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| Q1) For an account to verify true belief as knowledge, the account must already be knowledge already. If someone believes in P, and P is true, It still doesn’t count as knowledge if S is not rationally justified in believing in P. |
| Q2) KJTB: S knows that P just in case  (1) S believes that P;  (2) P is true;  (3) S is rationally justified in believing that P. |
| Q3) Ancient greek : The Greek word skepsis means investigation. By calling themselves skeptics, the ancient skeptics thus describe themselves as investigators. They also call themselves 'those who suspend', thereby signaling that their investigations lead them to suspension of judgment. They do not put forward theories, and they do not deny that knowledge can be found. At its core, ancient skepticism is a way of life devoted to inquiry. It is as much concerned with belief as with knowledge. As long as knowledge has not been attained, the skeptics aim not to affirm anything. This gives rise to their most controversial ambition: a life without belief.  New : you can't be certain about anything and i know that nothing can be known with certainty |
| Q4) External!world!skepticism is!the!view!that!you!can’t!know!anything!about!the!external!world!(or!even!if!  there!is!such!a!thing)!– you!can!only!know!about!the!internal!world!of!your!own!mind. A thing is mind independent  A skeptic says that he has know way of checking whether or not his senses are working or not. |
| Q5) We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than sense experience. Propositions that report to our sense-experience are self-evident. Some other propositions are justified on grounds of these self-evident truths |
| Q6) There are two kinds of experience or percep@on – sensa@on and reflec@on or “internal” sensa@on).  • We get ideas of “sensible quali@es” (ex. yellowness, heat, so\_ness, bi7erness) from our senses. (Essay II.i.3)  • We get ideas of “the opera@ons of our own minds” (ex. percep@on, thinking, doub@ng knowing, willing) from reflec@on. (Essay II.i.4)  • All our ideas are acquired through sensa@on or reflec@on, and all knowledge is grounded on those ideas.  • If a human had no sense-experience, then her mind would be “blank slate” (tabula rasa) |
| Q7 ) Perceptual Realism: Physical objects have mind-independent properties, and  our sense-experiences provide us with justified beliefs about those  properties.  Direct Realism: We can know the mind-independent properties of physical  objects because we immediately perceive physical objects.  Indirect Realism: The immediate objects of our sense-experience are  mental representations, and these mental representations allow us to  know the mind-independent properties of physical objects.  Direct : Thomas Reid Indirect : Locke |
| 1.If indirect realism is true, then  – physical objects are distinct from our ideas of them;  – we directly perceive only our ideas;  – we do not directly perceive physical objects.  2.If we cannot directly perceive physical objects, we cannot  know that our ideas of physical objects resemble those  objects.  3. So if indirect realism is true, then we cannot have  knowledge of physical objects.  4.We can have knowledge of physical objects.  ------------------------------------------------------------  C. Indirect realism is false. |
| Q9) “True ideas are those that we can validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. James is not saying that true beliefs must actually be verified; verifiability is sufficient.  • Not all truths are verified by the senses: There are “absolute” truths about “relations of ideas” that are “obvious at a glance” and “always true  **truth does not exist in some abstract realm of thought independent of social relationship or actions; instead, truth is a function of an active process of engagement with the world and verification.** |
| Q10) His position is roughly as follows:  A judgment (of sense) is true just in case that judgment coheres with my other sensations and memories.  • Analogously, we might say something like this: A belief is true just in case it forms part of a consistent set of beliefs. |
| Q11) foundationalism is a thesis or assumption about the structure of epistemic justification  a basic belief is a belief that is not justified by normal inferential means but are self-justifying  some beliefs are certain and self-evident while others are justified because these basic beliefs are justified  foundationalism holds that a certain set of beliefs are infaalible while coherentism holds that no set of beliefs are infallible eg examples of a basic belief is 2+2 =4 and i see a tree. coherentist believe that beliefs stand in sufficently with each other and therefore justified. in foundationalism basic beliefs suppotr nonbasic beliefs |
| Q12) A verbal statement is an assertion of some proposition.  • “There are also propositions that are not presented in words, but which someone is merely thinking.”  • “I understand by a proposition in itself any statement that something is or is not, indifferently whether this statement is true or false, whether or not anyone has put in into words, whether or not it has even been thought.”  “Every proposition is either true or false and true or false in all times and at all places.” |
| Q13) S does not infer that P from any false belief.1 |
| Q14) Goldman (1976) rejects the causal analysis in Goldman  (1967).  • In the “Barn County” case, the belief that there is a  barn is caused (in an appropriate way) by an actual  barn -- but the driver doesn’t know there is a barn.  • Goldman (1976)’s diagnosis: The driver doesn’t know  there is a barn, because he can’t distinguish between an  actual barn and a barn-facade.  • In this case, there is a relevant alternative state of affairs  where the driver’s belief is incorrect. |
| Q15) JTB+U: S knows that P iff  (1) S believes that P;  (2) P is true;  (3) there is evidence, E, that completely justifies  S in believing that P;  and  (4) there is no counter-evidence, D, that defeats  evidence E.  An example...  • In the pyromaniac’s experience, Sure-Fire  matches always light.  • The pyromaniac is completely justified in  believing that the Sure-Fire match he is  about to strike will light.  • This particular match is defective.  • The match is ignited by a random burst of  “Q-radiation.” |
| Q16) there is no relevant alternative Q of P  such that S would still believe that P  even if Q (and not P) were true. |
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