Rockchip TEE SDK Developer's Guide

Release Version: V1.87

Release Date: 2022.10

Security Level: □Top-Secret □Secret □Internal ■Public

DISCLAIMER

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED "AS IS". FUZHOU ROCKCHIP ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. ("ROCKCHIP")DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESSED, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT OF ANY REPRESENTATION, INFORMATION AND CONTENT IN THIS DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR REFERENCE ONLY. THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE UPDATED OR CHANGED WITHOUT ANY NOTICE AT ANY TIME DUE TO THE UPGRADES OF THE PRODUCT OR ANY OTHER REASONS.

Trademark Statement

"Rockchip", "瑞芯微", "瑞芯" shall be Rockchip's registered trademarks and owned by Rockchip. All the other trademarks or registered trademarks mentioned in this document shall be owned by their respective owners.

All rights reserved. ©2022. Fuzhou Rockchip Electronics Co., Ltd.

Beyond the scope of fair use, neither any entity nor individual shall extract, copy, or distribute this document in any form in whole or in part without the written approval of Rockchip.

Fuzhou Rockchip Electronics Co., Ltd.

No.18 Building, A District, No.89, software Boulevard Fuzhou, Fujian, PRC

Website: <u>www.rock-chips.com</u>

Customer service Tel: +86-4007-700-590

Customer service Fax: +86-591-83951833

Customer service e-Mail: fae@rock-chips.com

Preface

Summary

This document mainly introduces Rockchip TEE firmware description, TEE environment construction, CA/TA development test, TA debugging method, TA signature method and precautions.

Readers

This document is mainly applicable to the following engineers:

- Technical Support Engineer
- Software Development Engineer

History

Date	Revision	Author	Description
2018-4- 26	V1.00	ZZJ	Initial Version
2019-3- 18	V1.10	ZZJ	Add description of TEE in U-Boot; Distinguishing between V1 and V2 versions
2019-6- 4	V1.20	hisping	Add description of secure storage
2019-7- 4	V1.30	hisping	Modify description of secure storage
2019-7- 11	V1.40	hisping	Add description of parameter.txt; Add description of kernel node which relate to TEE
2019-8- 8	V1.50	hisping	Add description of error when compile rk_tee_user
2021-1- 27	V1.60	hisping	Add description of changes to optee v1 kernel driver
2021-3-	V1.61	hisping	Add description of unsupported error for rkfs
2021-5-	V1.70	hisping	Add description of SECSTOR TA
2021-5- 14	V1.71	WXB	Upgrade the CA/TA test program developed by RK, Update the description of the document
2021-6- 4	V1.72	hisping	Modify description of TEE Macro in U-Boot
2021-6- 4	V1.73	hisping	Add description of ENCRYPT TA
2021-6- 17	V1.74	WXB	Add description of anti rollback for REE FS TA
2021-7- 5	V1.75	hisping	Add description of TA debug method
2021-7- 8	V1.76	hisping	Add description of TA view function call stack method
2021-9-	V1.77	hisping	Revise TA signature chapter
2021-9- 6	V1.78	hisping	Add description of secure storage performance test
2021-9- 10	V1.79	ZZJ	Optimize partial format
2021-9- 10	V1.80	WXB	Add description of TA API

Date	Revision	Author	Description
2021- 10-12	V1.81	hisping	Modify description of secure storage performance test
2021- 10-15	V1.82	WXB	Add more API in TA API section
2021- 10-18	V1.83	ZZJ	Optimize partial format
2021- 11-22	V1.84	WXB	Add description of strong and weak security level, Update CA/TA description
2021- 11-26	V1.85	WXB	Add OTP description chapter, Update OTP API, Adjust CA/TA description
2021- 11-30	V1.86	WXB	Add reading guide chapter
2022- 06-22	V1.87	hisping	Add rk_tee_service chapter


Rockchip TEE SDK Developer's Guide


- 1. Reading Guide
- 2. Introduction to TrustZone
 - 2.1 What is TrustZone
 - 2.2 Architecture
 - 2.2.1 Hardware architecture
 - 2.2.2 Software architecture
 - 2.2.3 TrustZone and TEE
- 3. TEE Environment
 - 3.1 OP-TEE Version Description
 - 3.2 Parameter.txt
 - 3.3 TEE firmware
 - 3.4 TEE driver in U-Boot
 - 3.4.1 Macro Definition
 - 3.4.2 Shared Memory
 - 3.4.3 Secure Storage Test
 - 3.4.3.1 Test method
 - 3.4.3.2 Troubleshooting
 - 3.5 TEE driver in kernel
 - 3.5.1 OP-TEE V1
 - 3.5.2 OP-TEE V2
 - 3.5.3 Confirm TEE drive is enabled
 - 3.6 TEE Library
 - 3.6.1 Android
 - 3.6.2 Linux
- 4. CA/TA Development And Test
 - 4.1 Environment
 - 4.2 CA/TA demo
 - 4.3 Android
 - 4.3.1 Directory Introduction
 - 4.3.2 Compile
 - 4.3.3 Run
 - 4.3.4 Develop CA/TA
 - 4.4 Linux
 - 4.4.1 Directory Introduction
 - 4.4.2 Compile
 - 4.4.3 Run
 - 4.4.4 Develop CA/TA
 - 4.5 rk_tee_service
 - 4.5.1 Introduction
 - 4.5.2 Component
 - 4.5.3 Demo
- 5. TA Signature
 - 5.1 Principle
 - 5.2 Replace the public key
- 6. Built-in TA into secure storage
 - 6.1 Principle
 - 6.2 Reference implementation
- 7. Encrypt TA
 - 7.1 Method of encrypting TA
 - 7.2 Burn TA encryption key
 - 7.3 Decrypt and run the TA
- 8. REE FS TA anti-rollback
 - 8.1 TA anti-rollback usage
- 9. TA debugging methods
 - 9.1 OP-TEE v1 platforms
 - 9.2 OP-TEE v2 platforms

- 9.3 Call stack
- 10. Memory description
 - 10.1 OP-TEE V1
 - 10.2 OP-TEE V2
- 11. Secure Storage
 - 11.1 Partition
 - 11.2 Performance testing
- 12. Solution of optional strong or weak security levels
 - 12.1 Scope
 - 12.2 Notes
 - 12.3 Solution description
- 13. OTP description
- 14. TA API description
 - 14.1 Overview
 - 14.2 API return value
 - 14.3 API description
 - 14.3.1 Crypto API
 - 14.3.1.1 rk_crypto_malloc_ctx
 - 14.3.1.2 rk crypto free ctx
 - 14.3.1.3 rk_hash_crypto
 - 14.3.1.4 rk hash begin
 - 14.3.1.5 rk hash update
 - 14.3.1.6 rk hash finish
 - 14.3.1.7 rk cipher crypto
 - 14.3.1.8 rk set padding
 - 14.3.1.9 rk cipher begin
 - 14.3.1.10 rk cipher update
 - 14.3.1.11 rk cipher finish
 - 14.3.1.12 rk ae begin
 - 14.3.1.13 rk_ae_update
 - 14.3.1.14 rk_ae_finish
 - 14.3.1.15 rk_gen_rsa_key
 - 14.3.1.16 rk rsa crypto
 - 14.3.1.17 rk rsa sign
 - 14.3.1.18 rk set sign mode
 - 14.3.1.19 rk rsa begin
 - 14.3.1.20 rk rsa finish
 - 14.3.1.21 rk gen ec key
 - 14.3.1.22 rk_ecdh_genkey
 - 14.3.1.23 rk_ecdsa_sign
 - 14.3.1.24 rk ecdsa begin
 - 14.3.1.25 rk ecdsa finish
 - 14.3.1.26 rk_sm2_pke
 - 14.3.1.27 rk_sm2_dsa_sm3
 - 14.3.1.28 rk_sm2_kep_genkey
 - 14.3.1.29 rk mac crypto
 - 14.3.1.30 rk_mac_begin
 - 14.3.1.31 rk_mac_update
 - 14.3.1.32 rk_mac_finish
 - 14.3.1.33 rk_hkdf_genkey
 - 14.3.1.34 rk pkcs5 pbkdf2 hmac
 - 14.3.2 TRNG API
 - 14.3.2.1 rk_get_trng
 - 14.3.3 OTP API
 - 14.3.3.1 rk_otp_size
 - 14.3.3.2 rk_otp_read
 - 14.3.3.3 rk_otp_write

1. Reading Guide

The following figure describes the document structure, It can be used as a guide for developers





2. Introduction to TrustZone

2.1 What is TrustZone

ARM TrustZone technology is a system wide security method for a large number of applications on high-performance computing platforms, including secure payment, digital rights management (DRM), enterprise services and web-based services.

TrustZone Technology and Cortex TM- A Processor is tightly integrated and expanded in the system through AMBA-AXI bus and specific TrustZone system IP block. This system approach means that peripherals such as secure memory, encryption blocks, keyboards, and screens can be protected from software attacks.

The devices developed according to the recommendations of the TrustZone Ready Program and utilizing the TrustZone technology provide a platform that can support a fully trusted execution environment (TEE) as well as security aware applications and security services.

The latest devices such as smart phones and tablets provide consumers with a high-value experience based on an extended service set. Mobile devices have developed into an open software platform that can download various large-scale applications from the Internet. These applications are usually verified by the device OEM to ensure quality, but not all functions can be tested, and attackers are constantly creating more and more malicious code targeting such devices.

At the same time, the demand for mobile devices to handle important services is increasing. From being able to pay, download and watch the latest Hollywood blockbusters in a specific period of time to being able to pay bills and manage bank accounts remotely through mobile phones, all these indicate that new business models have begun to emerge.

These development trends have made mobile phones likely to become the next software attack target of malware, Trojan horses, rootkits and other viruses. However, by applying advanced security technology based on ARM TrustZone technology and integrating SecurCore TM Anti tamper elements can be used to develop devices that can provide an open operating environment with rich functions and powerful security solutions.


The trusted application adopts the SoC (running trusted execution environment) based on TrustZone technology, which is separated from the main OS to prevent software/malware attacks. TrustZone can be switched to safe mode to provide isolation supported by hardware. Trusted applications are usually containable, such as allowing trusted applications from different payment companies to coexist on one device. The processor supports ARM TrustZone technology, which is the basic function of all Cortex - A processors, and is introduced through the security extension of ARM architecture. These extensions provide a consistent programmer model across vendors, platforms, and applications, while providing a real hardware supported security environment.

2.2 Architecture

2.2.1 Hardware architecture

The TrustZone hardware architecture is designed to provide a security framework that enables devices to withstand the many specific threats they will encounter. TrustZone technology provides an infrastructure that allows SoC designers to choose from a large number of components that can implement specific functions in a secure environment, without providing a fixed and unchanging security solution.

The main security goal of the architecture is to support the construction of a programmable environment to prevent specific attacks on the confidentiality and integrity of assets. Platforms with these features can be used to build a wide range of security solutions, which are time-consuming and laborious to build using traditional methods.



System security can be ensured by isolating all SoC hardware and software resources so that they are located in two areas (a secure area for security subsystems and a normal area for storing all other content). AMBA3 AXI supporting TrustZone TM, The hardware logic in the bus construction can ensure that normal area components cannot access security area resources, thus building a strong boundary between the two areas. The design of placing sensitive resources in a secure area, as well as running software reliably in a secure processor core, ensures that assets can withstand numerous potential attacks, including those that are often difficult to protect (for example, entering passwords using a keyboard or touch screen). By isolating security sensitive peripherals in the hardware, designers can limit the number of subsystems that need to pass the security assessment, thus saving costs when submitting security certification equipment.


The second aspect of the TrustZone hardware architecture is the extension implemented in some ARM processor cores. With these additional extensions, a single physical processor core can safely and effectively execute code from both the normal area and the security area in a time slice manner. In this way, a dedicated security processor core is not required, which saves chip area and energy, and allows high-performance security software to run together with the general regional operating environment.

After changing the currently running virtual processor, the two virtual processors perform context switching through the new processor mode (called monitor mode).

The mechanisms used by the physical processor to enter the monitor mode from the normal area are closely controlled, and these mechanisms are always regarded as exceptions of the monitor mode software. The items to be monitored can be triggered by the software executing special instructions (security monitor call (SMC) instructions), or by a subset of the hardware exception mechanism. IRQ, FIQ, external data abort, and external prefetch abort exceptions can be configured to switch the processor to monitor mode.

The software executed in the monitor mode is implementation defined, but it usually saves the state of the current area and restores the state of the area location to which it will switch. It then performs the operation returned from the exception to restart the processing in the restored area. The last aspect of the TrustZone hardware architecture is the security aware debugging infrastructure, which can control the access to security zone debugging without weakening the debugging visualization of common zones.

2.2.2 Software architecture



Implementing security zones in SoC hardware requires that certain security software be run in them and that sensitive assets stored in them be utilized.

There may be many software architectures that can be implemented by the security zone software stack on the processor core that supports TrustZone. The most advanced software architecture is the dedicated security zone operating system; The simplest is the synchronized code base placed in the security zone. There are many intermediate options between these two extreme architectures.

A dedicated security kernel can be a complex but powerful design. It can simulate the concurrent execution of multiple independent security zone applications, the runtime download of new security applications, and security zone tasks that are completely independent of the general zone environment.

These designs are very similar to the software stack you will see in the SoC, which uses two separate physical processors in an asymmetric multiprocessing (AMP) configuration. The software running on each virtual processor is an independent operating system, and each region uses hardware interrupts to preempt the currently running region and obtain processor time.

A tightly integrated design using communication protocols that associate secure area tasks with normal area threats that request them can provide many advantages of symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) designs. For example, in these designs, a security zone application can inherit the priority of common zone tasks it supports. This will result in some form of soft real-time response to the media application.

Security extension is an open component of ARM architecture, so any developer can create a customized security zone software environment to meet its requirements.

2.2.3 TrustZone and TEE

Applications such as payment, online banking, content protection, and enterprise authentication can improve their integrity, functionality, and user experience by leveraging three key elements provided by TrustZone technology enhanced devices:

- 1. Software secure execution environment to prevent malware attacks from rich operating systems
- 2. The hardware trust root can check the integrity of data and applications in the rich operation field to ensure that the security environment is not damaged
- 3. Access security peripherals on demand, such as memory, keyboard/touch screen, and even monitor

The device based on ARM TrustZone technology is combined with open APIs to provide a trusted execution environment (TEE). Developers need a new type of software to achieve its functions and consistency: this software is a trusted application. A typical trusted application can contain part of the code in both the normal area and the security area, for example, handling critical storage and manipulation. TEE also provides isolation from other trusted applications, enabling multiple trusted services to coexist.

The standardization of TEE API (managed by GlobalPlatform) will enable service providers, operators and OEMs to market interoperable trusted applications and services.

ARM TrustZone technology does not require separate security hardware to verify the integrity of devices or users. It does this by providing a true hardware trust root in the main handset chipset.

In order to ensure the integrity of the application, TrustZone also provides a secure execution environment (i.e., trust execution environment (TEE)), in which only trusted applications can run, so as to prevent attacks in the form of hackers/viruses/malware.

The TrustZone hardware provides isolation between TEE and software attack media. Hardware isolation can be extended to protect data input and output from physical peripherals (including keyboard/touch screen, etc.).

With these key functions, the chipset using TrustZone technology provides many opportunities to redefine the services that users can access (more and better services), how to access services (faster and easier), and where to access services (anytime, anywhere).

On most Android devices, the Android Boot loader does not verify the authenticity of the device kernel. Users who want to further control their devices may install the cracked Android kernel to root their devices. The cracked kernel allows super users to access all data files, applications and resources. Once the kernel is broken, the service will be rejected. If the kernel contains malware, the security of enterprise data will be compromised.

Secure Boot can effectively prevent the above problems. Secure Boot is a security mechanism that can prevent unauthorized boot loaders and kernels from being loaded during startup. Firmware images (such as operating systems and system components) that are encrypted and signed by a trusted, known authority are considered authorized firmware. The security boot component can form the first line of defense to prevent malicious software from attacking the device.

3. TEE Environment

3.1 OP-TEE Version Description

Android 7.1 and higher SDKs in Rockchip platform support TEE environment by default, TEE environment is not supported by default in versions earlier than Android 7.1, Linux SDK does not support TEE environment by default.

The TEE solution on Rockchip platform is OP-TEE, and the TEE API conforms to the GlobalPlatform standard.

At present, there are two versions of OP-TEE running on the rockchip platform, OP-TEE V1 and OP-TEE V2.

TEE library files, TA files, and Secure OS firmware is different between the two versions. Select TEE components according to the specific platform.

3.2 Parameter.txt

The Parameter.txt file records the location and size of each image and partition, Rockchip's OP-TEE currently supports both security partition and rpmb secure storage file systems, The specific file system used is determined by setting the storageID parameter in TA code, TA cannot use security partition secure storage if security partition is not defined in parameter.txt, security partition can be set by adding 0x0002000@0x000xxxxx(security) in parameter.txt, 0x00002000 indicates the size of 4M, 0x000xxxxx indicates the starting address, modify according to the actual parameter.txt

3.3 TEE firmware

The source code of TEE Secure OS is not open source by default, binary file locat in directory uboot/tools/rk tools/bin or rkbin/bin.

1. The TEE binary of ARMv7 platform is packaged into trust.img by the tool uboot/tools/loaderimage, The name of TEE binary is as follows:

```
<platform>_tee_[ta]_<version>.bin
```

The name with [ta] support running user TA application, the name without [ta] do not support running user TA application.

2. The TEE binary of ARMv8 platform is packaged into trust.img by the tool uboot/tools/trust_merger, The name of TEE binary is as follows:

```
<platform>_bl32_<version>.bin
```

3. If [BL32_OPTION] SEC=0 in rkbin/RKTRUST/.ini, It needs to be changed to SEC=1, Otherwise trust.img will not contain Secure OS and cannot run TEE services.

3.4 TEE driver in U-Boot

At present, some safe operations need to be performed at the U-Boot level, For example, OP-TEE must be used to read some secure data. The OP-TEE Client code is implemented in U-Boot, U-Boot can communicate with OP-TEE through this interface. OP-TEE Client driver is under lib/optee_client, API conforms to GP specification. At present, developers are not supported to develop their own CA/TA applications in U-Boot.

3.4.1 Macro Definition

```
CONFIG_OPTEE_CLIENT, OP-TEE function main config.

CONFIG_OPTEE_V1, set by OP-TEE V1 platform.

CONFIG_OPTEE_V2, set by OP-TEE V2 platform.
```

CONFIG_OPTEE_ALWAYS_USE_SECURITY_PARTITION, The secure storage area will be selected according to the hardware if this macro is not enabled, use rpmb if device use EMMC, use security partition if device use NAND. After the macro is enabled, data is fixed store in the security partition, Not store in rpmb. Using rpmb is more secure than security partition, However, if the emmc is replaced during production, Due to the

characteristics of rpmb, the data in rpmb cannot be cleared (even if the firmware is reburned). It affect the convenience of factory production, please weigh the convenience and security whether to enable the macro or not; Some platforms will enable this macro by default, you can remove the macro if the security requirements are high.

3.4.2 Shared Memory

When U-Boot communicates with OP-TEE, the data must be stored in shared memory, You can use the <code>TEEC_AllocateSharedMemory()</code> to request shared memory, the shared memory size of each platform is different, and it is recommended that it should not exceed 1M. If it exceeds, it is recommended to split the data and transfer it for many times, Release shared memory by call <code>TEEC_ReleaseSharedMemory()</code>.

3.4.3 Secure Storage Test

3.4.3.1 Test method

Follow the steps below to perform the secure storage test. This test case will test the read/write function of secure storage. The test case will automatically check the hardware, the rpmb and security partition will be tested when the hardware uses emme. Only security partition will be tested when the hardware uses nand.

- 1. Enter the U-Boot command line: Device serial port connecting to PC, press ctrl+c in PC, Start device, It will stop at uboot.
- 2. Run: The following command starts the test.

```
=> mmc testsecurestorage
```

3.4.3.2 Troubleshooting

```
"TEEC: Could not find device"
```

The emmc or nand device is not found. Please check the driver in the U-Boot or the hardware.

```
"TEEC: Could not find security partition"
```

When the security partition is used for secure storage, the encrypted data will be stored in this partition. Please check whether the security partition is defined in parameter.txt

```
"TEEC: verify [%d] fail, cleanning ...."
```

When the security partition is used for secure storage for the first time, or the security partition data is illegally tampered, the security partition will be completely cleared.

```
"TEEC: Not enough space available in secure storage !"
```

There is not enough storage.

```
INF [0x0] TEE-CORE:storage_read_obj:201: Warning! head data not find!
ERR [0x0] TEE-CORE:storage_read_obj:210: cpu or emmc was replaced!
```

During U-Boot startup, key data will be stored by calling TEE, Key data is encrypted by TEE and stored in security partition or rpmb, And the encryption key is bound to the CPU; If the CPU is replaced, key data cannot be decrypted normally, resulting in U-Boot startup failure; If the emmc is replaced and used before, Old data exists in the security partition or rpmb, This error will also occur which causing U-Boot start fail; The solution is to clear the old data in the security partition or rpmb, format emmc directly if the security partition is used, If you use rpmb, you need to contact technical support to provide special firmware to clear the old data in rpmb.

```
"optee check api revision fail"
```

The U-Boot version does not match the TEE version, the U-Boot version is higher than the TEE version, The solution is as follows (choose one):

- 1. Fallback U-Boot version to cf13b78438 (tag: android-10.0-mid-rkr9) rockchip: spl: add rollback index check with otp.
- 2. Revert the following commit:

```
396e3049bd rochchip: board: only map op-tee share memory as dcache enabled
7a349fdcbd lib: optee_client: add optee initialize flag
74eb602743 lib: optee_client: update to new optee msg for optee v1 platform
102dfafc4a rochchip: board: map op-tee memory as dcache enabled
```

Normally, the versions of Uboot and OP-TEE in released SDK are matched.

```
"optee api revision mismatch with u-boot/kernel, panic"
```

If it is printed in the U-Boot startup, It mean the U-Boot version does not match the TEE version, U-Boot version is lower than TEE version, Upgradeable U-Boot version to 396e3049bd (tag: android-10.0-mid-rkr11, tag: android-10.0-mid-rkr10) rochchip: board: only map op-tee share memory as dcache enabled at least.

If it is printed at the startup stage of Android system, Then upgrade android/vendor/rockchip/common version to 8bc7bf97 (tag: android-10.0-mid-rkr10) vpu: librockit: add Rockit MetadataRetriever at least.

If printing in the startup phase of the Linux system, Then upgrade linux/external/security/bin version to f59085c optee v1: lib: arm&arm64: update binary and library at least.

Normally, the versions of Uboot and OP-TEE in released SDK are matched.

3.5 TEE driver in kernel

TEE kernel driver under security/optee linuxdriver/ or drivers/tee/

3.5.1 OP-TEE V1

The driver of the chips using OP-TEE V1 is located at security/optee_linuxdriver/, All are enabled by default. The method to enable is as follows:

Add the following configurations in config:

```
CONFIG_TEE_SUPPORT=Y
```

At present, we will gradually abandon the TEE kernel driver of OP-TEE V1, OP-TEE V1 platform will use the TEE kernel driver of OP-TEE V2.

If version>=v2.00 in the TEE binary file name in the rkbin/bin directory, you also need to enable the TEE kernel driver of OP-TEE V2.

Android 10 and above and Linux released after August 2020 use the TEE kernel driver of OP-TEE V2 by default.

3.5.2 OP-TEE V2

The driver of the chips using OP-TEE V2 is located at drivers/tee/, the method to enable is as follows: Confirm that the following nodes have been added to the platform dtsi file:

```
firmware {
     optee: optee {
        compatible = "linaro,optee-tz";
        method = "smc";
        #status = "disabled";
    };
};
```

This node is added to all platforms by default, However, some platforms will set **status = "disabled"**, Just remove **status = "disabled"** if you want to enable the optee driver.

Add the following two configurations in config:

```
CONFIG_TEE=y
CONFIG_OPTEE=y
```

3.5.3 Confirm TEE drive is enabled

If the <code>/dev/opteearmtz00</code> node appears, it indicates that the TEE kernel driver of optee v1 is enabled. If the <code>/dev/tee0</code> and <code>/dev/teepriv0</code> node appears, it indicates that the TEE kernel driver of optee v2 is enabled.

3.6 TEE Library

3.6.1 Android

TEE environment components are in the Android project directory vendor/rockchip/common/security or vendor/rockchip/optee (Including OP-TEE V1 and OP-TEE V2):

- 1. lib: Includes tee-supplicant、libteec.so and keymaster/gatekeeper library compiled from 32bit and 64bit platforms.
- 2. ta: Store the compiled keymaster/gatekeeper TA file.

3.6.2 Linux

TEE environment components are in the Linux project directory [external/security/bin] (Including OPTEE V1 and OPTEE V2):

- 1. lib: Includes tee-supplicant, libteec.so and other librarys compiled from 32bit and 64bit platforms.
- 2. ta: Store the compiled TA file.

4. CA/TA Development And Test

4.1 Environment

1. If the compilation reports an error: No module named Crypto.Signature, The reason is Python algorithm library is not installed on the development computer, Execute the following command:

```
pip uninstall Crypto
pip uninstall pycrypto
pip install pycrypto
```

2. If the compilation reports an error: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'Cryptodome' Please install python package on the development computer: pip3 install [--user] pycryptodomex

4.2 CA/TA demo

RK provides a series of CA/TA demo, The purpose is to:

- Provide reference for developers
- Directly used to test TEE environment

The source code of CA/TA demo is in the Android project <code>external/rk_tee_user</code>, Or Linux project <code>external/security/rk</code> tee user.

CA/TA demo contains "rktest" and "xtest", "xtest" is only available in Android project

external/rk_tee_user/v2, "xtest" is the open-source test code of OPTEE, Including more complete test items. Generally, if it is used to test TEE environment or reference development, "rktest" can basically meet.

The following describes the functions of rktest.

The CA name of the rktest demo is "rktest", TA named "1db57234-dacd-462d-9bb1ae79de44e2a5.ta" or "1db57234-dacd-462d-9bb1-ae79de44e2a5.ta". When running the CA program, you need to enter parameters to select the corresponding functions. Enter CA program name+space+any character, The available parameters will be prompted. The test functions implemented by rktest are shown in the following table.

Note: The test program only involves some commonly used functions and does not cover all functions supported by OPTEE.

parameters	function	notes
transfer_data	Test the parameter transfer between CA and TA	
storage	Test the secure storage	
property	Test get property	
crypto_sha	Test SHA algorithm	
crypto_aes	Test AES algorithm	
crypto_rsa	Test RSA encryption and decryption, signature verification	
otp_read	Test read OEM_S_OTP	The test program hides the otp test item by default, modify /host/rk_test/main.c if you want enable it. OTP characteristics are shown below "OTP Description" chapter.
otp_write	Test write OEM_S_OTP	
otp_size	Get OEM_S_OTP size	
otp_ns_read	Test read OEM_NS_OTP	
otp_ns_write	Test write OEM_NS_OTP	
trng	Get trng data	

Execute the test program. The command is as follows:

```
# rktest transfer_data
# rktest [command]
```

The successful execution of CA program prompts PASS, and the failure prompts Fail.

Note: Before testing the Secure Storage function, ensure that the corresponding node of the kernel exists, security partition need /dev/block/by-name/security; rpmb secure storage need/dev/block/mmcblk%u, /dev/block/mmcblk%urpmb, /sys/class/mmc_host/mmc%u/mmc%u:0001/cid, %u value is any one of 0, 1 and 2; If the node does not exist, please link to the corresponding node.

4.3 Android

4.3.1 Directory Introduction

TEE CA/TA development environment locate in Android project directory external/rk tee user:

- 1. Android.mk: Decide the compilation tool and the CA file to be compiled.
- 2. host: CA source files.
- 3. ta: TA source files.
- 4. export*: The environment which TA compilation depends on.

4.3.2 Compile

If there are only v1/v2/ directories under <code>external/rk_tee_user</code>, It indicates that the master branch has been merged into the develop-next branch, The master branch will be discarded, Merge point is master branch 492f1cbf testapp: support new OP-TEE MSG, Execute the following command to start compiling.

```
#For OP-TEE V1 platform
cd external/rk_tee_user/v1
#For OP-TEE V2 platform
cd external/rk_tee_user/v2
rm -rf out/
./build.sh ta
mm
```

If there are no v1/v2/ directories under <code>external/rk_tee_user</code>, It indicates that two branches are still used, please switch to the master branch for OP-TEE V1 platform, please switch to the develop-next branch for OP-TEE V2 platform, Execute the following command to start compiling.

```
cd external/rk_tee_user/
rm -rf out/
./build.sh ta (run if git log contain "Android.mk: remove build ta from android",
otherwise, do not need execute)
mm
```

The execution program will be obtained after successful compilation. The execution program contains CA (Client Application, run on normal world) and TA (Trust Application, run on secure world).

- CA is a Android execution file, which is generated in the Android project out directory after compilation.
- TA is a file with the file name uuid.ta, Generated in one of the directories rk_tee_user/ta, rk_tee_user/out/ta, rk_tee_user/v1/out/ta, rk_tee_user/v2/out/ta.

- 1. Enter the device by using adb shell
- 2. Install TEE library files, CA and TA into the device. For Android 7: push libteec.so into /system/lib or /system/lib64; push tee-supplicant and CA into /system/bin;

create /system/lib/optee_armtz directory, push TA into /system/lib/optee_armtz`.

For Android 8 and later: push libteec.so into <code>/vendor/lib</code> or <code>/vendor/lib64</code>; push tee-supplicant and CA into <code>/vendor/bin</code>; create <code>/vendor/lib/optee_armtz</code> directory, push TA into <code>/vendor/lib/optee_armtz</code>.

(If tee-supplicant starts automatically after startup, tee-supplicant and libteec.so do not need to push any more. These two files already exist in the system; libteec.so and tee-supplicant should distinguish OP-TEE V1 from OP-TEE V2, Distinguish between 32-bit and 64-bit;

After push, check whether the tee-supplicant and CA programs have execution permissions.

3. If the tee-supplicant is not automatically run when the machine is turned on, you need to manually run tee-supplicant in the background with root permission:

```
# tee-supplicant &
```

If print tee_supp_rk_fs_init: unsupported, It means security partition is not defined in parameter.txt, Please refer to Section 2.2 for details, If the developer only uses the rpmb or REE file system for secure storage, the error print can be ignored.

4. run CA/TA, test TEE functions. rktest can be used to directly test the basic functions of TEE, execute:

```
# rktest [command]
```

5. If rktest run successfully, Then TEE environment is normal, TEE development is available.

please check the drive and components if error occurs.

It may also be caused by the mismatch between the rk_tee_user version and the TEE OS version, The following are common matching relationships:

• OP-TEE V1:

```
version >= v2.00 of TEE binary name under rkbin/bin directory, match 492f1cbf testapp: support new OP-TEE MSG version < v2.00 of TEE binary name under rkbin/bin directory, match e8d7215d Android.mk: support build in android R or match 466515ec add tools for user to resign TA
```

• OP-TEE V2:

```
Serial port printing "OP-TEE version: 3.13.0" during TEE startup, a566557 - v2: update to keep up with v3.13.0 of optee_test

Serial port printing "OP-TEE version: 3.6.0" during TEE startup, laa969e2 Android.mk: support build in android R

Serial port printing "OP-TEE version: 3.3.0" during TEE startup, aa0a0c00 Android.mk: remove build ta from android

Serial port printing "OP-TEE version: 2.5.0" during TEE startup, lec9913a add tools for user to resign TA
```

4.3.4 Develop CA/TA

Refer to Makefile about CA TA, the UUID of the header file needs to be modified to a new UUID. It can be generated with the uuidgen command.

head and stack size are defined in user_ta_header_defines.h under include directory, head szie is 32KB (TA_DATA_SIZE), stack size is 2KB (TA_STACK_SIZE). Generally, it is better not to modify it. If it cannot meet the needs, it can be appropriately enlarged, The heap size should not exceed 1MB, and the stack size should not exceed 64KB.

```
#define TA_STACK_SIZE (2 * 1024)
#define TA_DATA_SIZE (32 * 1024)
```

4.4 Linux

4.4.1 Directory Introduction

TEE CA/TA development environment locate in Linux project directory

```
external/security/rk_tee_user:
```

- 1. build.sh: Compile script, please refer to the notes in the script for compilation instructions.
- 2. Makefile: Decide the compilation tool and the CA file to be compiled.
- 3. host: CA source files.
- 4. ta: TA source files.
- 5. export*: The environment which TA compilation depends on.

4.4.2 Compile

If there are only v1/v2/ directories under external/security/rk_tee_user, It indicates that the master branch has been merged into the develop-next branch, The master branch will be discarded, Merge point is master branch 492f1cbf testapp: support new OP-TEE MSG, Execute the following command to start compiling.

```
#For OP-TEE V1 platform
cd external/security/rk_tee_user/v1
#For OP-TEE V2 platform
cd external/security/rk_tee_user/v2
rm -rf out/
./build.sh 3232 (For 32-bit platform, CA 32bits, TA 32bits)
./build.sh 6432 (For 64-bit platform, CA 64bits, TA 32bits)
```

If there are no v1/v2/ directories under external/security/rk_tee_user, It indicates that two branches are still used, please switch to the master branch for OP-TEE V1 platform, please switch to the develop-next branch for OP-TEE V2 platform, Execute the following command to start compiling.

```
cd external/security/rk_tee_user/
rm -rf out/
./build.sh 3232 (For 32-bit platform, CA 32bits, TA 32bits)
./build.sh 6432 (For 64-bit platform, CA 64bits, TA 32bits)
```

The execution program will be obtained after successful compilation. The execution program contains CA (Client Application, run on normal world) and TA (Trust Application, run on secure world).

- CA is a Linux execution file, which is generated in one of the directories rk_tee_user/out, rk_tee_user/v1/out, rk_tee_user/v2/out.
- TA is a file with the file name uuid.ta, Generated in one of the directories rk_tee_user/ta, rk_tee_user/out/ta, rk_tee_user/v1/out/ta, rk_tee_user/v2/out/ta.

4.4.3 Run

- 1. Enter the device by using adb shell.
- 2. Install TEE library files, CA and TA into the device. push libteec.so* into /lib or /lib64; push tee-supplicant and CA into /usr/bin; create /lib/optee_armtz directory, push TA into /lib/optee_armtz.

(If tee-supplicant starts automatically after startup, tee-supplicant and libteec.so do not need to push again. These two files already exist in the system; libteec.so and tee-supplicant should distinguish OP-TEE V1 from OP-TEE V2. Distinguish between 32-bit and 64-bit;

After push, check whether the tee-supplicant and CA programs have execution permissions.)

3. Other steps are the same as Android platform. See the "Android" chapter above.

4.4.4 Develop CA/TA

Refer to Makefile about CA TA, the UUID of the header file needs to be modified to a new UUID. It can be generated with the uuidgen command.

head and stack size defined in user_ta_header_defines.h under include directory, head szie is 32KB (TA_DATA_SIZE), stack size is 2KB (TA_STACK_SIZE). Generally, it is better not to modify it. If it cannot meet the needs, it can be appropriately enlarged, The heap size should not exceed 1MB, and the stack size should not exceed 64KB.

```
#define TA_STACK_SIZE (2 * 1024)
#define TA_DATA_SIZE (32 * 1024)
```

4.5 rk_tee_service

4.5.1 Introduction

rk_tee_service is a security service developed based on TEE, which provides common security functions for developers. The simple and clear external interface greatly facilitates developers' use. rk_tee_service is essentially a CA TA application. Therefore, test the TEE environment is normal before using rk tee service.

Developers can directly call rk_tee_service to encrypts and decrypts sensitive data. The encryption/decryption key is derived by TEE using the unique key HUK inside the device hardware. Therefore, the encryption and decryption keys of each device are different. Copying the sensitive data of device A to device B cannot be decrypted normally to ensure that the sensitive data will not be stolen. Due to the size of shared memory, it is recommended that the size of data encrypted and decrypted at a single time should not exceed 1M. It is recommended to encrypt and decrypt big data in multiple times.

At present, the OP-TEE V2 platform supports this function, while the OP-TEE V1 platform does not.

4.5.2 Component

Currently, it supports Linux platform and Android platform (Android 12 and higher).

Component	Android directory	Linux directory
librk_tee_service.so	hardware/rockchip/optee/v2/arm hardware/rockchip/optee/v2/arm64	external/security/bin/optee_v2/lib/arm external/security/bin/optee_v2/lib/arm64
rk_tee_service.h	hardware/rockchip/optee/v2/include	external/security/bin/optee_v2/include
4367fd45-4469-42a6-925d- 3857b952704a.ta	hardware/rockchip/optee/v2/ta	external/security/bin/optee_v2/ta

The Userspace application can directly call librk_tee_service.so, Parameter of function please refer to rk_tee_service.h, Push 4367fd45-4469-42a6-925d-3857b952704a.ta into /lib/optee_armtz for Linux platform, Push 4367fd45-4469-42a6-925d-3857b952704a.ta into /vendor/lib/optee_armtz for Android platform.

4.5.3 Demo

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "rk_tee_service.h"
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
   unsigned char plain[256];
   unsigned int plain_len;
   unsigned char cipher[256];
   unsigned int cipher_len;
   int res;
   memset((void *)plain, 0xab, sizeof(plain));
   cipher len = 256;
   res = rk_encrypt_data(plain, sizeof(plain), cipher, &cipher_len);
   printf("res=0x%x cipher_len=%d\n", res, cipher_len);
   memset((void *)plain, 0, sizeof(plain));
   plain len = 256;
   res = rk_decrypt_data(cipher, cipher_len, plain, &plain_len);
   printf("res=0x%x plain len=%d\n", res, plain len);
    return 0;
```

5. TA Signature

5.1 Principle

When compiling TA, the compile script will automatically use the key in the <code>export-user_ta/keys</code> directory or <code>export-ta_arm32/keys</code> directory of the rk_tee_user project to sign TA application. The key is 2048 bits RSA key in pem format. Finally, the TA file in .ta format is generated.

There is an RSA public key stored in the TEE binary. When the TA is loaded and run, the TEE OS will use the public key to verify the validity of the TA. Only after the verification is passed, the TA application can run normally.

5.2 Replace the public key

To prevent developer A's TA application from running on developer B's board, it is recommended to replace the public key.

Developers can replace public keys in TEE binary with tools in the rk tee user project tools/ directory.

• Linux:

```
./change_puk --teebin <TEE binary>
```

This command automatically generates a 2048 bits RSA key oemkey.pem in the current directory, and replaces the original public key in the TEE binary with the public key in this key.

```
./change_puk --teebin <TEE binary> --key oemkey.pem
```

Replace the original public key in the TEE binary with the public key specified by the developer. The key length must be 2048 bits.

• Windows:

Open Windows_change_puk.exe and click "Generate oemkey.pem" to generate and save keys.

Select the key and TEE binary you just generated, and click "Modify Public Key".

(Since Windows_change_puk.exe invokes the BouncyCastle.Crypto.dll third-party library, make sure BouncyCastle.Crypto.dll is in the same directory as Windows change puk.exe)

After the public key is replaced, the developer needs to use the new TEE binary to replace the original TEE binary in the rkbin/ directory, recompile the U-Boot, and burn the new trust.img firmware. Part of the platforms have no trust.img because trust.img is packaged into uboot.img, so uboot.img is burned instead.

The developer needs to rename the key generated or specified by the previous tool to oem_privkey.pem and replace the key in the <code>export-user_ta/keys</code> or <code>export-ta_arm32/keys</code> directory of the rk_tee_user project. Recompile the CA and TA so that the resulting TA application can be properly loaded and run by the TEE binary (new public key). Any TA that is not signed with the correct private key is considered invalid and cannot be run.

6. Built-in TA into secure storage

In normal cases, TA files are stored in plaintext in an non-secure file system after TA development. Some OEM that have high security requirements do not want TA files to be exposed in plaintext. To meet the OEM' requirements, OP-TEE V2 supports built-in TA files to secure storage (OP-TEE V1 does not support this).

6.1 Principle

The CA side reads TA files in the non-secure file system and sends TA data to the OP-TEE OS. After receiving TA data, the OP-TEE OS verifies the validity of TA. If TA is legal, it randomly generates TA encryption key and encrypts TA data with TA encryption key. Then the ciphertext TA data and TA encryption key are securely stored. The key used for secure storage is derived from the unique key of the hardware, which is different for each device. Finally, the developer needs to delete TA files in the non-secure file system to prevent the plaintext TA from being exposed.

After the appeal step is complete, the CA can call the TA application normally. When the CA calls the TA in the secure storage, the OP-TEE OS searches for the TA in the secure storage according to the incoming uuid. If the TA is found, the OP-TEE OS decrypts and loads the TA; if the TA is not found in secure storage, the TA will be searched in the non-secure file system.

6.2 Reference implementation

Here is the CA-side code that lets you read the TA file and send the TA data to the OP-TEE OS using the install ta function.

```
static void install_ta(void *buf, size_t blen)
   TEEC Result res = TEEC ERROR GENERIC;
   uint32 t err origin = 0;
   TEEC UUID uuid = PTA SECSTOR TA MGMT UUID;
   TEEC Operation op;
   TEEC Context ctx = { };
   TEEC Session sess = { };
   int i = 0;
   res = TEEC InitializeContext(NULL, &ctx);
   if (res != TEEC SUCCESS) {
       printf("TEEC InitializeContext failed with code 0x%x\n", res);
       goto exit;
    res = TEEC OpenSession(&ctx, &sess, &uuid,
                  TEEC LOGIN PUBLIC, NULL, NULL, &err origin);
   if (res != TEEC SUCCESS) {
       printf("TEEC Opensession failed with code 0x%x origin 0x%x\\n",
             res, err origin);
       goto exit;
    }
   memset(&op, 0, sizeof(op));
   op.paramTypes = TEEC PARAM TYPES (TEEC MEMREF TEMP INPUT, TEEC NONE,
                    TEEC NONE, TEEC NONE);
   op.params[0].tmpref.buffer = buf;
   op.params[0].tmpref.size = blen;
```

7. Encrypt TA

Section in the previous chapter <u>Built-in TA to secure storage</u> introduce one way to avoid exposing clear TA file, but the built-in TA will take up secure storage space, and TA's secret key is randomly generated, not the developers own encryption key, this chapter introduces another kind of encryption method of TA (OP - TEE V2 support, OP-TEE V1 is not currently supported).

7.1 Method of encrypting TA


The developer needs to enable the <code>CFG_ENCRYPT_TA</code> macro in <code>export-ta_arm32/mk/link.mk</code> and change <code>TA_ENC_KEY</code> to developer's own encryption key. After this macro is enabled, the script will automatically sign and encrypt TA when the developer compiles TA application.

7.2 Burn TA encryption key

The developer uses the RKDevInfoWriteTool tool (version no less than 1.2.8) in the RKTools directory of the SDK project to write TA encryption key.

Before use, the developer needs to create a new key file, open the file in hexadecimal format, edit the developer's 32-byte encryption key in the file, open the RKDevInfoWriteTool tool, select "TA encryption key", and click the button to select the key file created by the developer. After the device enters the LOADER mode, click the "Write" (" $\Xi \lambda$ ") button to write the key. The key will be written to the device OTP (the OTP area cannot be changed once written, so the key can only be written once on device).

To prevent TA encryption key disclosure, the tool does not support reading TA encryption key.



7.3 Decrypt and run the TA

The use of encrypted TA and plaintext TA is exactly the same. OP-TEE OS will automatically recognize that TA is encrypted when loading TA, and OP-TEE OS will automatically read TA encryption key in OTP and decrypt and run TA. This process is automatically completed by OP-TEE OS.

8. REE FS TA anti-rollback

As shown in <u>Built-in TA to secure storage</u>, OP-TEE V2 supports storing TA in both REE FS and Secure storage in plain text. OP-TEE V2 supports TA rollback prevention if TA is stored in plain text in REE FS, preventing TA version rollback in an REE non-secure environment.

8.1 TA anti-rollback usage

The TA anti-rollback function of REE FS is always enabled. Developers can use the anti-rollback function by defining the TA version number in the Makefile.

If CFG_TA_VERSION is never defined in TA's Makefile, the system recognizes TA's version number as 0 and allows TA with the same version number to run.

If the Makefile of TA defines that the current CFG_TA_VERSION is greater than 0, as shown in the following example, the rollback of TA version is prevented.

```
# unsigned integer format
CFG_TA_VERSION=1
```

9.1 OP-TEE v1 platforms

When TA encounters a serious error condition, it prints diagnostic information as follows.

The pc or elr in the error condition is the virtual address that caused the exception. The load addr is the virtual address of the TA running in memory. We can know the offset of the exception code in the TA is, elr - load addr = 0x40200000 - 0x40200000 = 0xa0.

In the compiled directory, there is a file named by uuid.dmp in the same directory as the TA. The uuid.dmp is a disassembly file of the TA, which identifies the offset address of each function in the TA. Search for a0 in the uuid.dmp, as follows, where testapp_ta.c:97 indicates that the exception code is on line 97 of testapp_ta.c.

```
/home/xxx/android/vendor/optee_test/ta/testapp/testapp_ta.c:97
    98: 6823 ldr r3, [r4, #0]
    9a: 2202
                  movs r2, #2
    9c: 2161
                  movs r1, #97; 0x61
    9e: 4820
                 ldr r0, [pc, #128] ; (120
<TA InvokeCommandEntryPoint+0xa0>)
                 ldr r3, [r3, #0]
    a0: 681b
    a2: 4478
                  add r0, pc
    a4: 3033
                  adds r0, #51; 0x33
    a6: 9301
                  str r3, [sp, #4]
    a8: 4b1e
                  ldr r3, [pc, #120] ; (124
<TA InvokeCommandEntryPoint+0xa4>)
    aa: 447b add r3, pc
    ac: 9300
                  str r3, [sp, #0]
    ae: 2301
                 movs r3, #1
    b0: f002 fbc0 bl 2834 <trace printf>
```

9.2 OP-TEE v2 platforms

When TA encounters a serious error condition, it prints diagnostic information as follows.

```
E/TC:? 0 User mode data-abort at address 0x2a (translation fault)
E/TC:? 0 esr 0x92000005 ttbr0 0x20000084a7020 ttbr1 0x00000000
                                                                 cidr 0x0
E/TC:? 0 cpu #1
                  cpsr 0x20000130
#For 32-bit platforms, print r0-r12, sp, lr, pc(c00870a4)
#For 64-bit platforms, print x0-x30, sp el0, elr(00000000c00870a4)
E/LD: region 0: va 0xc0004000 pa 0x08600000 size 0x002000 flags rw-s (ldelf)
E/LD: region 1: va 0xc0006000 pa 0x08602000 size 0x008000 flags r-xs (ldelf)
E/LD: region 2: va 0xc000e000 pa 0x0860a000 size 0x001000 flags rw-s (ldelf)
E/LD: region 3: va 0xc000f000 pa 0x0860b000 size 0x004000 flags rw-s (ldelf)
E/LD: region 4: va 0xc0013000 pa 0x0860f000 size 0x001000 flags r--s
E/LD: region 5: va 0xc0014000 pa 0x08625000 size 0x001000 flags rw-s (stack)
E/LD: region 6: va 0xc0015000 pa 0x09201000 size 0x002000 flags rw-- (param)
E/LD: region 7: va 0xc0087000 pa 0x00001000 size 0x009000 flags r-xs [0]
E/LD: region 8: va 0xc0090000 pa 0x00000a000 size 0x00c000 flags rw-s [0]
E/LD: [0] 8cccf200-2450-11e4-abe2-0002a5d5c52c @ 0xc0087000
E/LD: Call stack:
E/LD: 0xc00870a4
E/LD: 0xc0088b21
E/LD: 0xc008d507
E/LD: 0xc008716c
```

The pc or elr in the error condition is the virtual address that caused the exception. The region 0 - region 8 are the virtual address of the TA code running in memory. The exception code address $0 \times 000870a4$ is in region 7. We can calculate the offset of the exception code as following, elr - region 7: va = $0 \times 00870a4 - 0 \times 0087000 = 0 \times a4$.

In the compiled directory, there is a file named by uuid.dmp in the same directory as the TA. The uuid.dmp is a disassembly file of the TA, which identifies the offset address of each function in the TA. Search for a4 in the uuid.dmp, as follows, where testapp_ta.c:101 indicates that the exception code is on line 101 of testapp_ta.c.

```
/home/xxx/rk px30 linux/external/optee test/ta/testapp/testapp ta.c:101
     9c: 6823 ldr r3, [r4, #0]
    9e: 2202
                   movs r2, #2
    a0: 4d28 ldr r5, [pc, #160] ; (144
<TA InvokeCommandEntryPoint+0xc4>)
    a2: 4e29 ldr r6, [pc, #164] ; (148
<TA InvokeCommandEntryPoint+0xc8>)
    a4: 681b ldr r3, [r3, #0]
     a6: 447d
                   add r5, pc
                  add r6, pc
    a8: 447e
     aa: 3533
                  adds r5, \#51; 0x33
                  mov r0, r5
     ac: 4628
                  str r6, [sp, #0]
    ae: 9600
    b0: 9301 str r3, [sp, #4]
b2: 2301 movs r3, #1
    b4: f000 f912 bl 2dc <trace printf>
```

9.3 Call stack

If the exception code address is not enough for you and also need functions call stack, the script export-ta_arm32\scripts\symbolize.py in OP-TEE v2 provides to show call stack. Note that the OP-TEE v1 platform does not support the script.

Step 1, set the compiler path you are using.

```
#For 32-bit platforms, execute:
export PATH=/home1/hisping/rk_px30_linux/prebuilts/gcc/linux-x86/arm/gcc-linaro-
6.3.1-2017.05-x86_64_arm-linux-gnueabihf/bin:$PATH
export CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabihf-

#For 64-bit platforms, execute:
export PATH=/home1/hisping/rk_px30_linux/prebuilts/gcc/linux-x86/aarch64/gcc-
linaro-6.3.1-2017.05-x86_64_aarch64-linux-gnu/bin:$PATH
export CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu-
```

Step 2, execute the script and -d parameter points to the TA compiled directory.

```
./export-ta_arm32/scripts/symbolize.py -d out/ta/testapp/
```

Step 3, the script will wait for the exception log, after input, you can get the following result including Call stack.

```
I/TA: Hello Test App!
E/TC:? 0
E/TC:? 0 User mode data-abort at address 0x2a (translation fault)
E/TC:? 0 esr 0x92000005 ttbr0 0x20000084a7020 ttbr1 0x00000000 cidr 0x0
                     cpsr 0x20000130
E/TC:? 0 cpu #1
E/TC:? 0 x0 0000000000069ee x1 000000000000062
E/TC:? 0 x2 000000000000002 x3 00000000000002a
E/TC:? 0 x4 0000000c0014f30 x5 0000000c0014f40
E/TC:? 0 x6 0000000c0074080 x7 0000000c0074308
E/TC:? 0 x8 0000000c00742e8 x9 0000000c0014f30
E/TC:? 0 x10 000000000000065 x11 0000000c007f2d8
E/TC:? 0 x12 000000000000773 x13 0000000c0014f00
E/TC:? 0 x16 000000000000000 x17 000000000000000
E/TC:? 0 x18 00000000000000 x19 00000000000000
E/TC:? 0 x24 00000000000000 x25 00000000000000
E/TC:? 0 x26 00000000000000 x27 00000000000000
E/TC:? 0 x28 00000000000000 x29 00000000000000
E/TC:? 0 sp el0 00000000c0014f80
E/LD: Status of TA 8cccf200-2450-11e4-abe2-0002a5d5c52c
E/LD: arch: arm
E/LD: region 0: va 0xc0004000 pa 0x08600000 size 0x002000 flags rw-s (ldelf)
E/LD: region 1: va 0xc0006000 pa 0x08602000 size 0x008000 flags r-xs (ldelf)
E/LD: region 2: va 0xc000e000 pa 0x0860a000 size 0x001000 flags rw-s (ldelf)
E/LD: region 3: va 0xc000f000 pa 0x0860b000 size 0x004000 flags rw-s (ldelf)
E/LD: region 4: va 0xc0013000 pa 0x0860f000 size 0x001000 flags r--s
E/LD: region 5: va 0xc0014000 pa 0x08625000 size 0x001000 flags rw-s (stack)
```

```
E/LD: region 6: va 0xc0015000 pa 0x09201000 size 0x002000 flags rw-- (param)

E/LD: region 7: va 0xc006b000 pa 0x00001000 size 0x009000 flags r-xs [0]

.ta_head .text .rodata .ARM.extab .ARM.exidx .dynsym .dynstr .hash

E/LD: region 8: va 0xc0074000 pa 0x0000a000 size 0x000c000 flags rw-s [0]

.dynamic .got .rel.got .data .bss .rel.dyn

E/LD: [0] 8cccf200-2450-11e4-abe2-0002a5d5c52c @ 0xc006b000

(out/ta/testapp/8cccf200-2450-11e4-abe2-0002a5d5c52c.elf)

E/LD: Call stack:

E/LD: 0xc006b0a4 TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint at ta/testapp/testapp_ta.c:98

E/LD: 0xc006cb0d entry_invoke_command at

/home/zhangzj/secure/optee_3.6.0/optee_os/lib/libutee/arch/arm/user_ta_entry.c:35

7

E/LD: 0xc00714f3 __ta_entry_c at export-ta_arm32/src/user_ta_header.c:48

E/LD: 0xc006b158 __ta_entry at export-ta_arm32/src/ta_entry_a32.S:20
```

10. Memory description


10.1 OP-TEE V1

The TEE memory allocation in the ARMv8 architecture chip is as follows:

2M	TEE_RAM
24M	TA_RAM
4M	SHMEM

Note: the total memory is 30M. The secure OS runs in TEE_RAM. The TA runs in TA_RAM. The shared memory is 4M.

The TEE memory allocation in the ARMv7 architecture chip is as follows:



Note: the total memory is 14M. The secure OS runs in TEE_RAM. The TA runs in TA_RAM. The shared memory is 1M.

10.2 OP-TEE V2

The memory size of each platform is not the same and may be adjusted, so it is not explained here.

11. Secure Storage

11.1 Partition

- 1. Secure storage is one of the important functions of OP-TEE OS. It generally used to store private user data. Data is encrypted by OP-TEE OS and then stored in the security partition or rpmb partition or REE file system. The partition in which it is stored is assigned to the TA by the CA through parameters.
- 2. Secure storage on the Uboot side. The code is in <code>lib/optee_client</code> of uboot side. Usually, when using nand, the storage location is the security partition.

When emmc is used and rpmb is available, the storage location is the rpmb partition.

When emmc is used and rpmb is not available, you can use the security partition by turning on CONFIG_OPTEE_ALWAYS_USE_SECURITY_PARTITION. The relevant macros are defined as follows.

CONFIG OPTEE CLIENT, U-Boot supports the use of OP-TEE features.

CONFIG_OPTEE_V1, support OP-TEE V1 platform.

CONFIG OPTEE V2, support OP-TEE V2 platform.

CONFIG_OPTEE_ALWAYS_USE_SECURITY_PARTITION, when emmc is used and rpmb is not available, open it to support security partition. The default is off.

The Uboot side does not support to develop your own TA, but you can develop your own CA to call OP-TEE OS internal static TA for secure storage. You only need to set the corresponding file name and data for secure storage. For more details, see functions in <code>lib/optee_client/OpteeClientInterface.c</code>.

3. Secure storage on Android side.

Defining PRODUCT_PROPERTY_OVERRIDES += ro.tee.storage=auto for selecting a secure storage area based on hardware. Emmc corresponds to the rpmb partition and nand corresponds to the security partition.

Defining PRODUCT_PROPERTY_OVERRIDES += ro.tee.storage=rpmb for selecting rpmb partition for secure storage.

Defining PRODUCT_PROPERTY_OVERRIDES += ro.tee.storage=rkss for selecting security partition for secure storage.

4. Make sure that the device does not power down when writing data for secure storage. The reason is that although we have done power loss protection but do not ensure the integrity of file system. Therefore, it is recommended that developers reduce the number of writes to ensure data security.

11.2 Performance testing

Test environment: OP-TEE V1, RK3399 in Linux platform, CPU fixed frequency to 1200000, DDR fixed frequency to 200000000.

Storage area	Data size	Create an empty file	Write	Read	Delete the file
Linux file system	30K	16ms	67ms	61ms	19ms
Linux file system	4K	17ms	23ms	13ms	7ms
Linux file system	1K	18ms	16ms	7ms	6ms
Linux file system	32	23ms	16ms	7ms	7ms
security partition	30K	97ms	181ms	54ms	277ms
security partition	4K	101ms	74ms	14ms	101ms
security partition	1K	104ms	56ms	7ms	64ms
security partition	32	103ms	55ms	7ms	73ms
rpmb partition	30K	20ms	233ms	10ms	7ms
rpmb partition	4K	20ms	36ms	3ms	6ms
rpmb partition	1K	22ms	14ms	2ms	6ms
rpmb partition	32	27ms	8ms	2ms	6ms

Test environment: OP-TEE V2, RK356x in Linux platform, CPU fixed frequency to 1416000, DDR fixed frequency to 324000000.

Storage area	Data size	Create an empty file	Write	Read	Delete the file
Linux file system	30K	17ms	28ms	3ms	8ms
Linux file system	4K	17ms	11ms	1ms	8ms
Linux file system	1K	18ms	9ms	1ms	8ms
Linux file system	32	19ms	8ms	1ms	7ms
security partition	30K	12ms	12ms	4ms	12ms
security partition	4K	12ms	3ms	1ms	11ms
security partition	1K	13ms	2ms	1ms	11ms
security partition	32	15ms	3ms	1ms	14ms
rpmb partition	30K	23ms	287ms	16ms	5ms
rpmb partition	4K	24ms	50ms	7ms	6ms
rpmb partition	1K	23ms	22ms	5ms	6ms
rpmb partition	32	30ms	12ms	5ms	5ms

12. Solution of optional strong or weak security levels

12.1 Scope

Solution applies to: RK3588.

12.2 Notes

Before using this solution, you should be aware of the following.

- Before downloading the firmware for the first time, confirm that the configuration items of uboot CONFIG_OPTEE_SECURITY_LEVEL configured as required. It only supports configuration once and cannot be modified later.
- If you select "Strong Security Solution 2", download the OEM HUK using the tool RKDevInfoWriteTool (V1.3.0 and above) before using.

12.3 Solution description

The solution supports the configuration of the security level of OP-TEE by the developer, and the protection strength of eMMC/Secure Storage is different for each security levels.

Security level	Description	CONFIG_OPTEE_SECURITY_LEVEL (uboot's configuration item)
Strong Security Solution 1	CPU chip and eMMC/secure storage data are strongly bound, if the CPU chip is replaced, you should replace a new eMMC chip and erase securely stored data.	2
Strong Security Solution 2	CPU chip and eMMC/secure storage data are weakly bound, the OEM HUK which derives for protecting eMMC/secure storage is defined by developer, if you download the same OEM HUK after replacing the CPU chip, then you can use the original eMMC/secure storage data.	1
Weak Security Solution	CPU chip and eMMC/secure storage data are not bound, you can use the original eMMC/secure storage data after replacing the CPU chip.	0 or none

The difference between the above security levels is due to the difference between eMMC and security storage related keys. The keys related to this solution are described below.


• HUK: for deriving RPMB key, secure storage keys and other keys. Different HUK for different security levels. See figures below for details.

Hard HUK is derived from the Device root key. Unique key in chips.

OEM HUK is defined by developer and stored in secure OTP.

Soft HUK is defined by Rockchip and all chips have the same soft HUK. It is stored in firmware.

- RPMB key: the storage protection key of the eMMC chip.
- Secure storage keys: the keys for secure storage.



13. OTP description

OTP is One Time Programmable Memory. The OTP region supports multiple reads but only written once.

Soft HUK

Secure storage keys

The following OTP types are supported.

OTP type	Description	supported platforms
OEM_HR_OTP	Supports hardware-readable secure OTP. When not configured, only secure world can read/write and can access the read/write data; When configured to be hardware-readable only, all software, including the secure and non-secure world, cannot access the read/write data. Usually, this can be used to protect sensitive data such as keys to achieve the isolation of keys from CPU software. The above configured actions are also controlled by the OTP mechanism. The following OTP API section provides the relevant operational interfaces.	rk3588
OEM_S_OTP	Security OTP. Only secure world can read/write. The following OTP API section provides the relevant operational interfaces.	rk3308, rk3326, rk3358, rk3568, rk3588, rv1126
OEM_NS_OTP	Normal security level OTP. There are two types. Type 1 is accessed through the CA call OP-TEE internal TA and the current total size is fixed to 64 Bytes. Type 2 is accessed directly in the REE through other methods. Unless otherwise specified, the OEM_NS_OTP refers to Type 1.	rk3308, rk3326, rk3358

14. TA API description

14.1 Overview

RK provides the following TA APIs for two purposes:

- For developers to refer to how to use the GlobalPlatform TEE Internal Core APIs
- For developers to use the APIs directly

14.2 API return value

The return value of APIs are:

- TEE_SUCCESS: if the function executes successfully
- TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS: if the parameter is wrong
- Others: see tee_api_defines.h

14.3 API description

14.3.1 Crypto API

14.3.1.1 rk crypto malloc ctx

```
crypto_ctx_t *rk_crypto_malloc_ctx(void);
```

Description

Request a crypto operation handle resource.

Parameters

• None.

14.3.1.2 rk_crypto_free_ctx

```
void rk_crypto_free_ctx(crypto_ctx_t **ctx);
```

Description

Release the crypto operation handle. It should be executed to release resources after algorithm is done.

Parameters

· ctx: crypto context

14.3.1.3 rk_hash_crypto

Description

The hash digest algorithm. If you need to input message multiple times, you can use the rk_hash_begin/update/finish interface.

- in: input data
- in_len: the length of input
- out: output data
- out_len: the length of output
- algo: algorithm type, supports TEE_ALG_MD5, TEE_ALG_SHA1, TEE_ALG_SHA224, TEE ALG SHA256, TEE ALG SHA384, TEE ALG SHA512

```
TEE_Result rk_hash_begin(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, uint32_t algo);
```

Description

The hash digest algorithm for multiple, initialization operation.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- algo: algorithm type, supports TEE_ALG_MD5, TEE_ALG_SHA1, TEE_ALG_SHA224, TEE_ALG_SHA256, TEE_ALG_SHA384, TEE_ALG_SHA512

14.3.1.5 rk_hash_update

```
TEE_Result rk_hash_update(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_len);
```

Description

The hash digest algorithm for multiple, calculates digest of the data inputed.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- in: input data
- in len: the length of input

14.3.1.6 rk_hash_finish

Description

The hash digest algorithm for multiple, calculates the digest of the last part and output the digest.

Parameters

- ctx: crypto context
- in: input data
- in_len: the length of input
- out: output data
- out_len: the length of output

14.3.1.7 rk_cipher_crypto

Description

Symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm interface. If you need to input data multiple times, you can use the rk cipher begin/update/finish interface.

Parameters

- in: input data
- len: the length of input
- out: output data
- key: the key used for cipher
- key len: the length of key, different algo may supports different key lengths
- iv: initialization vector
- algo: algorithm type, support the following(OP-TEE V1 dose not support the SM algorithm)

```
TEE_ALG_AES_ECB_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_AES_CBC_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_AES_CTR

TEE_ALG_AES_CTS

TEE_ALG_AES_XTS

TEE_ALG_SM4_ECB_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_SM4_CBC_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_SM4_CTR

TEE_ALG_DES_ECB_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_DES_CBC_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_DES3_CBC_NOPAD
```

• mode: the mode of cipher

14.3.1.8 rk_set_padding

```
TEE_Result rk_set_padding(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, int padding);
```

Description

Sets the padding mode for encrypted/decrypted data.

Parameters

- ctx: crypto context
- padding: see rk padding t for supported modes

14.3.1.9 rk_cipher_begin

Description

The initialization operation of the symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm for multiple.

- · ctx: crypto context
- key: the key used for cipher
- key_len: the length of key, different algo may supports different key lengths
- iv: initialization vector
- algo: algorithm type, support the following(OP-TEE V1 dose not support the SM algorithm)

```
TEE_ALG_AES_ECB_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_AES_CTR

TEE_ALG_AES_CTS

TEE_ALG_AES_XTS

TEE_ALG_SM4_ECB_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_SM4_CBC_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_SM4_CTR

TEE_ALG_DES_ECB_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_DES_ECB_NOPAD

TEE_ALG_DES_CBC_NOPAD
```

• mode: the mode of cipher

14.3.1.10 rk cipher update

Description

Encrypt/decrypt the input data of symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm for multiple.

Parameters

- ctx: crypto context
- in: input data
- in_len: the length of input
- out: output data
- out_len: the length of output

14.3.1.11 rk_cipher_finish

```
TEE_Result rk_cipher_finish(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t *out_len);
```

Description

Finish the encryption/decryption operation of symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm for multiple.

- · ctx: crypto context
- out: output data
- out len: the length of output

Description

Initialization operations of AES-CCM or AES-GCM algorithms.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- key: the key for calculation
- key len: the length of key, supports 16, 24, 32
- iv: initialization vector
- iv len: the length of iv
- add len: the ADD length of the AES-CCM
- tag_len: the tag length(bit), AES-GCM supports 128, 120, 112, 104, 96, and AES-CCM supports 128, 112, 96, 80, 64, 48, 32
- payload len: the payload length of the AES-CCM
- algo: algorithm type, support TEE ALG AES GCM, TEE ALG AES CCM
- mode: encryption or decryption mode

14.3.1.13 rk ae update

Description

Encrypts/decrypts the input data for AES-CCM or AES-GCM algorithms.

Parameters

- ctx: crypto context
- in: input data
- in_len: the length of input
- · out: output data
- out_len: the length of output
- is add: identifies whether there is AAD(Additional Authentication Data)

14.3.1.14 rk ae finish

Description

Complete the encryption/decryption operation for AES-CCM or AES-GCM algorithms.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- in: the last input data
- in len: the length of the last input data
- out: output data
- out len: the length of output
- tag: output tag
- tag len: the length of tag

14.3.1.15 rk_gen_rsa_key

Description

Randomly generate RSA key pairs.

Parameters

- rsa key: the output RSA key pairs
- key len: the length of RSA keys (byte), supports 32, 64, 96, 128, 192, 256, 384, 512
- public exponent: public exponent, supports 3, 65537

14.3.1.16 rk_rsa_crypto

Description

RSA encryption/decryption algorithms. You can also use the rk rsa begin/finish interface.

- in: input data
- len: the length of input
- out: output data
- key: the RSA key
- algo: the padding mode of RSA, supports:

```
TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_V1_5

TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA1

TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA224

TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA256

TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA384

TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA512

TEE_ALG_RSAES_NOPAD
```

• mode: the mode of RSA, supports TEE MODE ENCRYPT and TEE MODE DECRYPT

14.3.1.17 rk rsa sign

```
TEE_Result rk_rsa_sign(uint8_t *digest, uint8_t *signature, uint32_t digest_len, uint32_t *signature_len, rsa_key_t *key, uint32_t salt_len, uint32_t algo, TEE_OperationMode mode);
```

Description

RSA sign/verify algorithm. You can also use the rk rsa begin/finish interface.

Parameters

- · digest: digest value
- signature: the output value of sign, or the input value to be verified
- digest len: the length of digest
- signature len: the length of signature
- key: RSA key
- salt len: the length of salt, it is optional, if it is 0 then the salt length is equal to the digest length
- algo: algorithm, see GPD_TEE_Internal_Core_API_Specification, Table 6-4 for details
- mode: the mode of RSA, supports TEE MODE SIGN and TEE MODE VERIFY

14.3.1.18 rk set sign mode

```
TEE_Result rk_set_sign_mode(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, unsigned int mode);
```

Description

Set the RSA sign mode, sign data or sign digest.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- mode: SIGN DATA for signing data and SIGN DIGEST for signing digest

14.3.1.19 rk_rsa_begin

Description

Initialization of RSA encryption/decryption/sign/verify.

- · ctx: crypto context
- key: RSA key
- algo: the padding mode of RSA, see GPD_TEE_Internal_Core_API_Specification, Table 6-4 for details

• mode: algorithm type, support TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT, TEE_MODE_DECRYPT, TEE_MODE_SIGN, TEE MODE VERIFY

14.3.1.20 rk_rsa_finish

Description

RSA algorithm executed after rk_rsa_begin.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- in: input data
- in len: the length of input
- out: output data
- out len: the length of output
- salt_len: the length of salt, it is optional

14.3.1.21 rk_gen_ec_key

```
TEE_Result rk_gen_ec_key(ec_key_t *ec_key, uint32_t key_len, uint32_t curve);
```

Description

Randomly generate ECC key pairs.

Parameters

- ec_key: the output ECC key pairs
- key len: the length of key (bit), supports 192, 224, 256, 384, 521
- curve: ECC curve, see tee_api_defines.h for details

14.3.1.22 rk ecdh genkey

Description

Perform ECDH to negotiate symmetric key.

- private: ECC private key
- publicx: X-coordinate of ECC public key
- publicy: Y-coordinate of ECC public key
- algo: algorithm, supports TEE_ALG_ECDH_P192, TEE_ALG_ECDH_P224, TEE_ALG_ECDH_P256, TEE ALG ECDH P384, TEE ALG ECDH P521

- curve: ECC curve, supports TEE_ECC_CURVE_NIST_P192, TEE_ECC_CURVE_NIST_P224,
 TEE ECC CURVE NIST P256, TEE ECC CURVE NIST P384, TEE ECC CURVE NIST P521
- keysize: the length of key (bit), supports 192, 224, 256, 384, 521
- out: output symmetric key

14.3.1.23 rk ecdsa sign

Description

ECDSA sign/verify algorithm. You can also use the rk_ecdsa_begin/finish interface.

Parameters

- · digest: input digest
- signature: output signature, or input signature for verified
- · digest len: the length of digest
- signature len: the length of signature
- key: ECC key
- algo: algorithm, supports TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224, TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256, TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384, TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521
- mode: the mode of ECC, supports TEE_MODE_SIGN, TEE_MODE_VERIFY

14.3.1.24 rk_ecdsa_begin

Description

Initialization operations of ECDSA.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- key: ECC key
- algo: algorithm, supports TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224, TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256, TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384, TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521
- mode: mode, supports TEE MODE SIGN, TEE MODE VERIFY

14.3.1.25 rk_ecdsa_finish

Description

ECDSA signs the input digest, or verifys the input digest and signature.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- in: input digest
- out: output signature, or input signature for verified
- in len: the length of input
- out len: the length of output

14.3.1.26 rk_sm2_pke

Description

SM2 encryption/decryption. OP-TEE V1 does not support this interface.

Parameters

- in: input data
- in_len: the length of input
- out: output data
- out len: the length of output
- key: SM2 key
- algo: algorithm, supports TEE ALG SM2 PKE
- mode: mode, supports TEE MODE ENCRYPT and TEE MODE DECRYPT

14.3.1.27 rk sm2 dsa sm3

Description

SM2 sign/verify. OP-TEE V1 does not support this interface.

- digest: SM3 digest
- digest_len: the length of SM3 digest, fixed to 32
- signature: output signature, or input signature for verified
- signature_len: the length of signature
- key: SM2 key
- algo: algorithm, supports TEE ALG SM2 DSA SM3
- mode: mode, supports TEE MODE SIGN and TEE MODE VERIFY

```
TEE_Result rk_sm2_kep_genkey(rk_sm2_kep_parms *kep_parms, uint8_t *share_key, uint32_t share_key_len, uint8_t *conf_out);
```

Description

ECDH algorithm based on SM2. OP-TEE V1 does not support this interface.

Parameters

- kep parms: SM2 key infomation, contains the private key of A and the public key of B
- share key: output symmetric key
- share key len: the length of share key
- conf out: information for validation

14.3.1.29 rk mac crypto

Description

MAC calculation. You can use the rk_mac_begin/update/finish interface for multiple calculations.

Parameters

- in: input data
- in_len: the length of input
- out: output data
- out_len: the length of output
- key: MAC key
- key len: the length of key
- iv: initialization vector
- algo: MAC algorithm type, support the following(OP-TEE V1 dose not support the SM algorithm),

 TEE_ALG_HMAC_MD5, TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA1, TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, TEE_ALG_AES_CMAC,

 TEE ALG HMAC SM3

14.3.1.30 rk_mac_begin

Description

Initialization operation for MAC multiple calculation.

- · ctx: crypto context
- key: MAC key
- key_len: the length of key

- iv: initialization vector
- algo: MA Calgorithm type, support the following(OP-TEE V1 dose not support the SM algorithm),

 TEE_ALG_HMAC_MD5, TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA1, TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, TEE_ALG_AES_CMAC,

 TEE_ALG_HMAC_SM3

14.3.1.31 rk_mac_update

```
TEE_Result rk_mac_update(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_len);
```

Description

Input data for MAC multiple calculation.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- in: input data
- in len: the length of input

14.3.1.32 rk_mac_finish

Description

Input the last part of data and calculate the MAC or Verify the MAC.

Parameters

- · ctx: crypto context
- in: the last part of input data
- in_len: the length of in
- mac: mode=RK_MAC_SIGN output calculate MAC value; mode=RK_MAC_VERIFY input MAC value that is verified
- mac_len: the length of mac
- mode: see mac

14.3.1.33 rk hkdf genkey

Description

HKDF key derivation.

Parameters

• ikm: input password

- · ikm_len: the length of ikm
- salt: input salt
- salt_len: the length of salt
- info: input info
- info len: the length of info
- algo: algorithm, supports TEE_ALG_HKDF_MD5_DERIVE_KEY, TEE_ALG_HKDF_SHA1_DERIVE_KEY,

 TEE_ALG_HKDF_SHA224_DERIVE_KEY, TEE_ALG_HKDF_SHA256_DERIVE_KEY,

 TEE ALG HKDF SHA384 DERIVE KEY, TEE ALG HKDF SHA512 DERIVE KEY
- okm len: the length of okm
- · okm: output key

14.3.1.34 rk pkcs5 pbkdf2 hmac

Description

Key derivation by specifying the salt, iteration count and the password.

Parameters

- password: input password
- password_len: the length of password
- salt: input salt
- salt len: the length of salt
- iterations: input iteration count
- algo: algorithm, supports TEE ALG PBKDF2 HMAC SHA1 DERIVE KEY
- key len: the length of key
- out_key: output key

14.3.2 TRNG API

14.3.2.1 rk_get_trng

```
TEE_Result rk_get_trng(uint8_t *buffer, uint32_t size);
```

Description

Get the hardware random number.

Only supported by some platforms, if the interface is not supported, TEE ERROR NOT SUPPORTED is returned.

- buffer: output random number
- size: the length of buffer

14.3.3.1 rk_otp_size

```
TEE_Result rk_otp_size(uint32_t otp_type, uint32_t *otp_size);
```

Description

Gets the total size of the OTP, including the size of both written and unwritten. Support OEM_HR_OTP and OEM S OTP.

Parameters

- otp_type: OTP type, supports TYPE_OEM_HR_OTP, TYPE_OEM_S_OTP
- otp size: return OTP size

14.3.3.2 rk otp read

Description

Read OTP data. Support OEM_HR_OTP and OEM_S_OTP.

Parameters

- otp_type: OTP type, supports TYPE_OEM_HR_OTP, TYPE_OEM_S_OTP
- offset: the position offset of the OTP region to be read
- data: output data
- len: the length of data

14.3.3.3 rk otp write

Description

Write data to the OTP. Support OEM HR OTP and OEM S OTP.

Parameters

- otp_type: OTP type, supports TYPE_OEM_HR_OTP, TYPE_OEM_S_OTP
- offset: the position offset of the OTP region to be write
- data: input data
- len: the length of data

15. Reference

ARM TrustZone:

 $\underline{https://developer.arm.com/ip-products/security-ip/trustzone}$

GlobalPlatform:

https://globalplatform.org/

This website can download CA development API reference documents: TEE Client API Specification

TA development API reference document: TEE Internal Core API Specification

And other architecture reference documents.