

#flo #ref #disorganized #incomplete

assignment: https://docs.google.com/document/d/18pAQO6g8R1x7d8ufiJEgW8v3zi-qmJeRJX5nueh9W_Y/edit

image links

third synth third history geography third lit review

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2936421?seq=1>

title?

Powers Edge: Ideological Manipulation in Foreign Countries

installing leaders in foreign countries -> dictators that we can't do anything about dictators because fighting against the wants of the people

0.1 | **Note-taking, begin!**

- America overthrew Sukarno in 1965, and replaced him with the right wing Suharto who was big bad news
- evidence that America was involved?
- America had already participated in a revolt against Sukarno in 1958
- America congratulated Suharto and themselves when he smashed the communists
- this guy argues that America didn't play a large role
- America prodded the army to take down Sukarno but it didn't work
 - they had "basically given up"
- America gave up, the coup caught the CIA by surprise
- Lyndon B. Johnson and Watergate means we get info
- CIA was on a short leash, if they had plans to move against, then Washington would know
 - he didn't, and thus, CIA was not involved.
 - CIA admitted that they didn't have a connection
- Indonesia was important because:
 - the sprawling archipelago bestrode the sea lanes connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific;
 - outflanked Vietnam
 - it threatened havoc on the security of the Philippines and the American bases there
 - had a wealth of natural resources
- Sukarno was super charismatic, let him rise to the top
 - survived a coup, and a bunch of other things
- America doesn't want to push Sukarno into greater reliance on the Chinese and the Russians (communists)

- sukarno had a psychological war against malaysia
- CIA thought of sukarno more of a speaker rather than a thinker
 - more improviser than ideologue
- sukarno needed the PKI, the PKI needed sukarno
- sukarno has the same deal with the army, who also balanced the PKI
- american aid had to be low due to pressure from congress, but they tried to do enough to keep sukarno from behaving even more badly
- “When any nation offers us aid with political strings attached, then I will tell them,” here Sukarno switched to English for emphasis, “Go to hell with your aid!”
 - people didn't like that.
- cia thought that sukarno was becoming “mentally unhinged”
- sukarno made another speech that was very clearly anti american
- rusk said that internal anti communist action could not develop independent of sukarno
- and that they should think of it as a communist dictatorship
- sukarno declined americans a bunch (pg 16)
- ball said:
 - so long as sukarno is alive, the prospects of an army revolt against him are slim
- there were rumors of sukarno being ill, tons of misinformation

idk...

- america likes to take credit when things go right?
-

0.2 | planin

big (small) idea: we live in contexts, america provided the context for suharto to do the coup trying to fit the situation into the binary of blame is not nuanced enough wheeee

1. Title (Something catchy: short summary of topic)

1. TBD

2. Lede/hook (~1 paragraph)

1. description of the coup?
 1. describe in way that makes it seem like america did it.

3. Context for the case study (~1-2 paragraphs)

1. talk about indonesia and its positioning, what it meant
 1. indonesia had large strategic significance:

1. right in the middle of the sea lanes connecting “the Indian Ocean to the Pacific; it outflanked Vietnam; it threatened havoc on the security of the Philippines and the American bases there. Economically the country’s clout rested on a wealth of natural resources, and although no one could say just how abundant they might be, American oil companies had bet some half-billion dollars on Indonesia’s future.⁶ Politically Sukarno had early claimed stature among Third World neutralists by hosting the seminal Bandung conference of 1955; nearly a decade later he remained a heavyweight in the nonaligned movement.”

4. Source analysis (~1-2 paragraphs)

1. summary?

1. Pick at least one reading and provide a brief review of the article’s main contributions. To do so, identify both the purpose and the argument of the piece. What justifications does the author provide about the topic selection and the significance of the arguments?
 1. This brings us back to the most serious deficiency of covert warfare: its inevitable tendency to poison the well of public opinion. Each actual operation discovered gives rise to a hundred imagined, which for all their illusiveness are no less convincing to an international audience and damaging to the United States.
 2. Covert operations and secrecy -> intense speculation, damages public opinion, truth is important. this is the truth.
 3. Argument: Sukarno’s overthrow was not done by americans
2. Here would also be the place to provide a brief summary of the contents of the article: what specifics does the article focus on and how do those choices help to advance the author’s argument?
 1. America tried, failed. Gave up.
 2. we had info, we didnt know. caught us by surprise.
 3. america had incentive, made sense,
 4. but we ultimately didnt do it.

5. “Literature review” (~1-2 paragraphs)

1. How does your secondary source engage with the theme of triangularity and the global cold war?
 1. it acknowlwges the global cold war, and explores an edge case
 1. intellectual expanse, how truly global the cold war was.
2. Here you should connect your reading to the larger field. What is distinct about their approach and how effective is that approach at capturing the triangular relationship of the global cold war?
 1. another attempt to make sense and find truth from the knowledge pool
 2. another aspect of the global cold war: where it isnt, where it’s imagined to be

6. Evaluation: How did the Cold War system shape development and/or decolonization in your region?

1. connection to Munro:
 1. “The so-called Cold War...was far less the confrontation of the United States with Russia than America’s expansion into the entire world.”
 2. the fact that this event was thought to be done by the americans demstrates the expanse
2. context creation, blame, ect

0.3 | **writing? here we go.**

September, 1957: Eisenhower gives the command, and the CIA begins planning its coup to overthrow Sukarno. 1958, it fails, forcing Sukarno into greater reliance on the PKI — the Communist party of Indonesia. Sukarno gives his famous speech, declaring loudly to the United States: “When any nation offers us aid with political strings attached, then I will tell them, go to hell with your aid!” America’s influence over Sukarno had been admitted and destroyed in one fell swoop. A year later, Sukarno becomes the first to drop out of the United Nations. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002070206502000205?journalCode=ijxa> Sukarno then gives another speech, recorded by Francis Galbraith, the American embassy’s Chief of Mission. Galbraith wrote, “Sukarno declares Indonesia in the camp of the Asian Communist countries and opposed to the U.S.” He continued, “It would be fatuous to pretend that this speech is other principally than a declaration of enmity for us.” September 30, 1965: Another coup takes place, six top army generals are seized and murdered. Suharto, a far right-wing general, takes Sukarno’s power. Followed by this transfer was the massacring of Indonesian communists — and alleged communists — that left the country in shock. Body count estimates range from hundreds of thousands to over a million. The United States congratulated Suharto and supported him as he then ruled as dictator. H. W. Brands, the author of *The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn’t Topple Sukarno*, claims that America had virtually no involvement, and the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto “resulted instead from developments of essentially Indonesian origin.”

it’s importance in the Cold War.

To understand the events that took place in Indonesia, one must first understand Indonesia’s surrounding context. The initial coup took place just a few years after Eisenhower’s election. One year after the election, the CIA successfully overthrew Mohammed Mossadegh, the Iranian Prime Minister at the time. Another year later, the CIA toppled Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz, replacing him with Carlos Castillo Armas who instated a military dictatorship. It was a time of covert operations and government manipulation in developing countries. The second coup, leading to the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto took place just at the start of the Cold War’s height. Chronologically in the middle of the Vietnam war, the United States feared Sukarno would create a similar situation to South Vietnam. {CITES!}

Indonesia itself had incredible value to the United States during the cold war. It’s unique location contributed greatly to this value; Indonesia spanned the sea lanes linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, providing a crucial choke-point. It also outflanked Vietnam, providing crucial positioning to the ongoing war. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05921.11?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents Complimenting its locational and strategical advantages, Indonesia was rich with natural resources. Along with an abundance of oil and natural gas, it carried a slew of valuable metals. {} <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-are-the-major-natural-resources-of-indonesia.html>

However, H. W. Brands argues that America had virtually no involvement with the coup that took down Sukarno and replaced him with Suharto. Brands first states why the knowledge surrounding the event is available to the public: Lyndon B. Johnson had an “insatiable appetite for information,” leading to much of the CIA’s activity being documented.(CITE) After the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA was put on a far shorter leash. The documents on Indonesia later got revealed to the public when they came up for review in the Watergate scandal. Brands then goes on to describe America’s dealings with Sukarno. The CIA continually prodded the Indonesian army to move against Sukarno, and after many months, “the Johnson administration, at a loss as to what else it might do, had basically given up.” (CITE) The United States then decided to try and solidify relations with Sukarno, repeatedly meeting and offering aid. Every time, Sukarno would send “the Americans home empty-handed.” (cite). Giving up again, the United States attempted to resolve conflict in the Indonesian-Malaysian crisis and give aid only to keep Sukarno from — as Dean Rusk the Secretary of State at the time put it — “behaving even more badly than he has.”(cite). After repeated failure, the United States almost entirely withdrew from Indonesia. Ellsworth Bunker, a top diplomat reported to Washington that “Indonesia essentially will have to save itself.”

Brands concludes with his thoughts on covert operations as a whole. He acknowledges the credibility of America’s involvement, stating that the whole event would be “a nonstory except that the myth of American responsibility has proved so hardy.” (cite). By trying to get closer to the truth, Brands hopes to dispel

rumors surrounding the event, as “each actual operation discovered gives rise to a hundred imagined.” (cite). Listing the many deficits of covert operations, Brands claims that the “most serious deficiency of covert warfare” is its “inevitable tendency to poison the well of public opinion.”(cite). Rumors of covert operations, in the minds of the public, are nearly impossible to remove — damaging the United States. Brands ends by stating: “while the United States government remains in the business of covert warfare, the list of indictments will continue to grow.”

Brands grapples with the truly global nature of the Cold War by exploring where the Cold war is not. Even in a scenario where the United States did not meddle, it is still perceived as the puppet master orchestrating major changes. The extent of the Cold War reaches farther than reality — the Cold War was so truly global that it is now assumed to be the cause of major events like the ones Brands discusses. Brands tries to unveil the truth by analyzing and compiling multiple primary sources, disagreeing with the common assumptions. But as Brands mentions, the nature of these assumptions — rooted in the “top secret” — are very hard to dismantle. Lack of evidence simply increases speculation. He demonstrates a way in which the modern day manifestation of the Cold War, despite it being over, is global in its perception.

While very insightful, Brands tries to fit the events of Indonesia into the binary of blame. After roughly 25 pages, Brands concludes that “The United States did not overthrow Sukarno, and it was not responsible for the hundreds of thousands of deaths involved in the liquidation of the PKI.” (cite). While overthrowing Sukarno and being responsible for the deaths of those in the PKI are two separate things, Brands implies that the former led to the latter. While perhaps not involved directly with the coup that transferred power from Sukarno to Suharto, the United States created a context where they were easily assumed to be behind said coup. Suharto must have known that after the coup, the United States would be on the other side to support him as they had done with so many other power transfers.

However, the United States created a context where it could be easily assumed that they were behind