

## Review Questions: Phil Mind

1. What is Descartes' view about the nature of mind?
2. Explain the conceivability argument for substance dualism.
3. Explain Arnauld's response to the conceivability argument.
4. What is an essential property? What is a non-essential property?
5. Explain the argument from doubt for substance dualism.
6. How might a materialist use Frege's ideas to respond to the argument from doubt?
7. Why are mind-body causal relations problematic for substance dualism?
8. What are three different types of behaviorism?
9. What is a disposition? Provide some example of dispositional properties.
10. What is verificationism, and how does it figure into Hempel's argument for logical behaviorism?
11. Provide and explain two criticisms of verificationism.
12. How might the logical behaviorist analyze the sentence "Hamlet is pensive"?
13. Various philosophers have argued that behaviorism yields vacuous explanations of human action. Explain the difficulty for the behaviorist with an example.
14. Explain Hilary Putnam's super-Spartan thought experiment. What is it supposed to show?
15. What is Chomsky's general dilemma for Skinner? ("If read literally, then \_\_\_\_; if read metaphorically, then \_\_\_\_.")
16. What does the type-identity theorist believe? Provide an example.
17. Distinguish the type-identity theory from the token identity theory. Which one is stronger?
18. What is the primary motivation for the identity theory?
19. How does the identity theorist argue from "nomological danglers" to the conclusion that mental states are brain states?
20. Explain intra- and inter-species multiple realizability and why it is a problem for the type identity theory.
21. What does Jerry Fodor think about the relationship between the special sciences (psychology, economics, etc.) and basic science (physics)? How does multiple realizability figure into his argument?
22. In general, what does the functionalist view about the nature of the mind (/mental states)?
23. Distinguish machine functionalism from Lewis-functionalism.
24. True or false?: If two Turing machine systems have the same inputs and the same outputs, they are in the same functional state. If true, why? If false, why not?
25. How does the functionalist respond to the multiple realizability of the mental?
26. Can one consistently be a token physicalist and a functionalist? How about a dualist and a functionalist?
27. What is Lewis' argument for the identification of mental states with neural states? How does it differ from motivations regarding nomological danglers?
28. What are some problems specific to the Lewisian account of mind?
29. Block thinks that functionalism lapses into either liberalism or chauvinism about the mental states. What does he mean by this and why does he think so?
30. Provide Nagel's argument against physicalism in "What its like to be a bat."
31. What is the difference between a propositional attitude and a qualitative state?