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**CNT 4403**  
**Computing and Network Security**

**Cryptography – Asymmetric Crypto**

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# Public-key Systems

## ❑ Two keys

- *Private key* known only to individual
- *Public key* available to anyone

## ❑ Idea

- Confidentiality: encrypt using public key, decrypt using private key
- Integrity/authentication: encipher using private key, decipher using public key

## ❑ Requirements

- It must be computationally easy to encipher or decipher a message given the appropriate key
- It must be computationally infeasible to derive the private key from the public key
- It must be computationally infeasible to determine the private key from a chosen plaintext attack
  - ✓ Based on Hard problems: Factorization, discrete logarithms, elliptic curves, etc.

# Public-Key (Asymmetric) Encryption

## □ A *public-key encryption scheme* works as follows:

- Each user has a *public key*  $e$  and a *private key*  $d$ .
- To send a message  $M$  to Bob, Alice obtains Bob's public key  $e_{Bob}$  and encrypts  $M$  with  $e_{Bob}$ :


$$C = E_{e_{Bob}}(M)$$

- When Bob receives the ciphertext  $C$ , he decrypts it with his private key  $d_{Bob}$ :

$$M = D_{d_{Bob}}(C)$$


- The decryption algorithm  $D_d$  must be the reverse of the encryption algorithm  $E_e$ ; i.e.,  $D_d(E_e(M)) = M$  for any message  $M$ .
- It is computationally infeasible to determine the private key  $d$  given the knowledge of the public key  $e$  and the encryption and decryption algorithms.

# Public-Key Encryption



# RSA

- ❑ The ***RSA cryptosystem*** was invented by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman at MIT in 1977. It is, to date, the first unbroken and most widely used public-key cryptosystem.
- ❑ Rivest, Shamir and Adleman received the Turing Award 2002 for inventing RSA.



*Shamir, Rivest and Adleman in 1978*



*Shamir, Rivest and Adleman at Turing Award Lecture*



*Rivest, Shamir and Adleman at RSA 2003*



*Adleman, Shamir, Rivest at CRYPTO '82*

# RSA

## ❑ Key generation

1. Choose two (large) distinct primes  $p$  and  $q$  at random.
2. Compute the *RSA modulus* -  $n = pq$ .
3. Compute *Totient* -  $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ .
4. Select a random integer  $e$  (called the *encryption exponent*),  $1 < e < \phi(n)$ , such that  $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$ .
5. Compute the unique integer  $d$  (called the *decryption exponent*),  $1 < d < \phi(n)$ , such that  $ed \bmod \phi(n) = 1$ .
6. The public key is  $(e, n)$ ; the private key is  $(d, n)$ .

## ❑ Encryption

- Given: receiver's public key  $(e, n)$ , message  $M \in [0, n-1]$
- Encrypt:  $C = M^e \bmod n$

## ❑ Decryption

- Given: private key  $(d, n)$ , ciphertext  $C$
- Decrypt:  $M = C^d \bmod n$

# RSA: Example

## □ Key generation

1. Choose  $p = 11$  and  $q = 47$ .
2. Compute the RSA modulus  $n = 11 \times 47 = 517$ .
3. Compute  $\phi(n) = 10 \times 46 = 460$ .
4. Choose the encryption exponent  $e = 3$ . It is clear that  $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = \gcd(3, 460) = 1$ .
5. Compute the decryption exponent  $d = 307$ .
6. The public key is  $(3, 517)$ ; the private key is  $(307, 517)$ .

## □ Encryption

- Given: public key  $(3, 517)$ , message  $M = 26$
- Encrypt:  $C = 26^3 \bmod 517 = 515$

## □ Decryption

- Given: private key  $(307, 517)$ , ciphertext  $C = 515$
- Decrypt:  $M = 515^{307} \bmod 517 = 26$

# RSA Security

- ❑ The security of RSA depends on the hardness of the *integer factorization problem*: given an integer  $x > 1$ , what is its prime factorization?
  - Expressing the integer in terms of multiplication of primes
  - Currently there is no known algorithm that can efficiently factor a number whose prime factors are all arbitrarily large.
- ❑ If one can factor the RSA modulus  $n$  into  $p$  and  $q$ , then he can compute  $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$  and thus he can determine the decryption exponent  $d$  from  $e$  and  $\phi(n)$  efficiently using the *Extended Euclidean Algorithm*
  - Find  $d$ , given  $\phi(n)$  and  $e$  using  $ed \bmod \phi(n) = 1$
- ❑ The RSA modulus  $n$  should be at least 1024 bits long to guard against today's factoring attacks.



# Attacks on RSA

## ❑ Brute force

- trying all possible private keys
- use larger key, but then slower

## ❑ Mathematical attacks (factoring $n$ )

- see improving algorithms (QS, GNFS, SNFS)
- currently 1024-2048-bit keys seem secure

## ❑ Side channel timing attacks (on implementation)

- Check the time it takes during decryption of bits 1 and 0 on certain functions.
- use - constant time, random delays, blinding

## ❑ Chosen ciphertext attacks (on RSA properties)

# Other Public-Key Algorithms

## ❑ Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

- FIPS PUB 186 from 1991, revised 1993 & 96
- cannot be used for encryption
- Based on El-Gamal

## ❑ Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)

- Equal security for smaller bit size than RSA
- Seen in standards such as IEEE P1363
- Based on a mathematical construct known as the elliptic curve (difficult to explain)
  - ✓ Smaller keys is a plus compared to RSA
  - ✓ Decryption is costly and very slow
- Gives a possible compromise between symmetric key systems and public key systems

# Digital Signatures

- ❑ Enciphered messages that can be mathematically proven to be authentic
- ❑ Created in response to rising need to verify information transferred using electronic systems
- ❑ Asymmetric encryption processes are used to create digital signatures
  - Reverse of the asymmetric encryption
- ❑ Digital Certificates (will check them later in more details)
  - Electronic document containing the public key and identifying information about the entity that owns and controls key
  - Digital signature attached to certificate's container file to certify that the file is from entity it claims to be from

# Digital Signatures

## □ A *digital signature scheme* is composed of:

- A public key  $e$  and a private key  $d$  for each user
- A *signing algorithm*  $sig_d$  that, with a message  $M$  and the signer's private key  $d$  as input, produces the *digital signature*  $s = sig_d(M)$  of  $M$
- A *verification algorithm*  $ver_e$  that, with a message  $M$ , a digital signature  $s$  and the signer's public key  $e$  as input, returns true if and only if  $s$  is the digital signature of  $M$  signed by  $e$ 's owner; i.e.,

$$ver_e(M, s) = \begin{cases} true & \text{if } s = sig_d(M) \\ false & \text{if } s \neq sig_d(M) \end{cases}$$

## □ RSA digital signature scheme

- $(d, n)$  = signer's private key,  $(e, n)$  = signer's public key
- Sign:  $s = [Hash(M)]^d \bmod n$
- Verify: return true if and only if  $Hash(M) = s^e \bmod n$

## □ *Hash-and-sign*: if the message is long, it is common to sign the message digest ( $H(M)$ ) instead of the message itself to save time

- Hash functions will be explained later

# Example: Integrity/Authentication

- ❑ Take  $p = 7$ ,  $q = 11$ , so  $n = 77$  and  $\phi(n) = 60$
- ❑ Alice chooses  $e = 17$ , making  $d = 53$ 
  - $e$  is her public key,  $d$  is her private key
- ❑ Alice wants to send Bob message HELLO (07 04 11 11 14) so Bob knows it is what Alice sent (no changes in transit, and authenticated)
  - $07^{53} \bmod 77 = 35$  (the signing uses **her private** key---authentication)
  - $04^{53} \bmod 77 = 09$
  - $11^{53} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $11^{53} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $14^{53} \bmod 77 = 49$
- ❑ Alice sends 35 09 44 44 49
- ❑ Notice that anyone can intercept this...can only Bob decode?

# Integrity/Authentication cont'd

❑ Bob receives 35 09 44 44 49

❑ Bob uses Alice's public key,  $e = 17$ ,  $n = 77$ , to decrypt message:

➤  $35^{17} \bmod 77 = 07$

➤  $09^{17} \bmod 77 = 04$

➤  $44^{17} \bmod 77 = 11$

➤  $44^{17} \bmod 77 = 11$

➤  $49^{17} \bmod 77 = 14$

❑ Bob translates message to letters to read HELLO

- Alice sent it as only she knows her private key, so no one else could have enciphered it
- If (enciphered) message's blocks (letters) altered in transit, would not decrypt properly
- Coding is not tied to Bob----anyone could intercept and decode.
  - ✓ But whoever does know that the message had to have been encoded with Alice's private key

# Security Services Provided by RSA

## ❑ Confidentiality

- Only the owner of the private key knows it, so text enciphered with public key cannot be read by anyone except the owner of the private key

## ❑ Authentication

- Only the owner of the private key knows it, so text enciphered with private key must have been generated by the owner

## ❑ Integrity

- Enciphered letters cannot be changed undetectably without knowing private key

## ❑ Non-Repudiation

- Message enciphered with private key came from someone who knew it

# Example: BOTH Encryption & Signing

- ❑ Alice wants to send Bob message HELLO both enciphered and authenticated (integrity-checked)
  - Alice's keys: public (17, 77); private: 53
  - Bob's keys: public: (37, 77); private: 13
- ❑ Alice enciphers HELLO (07 04 11 11 14): authenticate first, code to recipient last
  - $(07^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 07$
  - $(04^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 37$
  - $(11^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $(11^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 44$
  - $(14^{53} \bmod 77)^{37} \bmod 77 = 14$
- ❑ Alice sends 07 37 44 44 14



# Symmetric-Key vs. Public-Key

- ❑ In symmetric-key encryption, the sender has to establish a secret key with the receiver prior to encryption.
  - However, in public-key encryption, the sender just needs to obtain an *authentic* copy of the receiver's public key.
    - ✓ In a network of  $n$  users, a symmetric-key cryptosystem requires  $n(n-1)/2$  secret keys, but a public-key cryptosystem requires only  $n$  public-private key pairs.
- ❑ Public-key cryptography (digital signatures) provides non-repudiation while symmetric-key cryptography does not.
- ❑ Public-key cryptosystems are substantially slower than symmetric-key cryptosystems since the key sizes of public-key cryptosystems are typically much larger.
  - RSA 10,000 times slower than AES
  - ECC does better but still slower than AES