComLab database of students of the Social and Behavioral sciences who in the past expressed willingness to participate in research projects. Participants were invited to fill out the questionnaire via e-mail. The participants

were put into a lottery draw for CD vouchers as incentive to take part in the study. The survey was conducted using an online survey tool and was accessible for a period of 14 days. The response rate was 60%. The sample consisted of 302 college students (age $M = 20.14$, $SD = 2.81$; 63% females) who were randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions or the control group.⁷ After reading the stimulus material, respondents were asked about their attitude toward the possible entry of Turkey to the European Union.⁸ After completion participants were debriefed.

Stimulus material. To test the impact of issue-specific news framing, we manipulated a newspaper article about the accession of Turkey to the EU. By altering only parts of the article and keeping all other elements constant, we ensured a high comparability of the stimulus material with a focused framing manipulation. The core part of the article was identical across the five conditions. The headline and the second paragraph were altered according to the issue-specific frames defined above. Each manipulated paragraph followed the same template, was of similar length, and contained one quote of a fictitious expert. For the wording of the frame manipulations, see Appendix B.

The first framing manipulation addressed cultural aspects in the way of changing food culture in certain areas highly populated with Turks and more generally the potential danger that European Christian culture would be undermined by the growth of Muslim populations in the future (cultural threat frame). The second frame related recently rising unemployment in the Netherlands to continuous immigration of Turks and also looked at the unemployment rate among Turks in the Netherlands (economic threat frame). The third frame considered the potential threat of terrorism by talking about religious fundamentalism among Turkish minorities and the possibility of involvement in terrorist activity (security threat frame). The fourth manipulation argued that in order to cope with aging populations Western countries would need immigration and that Turkey in the future could provide a highly educated workforce (economic benefits frame). The last frame considered the possible geopolitical and strategic advantage of embedding Turkey in the European Union, its function as mediator between East and West and its role as an example democratic Islam state ([geopolitical] security benefits frame). The five headlines that were used are (a) Turkey in the EU—Kebab instead of French Fries? (b) Turkey in the EU—rising unemployment as consequence? (c) Turkey in the EU—a security threat? (d) Turkey in the EU—a solution to our pension gap? (e) Turkey in the EU—a bridge between East and West?

Measures. The key dependent variable tapped respondents' attitude towards accession of Turkey in the EU by asking "What do you think about a possible entry of Turkey to the European Union?" Answers were given on a 5-point scale running from 1 = *very negative* to 5 = *very positive* ($M = 2.93$, $SD = 1.01$).⁹ A manipulation check revealed successful experimental manipulations with respondents recognizing the information pertaining to the frame to which they were exposed.¹⁰ The indirect framing hypothesis was tested by measures of the importance of considerations (belief importance) regarding Turkish EU entry. Respondents reported which of the following issues they would find important for a possible accession of Turkey on a 5-point scale from *not at all important* to *very important*. The issues relating to the frames were economics ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 0.80$), culture ($M = 4.58$, $SD = 0.78$) and security ($M = 3.61$, $SD = 0.91$).

Results pilot study. We found a first indication of effects of the frames on the importance of considerations regarding a Turkish EU accession. Respondents exposed to economic framing were more likely to regard economic considerations important ($M = 3.91$; $SD = 0.79$) than all other respondents ($M = 3.69$; $SD = 0.81$), $F(1, 301) = 4.74$; $p < .05$. Similarly, respondents exposed to security framing were more likely to regard security considerations important ($M = 3.74$; $SD = 0.98$) than all other respondents ($M = 3.55$; $SD = 0.87$), $F(1, 301) = 2.99$; $p < .10$. Results were less clear regarding culture framing. They, however, pointed into the expected direction with respondents exposed to culture framing having a higher mean value regarding cultural considerations ($M = 4.69$; $SD = 0.85$) than all other respondents ($M = 4.56$; $SD = 0.53$), $F(1, 301) = 1.36$; $p = .24$. This lends partial support for H1. We additionally found that respondents exposed to a positive framing of the accession of Turkey in terms of economic and geopolitical security advantages showed more positive attitudes than respondents exposed to negative framing, $t(263) = -2.14$, $p < .05$.¹¹ This provides initial support for H2—an effect of the valence of a frame on attitudes.

Main Study

The second study utilized the same design and manipulation as the pilot study. This time, however, we relied on a different sample and added a range of additional questions to the questionnaire in order to assess the impact of the framing experiment in the light of other factors that are assumed to influence support for Turkish membership.¹² In a web-administered survey with the experiment embedded, respondents, after answering some introductory questions, were asked to read a newspaper article on the accession of Turkey to the EU. The control group did not read any article. Subsequently, respondents reported their attitude toward Turkish EU enlargement alongside a range of control variables.

Sample. Respondents were drawn from the database of TNS NIPO. The composition of the database is comparable to the composition of the adult Dutch population according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. Individuals with higher levels of education are slightly overrepresented in our sample compared to the census information. A total of $n = 1,632$ respondents filled in the survey, which produced a response rate of 73.6%.

The respondents were randomly assigned to one of the five experimental categories or the control group (cultural threat frame $n = 287$; economic threat frame $n = 256$; security threat frame $n = 270$; economic benefits frame $n = 286$; geopolitical security advantage frame $n = 291$, and control group $n = 242$). A group comparison on variables such as age, gender, and education showed a successful randomization.

Measures. The *dependent* variable was the respondents' attitude toward accession of Turkey in the EU measured on a 5-point scale ["What do you think about a possible entry of Turkey to the European Union?"] ($M = 2.70$, $SD = 0.90$). The *indirect* process of influence is tapped using measures of the importance of certain considerations (belief importance) with regard to Turkish accession in the EU. Respondents were asked which issues (economics, culture, or security) they would find important for a possible accession of Turkey to the EU: economics ($M = 3.11$, $SD = 1.22$), culture ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.03$), and security ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.96$). Our *moderator* variable political sophistication is an additive index of political knowledge (0-3) and political interest (0-3) for which knowledge weighs twice as strongly as interest ($M = 2.52$, $SD = 1.25$).¹³

Table 1. Support of Turkish Accession in the EU by Experimental Category

	<i>M</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>n</i>
Cultural threat	2.47 ^a	.90	287
Economic threat	2.57 ^a	.86	256
Security threat	2.46 ^a	.87	270
Economic benefits	2.93 ^b	.83	286
Security benefits	2.96 ^b	.93	291
Control group	2.76 ^b	.88	242

Note: *N* = 1,632. Shared subscripts do not differ significantly from each other; a-b subscripts differ significantly at *p* < .05.

Given the fact that information, such as frames provided by the media, is not the only factor affecting a respondent's attitude toward Turkish membership, we included a range of other factors so as to assess the impact of exposure to specific news framing in the context of other influences (see Appendix A for details). To provide a conservative test of the framing effects, we employ a number of *control* variables in our analyses: Gender (1 = *female*), age (in years), education (coded into six categories ranging from low to high), and household income (coded into four categories running from *low* to *high*; see Gabel, 1998, for a discussion of sociodemographic characteristics and support for European integration) were included. Furthermore, respondents' ideological leaning (dummies for left and right, with middle as reference category) and support for postmaterialist values (materialist low, post-materialist high) were measured (see Inglehart, 1990, and van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). We included questions tapping economic and government evaluations (high is positive), whether respondents held an *exclusive* national identity (dummy) and we used a six-item measure for anti-immigration attitudes (see Marks & Hooghe (2003) and de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) for overviews and discussion of antecedents of support for European integration).

In the *analyses*, dummy variables represent the experimental categories or different framing clusters, with the control group being the reference category. The range of all variables was standardized and we report unstandardized coefficients. Several regression models were specified so as to, on the one hand, assess the impact of the experimental manipulation on the dependent measures and the scope of additionally explained variance after including the explanatory variables in the model and, on the other hand, to look at a moderation effect of political sophistication.

Results main study. Table 1 presents the differences of attitudes toward accession of Turkey between the experimental conditions. The findings confirm the trends found in the pilot study. Respondents exposed to benefit framing were markedly more positive about a Turkish EU membership than those in the threat-framing conditions. The control group, not exposed to any frame, falls right in the middle between the positive and negative framing conditions. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed overall significant mean differences between the groups, $F(5, 1626) = 17.969, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05$. The Tukey B post hoc

Table 2. Frame Effects on Importance of Considerations

	Importance Culture		Importance Security		Importance Economy	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
Intercept	.000	.028	.000	.025	.000	.024
Economy frame	-.082*	.040	-.047	.037	.076*	.030
Security frame	.038	.040	.076*	.035	.036	.031
Culture frame	.087*	.038	-.008	.033	.042	.028
Adjusted R^2	.076		.073		.022	
<i>N</i>	1,630		1,630		1,630	

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized *b* coefficients and standard errors. All models control for the effects of age, gender, education, anti-immigration attitudes, political sophistication, government approval, ideology, postmaterialism, national identity, and economic evaluations (not shown here). These controls are used in order to be able to estimate indirect effects (after estimating Model 2 in Table 3).

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

procedure revealed two homogeneous subsets ($p < .01$). The first subset consists of the three negative framing conditions, and the second of the two positive conditions and the control group. The results of both experimental studies confirm our expectations concerning the effect of valenced issue news framing (the Direct Framing Hypothesis, H2). We also see a first indication of a stronger effect of negatively valenced frames (H3).

We set out to disentangle the impact of the valence of a frame and the considerations that it highlights. So in addition to the *direct* effect of news frames on support, we expected that frames could have differential effects in that they affect support *indirectly* by increasing the importance of certain considerations with regard to a Turkish EU accession. We cluster the frames according to their issue focus into three groups, economic frames (including both economic threat and benefit frames), security frames (including geopolitical security benefit and security threat frames), and the cultural frame. Table 2 shows how these frame clusters affect the importance of considerations regarding a Turkish EU accession. Frame clusters are entered as independent variables into OLS regression models explaining consideration importance. It is shown that being exposed to economic framing, no matter whether positive or negative, increases the importance of the economy as a consideration for judging Turkish EU membership. Similarly, being exposed to cultural framing increases the role of culture as a consideration and being exposed to security frames increases the importance of security as a consideration.¹⁴ This provides supportive evidence for the first part of the Indirect Framing Hypothesis, H1.

To provide a more rigorous and conservative test of the effect of the experimental framing manipulation on attitudes toward accession of Turkey to the EU and a complete picture of the different relationships at hand in the context of other potentially important influences, we add factors introduced above as control variables alongside the experimental categories to OLS regression models explaining attitudes toward Turkey accession. Table 3 displays the results of four regression models. The first model looks at the

Table 3. Effect of Frames on EU Turkey Support

	Base Model		Frame Clusters		Frames		Valence Clusters	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
Intercept	.000	.021	.000	.021	.000	.021	.000	.021
Gender female	-.021	.022	-.019	.022	-.019	.022	-.019	.022
Age	.013	.023	.013	.023	.020	.022	.020	.022
Education	.020	.023	.018	.023	.015	.022	.017	.022
Income	.012	.022	.013	.022	.015	.022	.015	.022
Left ideology	.021	.027	.020	.027	.017	.027	.017	.026
Right ideology	-.081***	.026	-.083***	.026	-.086***	.025	-.087***	.025
Postmaterialism	.064***	.022	.065***	.022	.065***	.021	.065***	.021
Exclusive national identity	-.132***	.023	-.131***	.023	-.127***	.022	-.127***	.022
Anti-immigration index	-.310***	.024	-.307***	.024	-.308***	.024	-.308***	.024
Government approval	.061**	.025	.062***	.025	.066***	.024	.065***	.024
Economic evaluations	.103***	.023	.099***	.023	.090***	.023	.091***	.023
Political sophistication	-.057**	.024	-.052**	.024	-.051**	.024	-.051**	.024
Importance culture	-.179***	.023	-.173***	.024	-.164***	.023	-.163***	.023
Importance security	-.072***	.027	-.079***	.027	-.091***	.026	-.091***	.026
Importance economy	.034	.026	.042	.026	.066**	.026	.064**	.026
Cultural threat frame	—	—	—	—	-.092***	.028	—	—
Economic threat frame	—	—	—	—	-.091***	.027	—	—
Security threat frame	—	—	—	—	-.094***	.027	—	—
Economic benefits frame	—	—	—	—	.051*	.028	—	—
Security benefits frame	—	—	—	—	.076***	.028	—	—
Positive framing	—	—	—	—	—	—	.076***	.031
Negative framing	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.127***	.031
Economic frame	—	—	-.023	.031	—	—	—	—
Security frame	—	—	-.011	.031	—	—	—	—
Culture frame	—	—	-.089***	.028	—	—	—	—
Adjusted R ²	.272		.277		.305		.306	
N	1,630		1,630		1,630		1,630	

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized *b* coefficients and standard errors.

p* < .10. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01. *****p* < .001.

impact of the variables prescribed by our literature review, in addition to the three indirect routes identified above. Two of the three indirect routes do affect EU Turkey support. Considering culture or security as important consideration when it comes to a possible entry of Turkey to the EU significantly decreases support. To test for the indirect effects, we add the frame clusters to the estimation in the second model. The direct effects of the importance of considerations are not substantially altered. Furthermore, it is shown that the economy and security frame clusters do not significantly affect the dependent variable. The culture frame cluster has a negative effect, since it represents only a negative version of the culture frame; therefore it is not independent of valenced information. Relying on the results of the second model shown in Table 3 and on the findings in Table 2, we estimate indirect effects using a Sobel test (e.g., Sobel, 1982; see Hayes, 2009).¹⁵ The indirect effect test is significant for cultural framing, that is, being exposed to the cultural framing increases the importance of culture as a consideration, which in turn decreases support for a Turkish accession ($a = .087$; $b = -.173$; $s_a = .038$; $s_b = .024$; Sobel test statistic $= -2.18$, $p < .05$). Indirect effects were also found for security framing ($a = .076$; $b = -.079$; $s_a = .035$; $s_b = .027$; Sobel test statistic $= -1.74$, $p < .10$) and the indirect effects test for economic framing is not significant ($a = -.082$; $b = .034$; $s_a = .040$; $s_b = .026$; Sobel test statistic $= 1.36$, $p = 0.17$). These results lend partial support to our indirect framing Hypothesis.

Furthermore, the model shows significant negative effects of anti-immigration attitudes, exclusive Dutch identity, a right ideological leaning, and somewhat weaker political sophistication on attitudes toward accession of Turkey. Positive government evaluations, a positive economic outlook, and postmaterialist values affect the dependent variable significantly and positively. These findings confirm prior research on EU support. The second model explains about 28% of variance in attitudes toward Turkish accession.

We proceed with considering direct effects of the experimental manipulations. The third model adds dummy variables for the individual experimental categories to the first base model, with the control group as reference category. This addition produces a significant change in the explained variance to about 31%, $F(2, 1628) = 44.182$, $p < .001$. Exposure to the three negative frames had significant negative effects on attitudes toward accession of Turkey to the EU when compared to the reference group. Exposure to the geopolitical security benefit frame had a strongly and exposure to the economic benefit frame a weakly significant positive influence on support when compared to the control group. These effects are independent of the belief importance variables. Moreover, and as shown in the fourth model in Table 3 we note that the effect of *negative* framing is substantially stronger ($b = .13$) than the effect of positive framing ($b = .08$). This difference is significant (one-tailed) $t(1630) = 1.16$, $p < .05$, following the procedure advised by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003, pp. 640-641), thereby confirming our expectation with respect to somewhat stronger effects of negative frames (asymmetry hypotheses, H3). The effect size is Cohen's $d = 0.31$, which is referred to as a small effect (Cohen, 1988). So whereas evidence supports our expectations, we note that the difference between the effects of positive versus negative frames is rather weak.

Table 4. Interaction Effects of Frames and Political Sophistication

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
Intercept	.000	.021
Gender female	−.021	.022
Age	.017	.022
Education	.014	.022
Income	.017	.022
Left ideology	.018	.027
Right ideology	−.087***	.025
Postmaterialism	.066***	.021
Exclusive national identity	−.126***	.022
Anti-immigration index	−.308***	.024
Government approval	.066***	.024
Economic evaluations	.089***	.023
Political sophistication	−.054**	.024
Importance culture	−.165***	.023
Importance security	−.091***	.026
Importance economy	.064**	.026
Cultural threat frame	−.089***	.028
Economic threat frame	−.089***	.027
Security threat frame	−.094***	.027
Economic benefits frame	.052*	.028
Security benefits frame	.075***	.028
Political Sophistication × Cultural threat frame	−.015	.028
Political Sophistication × Economic threat frame	−.010	.027
Political Sophistication × Security threat frame	.011	.028
Political Sophistication × Economic benefits frame	.047*	.028
Political Sophistication × Security benefits frame	.074***	.027
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		.317 ^a
<i>N</i>		1,630

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized *b* coefficients and standard errors.

a. significant increase from model without interaction terms at *p* < .01.

p* < .10. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01. *****p* < .001.

Finally, we tested the moderating effect of political sophistication on the impact of frame exposure on EU Turkey support. We computed interaction terms for each framing condition with political sophistication and added these to the second model discussed above. As shown in Table 4, only for the positive framing conditions we find significant interaction effects. This provides only partial support for the moderation hypothesis (H4), which is addressed in the Discussion. Including the interaction terms significantly increases the explained variance of the model. The main effects of the experimental categories remain largely unaltered.

Discussion

In the context of ongoing negotiations about Turkish membership in the EU, we conducted this study that shed new light on our understanding of framing effects. We first identified several news frames that carry an inherent valence by framing the issue in either positive or negative terms. The presence of these frames in real news coverage was assessed through a systematic content analysis. In a next step we assessed the impact of these news frames on respondents' support for Turkish membership. We found that frames exerted two kinds of effects. They increased the importance of certain considerations highlighted in the frame (e.g., economic, cultural, security-related considerations), which in turn affected support *and* the valence of the frame affected attitudes directly. This stresses that frames can have *both* direct and indirect effects.

In addition to showing that valenced news frames matter directly, we also demonstrated how the impact of negative framing is greater than that of positive framing. This result corroborates extant research in health communication that also demonstrates stronger effects of negative framing (e.g., Schneider et al., 2001; see also Shah et al., 2004). Con arguments can indeed evoke fear, anger, and other emotions (Schuck & de Vreese, 2009). As Cobb and Kuklinski (1997, p. 115) suggest, these can serve as readily available sources of information when individuals evaluate policy proposals. This is not implying that positive arguments have no effect, because "they do, and sometimes [. . .] that effect can be substantial. But overall, con arguments win the day."

We hypothesized a pattern of differential effects regarding the news frames. First, in this study, we, as expected, found some framing effects to be more pronounced for high political sophisticates who are typically better able to understand new information and integrate this into the continuous updating of their opinion (see also Druckman & Nelson, 2003). This, however, was only the case for exposure to *positively* valenced news frames, which we believe expresses high sophisticates' ability to integrate positive information in their opinion. This is an unexpected feature of news coverage, which is generally rather negative (Kepplinger & Weissbecker, 1991).

In the current study, we also assessed the impact of exposure to news frames in the context of factors known to affect levels of support for advanced European integration. We find evidence that is supportive of most previously established relationships between, for example, positive government evaluations, positive economic outlook, absence of fear of immigration on the one hand, and support for European integration on the other (see de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005, and Gabel, 1998). In line with de Vreese et al. (2008) and McLaren (2007), we too find that utilitarian considerations matter less than feelings of, for example, identity in the case of Turkey. However, above and beyond these well-established relationships, we found exposure to news frames to affect support. Exposure to news framing not only affected the level of support in the hypothesized direction as a function of the valence of the news frame but also significantly increased the amount of explained variance in the model. Given the results of our content analysis, which showed variation in the use of the frames applied in the experiment, we can extrapolate from our experimental findings to suggest that exposure to such news frames as part of general news consumption is likely to affect public support. The latter emphasizes the importance of adding variables tapping

media exposure and communication patterns to survey data based models investigating the antecedents of and change in support for different aspects of European integration.

Our study of the presence and effects of issue-specific news frames integrates media content analyses and effects-focused experimental research. Much research has focused either on identifying frames in the news *or* on framing effects. As suggested by Scheufele (1999) and others, the research presented here integrates an investigation of the presence of issue-specific frames in the news with a study of their effects. However, a number of aspects require additional attention in the future. First, future studies should further develop and pursue the empirical consequences of frame definitions ranging from presentations that differ only marginally in substantive content (equivalence framing) to presentations that differ on several content features (emphasis framing). Our study is in between, and we extended our frames with a return to one of the origins of framing research, Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) seminal work. Second, disentangling the effects of multiple and even contradictory frames remains an open question. While our news content analysis showed that several frames, both positive and negative, were present, we, in this study, only assessed the effects of exposure to a single news frame. Future research needs to investigate the effects of exposure to multiple news frames, such as initially investigated in Shah et al.'s (2004) analysis of the interplay of frames (see also Chong & Druckman, 2007). These shortcomings and considerations notwithstanding, the current study applied the notion of valenced issue-specific news framing in a multi-method study of one of the most contentious issues of European integration and demonstrated that citizens are affected by the news framing, though not in the same ways.

Appendix A

Variables in Main Survey

		M	SD	alpha
Gender	1 = female	0.45	0.50	
What is your gender?				
Age	16 to 89	49.11	15.40	
How old are you?				
Education	6 = high	3.57	1.50	
What is your highest completed degree?				
1 = Primary school				
6 = University degree				
Income	4 = high	2.96	0.97	
What is your average monthly household income?				
1 = < EUR 1150				
2 = EUR 1150 to 1800				
3 = EUR 1800 to 2600				
4 = > EUR 2600				

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>alpha</i>
Ideology left	<i>I = left</i>	0.35	0.48	
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is very left, and 10 is very right, what is your ideological leaning? (1 = 1, 2, 3; 0 = Else)				
Ideology right	<i>I = right</i>	0.33	0.47	
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is very left, and 10 is very right, what is your ideological leaning? (1 = 8, 9, 10; 0 = Else)				
Postmaterialism	<i>4 = high</i>	2.14	0.91	
How important do you think following considerations are? 1 = keeping order (materialist) 2 = more citizen involvement (postmaterialist) 3 = handle inflation (materialist) 4 = freedom of speech (postmaterialist) 1 = least important 2 = somewhat important 3 = important 4 = very important (ranking recoded into scale from 1 to 4)				
Political sophistication	<i>4.5 = high</i>	2.52	1.25	
Additive index of knowledge and interest How interested are you in politics? 0 = not at all to 3 = very interested How many countries are EU members? What is the name of the Dutch EU commissioner? What is the name of the EU president?				
Exclusive Dutch identity	<i>I = yes</i>	0.57	0.50	
How do you see your own identity? Dutch only Dutch and a little bit European European and a little bit Dutch European only				
Government evaluation	<i>5 = good</i>	2.48	0.99	
How, in your opinion, is the present government handling the job?				
Turkey in EU support	<i>5 = positively</i>	2.70	0.90	
How do you think about possible membership of Turkey in the EU?				

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>alpha</i>
Immigration index	5 = <i>high</i>	3.02	1.02	.83
Additive index of six items. Answers on 5-point <i>agree-disagree</i> scale				
Immigration is good for the job market (recoded)				
The religious practices of immigrants threaten the Dutch way of life				
Immigration is an important cause of crime in The Netherlands				
Immigration contributes positively to Dutch culture (recoded)				
Immigrants misuse the Dutch welfare system.				
Immigrants are a threat to security				
Economic evaluation	5 = <i>positively</i>	2.95	0.82	
How do you think will the Dutch economy develop in the coming 12 months?				

Appendix B

Framing Manipulation

Core Paragraph and Subheadline

Start of Negotiations With Turkey Approaching. Turkish membership of the European Union has been an issue of debate since the EU and Turkey signed an Association Treaty in 1963. Only in 1987 Turkey officially applied for full accession to the EU and Turkey has been an official applicant since 1999. Yet accession negotiations have not started yet—a unique situation in EU history. In a recent report the European Commission called to start negotiations with the Turkish government as soon as possible. During the EU summit in December leaders of the current member states have to decide whether and if so when to start negotiation talks.

Manipulation A. Membership of Turkey in the European Union will have consequences for The Netherlands. In 2004 there were about 300,000 Turks living in The Netherlands. This number increases by about 20,000 per year, brought about by family reunions and marriages. And this number could yet increase even more as a consequence of an accession of Turkey to the EU. In some places in The Netherlands the concentration of Turkish people is already fairly high. Haluk T., a small shop owner in City, claims that changing buying and eating habits can be observed in The Netherlands due to changing ethnic composition of the population. And that is not likely to change again in the near future. Job Berkhaan, Professor at the University of Leiden, argues that at the end of the 21st century European Christian culture runs the danger of being undermined by the strongly growing population of Muslims throughout Europe.

(continued)

Appendix B (continued)

Manipulation B. This development leads to growing concerns about the effect of a Turkish membership in the EU on the The Netherlands economy. Job Berkhaan, Professor at the University of Leiden, argues that it is rather likely that a great stream of workers will come from Turkey to The Netherlands, even after an accession to the EU. There are about 300,000 Turks living in The Netherlands at the moment, and this number increases by about 20,000 Turks per year coming to live and work here. Unemployment among Turks decreased throughout the last years from almost 20% to 9%. At the same time total unemployment in The Netherlands increased. Consequently, as argued by Job Berkhaan, Professor at University of Leiden, the Dutch have to prepare for competition with Turks for the jobs there are in the The Netherlands in the near future.

Manipulation C. But what does this mean for The Netherlands and our national security? There are about 300,000 Turks living in The Netherlands at the moment. Many of whom have stronger religious beliefs than other groups in the Netherlands and relate closely to their Islamic background. According to Job Berkhaan, Professor at the University of Leiden, especially young Turks support the fundamentalist Islam. An estimated 5% of Turkish youth are open for fundamentalist opinions and visions. In addition to the Turks already living here now, 20,000 newcomers enter the country per year. If Turkey is to become member of the European Union, all Turks are allowed to move freely within the EU. Then, according to Job Berkhaan, it will become more difficult to keep people outside the country, that based on the fundamentalist religious belief might endanger our security and make society vulnerable for terrorist attacks.

Manipulation D. And there is a number of good reasons why Turkey should be given the possibility to join the European Union. These reasons do not only apply to the situation in Turkey but also to The Netherlands and other European countries. According to Job Berkhaan, Professor at the University of Leiden, the Dutch economy will be in need of immigration in the future in order to counterbalance problems caused by an aging population. Consequently, a relatively high number of immigrants is needed yearly to compensate for the growing number of elderly. It is expected that Turkey will provide a great amount of highly educated workforce, which could potentially support the The Netherlands economy in need. Also, as argued by Job Berkhaan the Dutch economy that strongly relies on export, will profit from the expanded internal market after an accession of Turkey to the EU.

Manipulation E. It is expected that membership of Turkey in the European Union will be an important contribution to internal and external security of The Netherlands and its citizens. Turkey will become the prime example of an Islamic and democratic society. According to Job Berkhaan, Professor at the University of Leiden, Turkey has the potential to form a bridge between the Middle East and the West and hence to contribute to a further stabilization and democratization of the whole region. In order to be able to join the EU Turkey will have to adhere to principles and norms that were set by the present members of the Union. Job Berkhaan argues that this will lead to increasing mutual understanding and at the same time Western countries could establish more influence over developments in the Middle East. Eventually it will be better and especially more secure to have Turkey enter the EU.

Appendix C

Framing Measures

Cultural Threat Frame

- Does the story suggest that the Dutch (or European) cultural life is challenged or under threat due to people of Turkish descent or Turkish immigrants?
- Does the story make reference to a unique European cultural area, with shared ideas, norms and/or values?
- Does the story mention that (present/future) immigrants from Turkey have to adapt to Dutch (or European) culture/to the Dutch (or European) way of life?
- Does the story mention that immigrants from Turkey have to learn and speak the Dutch language?
- Does the story offer a negative picture, a negative evaluation of cultural differences, especially the difference between Dutch (European) and Turkish (Islam) culture?
- Does the story suggest differences in terms of norms and values between Dutch (European) and Turkish (Islam) culture or way of life?

Economic Threat Frame

- Does the story mention that Turkish immigration/Turkish EU enlargement poses a threat to the economic prospects and well-being of Dutch people?
- Does the story mention that Turkish immigration/Turkish EU enlargement poses a threat to the economic prospects of the European Union?
- Does the story mention effects of Turkish EU enlargement on the Dutch (or EU) job market?
- Does the story mention the impact of Turkish EU enlargement or immigration from Turkey on the DUTCH welfare system?
- Does the story mention a “flood of workers” or similar metaphors?

Economic Benefits Frame

- Does the story mention that Turkish EU enlargement will have positive effects on the economic prospects and well-being of Dutch people?
- Does the story mention that Turkish EU enlargement will have positive effects on the economic prospects of the European Union?
- Does the story mention that immigration from Turkey will benefit or is necessary for social security in The Netherlands (or the EU), which is under threat due to aging populations?
- Does the story mention that in the future immigration of skilled workforce from Turkey will be needed in The Netherlands or the EU?

(continued)

Appendix C (continued)

Security Threat Frame

- Does the story mention that Turkey in the EU/Turkish immigrants pose a threat to security situation in the European Union?
- Does the story mention that Turkish immigrants contribute to problems related to crime in The Netherlands or the European Union?
- Does the story mention that Turkish EU enlargement increases the likelihood of foreigners living in The Netherlands (or the EU) that are involved in terrorist activity?
- Does the story mention that Turkish people tend to be religiously fundamentalist?
- Does the story mention that having Turkey in the EU brings terrorism closer to the Dutch (or European) citizens?

Security Benefits Frame

- Does the story mention that Turkish EU enlargement will have positive effects on the Middle East region, for instance, contribute to democratization of Islam countries?
- Does the story mention the term “bridge between West and East” or similar metaphors related to Turkish EU enlargement?
- Does the story mention the concern that after a Turkish EU enlargement the EU shares borders with countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, and so on.

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Notes

1. Turkey has had a long association with what today is known as the EU. In 1963 the two parties signed an Association Agreement, which envisaged the progressive establishment of a customs union and collaboration in economic and trade matters. Turkey applied for full membership to the EU in 1987, and in 1990 the European Commission, endorsed by the European Council, confirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership, yet deferred an in-depth analysis of its application. At a European Council summit in 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate state and in 2005 accession negotiations started.

2. For reasons of comprehensiveness and focus on communication research, this classification and further discussion excludes collective action frames (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Snow & Benford 1992) and decision frames (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), also referred to as "equivalence frames" (Druckman, 2001).
3. The exact period of analysis was from November 23 to December 20, 2004. However, the codebook for this study was pretested in a period prior to the experiment being conducted in order to validate the experimental manipulations.
4. Every article that appears in the five papers is available through a digital database. To identify relevant stories, we used the search terms "Turk!" and/or "Ankara" and "EU" and/or "Europ!", resulting in a sample of $n = 346$ articles. Further analysis revealed that $n = 144$ articles did not deal with the Turkish accession to the EU but with unrelated topics, such as sports or celebrity news.
5. All coders coded television news stories and newspaper articles by means of an extensive coding scheme. Data were then entered into a common database. Coders were thoroughly trained prior to and frequently supervised during the coding process. Questions were clarified during weekly meetings. To test for reliability, all coders coded a random 10% sub-sample. The percentage-wise agreement for the 23 dichotomous framing items we used ranged from 92.3 % to 100 % and Cohen's Kappa's ranged from .78 to 1.00 (with the exception of two framing items for which Cohen's Kappa was .65).
6. We also considered between outlet differences in framing the EU Turkey debate. Though certain differences were found, these by and large can be neglected. The only significant difference in terms of prominence of framing was found between sensationalist and serious outlets, with the latter putting significantly less emphasis on economic benefits. Furthermore, serious outlets scored higher on cultural and security threat framing and geopolitical benefits. Looking at differences between newspapers and television, we found that newspapers scored higher on cultural and security threat framing. Television put more emphasis on both economic threat and benefits frames than newspapers. We finally note that the stories that did not contain the frames investigated here largely dealt with procedural issues around the EU summit.
7. Cultural threat frame $n = 68$, economic threat frame $n = 49$, security threat frame $n = 51$, economic benefits frame $n = 51$, geostrategic advantage frame $n = 46$, control group $n = 39$.
8. In order to increase the likelihood that respondents actually did read the text, we did not allow clicking on to the next page of the survey for 90 seconds.
9. Our dependent variable was chosen after analysis of data collected among a separate sample ($n = 45$) in which a six-item index tapping support for Turkish membership was employed. The six items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .75$), but more importantly the item used as a dependent variable in this study performed virtually identically (in terms of mean and distribution) compared to the index. Given that all components of the index also correlated positively with the general item, we, for obvious reasons of space and financial constraints in the main study, utilized the general single item in this study.
10. We asked respondents to assess the amount of information about (1) cultural, (2) economic, (3) security, (4) European Union, and (5) employment issues that was provided in the article they read on a scale from 1 = *little* to 5 = *a lot*. Comparing the means of the different

experimental groups confirms that the manipulation was successful. For EU information, there was no significant difference between all groups, which is in line with the fact that the amount of EU information was not manipulated. For all other issues we find significant differences between groups as expected.

11. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with the experimental categories as factor and attitudes toward Turkey accession as dependent variable did not yield significant differences between all groups, $F(5, 298) = 0.963, p = .441, \eta^2 = .02$. This was however the case when considering the experimental categories in clusters as reported in the text.
12. Fieldwork was from November 14 to November 18, 2004.
13. The formula to construct the political sophistication index was (political interest $\times \frac{1}{2}$ + knowledge), so the index ranges between 0 and 4.5. Both political knowledge and political interest load on one latent factor and an exploratory factor analysis yields factor scores of .82, with an Eigenvalue of 1.4 and 68% explained variance. We weighed the index since we believe that knowing a question more should be more strongly represented than moving up one point on political interest. If the index is not weighed, then the main effects are somewhat stronger, and significance levels of the interaction effects remain unaltered.
14. It is important to note that these effects are independent of the valence of the frames. If the same OLS models are run with clusters of positive versus negative frames, no effect of framing on the importance of considerations is found.
15. To estimate the indirect effect of frame clusters on EU Turkey support via considerations a series of regression models was estimated. First, we estimated the effects of frame clusters (culture, economy, and security) on the importance of considerations (culture, economy, and security) in three OLS models (shown in Table 2). Next, we estimated the impact of the importance of considerations on EU Turkey support, while controlling for the frame clusters. Following the procedure advised by Preacher and Leonardelli (<http://people.ku.edu/~preacher/sobel/sobel.htm>), the Sobel test statistics were computed relying on the following formula:

$$z\text{-value} = a \times b \sqrt{(b^2 \times s_a^2 + a^2 \times s_b^2)}$$

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