A Definition of *Change* in terms of Universals

•A particular x *changes* if and only if, for some universal F, and some moments of time t1 and t2,

      x is F at t1 and x is not F at t2.
      (p. 22)

Aristotelian Realism

•Aristotle held that universals are real, but they are not separate from the particulars that instantiate them

•Universals exist only *in* particulars.

Problems for (Aristot.) Realism
      In what sense is redness 'in' this book?
      How can redness be in all these places at once?

Problem of Inexact Resemblances

•Realists say that particulars resemble one another in virtue of their instantiating the same universal(s).

•Problem: resemblance admits of degrees,
but instantiating a universal does not.

•Suggests that resemblance is more basic than sharing a common universal
      (25 – 28)

Price's Resemblance Nominalism

•Resemblance among particulars is "rock-bottom"
      i.e., not to be explained in terms of universals

•Possession of common characteristics should be explained in terms of resemblance.

Problems for ResNom: (1)

•Resemblance is always 'in some respect'

•Two apples resemble one another in respect of *color*, and in respect of *shape*, but not in respect of *size* etc.,

−The italicized terms seem to be terms for universals

−There does not appear to be any mere or simple resemblance.

Price's Response (pp. 31 – 33)

•Price must give a definition of (e.g.) 'x is red' which appeals only to resemblance, makes no mention of universals.

•'x is red' = x resembles each of y1, y2, . . .
yn at least as much as they resemble one another.

−The idea is that the y's are exemplary or paradigmatic examples of redness.

•The paradigm red things should have nothing in common except redness

•Problems:
–What is the status of these paradigms? (they are not supposed to be arbitrary or conventional – p. 33)
–Will there be such a set for every general term?
–This still assumes we can talk of simple resemblance, and degrees of it, without bringing in respects.

Problems for ResNom (2)

•Russell's problem: Resemblance is itself a universal.

•ResNom must give an account of resemblance--in terms of resemblance.

•But isn't this viciously circular?
–Price thinks not if we distinguish *levels* or *orders* of resemblance.

"Tu Quoque:" Levels or Orders of Universals

•Some universals seem to instantiate themselves, e.g., 'universality.'

•Instantiation is a universal, and so then is: *'x does not instantiate itself.'*

•Consider this last one: does it instantiate itself or not?

•Either answer leads to contradiction – this is *Russell's Paradox.*

Levels of Resemblance

•Seems necessary in light of this to distinguish *orders or levels* of universality, and of the relation of instantiation.

•Price says nominalists can, similarly, distinguish levels of *resemblance.*

•Resemblance1 is explained in terms of resemblance2, etc.
–Resemblance (1) is just a pattern of resemblance (2) among ordered pairs of particulars

A Realist Response to the Problem of Inexact Resemblances

•Distinguish between determinable and determinate universals. (36 – 38)

•'Red' is determinable, its determinates are 'scarlet', 'crimson,' etc.

•The distinction is relative, because 'scarlet' still admits of more determinate shades.
–Perhaps 'that shade' (pointing) is maximally determinate

Does this solve the problem?

•Well, it allows the realist to say that the various whitish things all instantiate the determinable 'whitish',

•but they instantiate different determinate shades of that determinable.

•But wasn't part of the problem the lack of *sharp boundaries* between shades?

Vagueness

•Arguably, there are some things that are clearly white and some things that are clearly not white, and some things in between.

•Saying the indeterminate things are "whitish" doesn't address the problem about white
–And it just creates the same problem about "whitish."

Summary
•Both realism and nominalism face logical difficulties
•The basic nominalist account of generality is cumbersome and problematic
•Vagueness is a serious problem for (Aristotelian) realism.