# LOCKE ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES

#### Text source:

Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 2 ch. 8 & ch. 21 sections 1-3

### QUALITIES vs IDEAS OF QUALITIES

- Our encounters with material bodies (i.e. physical objects)
  leads to their producing various ideas in us.
  - E.g. Our experience of a particular Granny Smith apple produces *ideas* of a certain roundish shape, a certain size, a certain range of green shades, a certain tart taste, and certain crisp texture etc...
- Here Locke distinguishes the qualities (=properties) had by the material object from the ideas of those qualities in our mind.
  - Qualities are in the external objects.
  - Ideas of qualities are in the mind.

### LOCKE DISTINGUISHING QUALITIES & IDEAS OF QUALITIES

"Our ideas and the qualities of bodies. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein the power is. Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas" (Locke, Essay bk. 2. ch. 8. sec. 8)

## PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES

- Locke holds that there is a deep metaphysical difference between two types of quality:
  - □ PRIMARY QUALITIES: size, shape, motion, solidity
  - □ SECONDARY QUALITIES: color, taste, odor, sound, felt texture, etc
- Traditionally (in both <u>pre-scientific common sense</u>, and in the received <u>Aristotelian philosophy</u>), these two types of quality were both thought to exist in external bodies in much the same way. In particular...
  - The color of the apple exists in the apple in much the same way as its shape and size. PQs and SQs are all straightforwardly intrinsic, nonrelational qualities.
  - Further, just as our idea of the apple's roundness resembles the quality roundness in the apple, so too our idea of the apple's color resembles the quality greenness in the apple. <u>Ideas of PQs resemble PQs, and ideas of SQs resemble SQs</u>.

### LOCKE'S RIVAL VIEW:

- PRIMARY QUALITIES (shape, size, motion, solidity)
  - These are intrinsic qualities in bodies.
  - Our ideas of these qualities do resemble the qualities themselves.
- SECONDARY QUALITIES (colors, odors, tastes, felt textures...)
  - These are in material bodies only as causal powers to produce certain sorts of sensations in us.
  - These causal powers result from the PQs. It is simply that suchand-such a microstructure configuration of PQs interacts with our senses to produce such-and-such a sensation in us.
    - So the SQs are really nothing in the object over and above the PQs.
  - Our ideas of these qualities in no way resemble the qualities themselves. (After all, the qualities themselves are just causal powers to produce sensations in us and these causal powers just result from the micro-configuration of PQs.)

### SECONDARY & TERTIARY QUALITIES

- In fact Locke thinks that secondary qualities are, metaphysically speaking, much like his third category of quality, the TERTIARY QUALITIES. (See Locke's Essay 2.8.23-25)
  - SECONDARY QUALITIES are causal powers (resulting from the PQs) to cause certain sorts of sensation in minds like ours.
  - TERTIARY QUALITIES are causal powers (resulting from the PQs) to cause certain sorts of changes in other material objects.
    - For example: A magnet's power to cause motion in iron filings; the Sun's power to melt ice; a hot coal's power to heat, blacken and burn neighboring objects.
- Note that both SQs and TQs are just different types of causal powers, and that both are just results of the intrinsic, more explanatorily basic PQs. (This is much more obvious in the case of TQs, but Locke thinks that it holds for SQs as well.)

### THE BIG QUESTION...

Can Locke establish that there is in fact this deep metaphysical difference between PQs on the one hand and SQs (& TQs) on the other? How?

To be continued...