
```
Abbreviations
~M_8 = certDevice(subjectServer_1,constructURL(subjectServer_1, path_1),pk(skThingAttacker_1),skRogueCA_1)
                     \simM 9 = skThingAttacker 1
   \simX_1 = PRF(PRF(a_3,a_1,~M_11),client_finished_label,hash(a_1,~M_11,~M_5,penc(a_3,getPkServer(~M_5))))
     PRF(PRF(a_3,a_1,serverRandom_4),client_finished_label,
         hash((a_1,serverRandom_4,cert(subjectServer2_1,
       pk(skServer2_1),skCA_1),penc(a_3,pk(skServer2_1)))))
\sim M_13 = PRF(PRF(a_3,a_1,serverRandom_4),server_finished_label,
                                                                         A trace has been found.
         hash(((a_1,serverRandom_4,cert(subjectServer2_1,
       pk(skServer2_1),skCA_1),penc(a_3,pk(skServer2_1))),
     PRF(PRF(a 3,a 1,serverRandom 4),client finished label,
         hash((a_1,serverRandom_4,cert(subjectServer2_1,
     pk(skServer2_1),skCA_1),penc(a_3,pk(skServer2_1)))))))
  \simX_2 = (getURL(\simM_10),HMAC(getURL(\simM_10),PRF(PRF(a_3,
                     a 1,\sim M 11),\sim M 11,a 1)))
                 = (constructURL(subjectServer2 1,
      path_1),HMAC(constructURL(subjectServer2_1,path_1),
       PRF(PRF(a_3,a_1,serverRandom_4),serverRandom_4,
                                a_1)))
                               Attacker
```



Honest Process