

An Analysis of Police Misconduct, Accountability, and Transparency at the Clearwater Police Department

Executive Summary & Key Findings

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of police misconduct, accountability structures, and data transparency related to the Clearwater Police Department (CPD) in Florida. The findings are intended to furnish a reliable, multi-source dataset for an application designed to track police conduct. The analysis synthesizes official data published by the CPD with independent metrics from watchdog organizations, court records, academic research, and investigative journalism to present a nuanced and critical view of the department's performance.

The investigation reveals a significant disconnect between the department's official narrative of professionalism and accountability and the patterns that emerge from a holistic review of available data. Key findings include:

- **The Accountability Funnel:** There is a clear and widening gap between the number of citizen complaints filed and the number of allegations the department substantiates. In 2023, citizen complaints rose by 18.6%, yet the rate of sustained complaints fell to a mere 3.4%.¹ This suggests a systemic process that filters a large volume of public grievances down to a minimal number of officially recognized misconduct events.
- **The Rise of Exonerations via Body-Worn Cameras:** The implementation of Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) correlates directly with a dramatic surge in "exonerated" findings, which increased by 75.7% in 2023.¹ In cases where BWC footage was used for resolution, over 90% resulted in officer exoneration, raising critical questions about whether the technology is being utilized as an objective tool or as a mechanism to systematically validate officer accounts over those of citizens.
- **Significant Racial Disparities in Enforcement:** The CPD's own data, when compared with demographic baselines, reveals stark racial disparities. In 2020,

Black residents were subjected to use of force at a rate more than three times their representation in the city's population.² These statistical imbalances point to systemic issues in how enforcement actions are applied across different communities.

- **A Pattern of Officer Criminality and Misconduct:** Recent years have seen a series of high-profile arrests of CPD officers for serious crimes, including the 2024 case against the police union president for allegedly aiding a drug trafficking ring and another officer for disability fraud.³ These incidents challenge the official narrative that misconduct is the work of a few "bad apples" and instead suggest a pattern of ethical and criminal failures.
- **A Critical Void in Civilian Oversight:** A thorough review confirms the absence of a dedicated, independent civilian review board for either the City of Clearwater or the broader Pinellas County Sheriff's Office.⁵ This structural gap means that the internal affairs process, a closed loop controlled entirely by the police department, is the primary mechanism for adjudication. This lack of external oversight makes independent, third-party tracking and reporting platforms critically important for public accountability.

This report aggregates these findings and the underlying data into a structured format suitable for data visualization. It provides not just statistics, but the context, case studies, and systemic analysis necessary to understand the complex landscape of police accountability in Clearwater.

Analysis of Citizen Complaints and Internal Discipline: The Accountability Funnel

An examination of the Clearwater Police Department's own data on citizen complaints and internal discipline reveals a system characterized by a growing volume of public grievances alongside a diminishing rate of substantiation. This dynamic creates an "accountability funnel," where a wide base of complaints is narrowed to a very small number of officially validated misconduct cases, raising significant questions about the impartiality and effectiveness of the internal review process.

Rising Complaints, Falling Accountability

The most recent data from the CPD's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) shows a clear trend of increasing public complaints. In 2023, the department received 89 citizen complaints, an 18.6% increase from the 75 complaints filed in 2022.¹ This rise could indicate a number of factors, including a potential increase in incidents of perceived misconduct or, conversely, a greater public awareness and willingness to engage with the formal complaint process.

However, this increase in reporting is starkly contrasted by the outcomes of the investigations. Despite more complaints entering the system, the number of allegations found to be "Sustained"—meaning the investigation determined the officer committed the alleged violation—actually decreased. In 2023, only 3 complaints were sustained, a 25% drop from the 4 sustained complaints in 2022.¹

This divergence reveals a critical pattern. The rate at which the CPD validates citizen complaints is not only low but also declining. In 2022, approximately 5.3% of all complaints were sustained (4 out of 75). By 2023, that rate had fallen to just 3.4% (3 out of 89).¹ This trend is further corroborated by external analysis from Police Scorecard, which found that between 2016 and 2018, only 13% of civilian misconduct complaints were ruled in favor of civilians.⁶ The more recent, lower figures from the CPD suggest this accountability gap may be worsening. The system appears to be absorbing more public dissatisfaction while simultaneously becoming less likely to validate it, a process that can erode community trust and reinforce perceptions of impunity.

The "Exoneration Engine" and the Role of Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs)

While sustained complaints have dwindled, findings of "Exonerated" have surged. An exoneration means the alleged incident occurred, but the officer's actions were determined to be lawful, justified, and within departmental policy. In 2023, the number of exonerated complaints skyrocketed by 75.7%, from 33 in 2022 to 58.¹

This dramatic increase is directly correlated with the expanded use of Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) in resolving complaints. The number of cases where BWC video was utilized grew by 30.6% in the same period, from 49 to 64 instances.¹ The outcomes of these BWC-adjudicated cases are overwhelmingly one-sided: of the 64 complaints

resolved with video evidence in 2023, 58 resulted in exoneration, while only 3 were sustained.¹ This means that when video was present, the officer's actions were deemed perfectly within policy over 90% of the time.

This context is particularly noteworthy given the CPD's initial reluctance to adopt the technology. In 2015 and 2016, the department, then under Chief Dan Slaughter, rejected a BWC program, citing the high costs and what it claimed was a low number of misconduct complaints.⁷ This decision stood in contrast to other regional agencies like the Pasco County Sheriff's Office and Gulfport Police, which moved forward with adoption.⁸ By 2020, however, reports indicated that the CPD, along with the St. Petersburg and Tampa police departments, was contracting with Axon for BWC technology.⁹ The city's 2024-2025 preliminary budget allocates over \$415,000 for a program to manage, monitor, and audit BWC videos, indicating the technology is now deeply integrated into its operations.¹⁰

The extreme statistical distribution of BWC-related outcomes suggests the technology may be functioning less as a neutral arbiter of truth and more as a powerful tool for institutional defense. While BWCs can provide valuable evidence, their "objectivity" is contingent on activation policies, camera angles, and, most importantly, the interpretive framework of the reviewer—who, in this system, is an internal member of the department. The pattern of near-universal exoneration when video is present suggests that BWC footage is being effectively leveraged to build a case for the officer, providing a veneer of technological impartiality to a process that remains entirely internal and lacks independent oversight.

"Resigning Before Discipline": Accountability Avoidance

Perhaps the most telling statistic in the 2023 annual report is the 500% increase in officers who resigned *prior* to serving discipline. This figure jumped from zero in 2022 to five in 2023.¹ This spike occurred alongside a 66.6% decrease in suspensions (from 12 to 4) and a 100% decrease in resignations that occurred

during an investigation (from 1 to 0).¹

This pattern points to a significant loophole in the accountability process. An officer who resigns before a final disciplinary action is taken can often avoid having a formal, career-damaging finding of misconduct on their permanent record. A suspension or

termination is a clear black mark, but a resignation can be framed neutrally, potentially making it easier for that officer to gain employment at another law enforcement agency—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the "wandering officer" problem.

The simultaneous drop in formal suspensions suggests a potential shift in how the department handles officers facing serious consequences. Instead of being suspended, officers found to have committed serious violations may be given the option to resign. This "wash out" practice achieves the immediate goal of removing a problematic officer from the CPD but fails to create a lasting record of their misconduct, thereby externalizing the risk to other communities and undermining the broader system of police accountability. This data point is a critical indicator for tracking officers who may be attempting to evade the consequences of their actions.

Table 1: Clearwater PD Citizen Complaint & Disciplinary Actions, Year-Over-Year Analysis

Metric	2022	2023	% Change
Total Citizen Complaints	75	89	+18.6%
Disposition: Sustained	4	3	-25.0%
Disposition: Exonerated	33	58	+75.7%
Disposition: Unfounded	11	3	-72.7%
Disposition: Not Sustained	1	0	-100.0%
BWC Video Used to Resolve	49	64	+30.6%

Discipline: Employee Counseling	55	89	+61.8%	
Discipline: Remedial Training	23	43	+86.9%	
Discipline: Letter of Reprimand	7	16	+123.5%	
Discipline: Suspension	12	4	-66.6%	
Discipline: Termination	1	2	+100.0%	
Discipline: Resignation Prior to Serving	0	5	+500.0%	
Data sourced from the Clearwater Police Department Office of Professional Standards Annual Reports for 2022 and 2023. ¹				

Use of Force – Policy vs. Practice

The Clearwater Police Department's policies emphasize de-escalation and the use of force only as a last resort. However, an analysis of the department's own use-of-force statistics, demographic data, and external evaluations reveals a significant disconnect

between stated policy and practical outcomes. The data points to stark racial disparities in enforcement and an internal review process that appears to ratify rather than critically examine officer actions.

Statistical Overview and the Implausibility of Perfection

In its 2020 Use of Force Analysis, the CPD reported 130 use-of-force incidents, a 26% decrease from 2019, which the department attributed to altered operational responses during the COVID-19 pandemic.² The report noted that hands-on techniques like takedowns were used three times more often than less-lethal weapons such as Tasers. While suspect injuries decreased from 65% to 52% of encounters between 2019 and 2020, officer injuries notably increased from 16% to 24% during the same period.²

More recent data from the 2023 Annual Report presents a striking finding: of the 121 use-of-force incidents and 77 show-of-force incidents reviewed that year, 100% were found to be "In-Compliance" with departmental policy.¹ This claim of flawless adherence to policy is a significant red flag for the credibility of the internal review system. In any complex and high-stress field of human activity, a 100% compliance rate is statistically improbable. It suggests a review process that is either not sufficiently critical or is structurally inclined to validate officer actions regardless of the circumstances. This "perfect score" undermines the department's claims of thorough oversight and reinforces the need for independent analysis of its conduct.

Stark Demographic Disparities in Enforcement

The CPD's own reports, when contextualized with demographic data, paint a clear picture of racially disparate policing outcomes. According to the U.S. Census, the city of Clearwater's population is approximately 11.7% Black or African American.

- **Use of Force Disparity:** The CPD's 2020 report states that force was used against Black individuals in 36% of all incidents.² This means Black residents were subjected to police force at a rate more than **three times** their representation in the city's population ($36\% \div 11.7\% \approx 3.08$).
- **Traffic Enforcement Disparity:** A similar, though less pronounced, disparity

exists in traffic enforcement. The department's 2022 Fair and Impartial Policing Review reported that Black individuals received 19% of all traffic citations.¹¹ This represents an enforcement rate approximately 1.6 times their share of the population ($19\% \div 11.7\% \approx 1.62$).

These figures, calculated from the department's own data, provide quantifiable evidence of disproportionate enforcement against Black residents. While such statistics do not prove individual officer bias, they demonstrate a systemic pattern of outcomes that places a heavier burden of enforcement on the Black community. This is a primary metric for any police accountability analysis.

The De-escalation Paradox

The CPD's official policy framework is built around the principle of de-escalation. The Use of Force policy mandates that officers "use only the least amount of force reasonably necessary" and that force is permissible "only after all other reasonable means of effecting compliance have failed".¹² The policy explicitly identifies "Dialogue" and "Tactical Positioning or Relocation" to create time and distance as foundational de-escalation tactics.¹² Based on this policy, the department claimed in its 2020 analysis that "Communication and de-escalation techniques were used during 95% of use of force incidents".²

This self-reported metric is difficult to reconcile with external assessments of the department's performance. Police Scorecard, for instance, gives the CPD a "Police Violence" score of 46%, which is worse than the median, and notes that the department was responsible for four killings by police between 2013 and 2023—a rate higher than 24% of U.S. police departments.⁶

This creates a "de-escalation paradox": the department claims to be using de-escalation techniques in nearly every encounter, yet its outcomes in terms of violence and deadly force are worse than average. This suggests that the department's internal definition and reporting of "de-escalation" may be overly broad or self-serving. An officer shouting commands, for example, could be internally coded as "communication," even if the action served to escalate rather than de-escalate the situation. This paradox highlights the unreliability of self-reported process metrics and underscores the importance of focusing on externally verifiable outcome data,

such as complaints, injuries, and killings.

Table 2: Demographic Breakdown of Clearwater PD Enforcement Actions

Race/Ethnicity	City Population % (2020 Census)	Use of Force Incidents % (2020)	Disproportionality Ratio (Use of Force)	Traffic Citations % (2022)	Disproportionality Ratio (Traffic)
White	70.1%	49%	0.70	56%	0.80
Black	11.7%	36%	3.08	19%	1.62
Hispanic	18.4% (any race)	14%	0.76	19%	1.03
Population data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Use of Force data from CPD 2020 Use of Force Analysis. ² Traffic Citation data from CPD 2022 Fair and Impartial Policing Review. ¹¹ Disproportionality Ratio is calculated					

as (% of Outcome) / (% of Population).						
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Independent Assessments and External Data

To address the inherent limitations and potential biases of self-reported police data, this section focuses on analysis from independent, third-party sources. These external assessments provide a critical check on the CPD's official narrative and reveal patterns that are not visible in the department's own publications.

Police Scorecard: A Failing Grade on Accountability

Police Scorecard, a research project by the police reform organization Campaign Zero, provides a nationwide comparative analysis of police departments. Its evaluation of the Clearwater Police Department is unflattering, particularly in the domain of accountability. The CPD receives an overall score of 41%, indicating performance below the median of U.S. departments.⁶

The score for "Police Accountability" is even lower, at 37%. A key finding supporting this poor grade is that from 2016 to 2018, only **13% of 157 civilian misconduct complaints were ruled in favor of civilians.**⁶ This external data point provides powerful corroboration for the "accountability funnel" identified in Section 2 of this report. It demonstrates that the extremely low rate of sustained complaints is not a recent anomaly but a persistent, long-term pattern. In fact, the department's more recent self-reported substantiation rate of just 3.4% in 2023 suggests the problem of validating citizen complaints has grown significantly worse over time.¹

The scorecard also sheds light on the department's policing strategy, finding that **67% of all arrests made by the CPD between 2013 and 2023 were for low-level, non-violent offenses.**⁶ This focus on minor infractions suggests a policing model that maximizes the quantity of police-citizen interactions. Such a strategy inherently increases the opportunities for conflict, use of force, and citizen complaints, thereby

feeding the very system of misconduct and review that the data shows is failing to provide accountability. Furthermore, the scorecard notes that the CPD's funding of \$398 per resident is higher than 73% of departments nationwide, indicating a well-resourced department whose outcomes do not align with its level of investment.⁶

A Culture of Secrecy: The ACLU and Stingray Surveillance

A 2014 investigation by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) into the use of invasive surveillance technology provides a stark example of the CPD's lack of transparency. The ACLU sent public records requests to three dozen Florida law enforcement agencies seeking information about their use of "Stingrays," also known as cell-site simulators. These devices mimic cell phone towers, forcing all phones in an area to connect to them and reveal their location and identifying information, gathering data from countless bystanders in the process.¹³

The ACLU's investigation uncovered that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) had spent over \$3 million on the technology and had signed agreements to share its Stingrays with at least 11 local and regional agencies. The FDLE also operated under a non-disclosure agreement with the FBI, and a pattern of concealment emerged across the state, with agencies refusing to produce records or even acknowledge the technology's use in court filings.¹⁴

In this context, the Clearwater Police Department's official response to the ACLU's request was telling. The department claimed it had **"no responsive records"**.¹³ Given the statewide network of equipment sharing and the common practice of concealment documented by the ACLU, this claim is highly suspect. It is more likely an act of deliberate non-transparency or stonewalling than a factual statement of the department's non-involvement. This incident establishes a precedent of opacity and a willingness to conceal sensitive operations from public scrutiny, a crucial piece of context when evaluating any and all data provided by the department. It suggests that what is omitted from official reports may be as significant as what is included.

Case Studies in Misconduct, Corruption, and Litigation

Aggregate statistics provide a view of systemic patterns, but individual case studies offer a qualitative understanding of how these patterns manifest in the real world. An examination of recent criminal cases against CPD officers and civil litigation filed by citizens reveals a troubling history of corruption, bias, and violence that gives narrative weight to the data.

Corruption and Criminality Within the Ranks

Official statements often frame officer misconduct as the unfortunate actions of a few "bad apples." However, a series of recent, high-profile criminal cases against CPD officers challenge this narrative, pointing instead to more significant ethical and cultural failures.

- **Case Study: Detective Fredrick Lise (2024):** In a case that strikes at the heart of police integrity, Fredrick Lise, a narcotics detective and the president of the Clearwater police union, was arrested in August 2024 on eight felony charges.³ He was accused of systematically leaking confidential information to aid a multi-million dollar drug trafficking organization run by two of his close friends, Matthew Turner and Henry Smith. According to the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, which led the investigation, Lise used his law enforcement access to monitor investigations into the traffickers, warned them about surveillance and phone taps, and even advised them to flee to avoid arrest.¹⁵ His actions allegedly compromised the safety of undercover officers and led the State Attorney's Office to review dozens of cases in which he was involved, with at least six being dropped immediately.³ Pinellas Sheriff Bob Gualtieri described the case as an "anomaly," but the details suggest a deeper problem.¹⁵ Lise was not a rookie officer; he was a detective in a sensitive unit and the elected leader of the union tasked with defending officer conduct. He had also been previously suspended for 10 days in 2018 for leading an unauthorized car chase that resulted in a crash injuring an officer and two civilians.³ His arrest was the third of a CPD officer in 2024 alone, following cases involving stalking and pension fraud.³
- **Case Study: Officer Scott Penna (2024):** In June 2024, Officer Scott Penna was charged with grand theft, scheme to defraud, and pension fraud.⁴ After suffering an on-duty arm injury, Penna allegedly exaggerated its severity to collect nearly \$12,000 in disability pension benefits. An investigation initiated by suspicious city officials found him performing activities inconsistent with his claims, including

lifting weights at a gym.⁴ Chief Eric Gandy stated that disability benefits are "reserved for people who really can't do the job anymore," and that Penna was attempting to "dupe the system".⁴

These cases, particularly the Lise investigation, demonstrate a pattern of serious criminality that goes far beyond excessive force. They involve allegations of deep-seated corruption, fraud, and a betrayal of public and institutional trust, originating from within the department's ranks and leadership structures.

Litigation as a Window into Misconduct

Civil lawsuits filed against a police department can serve as a crucial, externally-driven record of alleged misconduct, often revealing details that internal investigations fail to capture.

- **Case Study: The Jacques LaPread Lawsuit (2023):** In 2023, Jacques LaPread, a Black IT professional, filed two federal lawsuits against the CPD and three of its officers—Kyle Bingham, Michael Buis, and Henry Giles—alleging racial profiling and wrongful arrest.¹⁶ In 2019, the officers were investigating a car burglary and encountered LaPread at a gas station. Despite a lack of concrete evidence, they deemed him "suspicious," ran his license plate, and later arrested him at his home.¹⁶ After a five-month investigation, the Pinellas-Pasco State Attorney's Office declined to file charges, stating, "We were very uncomfortable with the identification of this individual".¹⁶ An internal CPD investigation into the officers' conduct resulted only in "reprimands," prompting LaPread to file suit.¹⁶
- **Case Study: *Marcus v. Carrasquillo* (1992):** The LaPread case is not an isolated event but rather an echo of past allegations. A federal civil rights lawsuit filed in 1992, *Marcus v. Carrasquillo*, contained strikingly similar claims. The plaintiff in that case alleged that the City of Clearwater had an "established policy or custom in the Department to ignore complaints of officer misconduct made, especially by blacks or other persons being abused or having their civil rights violated".¹⁷

The parallels between a lawsuit filed in 1992 and one filed over thirty years later are profound. They suggest that allegations of a departmental culture that engages in racial profiling and dismisses complaints from Black citizens are not a new phenomenon but a deeply rooted, potentially unaddressed systemic issue. This thirty-year history elevates the analysis from a series of individual incidents to a

long-term pattern of alleged institutional behavior.

The Community Impact of "Stand Your Ground"

While not a case of direct police misconduct, the 2018 killing of Markeis McGlockton in Clearwater is essential for understanding the local law enforcement climate and its impact on community trust.

- **Case Study: The Killing of Markeis McGlockton (2018):** On July 19, 2018, Michael Drejka confronted Markeis McGlockton's girlfriend over a handicapped parking space. When McGlockton came out of the convenience store and shoved Drejka to the ground, Drejka drew a handgun and fatally shot the unarmed McGlockton.¹⁸ The Pinellas County Sheriff, Bob Gualtieri—whose agency has jurisdiction in unincorporated Clearwater and works closely with CPD—initially refused to arrest Drejka, publicly citing Florida's controversial "Stand Your Ground" law as the reason his office was "precluded from making an arrest".¹⁸

This decision ignited national protests and condemnation from civil rights groups, including the NAACP and activists like Al Sharpton, who led a rally for justice in Clearwater.¹⁸ The case was eventually turned over to the State Attorney, who charged Drejka with manslaughter. Drejka was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison.¹⁸ The Sheriff's initial deference to a "Stand Your Ground" claim, even in the face of video evidence showing an unarmed man backing away, demonstrated how such laws can influence law enforcement's immediate response to violence, fostering a perception that the authorities are hesitant to hold armed individuals accountable. This incident profoundly damaged police-community relations and highlighted a significant disconnect between the initial law enforcement judgment and the final legal outcome.

The Accountability Infrastructure – Gaps and Opportunities

A thorough analysis of a police department's conduct requires an examination of the systems designed to hold it accountable. In Clearwater, the accountability infrastructure is defined by a closed-loop internal process and, most critically, a

complete absence of formal, independent civilian oversight. This structural reality makes third-party tracking and reporting not just supplementary, but essential.

The Internal Affairs Funnel Mapped

The process for addressing citizen complaints against the Clearwater Police Department is controlled entirely from within the agency. The department's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) is the central body for this function.¹⁹

The process unfolds as follows:

1. **Submission:** A citizen can file a complaint in multiple ways, including by email, phone, mail, or in person at the police headquarters. The complaint is directed to the OPS or a supervisor.²⁰
2. **Investigation:** The investigation is conducted internally, typically by the employee's immediate supervisor or, in more serious cases, by an investigator from the OPS.²⁰
3. **Adjudication:** After the internal investigation is complete, the Chief of Police makes the final determination on the outcome and what action, if any, should be taken.²⁰
4. **Notification:** The citizen is notified of the result of the investigation.²⁰
5. **Limited Transparency:** While the CPD does post closed Internal Affairs cases online, this transparency is limited. The documents are only displayed for a period of six months, restricting the ability of the public to conduct long-term analysis or identify patterns over time.¹⁹

This entire procedure, from the initial intake of a complaint to the final judgment and the control of public records, constitutes a closed-loop system. At no point is there a mandatory requirement for review, input, or oversight from an independent, non-police body. This structure is inherently susceptible to institutional bias and conflicts of interest, as it tasks the police with the responsibility of policing themselves.

The Structural Void: No Civilian Review Board

The most significant finding regarding Clearwater's accountability infrastructure is a structural one: **there is no dedicated, independent civilian review board (CRB) or police oversight committee for the City of Clearwater.** Furthermore, a broader search reveals no such body exists for the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, the primary law enforcement agency in the county.⁵

While Pinellas County maintains numerous citizen advisory boards for various functions like development and parks, none are tasked with the specific mandate of law enforcement oversight.⁵ The Pinellas County Inspector General's office, while an important accountability mechanism, has a primary mission focused on investigating fraud, waste, and abuse of county funds and resources, not the routine adjudication of citizen complaints about police misconduct.²²

This absence is critical. In many American cities, CRBs provide a vital, albeit often imperfect, check on police power. They can offer an alternative venue for citizens to file complaints, conduct parallel investigations, review internal affairs files, and make disciplinary recommendations. The lack of such a body in Clearwater means that the closed-loop internal affairs process is the only formal channel available to citizens.

This structural void has been exacerbated by recent state-level actions. A 2023 Florida law, referenced in reporting on the city of Kissimmee's efforts to create an oversight board, has significantly constrained the power of such bodies statewide, limiting their ability to launch their own investigations into alleged misconduct.²³

For the purposes of an accountability application, this finding is paramount. In a jurisdiction like Clearwater, which lacks any formal, independent government body for police oversight, the role of non-governmental, third-party tools becomes exponentially more important. An application that aggregates data, tracks officers, and publicizes misconduct fills a critical accountability vacuum that the local government has left open.

Comprehensive Data File for Visualization

The following tables are designed to provide a structured, machine-readable dataset summarizing the key quantitative and qualitative findings of this report. This data can be exported and used directly in a data visualization tool to track trends and specific

incidents related to the Clearwater Police Department.

Table 3: Longitudinal Misconduct and Enforcement Data

This table provides a year-over-year quantitative overview of the CPD's performance based on its own reporting, allowing for trend analysis in complaints, use of force, and disciplinary actions.

Y e a r	S o u r c e _ R e p o r t _ L i n k	T o t a l _ C i t i z e n _ C o m p l a i n t s	C o m p l a i n t s _ S u s t a i n e d	C o m p l a i n t s _ E x o n e r a t e d	C o m p l a i n t s _ U n f o u n d e d	C o m p l a i n t s _ N o t _ S u s t a i n e d	S u s t a i n e d _ R a t e _ P c t	E x o n e r a t e d _ R a t e _ P c t	B W C _ U s e d _ T o _ R e s o l v e	U s e _ O f _ F o r c e _ I n c i d e n t s	U o F _ S u b j e c t _ I n j u r y _ R a t e _ P c t	U o F _ O f f i c e r _ I n j u r y _ R a t e _ P c t	D i s c i p l i n e _ C o u n s e l i n g	D i s c i p l i n e _ R e m e d i a l _ T r a i n i n g	D i s c i p l i n e _ L e t t e r _ O f _ R e p r i m a n d	D i s c i p l i n e _ S u s p e n s i o n	D i s c i p l i n e _ T e r m i n a t i o n	D i s c i p l i n e _ R e s i g n a t i o n _ P r i o r _ T o _ D i s c i
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Table 4: Catalog of Misconduct Incidents and Lawsuits

This table provides a qualitative database of specific, verifiable incidents of misconduct, corruption, and litigation involving the CPD. It serves as the narrative backbone for accountability tracking.

Incident_ID	Date_of_Incident	Officer(s)_Involved	Allegation_Category	Summary_of_Allegation	Victim(s)_Name	Official_CPD_Disposition	Criminal_Charges_Filed_Against_	Criminal_Case_Outcome	Lawsuit_Filed	Court	Case_Number	Lawsuit_Status	Source_Links
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CP D- 00 2	20 24- 06 -2 0	Sc ott Pe nn a	Fra ud, Cri mi nal Act ivit y	Off ice r alle ge dly lie d ab out the ext ent of an on -d uty inj ury to fra ud ule ntl y clai m ne arl	N/ A (Ci ty of Cle ar wa ter)	Ad mi nis tra tiv e Le ave	Yes (Gr an d Th eft, Fra ud)	Pe ndi ng (pl ea de d not gui lty)	No	N/ A	N/ A	N/ A	4

				y \$12 ,0 00 in dis abi lity pe nsi on be nef its.									
CP D- 00 3	20 24- 01	Bri an Tej era	Cri mi nal Act ivit y	Off ice r arr est ed in Pa sc o Co unt y an d ch arg ed wit h ag gra vat ed sta lkin g of his girl frie	(N am es wit hh eld)	N/ A (Of fic er de ce as ed)	Yes (Ag gra vat ed Sta lkin g)	Dr op pe d (du e to de ath of def en da nt)	No	N/ A	N/ A	N/ A	3

				nd an d her fa mil y.									
CP D- 00 4	20 23	Nic ola s Pal om a	Se xu al Mis co nd uct	Off ice r fire d aft er bei ng ac cu se d of en ga gin g in sex act s wit h a wo ma n in his pat rol car whi le on dut y an	(N am e wit hh eld)	Fir ed	Yes (Se xu al Bat ter y)	No t Gui lty (Ju ry tria l)	No	N/ A	N/ A	N/ A	3

				d in uni for m.									
CP D- 00 5	20 19- 06	Kyl e Bin gh am , Mi ch ael Bui s, He nry Gil es	Ra cial Pro fili ng, Fal se Arr est	Off ice rs wr on gfu lly arr est ed a Bl ack IT pro fes sio nal for bur gla ry aft er de em ing hi m "su spi cio us" at a ga s sta tio n.	Ja cq ue s La Pre ad	Re pri ma nd	No	N/ A	Yes (2 fed era l sui ts)	U.S . Dis tric t Co urt, Mi ddl e Dis tric t of FL	N/ A	Pe ndi ng	16

				Sta te Att orn ey de clin ed to pro se cut e.									
CP D- 00 6	20 18- 09	Fre dri ck Lis e	Ex ce ssi ve For ce, Pol icy Vio lati on	Off ice r led an un aut hor ize d car ch as e tha t ca us ed a cra sh, inj uri ng an oth er offi cer and	(N am es wit hh eld)	Su sp en sio n (10 da ys)	No	N/ A	No	N/ A	N/ A	N/ A	3

				two civilian s.									
CP D- 00 7	199 2- 01- 09	Carra sq uill o	Racial Pro filing, Civil Rights Violation	Historical lawsuit alleged a CPD policy/ custom to ignore misconduct complaints from Black citizens and violate their	Marcus	N/A	No	N/A	Yes	U.S. District Court, Middle District of FL	N/A	N/A	17

				civil rights .									
CP D- 00 8	20 22- 12- 04	Sc ott Ye ate s	Fal se Arr est	Off ice r alle ge dly wr on gfu lly arr est ed a wo ma n for DU l Ma nsl au ght er de spi te a lac k of pro ba ble ca us e an d	Ha nn ah M. Ra y	N/ A	No	N/ A	Yes	Pin ella s Co unt y Cir cui t Co urt	N/ A	Pe ndi ng	²⁴

				evi de nc e sh owi ng no im pai rm ent .									
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