

Reading: Finish the McTaggart
chapter for next time.

‘Water’ is a rigid designator

- ‘Water’ functions like a *name* for this kind of stuff.
- It is not short for some description like, ‘the colorless, tasteless liquid that we drink, etc.’

The Necessity of “Water is H₂O”

- (1) This stuff is water
- (2) This stuff is H₂O
- (3) Therefore, water is H₂O

- Here, (1) is true in virtue of the way we use the word ‘water,’ so necessary
- (2) is an empirical discovery, but necessary because it reveals the *nature* of the stuff in question.

Could water have been XYZ?

- We can imagine a world in which there is *another substance* that looks and tastes like water, but that is not H₂O.
- But that is not a world in which *this very stuff* is not H₂O.
- Compare: there is no possible way that *this very podium* could have been made of plastic.

“Water could have turned out not to be H₂O”

- This is true only in an *epistemic* sense: at one time it could have been said: “maybe water isn’t H₂O.”
- But given that it is H₂O, it is necessarily H₂O.
 - Compare mathematical propositions the truth of which we are unaware.

Pegasus: Back to the Drawing Board

- Problem of how there can be meaningful proper names that do not denote anything returns if Kripke is right.

Time and Change

- Parmenides vs. Heraclitus:
 - *P: How could what is perish? How could it have come to be? For if it came into being, it is not; nor is it if ever it is going to be. Thus coming into being is extinguished, and destruction unknown.*
 - *H: One cannot step into the same river twice.*

McTaggart on Time

- Our concept of time involves both Parmenidean and Heraclitean elements, to the point of inconsistency.
- Time is “unreal” in the sense that our concept does not fit anything in reality.

The A and the B

- Two kinds of temporal concepts, properties and relations:
- *A-concepts*: those involving the notions of *past*, *present*, and *future*, and references dependent on these ideas.
- *B-concepts*: those of *earlier than* and *later than*, objective temporal references such as May 15, 2007

Egocentric/Allocentric

- Compare: conceiving of space in *egocentric* terms: in front of me, behind me, above me, to my left, to my right, etc.
vs.
- *Allocentric* terms: latitude and longitude, objective spatial references such as “100 miles north of London.”

The Overall Argument

- (1) Time requires change
- (2) Change can only be expressed or described using A -concepts.
- (3) The A - concepts are contradictory.
- (4) Therefore, time is unreal.

(1) Time requires change

- Time is the measure of change, or the field in which change occurs.

(2) Change can only be expressed in A-terms. 262-3

- No change is discernible in purely B-terms.
- B- properties and relations are timeless and eternal.
- “The Civil War IS earlier than the Great Depression.”
 - This is an eternal, unchanging fact.

A B-characterization of change?

- Russell's suggestion 263-4:
- A particular x changes if and only if:
For some property F , and times t_1 and t_2 :
 x IS F at t_1 , and x IS not F at t_2 .

With no restrictions on F , this leads to some funny changes, but maybe that's OK.

Not Good Enough

- McT: this is not adequate for change.
- 'x IS F at t1' and 'x is not F at t2' are both eternal facts. There is no change here at all. 264
 - No more than an object having one property at a spatial point, and another property at another spatial point.
 - Reminiscent of Zeno's paradoxes of motion.

A- change

- All change takes the form of an event in the *future* becoming *present* and then receding into the *past*.
- The argument if correct shows that such flow is an essential aspect of time.

(3) The A – concepts are contradictory

- The notions of past, present, and future are incompatible. (obvious)
- BUT
- Every event has all three properties ??
(very NOT obvious and needs to be shown)

Reality must have a single complete description

- McT's commitment to this Parmenidean idea explains his unwillingness to allow unreduced A-descriptions.
- Any description of temporal reality that uses A-descriptions is only partial in the sense that it leaves out certain facts.
 - Those A-facts accessible only from other positions in time

What about Space?

- Is that unreal too?
 - Recall that there is an egocentric/allocentric distinction that can be drawn for space.
 - And egocentric descriptions from different points of view cannot be combined.
- No, because we can give a complete description of a space by simply *leaving out the egocentric facts entirely*.
 - There is no analogue for space of the first part of McT's argument.

Time's Epitaph

- A complete description of temporal reality *must* include facts stateable only in A-terms
 - To account for change, which is essential to the reality of time.
- But a complete description of temporal reality *cannot* include facts stateable only in A-terms.
 - Because such facts are inherently partial and perspectival.

Presentism

- McT's argument assumes that we have to defend the reality of the past and the future as well as the present.
- Suppose we say that the past and the future do not exist.
- Reality = the present.

Prior's Idea

- We don't believe that reality includes the *existent* (GWBush) and also the *non-existent* (Pegasus).
- We don't believe that reality includes the *existent* and the “*believed by little Sally to exist*” (Santa Claus).
- ?We don't believe that reality includes the *actual* (HRCClinton) and the merely *possible* (HRC's first-born son). . . .

No past, no future

- . . . so we shouldn't believe that reality includes in addition to the *present* things (GWBush), the *past* things (A. Lincoln) or the *future* things (the first person born next year).
- Tense—presence—is fundamental to time.
- Reality is completely described by listing all the truths from the present point of view.

What about facts about the past?

- It's a fact that Abe Lincoln was president of the US.
 - This doesn't seem to be a fact about the present.
 - The trick is to understand this fact as not entailing the existence of AL.
- Compare: how do we express the facts about Pegasus and Santa Claus?

Intensional Contexts

- *According to the myth* (Pegasus was a winged horse.)
- *Little Sally believes that* (Santa Claus brings presents to all good children.)
- *It is possible that* (the Clintons' son is Chelsea's older brother.)

Existential Generalization fails in some contexts

- Usually, from “a is F” it follows that “There exists an x s.t. x is F.”
- But from: “Sally believes that Santa Claus is coming tonight,” it does not follow that “There exists an x s.t. Sally believes x is coming tonight.”

Tense is another kind of intensional context

- Prior's idea is that statements about the past and future should be treated like myth and belief statements.
- “Abe Lincoln was president in 1863” =
- *It was the case that* (Abe Lincoln is president in 1863.)
 - This does not entail that anyone exists and has the *property* of being president in 1863.

Tense is fundamental

- There are no tenseless verbs.
 - Temporal reality is essentially and irreducibly tensed.
- B-relations are derivative from the notions of past, present, and future:
- “The CW was earlier than WW1” =
- (something like) WAS[WAS(CW is occurring) & WWI is occurring]

Change in Presentism

- Events do not change, only things change.
- There is no temporal becoming in McT's sense.
- Change in an object: “[It was the case (that the poker is hot)] and [the poker is cool].”

Presentism and Physics

- Presentism requires that “the present” be a well-defined notion from a metaphysical point of view.
- This seems to contradict modern physical theories, especially Special Relativity.
 - In these theories time and space must be treated as an integrated whole.
 - One result: which events are simultaneous depends on the frame of reference.

Space-time


- A single 4-dimensional manifold.
 - Strictly, you cannot factor it into 3 dimensions of space and 1 dimension of time. But we will oversimplify here.


- Finish Intro to Part VI, and read Lewis's "Counterparts or Double Lives," from bottom of 197 to break on 200.


Smart's 4-dimensionalism


- Smart offers a package consisting of:
 - (1) “B-theory” of *space-time*:
 - temporal ordering of events by “earlier than” is basic; “A-” or tensed features not intrinsic to time.
 - (2) A revised theory of *objects*:
 - as “space-time worms” having both temporal and spatial parts.
 - Smart makes this look like a package deal, but in fact (1) does not entail (2): it is possible to endorse (1) without accepting (2)


A 3-dimensional
space-time over a
2-dimensional space

















Smart's 4-D Theory

- B-relations of earlier than, later than, simultaneous with, are fundamental.
- A-concepts are “anthropocentric,” don't belong in an intrinsic description of space-time. 295
 - We use only tenseless verbs in describing it.

Change in 4-D

- “We replace the notions of change and staying the same with the notions of similarity and dissimilarity of time-slices of four-dimensional solids” 296
- Alternatively, one might say that change just consists in such similarity or dissimilarity.

From Russell to Smart/Lewis

- Alf IS round at t1 and Alf IS not round at t2
- Modify this as follows:
- The temporal part (“slice”) of Alf that EXISTS at t1 IS round and the temporal part of Alf that EXISTS at t2 IS not round.

Tense is anthropocentric

- This is Smart's gloss on the "indexicality" of the notions of past, present, and future.
 - They are descriptions that make implicit reference to a perspective or point of view on temporal reality.
 - They do not describe time as it is in itself, only how it appears to an observer located at a point within it.
 - As though s/he were the center of the temporal world.

Token-reflexivity

- “All the jobs that can be done by tenses can be done by means of the tenseless way of talking and the self-referential utterance, ‘this utterance.’” 296
- “Smith *ran* a mile” = “Smith RUNS a mile earlier than this utterance.”
- “Smith *will cook* dinner” = “Smith COOKS dinner later than this utterance.”

The main “job” of tenses

- Tensed talk and thought cannot be dispensed with: they are crucial in explaining human actions.
- The difference between
 - “The meeting STARTS at noon on March 3, 2008”
 - “The meeting is starting now.”
 - His knowledge of the latter will explain why Smith gets up and goes to the conference room.

Science needs tense, too

- Tensed talk cannot be completely dispensed with in a scientific account of reality.
 - It's crucial to explaining human actions, and humans and their actions are part of reality, too.

Determinism?

- All talk of the “flow” of time or temporal “becoming” is mistaken, according to S.
- The future is “there” in some sense.
- Smart thinks this does not entail determinism. 302
 - It certainly does not entail causal determinism
 - It does not entail that the future exists *now*.


Persistence in Time

- Things persist in time: they exist at many different times.
- Two different ways of persisting:
- (1) A thing may *endure*: it is wholly present at each moment it exists.
- (2) A thing may *perdure*: it has temporal parts, and only a part of it exists at each time.

Common sense vs. Lewis

- Common sense says that material objects persist by enduring, events persist by perduring.
- Lewis argues that the idea that objects endure leads to contradiction.
 - Specifically, the endurantist account of *change* is contradictory.

Remember this picture?



**Does this picture contradict
Leibniz's Law?**

Start reading Parfit's
“Personal Identity”

Lewis says “Yes.”

The Simple Arg from Leibniz’s Law

- The picture represents the following:
- O at t_1 is F
- O at t_2 is not- F
- O at $t_1 = O$ at t_2 .
- Taken together, these three statements contradict Leibniz’s Law.
- Hence, the endurantist account of change must be rejected.

The Perdurantist Account of Change:

- O at t1 (e.g., Bush in 2008) and O at t2 (e.g., Bush in 2010) are *not identical*.
 - They are two distinct temporal parts of the overall object O.
 - “Change” is just dissimilarity of temporal parts.

The Simple Arg from Leibniz's Law: Endurantist Response

- We should not accept that the basic kinds of things are things like 'O at t1.'
- Endurantists would say we should put it:
 - O is F at t1
 - O is not F at t2.
 - Now Leibniz's Law cannot be used to get a contradiction.

Lewis again:

- This must mean:
 - O is (F at t1)
 - O is not (F at t2)
- So all properties become relational properties.
 - This is in conflict with the intuition that some properties are intrinsic.
 - But how serious is this objection?

Endurantist response to the Arg from Loss of Parts

- We should give up (III) and allow that two things can occupy the same space at a time: An object and *the matter that constitutes* that object.
- The Mistake is to say that Descartes after the change = Descartes-Minus after the change.
 - Descartes is a person, Descartes-Minus is not.

You are not this matter.

- A living thing is constantly changing its matter – this is an essential aspect of life.
- You will be sitting in this chair next week, but this matter will not be sitting here next week, so these things are not identical.
- Next week you will be constituted by a slightly different chunk of matter.

You *can* step into the same river twice

- Heraclitus confused the river with *the water that constitutes the river* at a given moment.
- Reality comes in layers: different kinds of particulars occupy different levels of organization.

Animal Persistence

- What makes it true that this giant oak in the yard = the little sapling I planted as a boy?
 - Not that it is made of the same matter
 - The identity is true in virtue of the continuity of the life processes characteristic of this species of plant.
 - Same for animals

Personal Persistence

- What makes it true that I am the same person who gave an apple to Mrs. Goodnow in the third grade?
 - Continuity of life processes? Locke thought not.
 - That's what makes me the same *human being*, but Locke thought there is a difference between the concept human being and the concept *person*.

Locke on Persons

- A person is a self-conscious being, it can think of itself under the concept 'I', and is conscious of its existence at various times.
- It retains in *autobiographical memory* knowledge of itself at earlier times. It forms intentions to act at later times, and carries out these intentions.
- “Person” is a *forensic* concept.

Body-Switching

- It is possible for a king and a cobbler to switch bodies – in that the person in the king's body “has the cobbler's memories” and vice versa.
 - We would then have: Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 even though the biological processes underlying this person are discontinuous
 - Cases of multiple personality disorder could be used to make a similar point.


The Lockean Account of Personal Identity

- X at t_1 is the same person as Y at t_2 iff:
Y remembers doing what X did, Y remembers feeling what X felt, Y carries out the intentions formed by X, and in general, Y is (more or less) *psychologically continuous* with X.

The Demise of the Lockean Account of Personal Identity

- Suppose the brain of X is removed, and the right half implanted in one body and the left half in another body.
- This results in two distinct persons, Y and Z.
- Suppose that *both* of them claim to remember doing what X did, feeling what X felt, etc.

The Double Half-Brain Transplant



Contradiction!

- By the Lockean Criterion, it would follow that $X = Y$ and $X = Z$. But *this cannot be right*, because it would then follow that $Y = Z$, which we know is not true.
- Thus this case shows that the Lockean criterion is not true in general.

Back to the Drawing Board?

- Parfit accepts that the Double Half-Brain Transplant case refutes the Lockean Criterion.
- Should we try to formulate a new criterion of personal identity?
 - Parfit thinks NOT: *this case gives us everything we could or should want in a criterion of persistence or “survival.”*

Survival

- If you were X and your brain was transplanted into a single other body, you would consider yourself as having survived. (assume for sake of arg).
- So we should say the same about the double transplant case.
 - How can a double success be a failure? 375

What Matters in Survival

- is psychological continuity. Locke was right that this is what we care about when interested in forensic questions or prudential questions about our future, etc.
380
- P: The only mistake Locke made was to think that where there is psych. cont. there is identity.
 - This is usually true, but not always.

Personal Survival

- This concept should replace the concept of personal identity in our thinking.
- X at t_1 *survives as* Y at t_2 iff (1st try)
 - Y remembers doing what X did, Y remembers feeling what X felt, Y carries out the intentions formed by X , and in general, Y is (more or less) *psychologically continuous* with X .

Survival does not entail identity

- It is possible to survive as two or more people. In such a case, one would not be identical to either one.
 - If I survive as someone, then I do not die.
 - *This is all I should care about, all that should matter to me.* I should not care if I will not be *identical* to any person alive at some future date.

A Problem for Parfit

- Survival must be defined in a way that does not presuppose identity.
 - But the definition includes clauses like: “Y remembers doing and feeling what X did and felt.”
 - This presupposes identity:
 - *Autobiographical* memory is by definition, memory of what *you yourself* did. 382

Q(uasi)-Memory (382)

- Y q-remembers an experience iff
 - (1) Y is in a state that seems to him like a memory (2) someone did have such an experience and (3) Y's mental state is causally dependent on that person's experience in the way characteristic of memory.
 - If the 'someone' in (2) is Y himself, then the q-memory is also a memory.

Definition of Survival Re-stated

- X at t1 survives as Y at t2 iff
 - Y *q-remembers* doing what X did, Y *q-remembers* feeling what X felt, Y carries out the *q-intentions* formed by X, and in general, Y is (more or less) *psychologically continuous* with X.
 - This assumes X's feelings, perceptions, and intentions have no true first-person element.

The Double Half-Brain Transplant Again

- It was said that Y and Z have X's memories. But this is not true. Each of them have a bunch of illusory or false memories.
- Are you still sure that “survival” in Parfit's sense is all you care about?

Memory and Q-memory

- Parfit holds that regular memories are just Q-memories where the person in question happens to be me.
- Supposedly, “it cannot be a part of what I seem to remember about this experience that I, the person who now seems to remember it, am the person who had the experience.” 382

Parfit on 'I'

- Parfit seems to assume a *descriptive* account of the reference of 'I':
 - 'I' means: "the person who is having *this* thought (memory, experience, etc.)"
 - When I remember taking Susie to the prom, strictly speaking, all I remember is: *the guy in this memory* took Susie to the prom."
 - I *assume*: the person having this memory = the person represented in the memory.

Lots of Problems Here!

- Kripkean objections: the modal behavior of 'I' is different from any definite description.
- Psychological objections: there is much evidence that a genuine first-person concept is precisely what is involved in memory and other forms of thought.

More problems

- How do I know that the person thinking *this* thought is identical to the person thinking *this other* thought?
- A very bad regress ensues.

Back to Locke

- Recall that the concept of a person is the concept of a self-conscious being: i.e., a being that can think 'I' thoughts.
- And 'I' thoughts span time in a very special way, via memory and intention.
- On Parfit's view this isn't really true: the 'I' is not represented as a persisting entity, but a momentary or transitory one.

A-theory vs. B-theory again

- The egocentric/allocentric distinction can be drawn for each of space, time, and personhood:
- *I*, *here*, and *now* form the axes of one's egocentric system of thought
- B-theories of space and time maintain that the egocentric spatial and temporal notions are not fundamental to space or time.

Parfit's "B-theory" of personhood

- Parfit is proposing to leave out the 'I' when giving a metaphysical account of personhood.
 - But this is just a mistake: How a person appears to himself is a crucial part of what a person is.
 - A metaphysical account of the "self" cannot dismiss as "subjective" or unimportant the self's representations of itself.

The End