

DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATICS

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN

Bachelor's Thesis in Informatics

**Crowdsourcing mobility data with privacy  
preservation through decentralized  
collection, analysis and storage**

Simon van Endern

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**TODO: Titel der Abschlussarbeit auf  
Deutsch**

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I confirm that this bachelor's thesis in informatics is my own work and I have documented all sources and material used.

Munich, 30.06.2019

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## Acknowledgments

# Abstract

We propose a method to publish location data without raising privacy concerns.

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# 1 Introduction

The introduction is meant to motivate the subject area (why is this important?), define the problem you are interested in (what are you doing?), and limit the scope (where do you stop?). It also gives an outline of the thesis (which chapters will explain what?) and explains how you are going the approach your subject.

## 1.0.1 Motivation

### General motivation

“Data is the new oil” is an often quoted stigma and means that everytime more businesses are based not on specific production capacities but on data. The success and monopoly of companies like Google or Facebook can at least to some extent be attributed to data that is only available to these companies. According to commonly accepted economic theories, monopolies hinder innovation and progress. This implies that the unavailability of huge amounts of data to the public is an impediment of innovation and increased growth. Thus publishing the respective raw data would solve this problem, though it would violate the privacy of any citizens about whom data is published. A more sophisticated solution is needed to grant the public access to as much data as possible while not violating privacy.

With the advent of the internet and large-scale applications, the question of privacy has drawn increasing attention. Especially with services like Twitter, Facebook, Google & Co. there are problems and privacy infringements when user data is realeased.

### Examples of direct and indirect privacy breaches

One example is that the location data of Twitter tweets was published without asking the user for permission. Furthermore this data is only available through the API, so that the user is not aware of this infringement. Using this data, [ZB11] has shown that this data can be used to infer a users home address and often also the work address, even if the user itself is privacy-aware, thus does not publish his / her name, etc.

Also [GP09] highlights the thread that home and work locations can be inferred from anonymized datasets and can in combination with other sources yield even more

information about a user. To reduce this risk, they propose "to collect the minimum amount of information needed". In contrary, we want to investigate another approach, so that rich data can still be used and be published in an aggregated manner to let people profit from the data but still preserve privacy.

### **Classification of location data and apps that use it**

TODO: Classification of location based services: real time vs. historical. Tracking vs. providing push-notifications of nearby venues.

### **What has been achieved so far**

#### **1.1 Existing approaches**

- Collect less data [GP09]
- Mixing approach [BS03]
- Anonymize data to meet the kriteria of k-anonymity [Swe02b] and [Dra+19]
- spatial cloaking [Kru07]
- Remove not only identifiers from the data-set but also apply algorithms, that remove samples, that can be (due to few samples in this area) identified [Hoh+07]

### **Problems that still arise**

[Dra+19] finds that even when personal data is anonymized thus that names and addresses, etc. are removed, sensitive information can be inferred from the data. In this study it was shown that from call-records in the US the home address and also often the work address of a person could be inferred. They highlight that while adhering to the k-anonymity model proposed by [Swe02b] it is practically not possible to publish datasets that are still of any significant use.

Still this privacy is only limited if only this one dataset is taken into account. If e.g. multiple of those data-sets from different data collectors are combined, or information about an individual like home and work adress is provided, privacy breaches are still highly likely.

They further find that those algorithms always depend on a trusted server to collect the data from all users and then publish the results of any analysis applying privacy-preserving algorithms beforehand. So while all those different approaches to preserving



privacy while publishing data-sets manage to achieve ever better results, they always depend on a trusted server for creating the full data-set beforehand. This still imposes a high privacy risk to every user, as trust can either be misused by the trusted server itself or by other parties exploiting eventual security loopholes in the trusted server. Thus our approach takes the opposite direction. We do not first collect the whole data-set and then reduce it to a data-set meeting privacy-constraints but we start from the bottom up - first by performing analysis in a decentralized manner so that there never is an overall data-set imposing a security risk on all the entries' users, and second by proposing a framework that only releases aggregated data where no interference of any user information is possible. This data will then be available to everybody. This gives us maximum possible feedback on eventual privacy problems, creates trust through transparency and supports the process of not randomly collecting data and afterwards researching on metrics that are actually needed but first on evaluating which metrics are needed and then retrieving them if possible without raising privacy concerns.

### 1.1.1 Research Question

This research shows that publishing raw data is critical, even when the data is anonymized. As still this data could be useful for many stakeholders, we will investigate how on the one hand aggregated data can be published without imposing any privacy risk to the owners of the data and on the other hand develop a prototype of a mobile application through which this location data is aggregated in a decentralized manner so that the raw user data never leaves the users' device.

### 1.1.2 Contributions

We will use the definition of location privacy as defined by [BS03]: "the ability to prevent other parties from learning one's current or past location". They further propose a different approach to preserve privacy. TODO!!!

### 1.1.3 Outline

## 2 Related Work

Another problem that arises is that anonymization algorithms applied to datasets prior to publishing them might yield good results if the location data is in a densely populated area but might perform poorly if the population is only sparse [Hoh+07].

[Hoh+07] identify that while privacy algorithms might successfully provide privacy for location data samples in highly frequented areas, but perform poorly and disclose sensitive information for samples in areas with lower traffic frequency. They discuss the problem commonly accepted in research that either the quality of the data becomes poor or useless when applying techniques like k-anonymity [SS98; Swe02b; Swe02a] or that privacy cannot be guaranteed. They propose a novel algorithm based on time-to-confusion. Thus basically whenever it is possible to attribute two different samples of a dataset with a high probability to the same user, the corresponding sample gets removed from the data-set to be published. This is necessary, as "the degree of privacy risk strongly depends on how long an adversary can follow a vehicle" [Hoh+07]. In more detail, time-to-confusion also takes into account the entropy information provided by the whole dataset, thus that even when two samples cannot be connected with high probability due to too many possible consecutive samples, analyzing the whole dataset can provide information that actually the possible consecutive samples have different probabilities due to common route choices. E.g. a vehicle on a highway is much more likely to follow on the highway for some more time than leaving the highway. While this information is taken into account, they point out the limitations of their work that when the dataset is matched with street maps, even more samples would have to be removed to ensure privacy because it will render some former possible consecutive samples impossible due to missing streets connecting them.

[BS03] introduces the concept of mix-nodes already known from privacy research on a network level (TODO: "copy" related work part of paper "time-to-confusion"). They propose a framework in which privacy is protected through frequently changing pseudonyms. Furthermore they find that similarly to the problem of identifying consecutive samples in [Hoh+07], the change of pseudonyms has also to be obfuscated in order to provide complete privacy. In contrast, this paper focuses mostly on solving the problem that location aware services that e.g. notify you when you are close to a venue of interest, do not need to have access to your location data at anytime but can register to events with a mix-node. Thus they register for the venues of interested

and only get notified when the mix-node, which is trusted and has complete access to location data, detects a match. One sees straight away, that this again depends on trust of the users on the mix-node. Nevertheless, the proposed solution of mix-nodes and mix-zones analyzed on a sample shows that even using this framework, privacy cannot be provided, especially as here again the entropy provided by the history of the released or somehow collected data-set makes it too hard to obfuscate the consecutiveness of different pseudonyms.

[Swe02b] is the current state of the art of minimum data protection. They define a dataset as the commonly understood tables in SQL. Besides the unique identifier used in the table, a quasi-identifier is the combination of several attributes with which a set of entries can be identified. a dataset adheres to the rules of  $k$ -anonymity, if querying every possible such identifier returns at least a set of  $k$  different entries. Thus 1-anonymity identifies an entry exactly and provides no anonymity at all. The anonymity problem arises not from the dataset itself, but from a combination of datasets, that have the attributes of the quasi-identifier in common. This way anonymous knowledge from both datasets can be linked in order to infer information not intended to be made public. They also highlight, that also publishing the same dataset with different privacy-rules, i.e. different anonymization techniques applied, can result in inferences that reveal the original dataset.

[Swe02b] clearly highlights that there are two approaches to hiding sensitive information. One is to restrict queries to a database that might reveal sensitive information. In contrast to this approach, they focus on anonymizing the data already before any access to it. Nevertheless, this is based on the assumption that the data owner knows about any possible quasi-identifier in order to obfuscate the dataset sufficiently to provide  $k$ -anonymity for all quasi-identifiers. If one quasi-identifier is not thought of, the dataset might expose 1-anonymity for this identifier and result in possible exposures of data not intended to be public.

[Swe02b] also discusses further problems that are easy to tackle but nevertheless necessary to protect users' privacy. The order of the published table must be random. Otherwise there is more information (hidden) available that can be used to break  $k$ -anonymity. Another problem is when the same table is released and obfuscated differently for the same quasi-identifier, other attributes in the releases can be used to link entries and thus de-anonymize the data.

[GP09] further investigates the fact that from a dataset containing GPS data of trajectories or e.g. twitter-posts as in [ZB11] the home location can be inferred with high probability. They show that also the work location can be identified with pretty high accuracy and probability. Furthermore they find that people who live and work in different regions or more generally, the further work and home diverge, the smaller the anonymity set of the specific user in the dataset and thus the lower also the anonymity.

This is similar to the findings of [BS03] that users in less populated areas are exposed to more privacy risk than in denser areas.

[BS04] extends the analysis of [BS03].

TODO: Cite middleware usage approach by [GG03] TODO: Cite approach of disclosure algorithms by [GH05] TODO: Cite confusion approach similar to [Hoh+07] by [HG05] TODO: Cite querying an anonymization by [MCA06] TODO: Read [Tan+06]

## 3 Solution

## 4 Analysis

## 5 Conclusion

## List of Figures



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