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**Разработка игр на блокчейне TON на основе NFT:
исследование игровых механик и проблем безопасности /
Development of NFT-Based Games on TON Blockchain:
Exploring Game Mechanics and Security Challenges**

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Literature Review

2.1 NFT-based Game Mechanics

The advent of NFT-based game mechanics has revolutionized the digital gaming landscape by introducing novel paradigms that redefine asset ownership, player incentives, and interactive experiences. Central to this transformation is the concept of verifiable asset ownership, where blockchain technology ensures that digital assets are uniquely identifiable and securely traceable, challenging traditional centralized models. The play-to-earn reward systems further bridge virtual economies with real-world finance, offering players tangible financial incentives for their in-game achievements. Additionally, NFT breeding and fusion, along with asset staking and yield generation, introduce complex mechanisms for asset creation and passive income, respectively, while NFT crafting and resource transformation leverage blockchain's principles of digital scarcity. Rental and delegation systems enhance asset liquidity and inclusivity, and cross-game asset utilization extends the utility of NFTs across multiple platforms. Tokenized governance participation empowers players with decision-making capabilities,

fostering a decentralized control of game evolution. Dynamic NFT evolution and fractional ownership systems further enrich the gaming experience by allowing assets to adapt over time and democratizing investment opportunities. Collectively, these mechanics not only enhance player engagement but also open new avenues for innovative monetization strategies, underscoring the potential and complexity inherent in NFT-based gaming.

2.1.1 Verifiable Asset Ownership

Blockchain technology has transformed digital gaming by introducing verifiable asset ownership a marked departure from traditional centralized models. Conventional online games typically vest control of virtual assets in the game operator, which limits players' rights regarding asset transfer and authenticity. In contrast, blockchain-based systems leverage decentralized ledgers and smart contracts to certify ownership, ensuring that digital game assets (such as NFTs) are uniquely identifiable and securely traceable [1]. Scholars have increasingly focused on the technical and economic implications of this shift. The integration of non-fungible tokens and immutable smart contracts offers a robust method for verifying asset authenticity and provenance [2]. This verifiability is achieved through a combination of cryptographic techniques and decentralized storage, ensuring that an asset's recorded ownership cannot be altered without detection. Nevertheless, challenges regarding scalability, high transaction fees, and latency have been identified as key obstacles to real-time asset verification [3]. Moreover, although the decentralized framework eliminates the need for trusted intermediaries, questions remain about enforcing digital property rights in cross-platform environments and sustaining such economic models [4]. The theoretical underpin-

nings here that inscribing ownership directly on the blockchain not only enhances security but also introduces liquidity to previously illiquid digital assets challenge traditional approaches to asset management and open new avenues for innovative monetization strategies [5]. Overall, these insights establish verifiable ownership as a critical component for understanding subsequent blockchain innovations in gaming.

2.1.2 Play-to-Earn Reward Systems

The rapid evolution of blockchain-based gaming has fostered a paradigm in which financial incentives motivate gameplay and bridge the gap between virtual economies and real-world finance. Central to this innovation is the design of reward systems that convert in-game achievements into tangible assets, enabling players to earn tokens, NFTs, or other digital commodities convertible into fiat currency. A core tenet of the play-to-earn (P2E) model is to compensate players for the time and effort they invest, thereby addressing limitations of traditional gaming models where rewards are limited solely to in-game benefits [4]. These systems facilitate an open market in which earned tokens and assets can be traded or staked, linking player performance with financial rewards. Blockchain integration further ensures that reward distributions are secure, transparent, and resistant to tampering [6], [7]. However, an overemphasis on extrinsic financial incentives can diminish intrinsic motivators such as personal achievement and enjoyment. Research indicates that prioritizing monetary gain may transform recreational gameplay into a high-pressure economic endeavor [8], while the speculative nature of asset trading may introduce volatility, undermining long-term engagement [4], [9]. Hence, effective P2E systems must carefully balance financial and intrinsic

rewards to ensure sustainable and engaging gameplay.

2.1.3 NFT Breeding and Fusion

In the evolving landscape of digital asset management, NFT breeding and fusion have emerged as innovative mechanisms for generating, combining, and enhancing unique tokens. Originating in crypto-games, these processes are central both to the creation of novel virtual products and to broader discussions on economic and cultural impacts within blockchain ecosystems. Early implementations exemplified by projects such as CryptoKitties demonstrated that chance-based breeding mechanics can create NFTs with variable traits and market value, similar to loot boxes and gacha games [10]. In addition, fusion techniques that consolidate multiple tokens into a single enhanced NFT add complexity by blending elements of randomness with engineered asset evolution. Critical analysis shows that NFT breeding typically relies on probabilistic trait inheritance, thereby incentivizing continued user engagement through the possibility of achieving rare characteristics [10]. In parallel, fusion processes allow for the combination of distinct NFTs to produce composite tokens with augmented features for example, as seen in Nike's CryptoKicks initiative [11]. Yet, economic constraints such as the arbitrage constraint affecting breeding outcomes highlight the necessity for careful balance between game tokens and market costs [12]. From an implementation perspective, blockchain-based smart contracts enforce randomness, traceability, and non-fungibility, although regulatory uncertainties, market volatility, and fair distribution challenges persist. These discussions underscore how NFT breeding and fusion exemplify both the potential and the complexity inherent in innovative digital asset creation.

2.1.4 Asset Staking and Yield Generation

Asset staking and yield generation have emerged as pivotal mechanisms in blockchain-based gaming by offering players an alternative revenue stream. By committing digital assets such as tokens or NFTs to smart contracts in exchange for passive rewards, players are enabled to forgo immediate in-game utility in favor of long-term yield. Research on token circulation demonstrates that staking can regulate in-game economies and mitigate market volatility [13]. Complementary studies further examine the psychological benefits of sustained passive rewards, suggesting that such incentives foster increased player engagement over extended periods [6]. However, staking involves trade-offs; removing assets from active gameplay may reduce immediate interaction, and mandatory lock-up periods can create barriers for new players as well as potential economic imbalances [14]. Hence, a balanced staking mechanism must provide attractive passive income while preserving active gameplay dynamics.

2.1.5 NFT Crafting and Resource Transformation

NFT crafting introduces a novel game mechanic in which players combine in-game resources or lower-value NFTs to create new, higher-value digital assets. This process distinguishes itself from traditional crafting systems by incorporating blockchain's principles of digital scarcity and permanence for instance, component NFTs are often permanently transformed or destroyed during crafting [15]. Fixed or discoverable crafting recipes encourage strategic resource gathering, deepening player engagement and exploration, while probabilistic outcomes add an essential element of risk and reward. At the same time, the complexity of balancing resource costs with resultant rewards can lead to economic inflation if not managed properly

[16]. Additional technical obstacles, such as slow transaction confirmations and high gas fees, further complicate the user experience and necessitate a robust interface design that accommodates NFTs both as collectibles and interactive game components [17], [18]. Thus, NFT crafting encapsulates both the promise and the challenges of merging traditional resource transformation with digital scarcity, a synthesis that is critical for the development of secure, innovative NFT-based games.

2.1.6 Rental and Delegation Systems

Recent advancements in blockchain gaming have highlighted the importance of rental and delegation systems as innovative approaches to digital asset management. These systems enable NFT owners to temporarily grant usage rights while maintaining overall ownership, thereby creating opportunities for passive income and expanding access to premium in-game assets. The underlying principle is one of efficient asset utilization; by monetizing NFTs without transferring full ownership, these systems enhance liquidity and inclusivity [7], [18]. Automated smart contracts underpin these mechanisms by enforcing time-limited agreements, revenue-sharing protocols, and safeguards against misuse [19]. Empirical examples such as scholar-manager programs observed in games like Axie Infinity demonstrate how lending arrangements can generate shared revenue [20]. Nonetheless, challenges including contractual exploitation [4], asset theft, and market volatility necessitate robust contract design and governance frameworks to ensure system stability.

2.1.7 Cross-Game Asset Utilization

Cross-game asset utilization represents a transformative mechanism by which NFTs retain their identity and value across multiple digital environments. Through blockchain-verified credentials, an asset can function beyond the confines of a single game [18]. This mechanism relies on smart contracts and shared metadata standards to ensure uniform recognition across diverse platforms. Initiatives like the “Nifty License” exemplify how assets from one game may be integrated into others such as KittyRace, KittyBattle, and KotoWars [1]. By extending asset utility across games, this approach supports economic growth through cross-game marketplaces that promote liquidity and bolster player retention [21]. Despite its advantages, significant challenges remain regarding technical complexity, economic balance within game environments, and regulatory compliance [15]. These issues underscore the need for further standardization and innovation in achieving true NFT interoperability.

2.1.8 Tokenized Governance Participation

Tokenized governance has become a transformative mechanism in NFT-based games, enabling decentralized control of game evolution through blockchain-based voting systems. By endowing players with governance tokens or NFTs, these systems allow for direct influence over game rules, economic models, and content updates, thereby aligning player interests with long-term development objectives [22]. Various models for distributing voting rights exist; some rely on direct token holdings while others incorporate reputation scores to prevent power concentration [23]. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) facilitate community-driven proposals that shift control from developers to a distributed

stakeholder network [7], [13]. Nevertheless, challenges such as voter apathy and plutocratic imbalances where large token holders can dominate outcomes have been identified [13], [24]. Emerging solutions, including decay mechanisms for reputation scores and delegated voting, are being explored to address these issues [19], [23]. Overall, tokenized governance represents an important evolution in democratizing decision-making in game development while incentivizing sustained stakeholder engagement.

2.1.9 Dynamic NFT Evolution

Dynamic NFT evolution extends the concept of static digital ownership by allowing assets to adapt and transform over time in response to gameplay events and external data. This mechanism leverages sophisticated smart contract designs to update an NFT's metadata in real time, ensuring that every change is securely recorded on the blockchain [25]. Notable implementations include games where characters or in-game items evolve through level ups or trait changes triggered by user interactions or on-chain events [10], [26]. However, the increased complexity introduced by dynamic evolution requires rigorous security testing and careful calibration to avoid gameplay imbalances, particularly when external oracles are involved. Despite these challenges, dynamic NFT evolution offers a promising avenue for enhancing interactivity and enriching the overall gaming experience.

2.1.10 Fractional Ownership Systems

Fractional ownership systems have emerged as a transformative paradigm in digital asset management by leveraging blockchain technology to democratize investment, enhance liquidity, and broaden market participation. By dividing

high-value assets into smaller, tradeable tokens, these systems lower entry barriers and enable secure, verifiable transactions through smart contracts [18], [27]. Each transaction is immutably recorded on the blockchain, thereby mitigating traditional trust issues while facilitating risk-sharing among investors [6], [25]. Fractional ownership has found applications in diverse fields including art, real estate, and decentralized finance, demonstrating its potential to support diversified investment strategies [27], [28]. In this context, fractional ownership aligns with the broader objectives of this study by exploring secure, scalable economic models within NFT-based gaming.

2.2 Comparative analysis of TON's and Ethereum's Features

This section examines key technical differences between TON and Ethereum that are critical for developing NFT-based game mechanics. By comparing aspects such as smart contract modifiability, the atomicity of contract calls, scalability architecture, and off-chain asset handling, this review highlights how each platform's design choices affect error management, adaptability, and performance. These insights set the stage for understanding which blockchain features best support innovative game development.

2.2.1 Smart Contract Modifiability

Blockchain platforms differ significantly in their approach to modifying smart contracts. TON offers native upgrade mechanisms that enable developers to alter contract logic post-deployment through built-in update functions [29]. This

flexibility facilitates rapid iteration and dynamic enhancements while minimizing downtime. In contrast, Ethereum enforces immutability to ensure stability and trust but requires the use of complex upgrade patterns—such as proxy contracts—to implement changes [30], [31]. Thus, while TON prioritizes adaptability through post-deployment modifications, Ethereum emphasizes security integrity at the expense of responsiveness to change.

2.2.2 Atomicity in Smart Contract Calls

The paradigms for message structure and error handling diverge markedly between the two platforms. TON employs a cell-based data structure in which all data, including messages, are stored in cells capable of holding up to 1023 bits and referencing up to four other cells [32]. Organized as directed acyclic graphs to prevent cyclic dependencies, this mechanism requires strict synchronization when serializing messages according to TL-B schemes ([32]). The primary processing function, `recv_internal`, explicitly manages errors by bouncing messages that fail processing, thereby obliging developers to address issues such as the “Unchecked Bounced Message” defect [29].

By contrast, Ethereum utilizes a conventional message model within its virtual machine. Here, messages are virtual objects encapsulating the sender, recipient, ether amount, data, and a `STARTGAS` value, generated via the `CALL` opcode [33]. Ethereum's execution model is inherently atomic—if any component of a transaction encounters an error, the entire sequence is reverted, ensuring complete transactional integrity [34]. This all-or-nothing approach simplifies failure recovery, whereas TON's non-atomic call structure means that state changes made by preceding calls are not automatically rolled back on failure [29]. In addition,

TON's reliance on builder and slice primitives for data handling demands careful synchronization to avoid critical errors [29], while Ethereum's established virtual machine abstracts such complexities [33]. Together, these differences necessitate that developers working on TON implement more defensive programming strategies and explicit recovery protocols compared to the straightforward atomic transactions of Ethereum.

2.2.3 Scalability Architecture

Scalability is a fundamental challenge with significant implications for transaction throughput and overall user experience. TON adopts an innovative 2D-blockchain structure comprising a masterchain, multiple workchains, and numerous shardchains. In this configuration, the masterchain maintains protocol and validator data, workchains handle transactions and smart contracts under varied rules, and shardchains enable dynamic sharding based on account distribution. Although current throughput may be modest, TON's architecture promises significant scalability potential as user engagement increases [32].

In contrast, Ethereum is constrained by its design, reliably processing around 20 transactions per second in practice despite theoretical capacities of up to 1,000 TPS. Extended consensus times and continuous growth in blockchain size exacerbate these limitations [35]. These constraints contribute to high gas fees and network congestion—as seen during the CryptoKitties surge [31], [36] which restrict game design to simpler, turn-based mechanisms. Although TON's dynamic sharding and lower transaction costs offer greater potential for intricate game mechanics, developers must remain mindful of challenges such as its non-atomic call behavior [29]. Overall, the scalability comparison underscores the trade-offs

between Ethereum's established ecosystem and TON's promising yet nuanced infrastructure.

2.2.4 Off-Chain Asset Handling

Managing off-chain assets is crucial for blockchain game development, particularly for preserving data integrity while minimizing on-chain storage costs. On Ethereum, key components like metadata, images, and state data are typically stored off chain with only a cryptographic hash or pointer recorded on the blockchain [26], [37]. This approach maintains verifiable ownership but can impose rigidity; modifications to off-chain asset references often require complex proxy patterns or complete redeployments.

TON addresses these challenges by supporting native smart contract upgradability, which allows for rapid updates to off-chain asset references without resorting to intricate workarounds [29]. When combined with its 2D blockchain architecture, TON is well positioned to manage high volumes of transactions. Furthermore, its non-atomic call mechanism permits incremental updates by enabling partial transaction commitment in the event of processing errors [29]. In this way, TON's flexible approach to error handling and system updates contrasts with Ethereum's all-or-nothing model, offering enhanced adaptability for dynamic off-chain asset management.

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