

PHIL 20C / HOLDEN / SPRING 2007

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: EMPIRICISTS TO KANT

FINAL EXAM STUDY GUIDE

The final exam will be on **THURSDAY JUNE 14, 12-3pm** in our usual classroom.

Bring your own blue books.

You will be asked to answer *three* questions from a choice of *five*. All five questions will be drawn (by the instructor) from the list of study questions below.

It is important to answer every part of each question; each successive part should be thought of as leading the essay writer step-by-step through the writing of a satisfactory mini-essay.

Grading is based on *demonstrated* understanding—which means that, within reason, you should try to use your own words as far as possible. (Verbatim quotes from the lecture notes show good memory but not necessarily any real comprehension.) It is also based on the *accuracy*, *completeness* (given the time available), and *philosophical acuity* of the essay considered as a response to the question posed.

No books or notes of any kind may be used during the examination. Forming study groups prior to the examination is permitted and encouraged.

A reminder: If you need more help, there is a list of recommended secondary literature on the syllabus. (It is by no means necessary to use these resources, but they may help some students catch up).

QUESTIONS

1. According to a common sense view, when we observe a red apple under normal viewing conditions, our idea of the apple's shape *resembles* a shape that exists independently of us, and our idea of the apple's redness likewise *resembles* a redness that exists independently of us. But Locke claims that this is wrong. He argues that the resemblance only holds in the case of the shape, and not in the case of the color. (See Locke's *Essay* Book 2 Chapter 8.)

(i) Explain Locke's distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities, giving examples of each.

(ii) How does Locke argue for the claim that our ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the secondary qualities as they are in external objects? (Locke may have several different arguments here: you should just select *one* of these arguments to focus on.)

(iii) Present a *reasoned evaluation* of Locke's argument. Does it succeed in overthrowing the common sense view and establishing an important distinction between the primary and secondary qualities?

2. Some philosophers think that material bodies in the world consist of both (a) properties and (b) an underlying substance that supports those properties.

(i) What sorts of reasons are advanced for positing an underlying substance in addition to a thing's properties? (Notice that Locke reviews these traditional reasons in *Essay* 2.23.1-5.)

(ii) What is the best argument that can be made *against* the supposed existence of a substance behind all properties?

(iii) Adjudicate between the case for substance and the case against. Should we posit a substance that supports a body's properties in addition to the properties themselves? Why or why not?

3. (i) Explain Locke's account of the nature of personal identity across time (see his *Essay*, Book 2 Chapter 27, especially Sections 9 and 10). In setting out Locke's view, be sure to show how his theory contrasts with the view that personal identity consists in sameness of immaterial soul.

(ii) Set out what you take to be the strongest objection to Locke's theory of the nature of personal identity.

(iii) Present a *reasoned evaluation* of that objection. Does it sink Locke's theory, or can his theory be successfully defended?

4. According to Berkeley, "an idea can be like nothing but another idea", and this thesis shows that the doctrine of materialism is completely unintelligible. This is (what we have called) Berkeley's 'no-resemblance argument'.

(i) Explain what the doctrine of materialism is that Berkeley is trying to refute.

(ii) Clearly and precisely reconstruct Berkeley's 'no-resemblance argument' against materialism.

(iii) Present a *reasoned evaluation* of that argument. Does it succeed? Why or why not?

5. Berkeley repeatedly claims to be championing the pre-philosophical common sense worldview against the theories of pretentious but confused philosophers such as Locke. "I side in all things with the Mob", he says.

(i) In what ways does Berkeley seem to be on the side of pre-philosophical common sense against the unintuitive positions of Locke?

(ii) In what ways does Berkeley's position itself seem to conflict with pre-philosophical common sense?

(iii) Present an all-things-considered *reasoned evaluation* of Berkeley's claim to be on the side of common sense. Is he right about this? Wrong? Partially right? Or what? And clearly explain *why* this is your opinion.

6. Do you have any reason to expect that kerosene will be flammable tomorrow, or that water will be non-flammable?

(i) State clearly and precisely just what an inductive inference is. Give an example (of your own).

(ii) Clearly and precisely explain Hume's argument that no inductive inference ever has any rational justification. (This is Hume's 'problem of induction', set out in his section 4 of his *Enquiry*.)

(iii) Present a *reasoned evaluation* of that argument. Is Hume right that there could be no rationally justifiable inductive inference? Why or why not?

7. (i) Present a reconstruction of the cosmological argument. (This is the argument presented by Demea in section 9 of Hume's *Dialogues*). What is this argument supposed to prove and how does it work?

(ii) What do you think is the strongest objection to the cosmological argument? How is this objection supposed to sink the cosmological argument?

(iii) Present a *reasoned evaluation* of that objection. Does it succeed in shooting down the cosmological argument, or can a defender of that argument respond to the objection?

8. "Is the world, considered in general and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man or such a limited being would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise and benevolent Deity?" (Hume, *Dialogues*, part 11 paragraph 4)

(i) What is the problem of evil? What is Hume's assessment of the force of this problem against the theist's position?

(ii) What is the strongest response a theist can make to the challenge of the problem of evil?

(iii) Present a *reasoned evaluation* of this response. To what extent -- if any -- does the problem of evil undermine the theist's position?

9. According to Kant, if metaphysics is to be a legitimate science, we first need to explain how synthetic a priori judgments are possible.

(i) Explain what Kant's distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' judgments is.

(ii) Explain what Kant's distinction between 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' judgments is.

(iii) Explain why Kant thinks that metaphysics involves synthetic a priori judgments.