# "You Know Where I Stand": Moral Framing of the War on Terrorism and the Iraq War in the 2004 Presidential Campaign

Christian Spielvogel

*Many pundits assumed that an allegiance to "moral values" associated with social issues such as same-sex marriage enabled George W. Bush to narrowly defeat John F. Kerry in the 2004 presidential election campaign. In this essay, I argue that both candidates produced surprisingly little explicit discourse on the moral issues in and of themselves, but rather, in distinct ways, relied upon the moral framing of the "war on terrorism" and the situation in Iraq as a battle between "good and evil" in their day-to-day political discourse. I argue that Bush employed this rhetorical frame to politically and morally cloak the war in Iraq under a larger war on terror and, in this way, produced a hegemonic expression, test, and affirmation of conservative morality. Although John Kerry successfully questioned the validity of Bush's policy framing of the Iraq war as part of the war on terror, he continued to reason within the orthodox moral frame created by Bush in the wake of September 11, 2001. Consequently, Kerry did not critique the conservative moral foundations upon which Bush's policy frame rested nor did he affix an alternative liberal moral worldview to his own discourse on Iraq.*

Citing a national exit poll conducted by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International in which 22 percent of voters in the 2004 presidential election identified "moral values" as their top issue, many journalists, pundits, consultants, and politicians declared in the days and weeks following the election that morality was the decisive "issue" that helped George W. Bush narrowly defeat Senator John F. Kerry and win reelection.[1] Polling data appeared, on the surface, to support claims by those who said that Bush was the beneficiary of the moral values vote. Eighty percent of those who cited moral values as their top issue in the poll conducted by Edison/Mitofsky voted for Bush, and white evangelical Christians voted four to one to reelect the

*Christian Spielvogel is Assistant Professor of Communication at Hope College in Holland, Michigan.*


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president, enabling religious conservatives like Gary Bauer to declare 2004 "the year of the values voter."[2] Presumably, "moral values" was an umbrella term for same-sex marriage and abortion, the election's most salient and divisive moral issues.

In contrast, some journalists pointed out that the amorphous issue of moral values is weighted if the war in Iraq and terrorism are combined to form broader issues of foreign policy.[3] Others complained still that the moral values choice reflected a conservative bias and that it precluded other issues such as the war, health care, and environment from being considered moral issues.[4] Rejecting conservative ownership of morality, Ellen Goodman facetiously wrote, "I suspect that the people answering the exit polls also accepted the categorical divide between the pocketbook and the Bible, between economic and moral issues, between war and values. Anyone who isn't a member of the anti-abortion, anti-gay rights, fundamentalist right is categorized (or caricatured) as someone who checked her values 100 yards from the polling booth."[5]

The validity of the polls and poll questions notwithstanding, Democratic and Republican supporters alike agree that moral values debates play an important role in the struggle for national political power. Despite Goodman's criticism that the Edison/Mitofsky poll appeared to exaggerate the importance of morality as an issue, she conceded that "the entire moral vocabulary is now a wholly owned language of the religious right" and urged Democrats to consider moral values "Job No. 1" by restating their issues "into a basic, simple, straightforward language of values and morals."[6] Current and former Democratic politicians and strategists also connected John Kerry's campaign defeat to his inability to couch policy initiatives in clear moral language. Former President Bill Clinton remarked that "'If you let people believe that your party doesn't believe in faith or family, doesn't believe in work and freedom—that's our fault,'" while Democratic strategist James Carville cited the party's tendency to "'act like an accumulation of interest groups'" devoid of a "'coherent narrative'" or ideology.[7] Republicans, for their part, seized on the Edison/Mitofsky poll as evidence that their strategy to reach out to religious conservatives paved the way to Bush's triumph. White House strategist Karl Rove announced, "'This year moral values ranked higher than they traditionally do. I think people would be well advised to pay attention to what the American people are saying.'"[8]

There is consensus among journalists, pundits, and politicians that the moral values issue continues to hold sway among popular perceptions of election outcomes and the struggle for political power. Many assume that "moral values" is synonymous with what James Davison Hunter has called the "culture wars," those seemingly intractable issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion, affirmative action, censorship, and euthanasia that expose deep moral and religious cleavages in U.S. society.[9] Thomas Frank argues that a key to Republicans'

electoral success over the past 25 years is the exploitation of such social "wedge" issues to convince blue-collar social conservatives to vote against their economic self-interests.[10] And in 2004, there was no shortage of pundits who opined that Bush benefited tremendously from a ballot initiative that passed in 11 states to prohibit same-sex marriage, including the decisive battleground state of Ohio.[11] While not denying the importance of culture wars issues in galvanizing the conservative religious vote for President Bush in the 2004 election, the candidates produced surprisingly little discourse on the subject in their acceptance speeches, advertisements, stump speeches, and debates.[12]

If the candidates did not engage in frequent and intense moral argument during the campaign, then how does one account for the perception shared by so many—even after the debunking of the exit polls—that morality had a decisive impact on the campaign and that Democrats have to close the "God gap" if they are going to start winning elections again? In this essay, I argue that the candidates in the 2004 presidential election, in their diffused, day-to-day discourse, invited audiences to interpret issues through moral frames, thereby exerting a more powerful rhetorical dimension than simply debating so-called moral issues in and of themselves.[13] In my discussion of some of the candidates' stump speeches, campaign advertisements, and convention addresses, I explore the implicative dimension of moral values as a frame used by George W. Bush and John Kerry to define problems, identify causes, and propose solutions to the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq.

Rhetorical critics can expand their understanding of the power of morality in U.S. political discourse by regarding moral values as a *frame* used to evaluate any issue rather than just a public *argument* about moral issues. According to Walter R. Fisher, "public *moral* argument is moral in the sense that it is founded on ultimate questions—of life and death, of how persons should be defined and treated, of preferred patterns of living," while public moral *argument* involves "public controversies—disputes and debates—about moral issues."[14] Frames, on the other hand, are "mental structures that shape the way we see the world," notes cognitive linguist George Lakoff.[15] According to Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman, frames shape and limit the range of interpretive possibilities by "tell[ing] us what is important, what the range of acceptable debate on a topic is, and when an issue has been resolved."[16] Similarly, Robert Entman argues that a frame, once naturalized as an "objective" rendering of events, can impose perceptual boundaries around a problem and impact how it is defined, understood, evaluated, and resolved.[17] When used in political discourse, frames rooted in moral values invite audiences to interpret political issues and programs based on their own deeply rooted cultural standards of what is considered right or wrong in human conduct, action, and character.

The dissemination of moral values in the 2004 presidential campaign was especially salient and diffuse in the candidates' discourse on the war on terrorism and in Iraq, when just three years removed from perhaps the most devastating foreign attack on U.S. soil in the nation's history, the country was still immersed in ruminations about its values and ideals. In this paper, I will illustrate how George W. Bush and John Kerry utilized moral framing in their campaign discourse about the war in Iraq and the ongoing conflict with al-Qaeda.

George W. Bush relied upon a framing of the war as part of an ongoing struggle between "good and evil," a frame that Bush helped to naturalize and make hegemonic in the months following September 11, 2001.[18] More significantly, I argue that Bush's good-versus-evil frame functioned as a ritual expression, test, and affirmation of conservative morality. Rooted in what James Davison Hunter calls an *orthodox* worldview or what George Lakoff calls a conservative "Strict Father" morality, Bush defined the war on terrorism and Iraq as a test of national moral resolve in the face of evil. As iterated throughout the campaign, such comments as "I will not waver" and "You know where I stand" functioned symbolically as pronouncements of moral strength and spiritual fortitude that Bush used to establish and reinforce his moral authority to make decisions on behalf of the nation, and to contrast his moral leadership with a critique of Senator Kerry as a malleable moral relativist.

George W. Bush, in justifying war against Iraq, attempted to both politically and morally define the conflict as part of the war on terrorism. During the campaign, John Kerry successfully questioned the validity of Bush's policy framing of the Iraq war, yet did so without consistently critiquing the conservative moral foundations upon which that policy frame rests. In this way, Kerry reasoned within the hegemonic "good versus evil" moral frame created by Bush, and did not consistently affix an alternative liberal or more progressive morality to challenge Bush's orthodox worldview.

Before turning to an analysis of the candidates' moral framing of the war on terrorism and Iraq war, I first discuss how Republicans, in particular, strategically used morality to assist the party's recent rise in political power. Next, I review Lakoff's and Hunter's scholarship that outlines the parameters of conservative and liberal morality and how that impacts the framing of issues. Last, I demonstrate how the orthodox worldview, or "Strict Father" metaphor, applies to Bush's moral framing of foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. In the second half of the paper, I analyze the candidates' campaign rhetoric on Iraq and the war on terrorism to illustrate the ways in which morality infused their day-to-day discourse. Specifically, I examine the "Windsurfer" advertisement, Bush's standard stump speech, and a selected excerpt from the first presidential debate to illustrate the ways in which Bush's

war rhetoric was articulated in orthodox moral terms. Finally, I examine Kerry's Democratic National Convention Address and standard stump speech to explore the ways in which Kerry appropriated Bush's hegemonic war frame, actively criticizing the president's deliberative judgment in the process.

## MORAL VALUES AND POLITICAL POWER

The last 25 years in U.S. history have represented a period of conservative hegemony, marked ideologically by growing distrust in government and increased faith in markets, politically by increased Republican control of the House of Representatives, Senate, and presidency, and symbolically by the nostalgic ethos of Ronald Reagan.[19] A shift in the party's political discourse brought about by its recent relationship with the New Christian Right has contributed, in part, to this electoral success.

One consistent quality in conservative rhetoric over this period has been the tendency to define policy in moralistic terms, or what Kenneth Burke referred to in another context as the "spiritualizing" of material issues.[20] The emergence of modern Republican moral politics is generally associated with the party's development of several powerful political action committees and think tanks in the 1970s that formed alliances with numerous fundamentalist Christian organizations, which were reentering the world of secular politics for the first time in 50 years.[21] The origins of the religious right, however, are often traced to the emergence of a coalition of New Right conservatives determined to overcome Barry Goldwater's failed run for the presidency in 1964 by embracing hard-line anti-communism and a socially conservative policy agenda, and repealing the policy gains made possible by the various social justice movements of the 1960s.[22] Led by former Goldwater campaign staffers Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips, and Richard Viguerie, the New Right formed think-tanks such as the Heritage Foundation (1973) and organizations such as the Free Congress Foundation (1978) to help elect sympathetic politicians to office. In 1979, New Right leaders asked fundamentalist Baptist minister Jerry Falwell to lead a national Christian political organization that would encourage the Republican Party to support its positions against abortion, the teaching of sex education and evolution in schools, and equal rights for gays and lesbians, among other issues.

Falwell's organization, the Moral Majority, became part of a network of political Christian organizations within the New Christian Right (NCR) that supported Ronald Reagan's candidacy for president in 1980. Reagan, for his part, was credited with reaching out to the NCR at the Religious Roundtable's National Affairs Briefing in 1980, saying, "I know you can't endorse me, but I endorse you."[23] Although many contend that Reagan did little to advance the

NCR's political agenda on abortion, gay rights, school prayer, and other issues, sociologist Dale McConkey argues, "The alignment with Reagan began an exodus of southern Democrats who switched to the Republican Party, the party with whom most NCR groups still align themselves."[24]

The New Christian Right also influenced conservative political rhetoric. In November 1990, a group of conservative thinkers, politicians, and religious leaders gathered in Washington, D.C., for a conference organized by the Heritage Foundation. The conference centered on an article written by Thomas C. Atwood, former member of Pat Robertson's staff, that was critical of religious right leaders who "'often came across as authoritarian, intolerant and boastful, even to natural constituents.'" Atwood called on conservative religious leaders to tone down the "'Messianic rhetoric'" and communicate through "'common sense' values."[25] Susan Friend Harding, in her decade-long ethnographic study of Jerry Falwell's ministry in Lynchburg, Virginia, finds a similar tendency in Falwell to adapt his Bible-based message to secular audiences with rhetoric that mixed political concerns with Christian doctrine over the course of the 1980s.[26]

The early 1990s also marked the entry of the "culture wars" into the national vernacular when Pat Buchanan declared in his speech at the National Republican Convention in 1992 that "there is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as the Cold War itself."[27] Hunter argued that the new cultural divide in America cut across religious lines to formally link orthodox Jews, Protestants, and Catholics united by a belief in transcendent authority and natural law against interfaith progressivists whose belief in moral authority "tends to be defined by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism."[28]

Deeply rooted moral tensions were given expression by those specific cultural issues most associated with the culture wars—abortion, school prayer, same-sex marriage, funding for the arts, and so on. Americans were deeply divided over these issues, of course, but the fact that moral issues were synonymous with the agenda of religious conservatives by the early 1990s demonstrated how much conservatives had both dominated public perception of what constituted a moral issue and controlled the legislative agenda on so-called moral issues. The conservative hold on moral politics was the product of extensive rhetorical planning and execution. Republican strategist Frank Luntz, for example, has developed an annual *Republican Playbook* for conservatives on how to label, frame, think, and argue about issues.[29] By encouraging Republican spokespersons to coordinate efforts to frame issues using select words and labels, Luntz has helped create a conservative "language machine" customized for sound-bite consumption.[30]

Recently, liberals or progressives have initiated a moral framing strategy of their own by studying, among other things, how conservatives use morality to strategically frame issues, by exploring the ideas, values, and language that constitute a coherent progressive morality, and by using that moral perspective to frame issues with a progressive discourse. For many progressives, George Lakoff's book *Moral Politics* has been the handbook of their newfound rhetorical activism. "If only the Democrats had read George Lakoff a few years ago" bemoans Howard Dean, "we might not be in the position we find ourselves in today: out of power in the White House, out of power in Congress, and out of power in the Courts."[31]

## CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL MORALITY

Lakoff's *Moral Politics* is one of the most comprehensive attempts to understand the worldviews that underlie the various issues that liberals and conservatives tend to support. While acknowledging the complexity of political ideologies, Lakoff argues that conservative and liberal paradigms are, in their simplest form, modeled on two contrasting views of family morality. What connects politics to family morality, he argues, "is a common [metaphorical] understanding of the nation as a family, with the government [serving] as parent. Thus, it is natural for liberals to see it as the function of the government to help people in need and hence to support social programs, while it is equally natural for conservatives to see the function of the government as requiring citizens to be self-disciplined and self-reliant and, therefore, to help themselves."[32]

Lakoff argues that conservative intellectuals, politicians, and religious leaders deliberately attempted over the past 30 years to connect their policies to an idealized model of traditional family morality. To that end, adherents of a "Strict Father" model of child-rearing are likely to support politically conservative causes, values, and positions. Strict Father morality is grounded on the fundamental belief that the world is divided into good and evil, and children must learn to develop self-discipline and self-reliance if they are to develop an unwavering foundation of character and integrity that will enable them to survive in an often dangerous and immoral world.[33] Through the benefit of "tough love," children should be able to develop the self-control and self-denial that is necessary to build character and remain morally strong. Those who transgress such explicit boundaries and fail to demonstrate moral strength are thus threats to an orderly society since they blur the established lines between morality and immorality.

Conversely, Lakoff argues that the "Nurturant Parent" model is a guideline for moral well-being whose proponents are more likely to support progressive

causes, values, and positions. While it contains the same general concepts as Strict Parent morality, the hierarchical structure of Nurturant Parent's values are inverted. "Nurturance" is a value in the Strict Father model, but it exists in the service of developing moral strength, while parents in the Nurturant Parent model need moral strength to sustain an environment of nurturance and empathy in the face of daily challenges. "The principal goal of nurturance" Lakoff argues, "is for children to be fulfilled and happy in their lives and to become nurturant themselves. A fulfilling life is assumed to be, in significant part, a nurturant life—one committed to family and community responsibility. . . . What children need to learn most is empathy for others, the capacity for nurturance, cooperation, and the maintenance of social ties."[34]

Lakoff's theory of moral politics helps explain how conservative and liberal identity can be rooted in contrasting views of human nature, how people should treat one another, and what makes a "good" person. Similarly, Hunter theorizes that contemporary cultural conflict in America is grounded in competing systems of reality, although for Hunter the differences are reflected in different standards of moral truth that are polarized through the culture wars. Contemporary moral conflict, according to Hunter, has realigned old religious antagonisms so that Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, for example, can generate shared identification around "orthodox" and "progressive" views of the moral foundations of knowledge and truth.

Orthodox and progressive Protestants, Catholics, and Jews might emphasize different religious practices, but for Hunter they are connected as

> *formal properties* of a belief system or worldview. What is common to all three approaches to *orthodoxy . . . is the commitment on the part of adherents to an external, definable, and transcendent authority*. Such objective and transcendent authority defines, at least in the abstract, a consistent, unchangeable measure of value, purpose, goodness, and identity, both personal and collective.[35]

Shared form not only makes it possible for members of different religious faiths to share a common interpretive framework but it also makes it easier for rhetors to generate common assumptions with those divergent audiences and to tacitly use religious appeals in the secular space of the campaign trail. Bush, in particular, presented himself on the campaign trail as a prototype of orthodoxy and a leader committed to consistency and steadfastness.

While moral orthodoxy is rooted in a view of moral truth as fixed by natural law, a progressive view of morality is more modern, rational, and subjective, argues Hunter, and "from this standpoint, truth tends to be viewed as a process, as a reality that is ever unfolding."[36] Kerry, in particular, applied the spirit of Enlightenment rationalism to his critique of the Bush administration's mis-

management of the war on terrorism and Iraq, while deflecting Bush's criticism that Kerry's decision making is shaped by a subjective view of the world that leads to supposed indecision.

## BUSH'S MORAL FRAMING OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND IRAQ

Bush's moral discourse on the war on terrorism and Iraq first crystallized in his framing of the September 11 terrorist attacks as the opening act in a new war between good and evil. As Jamieson and Waldman explain, terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Africa in 1998 and the USS *Cole* in 2000 were framed as criminal acts under the purview of law-enforcement.[37] The "crime" frame depicts the terrorist acts as a "criminal act" punishable by imprisonment or death penalty as imposed by the rule of law in an attempt to establish "justice." Almost immediately, however, the Bush administration moved to define the terrorist attacks as a declaration of war against the United States between the forces of "good" and "evil" with the goal of "victory" and justice through retribution.[38]

Characterizing the attacks as a Manichean struggle between good and evil spiritualizes the "war on terrorism" and offers "salvation" through what Robert L. Ivie calls the act of "slaying a palpable and materialized scapegoat."[39] Sam Keen, in his study on enmity and enemy making, argues that constructing war as a righteous battle between good and evil conceals the political, economic, and social motives of nations and groups in conflict, absolves humankind of agency by placing "God" in control of events, limits the range of options to peacefully resolve the conflict, and raises the conflict to dangerously apocalyptic levels by casting the participants and their motives in ultimate, theistic terms.[40]

Yet as transcendent as his words might have sounded at the time, Bush's moral framing of the terrorist attacks and the post-9/11 era was a quintessential expression of Hunter's orthodoxy and Lakoff's conservative "Strict Father" morality. Orthodoxy upholds a view of moral and religious truth as hierarchical, fixed, and external to the material world. Bush not only defines the world in absolutist terms, but he offers himself as an immutable, unyielding, and unequivocal prototype of orthodoxy.

The major thrust of the Bush campaign strategy, according to journalist E. J. Dionne Jr., was to emphasize Bush's alleged steadfast character and attack John Kerry as a weak and malleable would-be leader. Dionne wrote that "on the central issue of the campaign, Bush is understandably pushing the Iraq debate away from the specific—the failure to find weapons of mass destruction, poor postwar planning, etc.—to the general plane of character and toughness. Bush is using a zinger aimed at all soft and elitist believers in psychobabble. 'You can't

negotiate with terrorists,' Bush says. 'You can't sit back and hope that somehow therapy will work and they will change their ways.'"[41]

One of the Bush campaign's most acclaimed television advertisements, "Windsurfer," was emblematic of the Bush strategy to attack liberal morality through personal character. "Windsurfer" created a visual representation of "flip-flopping" by pairing a narrator's explanation of Kerry's alternating support and opposition to legislation on the Iraq war, education reform, and Medicare premiums with Kerry on a surfboard edited to reverse his position 180 degrees each time "support" or "opposition" is mentioned.[42]

"Windsurfing" made personal character and lifestyle the frame used to gauge Kerry's approach toward policy making. The ad began with a close-up of Kerry from the waist up donning wet suit and sunglasses with a body of water in the background. The image of the coastal vacationing senator accompanied by the sound of classical music helps create an argument about class that circulates around lifestyle differences while circumventing economic difference as a basis for class identity. Associating the upper class with cultural elitism, Thomas Frank argues, is a consistent appeal in populist conservative rhetoric, and is often expressed in the context of red-state/blue-state narratives:

> The red-state/blue-state divide also helped conservatives perform one of their dearest rhetorical maneuvers, which we will call the *latte libel*: the suggestion that liberals are identifiable by their tastes and consumer preferences and that these tastes and preferences reveal the essential arrogance and foreignness of liberalism. . . . In particular, the things that *liberals* are said to drink, eat, and drive: the Volvos, the imported cheese, and above all, the lattes.[43]

If the central theme of "Windsurfer" was "flip-flopping" ("support(ed)" and "oppose(d)" are mentioned eight times each in the 30-second ad), then the ad implied that Kerry's policy reversals are directed against those of lower and working classes with whom Kerry shows no "class" allegiance.

While "Windsurfer" used the private sphere to make class distinctions between the two candidates, it also drew from that space to leverage its moral critique of John Kerry. Specifically, the ad suggested that Kerry's flip-flopping is antithetical to an orthodox view of moral truth. While it is only implied in "Windsurfer" that Bush is a reliable prototype of orthodox moral truth, Kerry was clearly portrayed as an undisciplined moral relativist, as this excerpt from the ad makes clear:

> NARRATOR: In which direction would John Kerry lead? Kerry voted for the war, opposed it, supported it, and now opposes it again.

TEXT: Iraq War; Supported [VISUAL: Sail pointed to right]; Opposed [VISUAL: Sail pointed to left].
NARRATOR: He bragged about voting for the 87 billion to support our troops before he voted against it.
TEXT: $87 Billion For Our Troops; Supported [VISUAL: Sail pointed to right]; Opposed [VISUAL: Sail pointed to left]

"Windsurfer" sublimated its verbal mode of communication and accompanying policy critique of Kerry to the windsurfing image and the classical music score. Taken together, the equations of Windsurfer's visual, aural, and verbal associative logic integrate moral and class critique into prototypical conservative framing of liberal morality that links malleability and indecisiveness with moral dubiety and cultural elitism. Although Bush's moral certitude here is implicit, his campaign discourse and debate performances were replete with orthodox characterizations of his own moral leadership.

Bush's characterization of his own orthodox leadership was especially explicit in the second half of his stump speech. In the speech, he divided his message into two sections; the first addressed domestic policy while the second half used the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq to sermonize about the nature of truth and orthodox belief. Bush emphasized his unwavering certainty, declaring that "America will continue to lead the world with confidence and moral clarity," and "If America shows uncertainty or weakness in this decade, the world will drift toward tragedy."[44] Bush consistently drew a causal relationship between morality and failure or success in the war on terrorism, as when he stated in his acceptance address at the Republican National Convention that "This moment in the life of our country will be remembered. Generations will know if we kept our faith and kept our word. Generations will know if we seized this moment, and used it to build a future of safety and peace. The freedom of many, and the future security of our nation, now depend on us."[45] As he did so often during the campaign, Bush framed the war on terror as a test of America's martial and spiritual mettle.

The ceaseless interplay between morality and policy was also displayed in the debates. The first presidential debate on September 30, 2004 was devoted to the topic of foreign policy. An analysis of an early excerpt from the first debate illustrates how moral framing provides the assumptions about the proper role and source of authority, truth, and judgment used to support the candidates' specific claims about how the war against terrorism and Iraq should be waged. PBS's Jim Lehrer moderated this early exchange between Kerry and Bush:

LEHRER: Do you believe the election of Senator Kerry on November the 2nd would increase the chances of the U.S. being hit by another 9/11-type terrorist attack?

> BUSH: No, I don't believe it's going to happen. I believe I'm going to win, because the American people know I know how to lead. I've shown the American people I know how to lead. . . . I understand everybody in this country doesn't agree with the decisions I've made. And I made some tough decisions. But people know where I stand. People out there listening know what I believe. . . . This nation of ours has got a solemn duty to defeat this ideology of hate. And that's what they are. This is a group of killers who will not only kill here, but kill children in Russia, that'll attack unmercifully in Iraq, hoping to shake our will. We have a duty to defeat this enemy. We have a duty to protect our children and grandchildren. The best way to defeat them is to never waver, to be strong, to use every asset at our disposal, is to constantly stay on the offensive and, at the same time, spread liberty. . . . In Iraq, no doubt about it, it's tough. . . . You know why? . . . The enemy understands a free Iraq will be a major defeat in their ideology of hatred. . . . They're trying to defeat us. And if we lose our will, we lose. But if we remain strong and resolute, we will defeat this enemy.[46]

Bush's war rhetoric was articulated in orthodox moral terms. The characters in Bush's "war on terror" narrative are motivated almost exclusively by moral action, and the keys to victory are defined in spiritual ("never waver," "to be strong," "remain strong and resolute") rather than material terms. Bush attempted, in the opening paragraph, to position himself as a reliable moral authority on the wars against terrorism. Importantly, Bush defined himself here as a figure of moral rather than political or military authority, offering his steadfast character as evidence for those claims. He follows his claim to moral authority in the first paragraph with a call to obey that authority in the second, emphasizing that the nation has a "solemn duty to defeat this ideology of hate" and "a duty to defeat this enemy." Bush then went on to equate the challenge of winning the war with moral resolve, telling his audience that "the best way to defeat them is to never waver, to be strong, to use every asset at our disposal, is to constantly stay on the offensive and, at the same time, to spread liberty." The sequence is important, and implies a hierarchy; the first objective is to possess moral strength, followed by military ("stay on the offensive") and political ("spread liberty") keys to success. I agree with Ivie that Bush's war rhetoric—both here and elsewhere—frames the wars on terrorism as a test of national faith "and of faith in a fellow Christian," although I would add that Bush's call to duty would resonate more broadly with those that share orthodox views in general.[47]

As Hunter argues, the orthodox impulse does not mimic religiosity per se; rather, it unites people of different orthodox religious and secular groups around certain specific belief systems, definitive worldviews.[48] Bush's response, for example, parallels orthodox Christians' belief that one can only

follow God's commandments by building up moral strength. Lakoff argues that orthodox Christians begin with Original Sin, the idea that humans made of flesh are inherently weak, and can only overcome by first accepting the authority of God and then faithfully obeying his commandments by being "born again" with a "new moral essence" rooted in moral strength. As Lakoff argues, "It [moral essence] requires building up moral strength through self-discipline and self-denial. It requires obeying moral authority, the moral authority of God, as revealed through the Bible and his church. It requires staying within moral boundaries and not deviating from the path of righteousness. And it requires remaining pure and upright. Jesus' offer was one of love—not unconditional love, but tough love."[49] For Bush, a born-again Christian, moral strength functions as a God term of sorts in his response, and is used to define not only his own character as a prototypical "Strict Father" but the moral qualities the nation will need to defeat terrorism. That inner strength—expressed through Bush's conviction to "never waver," "be strong," "remain strong and resolute" —is exerted in the face of those who attempt to "shake" that "will" or faith. It is this moral logic that inspires Bush's supporters and befuddles his critics. It is why, for example, "going it alone" in the war on terror is what morally strong people do—relying on foreign support does not help one sustain the self-discipline and self-reliance required to remain faithful (win) in the war against terrorism. It is also why moral orthodoxy almost demands—at least in symbolic form—perpetual war: fear of evildoers provides the impetus to sustain one's moral fortitude; without it, one becomes weak and indecisive.

## JOHN F. KERRY'S MORAL FRAMING OF THE IRAQ WAR AND WAR ON TERRORISM

It was within the context of a binary world of "good and evil" that John Kerry would introduce himself to the U.S. public for the first time as the Democratic nominee for president with a salute and the line: "I'm John Kerry and I'm reporting for duty."

The Democrats, convening in Boston on July 26–29, dramatically reinforced their theme of "Stronger at Home, Respected in the World" during the week with several tributes to John Kerry's decorated years of service in Vietnam. The display of what *New York Times* columnist David Brooks called "muscular moderation" was an attempt, at least in part, to demonstrate the senator's ability to be as aggressive and tough—but smarter—on terrorism as the president.[50] By touting his own strength, character, courage, and decisiveness, Kerry embarked on a bold but risky strategy to outflank the president on foreign policy and leadership attributes. Historian Richard Norton Smith

argued that the speech "went right at some of the traditional strong points of Republicans and conservatives. . . patriotism and family values, wrapping this party in almost a Reaganesque blanket of optimism."[51]

Smith implies that a key dimension of the Kerry strategy was to appropriate the Bush administration's framing of character and morality that Bush had naturalized through his post-9/11 anti-terrorism rhetoric. Beginning with his salute, Kerry attempted to demonstrate as other speakers did before him earlier in the week that his experience as a naval lieutenant in Vietnam gave him the wisdom and courage to become America's commander in chief in "these dangerous days."[52] In his acceptance address and throughout the campaign, Kerry tacitly condoned conservative morality by reasoning within Bush's "good versus evil" frame and criticized Bush not at the abstract level of moral values but at the more concrete level of deliberative reasoning by promising to "fight a smarter, more effective war on terror" (7). Like Bush, Kerry defines a post-9/11 world threatened by a dangerous enemy. "My fellow Americans," Kerry exclaimed, "this is the most important election of our lifetime. The stakes are high. We are a nation at war—a global war on terror against an enemy unlike any we've known before" (4). Here Kerry accepted the language of war, and although he did not define the struggle as a metaphysical one between good and evil, he avoided, like Bush, suggesting that terrorist attacks are rooted in any political, military, religious, or economic cause, whether it be global poverty, U.S. support of Israel, or the stationing of U.S. troops in Osama bin Laden's home country of Saudi Arabia since the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Kerry, by reasoning within an "us versus them" frame that most Americans had expressed support for throughout most of Bush's first term, was constrained in applying a progressive moral frame to define the post-9/11 world and constrained in criticizing Bush's handling of terrorism and the war in Iraq. If demonstrations of weakness are immoral for moral conservatives, failing to base one's decision on compassion and empathy for others—especially innocent people—is immoral in the progressive worldview. Progressive morality advocates that moral well-being can only be sustained through persistent and unrelenting acts of nurturance and caring. The killing of innocent people such as Iraqi civilians is immoral in the progressive moral worldview. Moreover, symbolically, the war frame arouses and sustains fear and enmity toward others, thereby eroding the very conditions of progressive morality and making the values of empathy and compassion appear irrelevant to the objective of defeating an enemy.

Perhaps the greatest challenge Kerry faced in the convention address was to articulate progressive morality within a dominant war frame established by Bush, which made progressive morality appear ineffective and immoral as an approach to understanding and defeating terrorism. Kerry's approach, it

seemed, was to subtly redefine the moral conservative "God term" of "strength" by linking it with service and rationalism, which contrasted with Bush's association of strength with moral fixity and self-reliance. In this way, Kerry could inspire the Democratic base while reasoning within the parameters of the dominant conservative interpretation of the post-9/11 era.

Strength was the central term in Kerry's address, and was frequently connected to the moral value of "service," as when Kerry paid tribute to his parents' generation: "Mine were greatest generation parents. And as I thank them, we all join together to thank a whole generation for making America strong, for winning World War II, winning the Cold War, and for the great gift of service which brought America fifty years of peace and prosperity" (3). Avoiding the more obligatory and hierarchical language of duty and sacrifice, Kerry associated patriotism and strength with voluntary service to others, although within the context of military heroism. And toward the end of his speech, when discussing the meaning of American values, Kerry connected diversity to militarism: "I learned a lot about these values on that gunboat patrolling the Mekong Delta with Americans. . . . No one cared where we went to school. No one cared about our race or our backgrounds. We were literally all in the same boat. . . . We looked out for one another, and we still do. That is the kind of America I will lead as President—an America where we are all in the same boat" (13). Progressives might see contradictions in gleaning progressive values from a wartime experience that Kerry himself rejected on moral grounds as a young man. Yet to credibly reason within the dominant conservative war frame Kerry had to pay tribute to the virtue of strength as well as demonstrate it himself, lest he be marginalized as "weak" and therefore immoral.

Kerry also attempted to derive moral authority as a leader by associating strength with rationalism, tacitly creating a contrast between his and Bush's self-described orthodox leadership styles, especially on the issue of Iraq. Kerry initiated in the acceptance address a pattern of criticizing Bush's mismanagement of the Iraq war that would persist throughout the campaign. While he upheld prudence, intelligence, and sound judgment as a prototype of presidential leadership, Kerry did not consistently align his critique of Bush's flawed leadership with a critique of conservative moral orthodoxy. There were times, however, when Kerry's criticism did strike directly at Bush's orthodox leadership model. "Now I know there are those who criticize me for seeing complexities," Kerry remarked during his address, "and I do—because some issues just aren't all that simple. Saying there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq doesn't make it so. Saying we can fight a war on the cheap doesn't make it so. And proclaiming mission accomplished certainly doesn't make it so" (6). As he also did effectively on occasion in the debates, here Kerry critiqued an orthodox view of truth as leading to hubris, oversimplification, and blind faith.

There were numerous difficulties in Iraq over the course of the campaign that provided an opportunity for Kerry to politically and morally dislodge the frame of "good versus evil" that Bush used to define both the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. The Bush administration's rationale for including Iraq as part of the ongoing war on terrorism was undermined by, among other things, the September 11 Commission report that no "collaborative relationship" existed between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's government and the absence of any evidence that Iraq had been stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. On the stump, Kerry's harshest criticism of Bush was aimed at his planning and execution of the Iraq war that by the summer and fall of 2004 had become a chaotic and bloody period of American occupation. In his stump speech, for example, Kerry refers to "a series of catastrophic choices" in Iraq. In a speech in Allentown, Pennsylvania, on September 10, Kerry declared, "I would never have sent young Americans off to war without the equipment, the body armor, the Humvees, and the equipment they need. I would never have spurned our allies and rushed to war without a plan to win the peace."[53] Later in the week Kerry attacked Bush's missteps on Iraq while retaining the basic "good versus evil" frame: "The invasion of Iraq was a profound diversion from the battle against our greatest enemy—Al Qaeda—which killed more than 3,000 people on 9/11 and which still plots our destruction today. And there's no question about it: the president's misjudgment, miscalculation and mismanagement of the war in Iraq all make the war on terror harder to win." In his standard stump speech Kerry outlined what his administration would do to win the war on terror, which included "'denying our most dangerous enemies the world's most dangerous weapons,'" "'wag[ing] a war on terrorist finances every bit as total as the war we wage on the terrorists themselves'" and his oft-repeated declaration to "'kill the terrorists.'" [54]

Although he was forced to reason within the "good versus evil" frame, Kerry attempted over the course of the campaign to find a way to inductively connect his specific criticisms of Bush's handling of Iraq with a broader set of values. For several weeks in September, for example, he latched onto the meaning of the "W" in George W. Bush: "The 'W' in George W. Bush stands for wrong. Wrong choices, wrong direction, wrong leadership for America…I believe George Bush has made a series of catastrophic choices. The wrong decisions, and the most catastrophic choice of all is the mess he's made in Iraq." The theme of "wrong choices" was followed in October with the message that Bush was disconnected from reality: "He [Bush] has spent the entire campaign trying to make us believe the unbelievable . . . The president just does not seem to get it. He can spin until he's dizzy, but, at the end of the day, who does he think the American people are going to believe: George Bush or their own eyes?"[55]

Kerry appears to have little choice politically but to conform to a dominant moral conservative framing of the post-9/11 world of terror, but the struggle to articulate a consistent and coherent critique of Bush from a progressive moral perspective constitutes a missed opportunity for Kerry to link failure in Iraq to conservative morality, not just Bush's bad choices.

Reflecting on President Bush's public interpretation of the post-9/11 world and the difficulty faced by those who try to oppose that worldview, John M. Murphy writes, "Extraordinary public pressure is brought to bear on those who oppose the president because opposition based on practicality and expediency makes no sense in a world governed by theistic essence. If the president's policy is not justified through reference to expediency, then it is not appropriate to judge the policy on its practicality. Disagreement can be based only on opposition to the values that the president expresses as the synecdochical voice of the people."[56]

## CONCLUSION

More so than Republicans, Democrats such as John Kerry have experienced difficulty articulating a coherent understanding of the relationship between moral values and public policy, making the task of affixing an alternative moral frame to Iraq and the war on terror a difficult one, especially when conservatives control a "moral hegemony" over U.S. foreign policy in a post-9/11 world. Republicans, for their part, can readily access a repertoire of moral abstractions and stereotypes of Democrats that have been rehearsed for almost 40 years, as George W. Bush demonstrated in his campaign.

One of the reasons, it seems, why John Kerry was perceived as the winner of at least two of the debates was because the debate format forced Bush to reason using a progressive view that regards truth as contingent, subjective, and emerging through reasoned dialectic, making his orthodox moral frame seem repetitive and hollow after 90 minutes of dialogue. Kerry's rational, deliberative discourse is effective in a debate context that demands such exposition from its participants. Yet one wonders why Kerry was rarely able to penetrate in consistent sound bites the moral worldview that was ubiquitous in Bush's campaign rhetoric. On the surface, Kerry's rhetorical strategy of being tough but more intelligent and prudent than Bush on terrorism and Iraq seemed to be a winning formula. The war, loss of manufacturing jobs, soaring health care costs, and poor credibility abroad were just a few challenges that made Bush's reelection far from certain. Yet of the limited opportunities Kerry had to penetrate that moral frame, he did not consistently bring to light how orthodox or "Strict Father" morality can lead to inflexibility, hubris, self-righteousness, conformity, a rush to violence—in short, poor judgment.

Furthermore, I surmise that the overall fragmentation of campaign discourse in a postmodern age gives an edge to candidates who offer an orthodox message. Bush, for example, can give the appearance of being morally fit and upright by "staying the course," staying on message, and "never wavering" in his campaign rhetoric. His own image, therefore, can be reinforced through sheer repetition. Moreover, Bush's "flip-flopper" charges may sound absurd to progressives who rightfully charge that any politician with experience in the Senate is bound to change his or her vote in a contingent world, but such assertions can strike a deep and instantaneous moral chord for conservatives without need for elaboration or context. While reading a billboard on my way to work during the campaign, "Boots or Flip-Flops?" I doubted that the Democrats could as easily develop a sound bite that would so effectively stereotype conservative morality.

This is not to repeat the elitist argument that conservative appeals work because their constituency lacks intelligence. Far from it. In fact, as demonstrated here conservatives have a more thorough understanding of how people create a deep sense of identification with politics based on their beliefs about the "nature" of truth, authority, and well-being. If "moral values" are shaping political power, then conservatives continue to win national elections not just on their strategic use of culture wars "wedge" issues but, as I have argued here, on the strength of a highly diffused and coherent moral frame within which Democrats are forced to reason. The culture wars will continue to be waged in this implicit form; it remains to be seen, however, whether the Democrats will be able to match the quality and complexity of their deliberative rationalism with the simplicity of a coherent moral frame.

## NOTES

1. Approximately 22 percent of voters in a national exit poll of 13,531 voters created by a commission of representatives from the major networks and contracted to Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International cited "moral values" as the "most important issue." The economy was second at 20 percent and terrorism third at 19 percent. For a summary of the poll, see Joseph Curl and Julia Duin, "Focus on Moral Values Tipped Vote for Bush," *Washington Times*, November 4, 2004, A1.
2. Some journalists assumed that moral values benefited President Bush because moral values encompass social issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion. See Frank Langfitt, "For Most Voters, Values Trumped Terror and Taxes," *Baltimore Sun*, November 4, 2004, A1; Brian C. Mooney and Raja Mishra, "Religion-Based Voters Provided Critical Edge," *Boston Globe*, November 4, 2004, A33. Gary Bauer quoted in Ellen Goodman, "Democrats, Expand Language of Morality: Values is a Bigger Territory than the Republicans Think," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, November 10, 2004, A17.
3. For criticisms of the Edison/Mitofsky poll, see, for example, Charles Babington and Brian Faler, "Sliding Scale of Moral Values Is All in the Phrasing," *Washington Post*, November 14,

2004, A5; and Charles Krauthammer, "'Moral Values' Myth," *Washington Post*, November 12, 2004, A25.

4. Another poll conducted by Zogby International a week after the election included a broader list of moral values issues, and generated different results that reflected Goodman's views: 33 percent of those polled, for example, considered greed and materialism "the most urgent moral problem in American culture"; 31 percent, poverty and economic justice; 16 percent, abortion; and 12 percent, same-sex marriage. The Zogby poll was supported by the Center for American Progress, Res Publica, and Pax Christi USA. For a detailed summary of the poll, see Carol Eisenberg, "Election Poll: Morally Speaking, Iraq Was the Bigger Issue," *Newsday*, November 10, 2004, A27.
5. Goodman, "Democrats, Expand Language of Morality," A17.
6. Goodman, "Democrats, Expand Language of Morality," A17.
7. For a summary of Bill Clinton's speech at the annual conference of the Urban Land Institute, see Jim Pickard and Holly Yeager, "Clinton: We Lost Because We Were Seen as Aliens," *Financial Times*, November 6, 2004, 7. Carville's comments and those of other Democratic strategists musing about the campaign's lessons can be found in Julia Malone's article, "Wake-up Call for Democrats: Party Insiders Find Lessons in Election Rout," *Atlanta-Journal Constitution*, November 9, 2004, 9A.
8. Quoted in Bob von Sternberg's article, "'Moral Values' Become Hot Political Currency: Democrats Argue They Have as Much Claim to the Moral High Ground as GOP," *Star Tribune* (Minneapolis), November 15, 2004, 1A.
9. James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
10. Thomas Frank, *What's the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 245.
11. On the role of same-sex marriage in aiding the Bush reelection effort, see Demian Bulwa, "A Church's Role in GOP's Win: Evangelicals Take Moral Values Message to Heart," *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 8, 2004, A9; Jane Lampman, "A 'Moral Voter' Majority? The Culture Wars are Back," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 8, 2004, 4; and Gayle White, "Election 2004: God's Country; Christians' Support for Bush Illustrates Moral Counterattack," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, November 7, 2004, 1D.
12. One of Bush's biggest applause lines of his standard stump speech was "We stand for a culture of life in which every person matters and every being matters. We stand for marriage and family, which are the foundations of society. And I stand for the appointment of federal judges who know the difference between personal opinion and the strict interpretation of the law." Bush generally made no other mention of his policies on abortion or same-sex marriage in his speeches. See George W. Bush, "President's Remarks in Victory 2004 Rally in Holland, Michigan, September 13, 2004, *http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040913-5.html*.
13. "Moral values" and the "God gap" between Democrats and Republicans were frequent topics of discussion in news media reflections about the election. See, for example, E. J. Dionne Jr., "He Didn't Get?" *Washington Post*, November 5, 2004, A25; and Adam Nagourney, "'Moral Values' Carried Bush, Rove Says," *New York Times*, November 10, 2004, A20.
14. Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," *Communication Monographs* 51 (1984): 12.

15. George Lakoff, *Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate* (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004), xv.
16. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman, *The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories That Shape the Political World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), xiii.
17. Robert Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43 (1993): 51–58.
18. Jamieson and Waldman, *The Press Effect*, 151–64.
19. Robert B. Reich makes this admission in *Reason: Why Liberals Will Win the Battle for America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).
20. Kenneth Burke, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,'" in *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 191–220.
21. For an overview of fundamentalist Christian alliances with the Republican Party since the 1970s, see Susan Friend Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
22. For an overview of Barry Goldwater's role in the rise of the New Right, see John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 40–93.
23. For a brief overview of Reagan's involvement with the Religious Right, see Robert Marus and Greg Warner, "Reagan Political Years Paralleled Right's Rise," *Christian Century* 121 (June 29, 2004): 11–12.
24. Dale McConkey, "Whither Hunter's Culture War? Shifts in Evangelical Morality, 1988–1998," *Sociology of Religion* 62 (2001): 153.
25. For an overview of Atwood and the Heritage Foundation's impact on intellectual conservatism in the 1980s and 1990s, see Jonathan Mozzochi, Gillian Leichtling, and Steven Gardiner, "The New Right and the Christian Right," *http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/FTR/newright.html.*
26. Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell.*
27. Quoted in McConkey, "Whither Hunter's Culture War," 153.
28. Hunter, *Culture Wars*, 44.
29. For a summary of the contents of the 2006 Republican Playbook authored by Frank Luntz, see Tom Ball, "The Framing Project," *Political Strategy*, February 1, 2005, *http://www.politicalstrategy.org/archives/001118.php*. For an overview of Luntz's "word labs" see Nicholas Lemann, "The Word Lab: The Mad Science Behind What Candidates Say," *New Yorker*, October 16, 2000, 100–108.
30. For a discussion of how conservatives frame policies using conservative moral language and ideas, see George Lakoff, *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), ix–xi.
31. From Dean's foreword to Lakoff's guidebook on moral framing for progressives published during the 2004 campaign season. Lakoff, *Don't Think of an Elephant!*, ix.
32. Lakoff, *Moral Politics*, 35–36.
33. Lakoff, *Moral Politics*, 65–107.
34. Lakoff, *Moral Politics*, 109–10.
35. Hunter, *Culture Wars*, 44.
36. Hunter, *Culture Wars*, 44.

37. Jamieson and Waldman, *The Press Effect*, 36.
38. For two critiques of Bush's post-9/11 anti-terrorist rhetoric, see, Joshua Gunn, "The Rhetoric of Exorcism: George W. Bush and the Return of Political Demonology," *Western Journal of Communication* 68 (2004): 1–23; John M. Murphy, "'Our Mission and Our Moment': George W. Bush and September 11th," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 6 (2003): 607–32.
39. Robert L. Ivie, "The Rhetoric of Bush's 'War' on Evil," *K.B. Journal* 1, 2004, *http://www.kbjournal.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2*.
40. Sam Keen, *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986), 27–42.
41. E. J. Dionne Jr., "Doing an Atwater on Kerry," *Washington Post*, July 16, 2004, A21.
42. The transcript of the "Windsurfer" ad was obtained from *The Living Room Candidate* website, *http://www.livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us/index.php*.
43. Frank, *What's the Matter with Kansas?* 16–17.
44. Quoted in Dan Balz and Jim VandeHei, "Candidates Debut Closing Themes; Bush and Kerry Gear Up for Final Push," *Washington Post*, October 15, 2004, A1. See, for example, George W. Bush, "President's Remarks in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania," October 22, 2004, *http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041022-5.html*.
45. George W. Bush, "President's Remarks at the 2004 Republican National Convention," September 2, 2004, *http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902-2.html*.
46. A transcript of the first presidential debate, which took place on September 30, 2004, is available online at *http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_0930.html*.
47. Ivie conducts a Burkean critique of Bush's war rhetoric and finds many disturbing similarities in the way Bush and Adolf Hitler misuse fundamentally religious patterns of thought. See "The Rhetoric of Bush's 'War' on Evil." See also Robert L. Ivie, *Democracy and America's War on Terror* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005).
48. Hunter, *Culture Wars*.
49. Lakoff, *Moral Politics*, 250.
50. David Brooks, "All Things to All People, *New York Times,* July 31, 2004, A17.
51. Smith's comments were part of PBS's convention news coverage and analysis, a transcript of which is available at *http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec04/kerry_7-29.html*.
52. John Kerry, "2004 Democratic Convention Acceptance Address," 7. Online at *http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/convention2004/johnkerrydnc.htm*. Subsequent references to Kerry's address in this section will be by page number in the text.
53. John F. Kerry, "Speech of September 10, 2004," audio recording available at *www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=3845655*.
54. Quoted in Robin Toner, "Kerry Promises to Refocus U.S. on Terror War," *New York Times*, September 25, 2004, A1. Kerry references to "kill the terrorist," during the second presidential debate of October 8, 2004. See *http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_1008.html*.
55. See Kerry, "Speech of September 10, 2004."
56. Murphy, "'Our Mission and Our Moment,'" 627.