



Key Event Receipt Infrastructure

A Secure Identifier Overlay for the Internet

Samuel M. Smith Ph.D.

sam@keri.one

<https://keri.one>

version 2.58

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Resources

DIF Identity and Discovery WG:

Documentation:

<https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keri>

Meetings:

Tuesdays:

Specification mtg. 2 pm UTC (7 am MT)

Developer mtg. 3 pm UTC (8 am MT)

Zoom: <https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87321306589?pwd=MSs5dIJYRohOYjBCbWJOSmR3TDQwdz09>

Agenda: <https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keri/blob/master/agenda.md>

Implementations:

Python: <https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keripy>

Rust: <https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keriox>

Go: <https://github.com/decentralized-identity/kerigo>

JavaScript: <https://github.com/decentralized-identity/kerijs>

Java: coming

Other

<https://keri.one>

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.02143>

https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/KERI_WP.web.pdf

https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/presentations/KERI_Overview.web.pdf

TOIP ACDC (Authentic Chained Data Containers) TaskForce:

<https://wiki.trustoverip.org/display/HOME/ACDC+%28Authentic+Chained+Data+Container%29+Task+Force>

Background References

Self-Certifying Identifiers:

Girault, M., "Self-certified public keys," EUROCRYPT 1991: Advances in Cryptology, pp. 490-497, 1991

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F3-540-46416-6_42.pdf

Mazieres, D. and Kaashoek, M. F., "Escaping the Evils of Centralized Control with self-certifying pathnames," MIT Laboratory for Computer Science,

<http://www.sigops.org/ew-history/1998/papers/mazieres.ps>

Kaminsky, M. and Banks, E., "SFS-HTTP: Securing the Web with Self-Certifying URLs," MIT, 1999

<https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/~kaminsky/sfs-http.ps>

Mazieres, D., "Self-certifying File System," MIT Ph.D. Dissertation, 2000/06/01

<https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/~ericp/doc/sfs-thesis.ps>

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<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-DICE-Arch-Implicit-Identity-Based-Device-Attestation-v1-rev93.pdf>

Autonomic Identifiers:

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<https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/open-reputation-low-level-whitepaper.pdf>

Smith, S. M. and Khovratovich, D., "Identity System Essentials," 2016/03/29

<https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/Identity-System-Essentials.pdf>

Smith, S. M., "Decentralized Autonomic Data (DAD) and the three R's of Key Management," Rebooting the Web of Trust RWOT 6, Spring 2018

<https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/DecentralizedAutonomicData.pdf>

Smith, S. M., "Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI) Design and Build", arXiv, 2019/07/03 revised 2020/04/23

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.02143>

Smith, S. M., "Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI) Design", 2020/04/22

https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/KERI_WP_2.x.web.pdf

Stocker, C., Smith, S. and Caballero, J., "Quantum Secure DIDs," RWOT10, 2020/07/09

<https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/rwot10-buenosaires/blob/master/final-documents/quantum-secure-dids.pdf>

Certificate Transparency:

Laurie, B., "Certificate Transparency: Public, verifiable, append-only logs," ACMQueue, vol. Vol 12, Issue 9, 2014/09/08

<https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668154>

Google, "Certificate Transparency,"

<http://www.certificate-transparency.org/home>

Laurie, B. and Kasper, E., "Revocation Transparency,"

<https://www.links.org/files/RevocationTransparency.pdf>

Human Basis-of-Trust “in person”

I can know you – therefore I can trust you



“on the internet”

I can't really know you – therefore I can't really trust you

Secure Attribution Problem

Secure attribution of any communication to its source

Authentic communication

Authentic interactions based on secure attribution of all statements by participants

Verifiable authenticity of data

Data Provenance

Authentic data economy

Replace human *basis-of-trust* with cryptographic *root-of-trust*.

With verifiable digital signatures from asymmetric key crypto –
we may not trust in “**what**” was said, but we may trust in “**who**” said it.

We may verify that the **controller** of a private key, (the **who**), made a statement
but not the validity of the statement itself.

The root-of-trust is **consistent attribution** via verifiable integral non-repudiable statements

We may build trust over time in **what** was said via histories
of verifiably attributable (to **whom**) consistent statements i.e. **reputation**.

KERI is the Platypus of the identity space



Platypus has a unique combination of features

Mammal (milk), Reptile (eggs), Bird (bill), Ray (electro-location), Snake (venom)

KERI is a unique combination of features that solve the secure attribution problem.

KERI has elements from DNS/CA, PGP, Blockchain, etc.

Closest comparison is the DNS/CA system.

Provide perspective and set expectations about KERI

Secure Attribution System Design Problem

Mission (security etc) Survivability = ...

Susceptibility, Vulnerability, and Recoverability

Failure is inevitable. Preventing all failures is futile.

Instead











Never fail to detect failure


High fidelity failure detection limits exposure to failure = protection

Three principles:

- 1) Make authentic sources of statement responsible for any failure in the secure attribution of their statements.
- 2) Enable the secure attribution of any failure to the source of that failure.
- 3) Failure detection via duplicity detection

System Design Trade Space





KERI for Short

Open Source: Apache 2:

Scalability:

Designed for performance, asynchronous, bare metal TCP, UDP, non-enveloped.

Self-Certifying Identifiers:

Root-of-trust in cryptographic derivation from entropy.

Truly Decentralized Identity:

Control over identifiers is not dependent on shared control of resources.

End Verifiable Authenticity:

Zero-trust, key event logs as proofs, no trusted entities, no trust in intervening infrastructure, end state is ambient verifiability.

Decentralized Key Management Infrastructure:

Pre-rotation for key rotation for compromise recovery, post-quantum secure, built-in multi-sig, weighted multi-sig.

Delegated Identifiers for Enterprise Key Management:

Multi-valent key management infrastructure for scalability and more secure compromise recovery.

Supports GDPR Compliance:



Separable identifier trust bases. Non-intertwined KELs.

Supports Electronic Digital Signature Compliance (EIDAS, UETA, E-SIGN):


Non-repudiable digital signatures under sole control of identifier controller satisfies core condition for legal liability.

Identity System Security Overlay

Establish authenticity of IP packet's message payload.





The overlay's security is contingent
on the mapping's security.




Identifier Issuance

Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance and Binding



Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance


Basic SCID



BDKrJxkcR9m5u1xs33F5pxRJP6T7hJEbhpHrUt1Ddhh0

did:un:BDKrJxkcR9m5u1xs33F5pxRJP6T7hJEbhpHrUt1Ddhh0/path/to/resource?name=secure#really


Self-Addressing SCID



EXq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148

did:keri:EXq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148/path/to/resource?name=secure#this




Multi-Sig Self-Addressing SCID



EXq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148

did:un:EXq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148/path/to/resource?name=secure#really




Delegated Self-Addressing SCID




EXq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148

did:un:EXq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148/path/to/resource?name=secure#really

Self-Signing SCID



Inconsistency and Duplication



inconsistency: lacking agreement, as two or more things in relation to each other

duplicity: acting in two different ways to different people concerning the same matter

Internal vs. External Inconsistency

Internally inconsistent log = **not verifiable**.

Log verification from self-certifying root-of-trust protects against **internal inconsistency**.

Externally inconsistent log with a purported copy of log but both verifiable = **duplicitous**.


Duplicity detection protects against **external inconsistency**.

Cate promises to provide a consistent pair-wise log.

Local Consistency Guarantee

Duplicity Game

How may Cate be *duplicitious* and not get caught?




private (one-to-one) interactions

Service promises to provide a consistent log to anyone.

Local Consistency Guarantee

Duplicity Game

How may Cate/Service/Agent be **duplicitous** and not get caught?



highly available, private (one-to-one) interactions

Service promises to provide exact same log to everyone.


Global Consistency Guarantee



Duplicity Game



How may Cate and/or service be **duplicitous** and not get caught?

Breaking the promise of global consistency is a provable liability.



global consistent, highly available, and public (one-to-any) interactions

Ledger Registration



The access identifier may have a self-certifying primary root-of-trust, but the registered identifier does not, even if its format appears to be self-certifying.

Autonomic Identifier (AID) and Namespace (AN)

auto nomos = self rule


autonomic = self-governing, self-controlling, etc.

An *autonomic* namespace is
self-certifying and hence *self-administrating*.

AIDs and ANs are *portable* = truly self-sovereign.


autonomic prefix = self-cert + UUID + URL = universal identifier

Trust Basis




Administrative Trust Basis

DNS/Certificate Authorities




Algorithmic Trust Basis

Shared Distributed Ledgers



Autonomic Trust Basis

Cryptographic Proofs



KEY Event Based Provenance of Identifiers

KERI enables cryptographic *proof-of-control-authority (provenance)* for each identifier.

A *proof* is in the form of an identifier's *key event receipt log (KERL)*.

KERLs are *End Verifiable*:

End user alone may verify. Zero trust in intervening infrastructure.

KERLs may be *Ambient Verifiable*:

Anyone may verify *any-log, anywhere, at anytime*.

KERI = self-cert root-of-trust + certificate transparency + KA²CE + recoverable + post-quantum.

KERI for the *DIDified*

KERI non-transferable ephemeral with derivation code ~ did:key

KERI private direct mode (one-to-one) ~ did:peer

KERI public persistent indirect mode (one-to-any) ~ Indy interop, did:sov etc

KERI = did:keri (did:uni, did:un) (all of the above in one method)

did:keri:*prefix*[:*options*] [/path] [?query] [#fragment]

BDKrJxkcR9m5u1xs33F5pxRJP6T7hJEbhpHrUtlDdh0

did:keri:BDKrJxkcR9m5u1xs33F5pxRJP6T7hJEbhpHrUtlDdh0/path/to/resource?name=secure#really

KERI Agnosticism and Interop

KERI itself is completely agnostic about anything but the **prefix** !

??? :*prefix* [:options] [/path] [?query] [#fragment]

The KERI layer establishes control authority over a **prefix**

Any and **All** namespaces that share the same **prefix** may share the same KERI trust basis for control establishment over that **prefix** and hence that namespace.


Interop happens in a layer above the KERI layer

All we need for bootstrapping **interop** is some indication that the **prefix** inside identifier is KERI based (KERI trust basis).

BDKrJxkcR9m5u1xs33F5pxRJP6T7hJEbhpHrUtlDdhh0

did:indy:sov:keri:BDKrJxkcR9m5u1xs33F5pxRJP6T7hJEbhpHrUtlDdhh0

Autonomic Identifier System




KÉRI

Zooko's Trilemma

Desirable identifier properties: secure, decentralized, human meaningful

Trilemma: May have any two of the three properties but not all three.

One way to sort of solve the trilemma is to uniquely register a human meaningful identifier on a ledger controlled by a different identifier that is secure and decentralized but not human meaningful.




Trust Balance

Reputational Trust

veracity

Cryptographic Trust

authenticity



Unified Identifier Model

AID: Autonomic Identifier (primary)

self-managing self-certifying identifier with cryptographic root of trust


secure, decentralized, portable, universally unique

LID: Legitimized Human Meaningful Identifier (secondary)

legitimized within trust domain of given AID by a verifiable authorization from AID controller

authorization is verifiable to the root-of-trust of AID

Forms $AID \mid LID$ couplet within trust domain of AID





AID|LID Couplet

625.127C125r

EXq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148 | 625.127C125r

KERI Stack




KERI employs a modular architecture with modular components that each provide services. Participants may configure their stacks to provide some or all of the services or share services provided by others.


The component services include Controller, Witness, Watcher, Delegate, Oracle, Validator.

The root-of-trust for the GLEIF ecosystem is provided by a single globally published AID called the Root AID. It is a KERI DID.


This Root AID is the issuer of delegations to other KERI AID DIDs. These delegated identifiers may be the issuers of VCs.




Decentralized Key Management Infrastructure (Univalent DKMI)




Hierarchical DKMI: Bivalent DKMI




MultiValent Delegation




Delegation (Cross Anchor)



Interaction Delegation




Scaling Delegation via Interaction




$\Delta \rightarrow X$: Delegation to X

$\Delta \leftarrow A$: Delegation from A


Rotation Delegation





Scaling Delegation via Rotation




$\Delta \rightarrow X$: Delegation to X
 $\Delta \leftarrow A$: Delegation from A










Each level of delegation forms a nested trust domain that is protected by the level above. This increases ultimate security while enabling higher performance event issuance in lower layers.


The Level 1 entity AID provides the root-of-trust for the whole ecosystem. This enables secure decentralized interoperability.

Each trust domain may make delegations of both identifiers and verifiable credentials to a subordinate trust domain. These delegations provide revocable authorizations.



Delegations may be granular and include authorizations of individual employees. This provides specific scalable but non-repudiable accountability of all participants in the ecosystem.

Verifiable Algorithm
DADi Block-Graph (Chain, Tree, Forest)
Decentralized Autonomic Data item



Tripartite Authentic Data (VC) Model

Issuer: Source of the VC. Creates (issues) and signs VC


Holder: Usually the target of the VC. The holder is the “*issuee*” that receives the VC and holds it for its own use.

Verifier: Verifies the signatures on the VC and authenticates the holder at the time of presentation

The issuer and target each have a DID (decentralized identifier).

The DIDs are used to look-up the public key(s) needed to verify signatures.

Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model




Tripartite Authentic Data (VC) Model with VDR

Verifiable Data Registry (VDR) enables decentralized but interoperable discovery and verification of authoritative key pairs for DIDs in order to verify the signatures on VCs. A VDR may also provide other information such as data schema or revocation state of a VC.

Each controller of a DID registers that DID on a VDR so that a verifier can determine the authoritative key pairs for any signatures.

We call this determination, *establishment of control authority* over a DID.




KERI VDRs vs. Shared Ledger VDRs

Most DID methods use a shared ledger (commonly referred to as a *blockchain*) for their VDR. Typically, in order to interoperate all participants must use the same shared ledger or support multiple different DID methods. There are currently over 70 DID methods. Instead GLEIF has chosen to use KERI based DID methods. KERI stands for Key Event Receipt Infrastructure. KERI based VDRs are ledger independent, i.e. not locked to a given ledger. This provides a path for greater interoperability without forcing participants in the vLEI ecosystem to use the same shared ledger.

A KERI VDR is called a key event log (KEL). It is a cryptographically verifiable hash chained data structure. Each KERI based identifier has its own dedicated KEL. The purpose of the KEL is to provide proof of the establishment of control authority over an identifier. This provides cryptographically verifiable proof of the current set of authoritative keys for the identifier. KERI identifiers are long cryptographic pseudo random strings of characters. They are self-certifying and self-managing.

A KERI identifier is abstractly called an Autonomic Identifier (AID) because it is self-certifying and self-managing. A KERI DID is one concrete implementation of a KERI AID. The same KERI prefix may control multiple different DIDs as long as they share the same prefix.



KERI Identifier KEL VDR **Controls** Verifiable Credential Registry TEL VDR

A KERI KEL for a given identifier provides proof of authoritative key state at each event. The events are ordered. This ordering may be used to order transactions on some other VDR such as a Verifiable Credential Registry by attaching anchoring seals to the KEL events.

The set of transactions that determine registry state form a log called a Transaction Event Log (TEL).

Transactions are signed with the authoritative keys determined by the key state in the KEL with the transaction seal.


The transactions likewise contain a reference seal back to the key event authorizing the transaction.

This setup enables a KEL to control a TEL for any purpose.

In the case of the vLEI the TEL controls a vLEI issuance and revocation registry.

The TEL provides a cryptographic proof of registry state by reference to the corresponding controlling KEL.

Any validator may therefore cryptographically verify the authoritative state of the registry.




Registry with Separable VC Issuance-Revocation TELs

Each VC may be uniquely identified with a content digest.

Each VC also has a uniquely identified issuer using a KERI AID.



This combination enables a separable registry of VC issuance-revocation state.

The state may employ a cryptographic accumulator for enhanced privacy




Identity System Security Overlay

Establish authenticity of IP packet's message payload.



The overlay's security is contingent
on the mapping's security.



Identifier Issuance

Identifier System Security

Authentic transmission of data may be verified using an identity system security overlay.


This overlay maps cryptographic key-pairs to identifiers.

When those identifiers are self-certifying they are derived via cryptographic one-way functions from the key pairs.


This provides a self-certifying identifier with a cryptographic root-of-trust.

A key event log (KEL) provide support for secure key rotation without changing the identifier.

Message authenticity is provided by verifying signatures to the authoritative keys pairs for the identifier included in the message.




The overlay's security is contingent
on the mapping's security.




Identifier Issuance

Smith's Identifier System Properties Triangle



May exhibit any two at the highest level but not all three at the highest level

The Internet Protocol (IP) is *bro-ken* because it has no security layer.





Instead ...


We use *bolt-on* identity system security overlays.
(DNS-CA ...)

Identity System Security Overlay

Establish authenticity of IP packet's message payload.





The overlay's security is contingent
on the mapping's security.



Identifier Issuance

Administrative Identifier Issuance and Binding






Admin-Certifying Identifier Issuance

DNS Hijacking

A DNS hijacking wave is targeting companies at an almost unprecedented scale. Clever trick allows attackers to obtain valid TLS certificate for hijacked domains.

<https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/01/a-dns-hijacking-wave-is-targeting-companies-at-an-almost-unprecedented-scale/>




BGP Hijacking: AS Path Poisoning

Spoof domain verification process from CA. Allows attackers to obtain valid TLS certificate for hijacked domains.

Birge-Lee, H., Sun, Y., Edmundson, A., Rexford, J. and Mittal, P., “Bamboozling certificate authorities with {BGP},” vol. 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium, no. {USENIX} Security 18, pp. 833-849, 2018 <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee>


Gavrichenkov, A., “Breaking HTTPS with BGP Hijacking,” BlackHat, 2015 <https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf>

AS path poisoning




Vulnerability of domains: sub-prefix attacks



- Any AS can launch
- Only prefix lengths less than /24 vulnerable (filtering)




Identity System Security Overlay




Spanning Layer




Hourglass



Platform Locked Trust





Trust Domain Based Segmentation





Each trust layer only spans platform specific applications
Bifurcates the internet trust map
No spanning trust layer

Waist and Neck




Identity System Security Overlay

Establish authenticity of IP packet's message payload.




The overlay's security is contingent
on the mapping's security.




Tripartite Authentic Data Model

Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model




Tripartite with VDR

Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model with Verification at Verifiable Data Registry




Tripartite without VDR

Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model with Verification at Issuer




Bipartite Model


Issuer-Holder Model with Verification at Issuer




Joint Delegator-Service Model




Split Delegator-Service Model




Closed Loop Joint Model



Closed Loop Split Model



Open Loop Split Model



Autonomic Identity System

why, how – *who* controls *what, when, and how?*

Root-of-Trust

cryptographic autonomic identifier = *why, how*



Source-of-Truth

controller of the private key = *who*


Loci-of-Control

authoritative operation = *what, when, how*

Key Event Message



Event Chaining




Self-Certifying Identifier Prefixes

All crypto material appears in KERI in a fully qualified representation that includes a derivation code prepended to the crypto-material.

Identifier prefixes are fully qualified crypto-material.


Event Sequencing



Establishment Events



Establishment Subsequence




Inception Event

Rotation Event


Rotation Event

Rotation Event



Non-Establishment Events

Full Sequence



Establishment Subsequence

Inception Event

Rotation Event

Non-Establishment Subsequence



Rotation Event

Rotation Event

Interaction Event

Rotation Event



Interaction Event

Interaction Event

Interaction Event

Seal (Anchor)



seal provides evidence of authenticity



A seal anchors arbitrary data to an event in the key event sequence thereby providing proof of control authority for that data at the location of the anchoring event.

Seals make KERI both privacy preserving and *data semantic agnostic*.
Context *independent extensibility* via externally layered APIs for anchored data instead of context dependent extensibility via internal linked data or tag registries.
Interoperability is total w.r.t. establishment of control authority.
Minimally sufficient means.

Pre-Rotation



Inception			
SN	initial	next digest	current
0	C^0	\underline{C}^1	C^0

Rotation			
SN	current	next digest	current
1	C^1	\underline{C}^2	C^1


Rotation			
SN	current	next digest	current
2	C^2	\underline{C}^3	C^2

Rotation			
SN	current	next digest	current
3	C^3	\underline{C}^4	C^3



Rotation			
SN	current	next digest	current
4	C^4	\underline{C}^5	C^4

Digest of *next* key(s) makes pre-rotation post-quantum secure

Key Infrastructure Valence




Repurposed Keys




Univalent Key Roles


Repurposed Rotation to Interaction




Rotation Only




Delegation (Cross Anchor)



Interaction Delegation




Scaling Delegation via Interaction




$\Delta \rightarrow X$: Delegation to X

$\Delta \leftarrow A$: Delegation from A

Rotation Delegation



Scaling Delegation via Rotation



$\Delta \rightarrow X$: Delegation to X
 $\Delta \leftarrow A$: Delegation from A

Security Concepts

Availability, Consistency, and Duplication

Harm to controller: Unavailability, loss of control authority, externally forced duplication

Harm to validator: Inadvertent acceptance of verifiable but forged or duplicitous events

Local vs. Global Duplication Guarantees

Direct Mode vs. Indirect Mode Operation

Malicious Controller vs. Malicious Third Party

Live Exploit vs. Dead Exploit

Controller Protection vs. Validator Protection

Protection to controller: key management, promulgation consensus, redundancy.

Protection to validator: verifiable logs, verification consensus, duplication detection

Ledger Attack Vectors

TABLE I

ATTACK VECTORS RELATED TO THE ATTACK CLASS IN BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS. WE ALSO SHOW, BY REFERENCING TO THE PRIOR WORK, HOW EACH ATTACK AFFECTS THE ENTITIES INVOLVED WITH BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS. FOR INSTANCE, ORPHANED BLOCKS AFFECT THE BLOCKCHAIN, THE MINERS, AND THE MINING POOLS.

	Attacks	Blockchain	Miners	Mining Pools	Exchanges	Application	Users
Blockchain Structure	Forks [26]	✓					
	Orphaned blocks [27]	✓	✓	✓			
Peer-to-Peer System	DNS hijacks [28]		✓	✓	✓		✓
	BGP hijacks [29]		✓	✓			✓
	Eclipse attack [30]		✓				✓
	Majority attack [31]	✓	✓			✓	
	Selfish mining [32]	✓	✓	✓			
	DDoS attacks [33]	✓	✓	✓			
	Consensus Delay [34]		✓	✓			✓
	Block Withholding [34]		✓	✓			
	Timejacking attacks [35]		✓	✓		✓	
	Finney attacks [36]		✓	✓			✓
Blockchain Application	Blockchain Ingestion [37]	✓					
	Wallet theft [38]				✓	✓	✓
	Double-spending [39]	✓					✓
	Cryptojacking [40]					✓	✓
	Smart contract DoS [41]	✓				✓	✓
	≈ Reentrancy attacks [42]					✓	✓
	≈ Overflow attacks [42]					✓	✓
	≈ Replay attacks [41]	✓		✓		✓	✓
	≈ Short address attacks [42]					✓	
	≈ Balance attacks [41]					✓	✓

Ledger Attack Effects

TABLE II

IMPLICATIONS OF EACH ATTACK ON THE BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEM IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRIOR WORK. FOR INSTANCE, FORKS CAN LEAD TO CHAIN SPLITTING AND REVENUE LOSS. AS A RESULT OF A FORK, ONE AMONG THE CANDIDATE CHAINS IS SELECTED BY THE NETWORK WHILE THE OTHERS ARE INVALIDATED. THIS LEADS TO INVALIDATION OF TRANSACTION AND REVENUE LOSS TO MINERS.

	Attacks	Chain Splitting	Revenue Loss	Partitioning	Malicious Mining	Delay	Info Loss	Theft
Blockchain Splitting	Forks [26]	✓	✓					
	Orphaned Blocks [27]		✓					
P2P System	DNS hijacks [28]		✓	✓				✓
	BGP hijacks [29]		✓	✓				✓
	Eclipse attacks [30]			✓				
	Majority attacks [31]	✓	✓		✓			
	Selfish mining [32]		✓		✓			
	DDoS attacks [33]				✓			✓
	Consensus Delay [34]					✓	✓	
	Block Withholding [34]		✓		✓			
	Timejacking attacks [35]	✓	✓		✓	✓		
	Finney attacks [36]		✓					
Blockchain Application	Blockchain Ingestion [37]						✓	
	Wallet theft [38]		✓					✓
	Double-spending [39]							
	Cryptojacking [40]	✓			✓			✓
	Smart contract DoS [41]		✓			✓		✓
	≈ Reentrancy attacks [42]		✓					✓
	≈ Overflow attacks [42]							✓
	≈ Replay attacks [41]		✓				✓	
	≈ Short address attacks [42]		✓					✓
	≈ Balance attacks [41]		✓					✓

Apples-to-Apples

Ledger:

Network paid by transaction fees
(more or less competitive within the network)

Successful exploits without compromised keys

Controller:

Highly available nodes of other's choosing

Must trust that a majority are honest

No recovery if keys compromised

Validator;

Need full copy of ledger (big)

Need full access to network

Must trust that a majority are honest

KERI:

Networks paid by transaction fees
(competitive across all networks)

Controller:

Highly available nodes of own choosing

Must “trust” that a majority are honest
Successful exploits must compromise keys

Recovery if keys compromised

Validator:

Need full copy of KEL (small)


Need full access to network of own choosing.
Must “trust” that a majority are honest

Protocol Operational Modes


Direct Event Replay Mode (one-to-one)

Indirect Event Replay Mode (one-to-any)


Direct Mode: A to B



Direct Mode: B to A



Indirect Mode Promulgation Service




Establishment Events

Inception Event Data									
Header				Key Config			Witness Config		Other Config
version	prefix	sn	ilk	sith	public keys	threshold key digest	toad	witnesses	cnfg
v1	C	0	icp	initial	initial	next	initial	initial	initial


Rotation Event Data										
Header					Key Config			Witness Config		Payload
version	prefix	sn	ilk	digest	sith	public keys	threshold key digest	toad	witnesses	data
v1	C	1	rot	prev	current	current	next	new	prune	seals

Indirect Mode Promulgation and Confirmation Services




Indirect Mode Full

Indirect Replay Mode



Indirect Mode with Ledger Oracles

Indirect Replay Mode with Ledger Oracle



Separation of Control

Shared ledger = *shared control* over *shared data*.

Shared *data* = good, shared *control* = bad.


Shared control between controllers and validators may be problematic for governance, scalability, and performance.

KERI = *separated control* over *shared data*.

Separated control between controllers and validators may provide better decentralization, more flexibility, better scalability, lower cost, higher performance, and more privacy at comparable security.

Live Exploit (current signing keys)


Hard Problem:
Recovery from *Live Exploit*
of Current Signing Keys



Pre-rotation provides protection from successful *live* exploit of current signing keys.

Live Exploit (next signing keys)

Original History



Exposed Keys

\dot{C}^0

Compromised Keys

\dot{C}^1


\dot{C}^2

\tilde{C}^3

\dot{C}^3


\dot{C}^4

Preemptive Alternate History



Difficulty of inverting next key(s) protects against successful *live* exploit.

Dead Exploit (stale next signing keys)



Any copy of original history protects against successful **dead exploit**: First Seen Wins

Witnessing Rules

An honest witness will only witness, (i.e. create, store, and promulgate a receipt for), at most *one and only one version* of any event.

That event version must first be verified.

A verified event version must be signed by the controller's authoritative keys as determined by prior events.

A verified event version must be consistent with all prior events.

Agreement

A *state of agreement* about a version of an event is defined with respect to *set* of witnesses in agreement:

Each witness in that *set* has witnessed the same version of that event and each receipt in that set has been promulgated to every other witness in that *set*.

The size of an agreement is the number of contributing witnesses in the *set*.

The associated *agreement* include a receipt from each witness in the *set*.

This *state of agreement* is provable to any validator, watcher, juror, or judge via a verifiable fully receipted copy of the event i.e the *agreement*.

This copy provides *proof of agreement*.

Such a proof may be obtained via any verifiable KERL that includes that version of that event.

Definitions

N = number of witness

M = size of agreement

F = faulty witnesses

V Validator

C Controller

Threshold of Accountable Duplication

TOAD

M_C

M_V

Sufficient Agreement

Controller's Guarantee

$$M \geq M_C$$

Validator's Choice

$$M_V \geq M_C$$

Algorithm Objectives

Any pre-existing copy or digest of original KERL available to Validator protects Validator from future dead exploits.

KAACE provides fault tolerance from live exploit.

A successful but recoverable live exploit is a compromise of the controller's current signing keys and/or a compromise of the witnesses' signing keys.

- A) WRT Controller, a successful live exploit of the witnesses' would prevent sufficient agreement thereby inducing a recovery operation.
- B) WRT Validator, a successful live exploit would produce undetectably duplicitous but sufficient agreement about current events.

(KAACE immune agreement prevents this, i.e. Validator is immune)

Detectable vs Undetectable Duplicity

Witness Duplicity

Witness Duplicity is Detectable.


Controller Duplicity

Controller Duplicity wrt witnesses is undetectable if a sufficient number of witnesses are not duplicitous and sufficient agreement is small enough.

(KA²CE)

Keri's Agreement Algorithm for Control Establishment

Produce Witnessed
Agreements
with Guarantees



Agreement Constraints

N = number of witness

Proper Agreement

M = size of agreement

$$F + 1$$

F = faulty witnesses

Bounds on Sufficient Agreement

V Validator

$$M > F$$

C Controller

$$M \leq N - F$$

$$F < M \leq N - F$$

Intact Agreement

$$N \geq 2F + 1$$

One Agreement or None at All (Immune)

first seen rule limits liveness induces recovery rotation

$$|\hat{N}| = N \quad |\hat{M}_1| = |\hat{M}_2| = M$$

$$|\hat{M}_1 \cup \hat{M}_2| = |\hat{N}| = N$$

Overlapping Sets

$$\hat{M}_1 \cup \hat{M}_2 = \hat{N}$$

$$|\hat{M}_1| + |\hat{M}_2| = |\hat{M}_1 \cup \hat{M}_2| + |\hat{M}_1 \cap \hat{M}_2|$$

$$2M = N + F + 1$$

$$M \geq \left\lceil \frac{N + F + 1}{2} \right\rceil$$


$$M \leq N - F$$

Immune Agreement

One honest witness if:

$$|\hat{M}_1 \cap \hat{M}_2| \geq F + 1$$


$$\frac{N + F + 1}{2} \leq M \leq N - F$$



Example Values



		Immunity			
F	N	3F+1	$\left\lceil \frac{N+F+1}{2} \right\rceil$	N-F	M
1	4	4	3	3	3
1	5	4	4	4	4
1	6	4	4	5	4, 5
1	7	4	5	6	5, 6
1	8	4	5	7	5, 6, 7
1	9	4	6	8	6, 7, 8
2	7	7	5	5	5
2	8	7	6	6	6
2	9	7	6	7	6, 7
2	10	7	7	8	7, 8
2	11	7	7	9	7, 8, 9
2	12	7	8	10	8, 9, 10
3	10	10	7	7	7
3	11	10	8	8	8
3	12	10	8	9	8, 9
3	13	10	9	10	9, 10
3	14	10	9	11	9, 10, 11
3	15	10	10	12	10, 11, 12

Recovery from Live Exploit Of Current Signing Keys





Function Stack

KERI



Authorizations after Establishment



On Top of KERI

Design follows the
Hourglass Model of
a stack of thin layers


Rotate Prefix vs Rotate Keys

Non-transferable may not rotate keys. May only rotate prefix


Rotate prefix good for bootstrapping. No key event log (KEL) needed.

If prefix has no persistent value outside its function and its function may be marshaled by some other prefix controller then rotating prefix may be preferred.

Events




Delegating Events




State Verifier Engine

KERI Core — State Verifier Engine





Delegated State Verifier Engine

KERI Delegated Core — State Verifier Engine



Witness Designation






Witnessed Key Event Receipt



$$\langle \varepsilon_k^C \rangle W_0^C \sigma_{W_0^C}^C$$

$$\langle \varepsilon_k^C \rangle W_0^C \sigma_{W_0^C}^C W_1^C \sigma_{W_1^C}^C$$

Generic Event Formats



Generic Inception

$$\varepsilon_0^C = \left\langle v_0^C, C, t_0^C, \text{icp}, K_0^C, \hat{C}_0^C, \eta_0^C \left(\left\langle K_1^C, \hat{C}_1^C \right\rangle \right), M_0^C, \hat{W}_0^C, [cfg] \right\rangle \hat{\sigma}_0^C$$

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{C}_0^C &= \left[C^0, \dots, C^{L_0^C - 1} \right]_0^C \\ \hat{C}_1^C &= \left[C^{r_1}, \dots, C^{r_1 + L_1^C - 1} \right]_1^C \\ \hat{W}_0^C &= \left[W_0^C, \dots, W_{N_0^C - 1}^C \right]_0^C\end{aligned}$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_0^C = \sigma_{C^{s_0}} \dots \sigma_{C^{s_{S_0^C - 1}}}$$

Generic Rotation

$$\varepsilon_k^C = \left\langle v_k^C, C, t_k^C, \eta_k^C(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C), \text{rot}, K_l^C, \hat{C}_l^C, \eta_l^C(\langle K_{l+1}^C, \hat{C}_{l+1}^C \rangle), M_l^C, \hat{X}_l^C, \hat{Y}_l^C, [\text{seals}] \right\rangle \hat{\sigma}_{kl}^C$$

$$\hat{C}_l^C = \left[C^{r_l^C}, \dots, C^{r_l^C + L_l^C - 1} \right]_l^C$$

$$\hat{C}_{l+1}^C = \left[C^{r_{l+1}^C}, \dots, C^{r_{l+1}^C + L_{l+1}^C - 1} \right]_{l+1}^C$$

$$\hat{X}_l^C = \left[X_0^C, \dots, X_{O_l^C - 1}^C \right]_l^C$$

$$\hat{Y}_l^C = \left[Y_0^C, \dots, Y_{P_l^C - 1}^C \right]_l^C$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_{kl}^C = \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_0}} \dots \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s} S_{kl}^{C-1}}$$

Generic Interaction


$$\varepsilon_k^C = \left\langle v_k^C, C, t_k^C, \eta_k^C(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C), \text{ixn}, [\text{seals}] \right\rangle \hat{\sigma}_{kl}^C$$

$$K_l^C$$

$$\hat{C}_l^C = \left[C^{r_l^C}, \dots, C^{r_l^C + L_l^C - 1} \right]_l^C$$


$$\hat{\sigma}_{kl}^C = \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_0}} \dots \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_{kl}^C - 1}}$$

Generic Delegating Event Formats



Generic Delegated Event Formats

Delegating Event Location Seal			
prefix	sn	ilk	prior digest



Inception Delegation

$$\hat{\Delta}_0^D = \left\{ D, t_0^D, \eta_k^C(\varepsilon_0^D) \right\} \quad \text{Delegated Event Seal}$$

$$\varepsilon_0^D = \left\langle v_0^D, D, t_0^D, \mathbf{dip}, K_0^D, \hat{D}_0^D, M_0^D, \hat{W}_0^D, [cfg], \hat{\Delta}_k^C \right\rangle \hat{\sigma}_0^D$$

$$\hat{D}_0^D = \left[D^0, \dots, D^{L_0^D-1} \right]_0^D$$

$$\hat{W}_0^C = \left[W_0^C, \dots, W_{N_0^C-1}^C \right]_0^C$$

$$\hat{\Delta}_k^C = \left\{ C, t_k^C, ilk, \eta_k^C(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C) \right\} \quad \text{Delegating Event Location Seal}$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_0^D = \sigma_{D^{s_0}} \dots \sigma_{D^{s_{S_0^D-1}}}$$

Rotation Delegation

$$\widehat{\Delta}_k^D = \left\{ D, t_k^D, \eta_k^C \left(\varepsilon_k^D \right) \right\} \quad \text{Delegated Event Seal}$$

$$\varepsilon_k^D = \left\langle \nu_k^D, D, t_k^D, \eta_k^D \left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^D \right), \mathsf{drt}, K_l^D, \widehat{D}_l^D, M_l^D, \widehat{X}_l^D, \widehat{Y}_l^D, [\mathit{seals}], \widehat{\Delta}_k^C \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^D$$

$$\widehat{D}_l^D = \left[D^{r_l^D}, \dots, D^{r_l^D + L_l^D - 1} \right]_l^D$$

$$\widehat{X}_l^D = \left[X_0^D, \dots, X_{O_l^D - 1}^D \right]_l^D$$

$$\widehat{Y}_l^D = \left[Y_0^D, \dots, Y_{P_l^D - 1}^D \right]_l^D$$

$$\widehat{\Delta}_k^C = \left\{ C, t_k^C, ilk, \eta_k^C \left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C \right) \right\} \quad \text{Delegating Event Location Seal}$$

$$\widehat{\sigma}_{kl} = \sigma_{C^{+r_l^D+s_0}} \dots \sigma_{C^{r_l^D+s_{kl}^D-1}}$$


Delegated Interaction

$$\mathcal{E}_k^D = \left\langle \nu_k^D, D, t_k^D, \eta_k^D(\mathcal{E}_{k-1}^D), \text{ixn}, [\text{seals}] \right\rangle \hat{\sigma}_{kl}^D$$

Receipt Messages



$$\rho_{\tilde{W}_s^C}^C(\varepsilon_k^C) = \langle v_k^C, C, t_k^C, \text{rct}, \eta_k^C(\varepsilon_k^C) \rangle W_{l0}^C \sigma_{W_{l0}^C}^C, \dots, W_{lN_s^C-1}^C \sigma_{W_{lN_s^C-1}^C}^C$$



$$\rho_V^C(\varepsilon_k^C) = \langle v_k^C, C, t_k^C, \text{vrct}, \eta_k^C(\varepsilon_k^C), \hat{\Delta}_k^V \rangle \hat{\sigma}_{V_l}^C$$

$$\hat{\Delta}_k^V = \{V, \eta_k^V(\varepsilon_k^V)\}$$

Witness Rotations

$$\hat{W}_0 = \left[W_0 \ , W_1 \ , \cdots , W_{N-1} \right]$$

$$\hat{W}_l = \left(\hat{W}_{l-1} - \hat{X}_l \right) \cap \hat{Y}_l$$

$$\hat{X}_l \subseteq \hat{W}_{l-1} \quad \hat{Y}_l \not\subset \hat{W}_{l-1} \quad \hat{X}_l \not\subset \hat{W}_l$$

$$N_l = N_{l-1} - O_l + P_l$$

$$M_l \leq N_l$$

$$\left| \hat{X}_l \right| = O_l \quad \left| \hat{Y}_l \right| = P_l \quad \left| \hat{W}_l \right| = N_l$$

$$\hat{U}_{l-1} \subseteq \hat{W}_{l-1} \quad \left| \hat{U}_{l-1} \right| \geq M_{l-1}$$

$$\hat{U}_l \subseteq \hat{W}_l \quad \left| \hat{U}_l \right| \geq M_l$$

$$\left| \hat{U}_{l-1} \cup \hat{U}_l \right| \leq M_{l-1} + M_l$$

Complex Weighted Signing Thresholds

$$\hat{C}_l = [C_l^1, \dots, C_l^{L_l}]_l$$

$$\hat{K}_l = [U_l^1, \dots, U_l^{L_1}]_l \quad \hat{C} = [C^1, C^2, C^3]$$

$$0 < U_l^j \leq 1$$

$$U_l^j = \frac{1}{K_l}$$

$$\hat{s}_k^l = [s_0, \dots, s_{S_k^l - 1}]_k^l$$


$$\hat{K} = [\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}]$$

$$\bar{U}_l = \sum\nolimits_{i=s_0}^{s_{S_k-1}} U_l^i \geq 1$$

$$\hat{K}_l = [\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}]_l$$

$$\hat{K}_l = [[\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}], [\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}], [1, 1, 1, 1]]$$

BACKGROUND



KERI

Tripartite Authentic Data (VC) Model

Issuer: Source of the VC. Creates (issues) and signs VC


Holder: Usually the target of the VC. The holder is the “*issuee*” that receives the VC and holds it for its own use.

Verifier: Verifies the signatures on the VC and authenticates the holder at the time of presentation

The issuer and target each have a DID (decentralized identifier).

The DIDs are used to look-up the public key(s) needed to verify signatures.

Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model




Tripartite Authentic Data (VC) Model with VDR

Verifiable Data Registry (VDR) enables decentralized but interoperable discovery and verification of authoritative key pairs for DIDs in order to verify the signatures on VCs. A VDR may also provide other information such as data schema or revocation state of a VC.

Each controller of a DID registers that DID on a VDR so that a verifier can determine the authoritative key pairs for any signatures.

We call this determination, *establishment of control authority* over a DID.




KERI VDRs vs. Shared Ledger VDRs

Most DID methods use a shared ledger (commonly referred to as a *blockchain*) for their VDR. Typically, in order to interoperate all participants must use the same shared ledger or support multiple different DID methods. There are currently over 70 DID methods. Instead GLEIF has chosen to use KERI based DID methods. KERI stands for Key Event Receipt Infrastructure. KERI based VDRs are ledger independent, i.e. not locked to a given ledger. This provides a path for greater interoperability without forcing participants in the vLEI ecosystem to use the same shared ledger.

A KERI VDR is called a key event log (KEL). It is a cryptographically verifiable hash chained data structure. Each KERI based identifier has its own dedicated KEL. The purpose of the KEL is to provide proof of the establishment of control authority over an identifier. This provides cryptographically verifiable proof of the current set of authoritative keys for the identifier. KERI identifiers are long cryptographic pseudo random strings of characters. They are self-certifying and self-managing.

A KERI identifier is abstractly called an Autonomic Identifier (AID) because it is self-certifying and self-managing. A KERI DID is one concrete implementation of a KERI AID. The same KERI prefix may control multiple different DIDs as long as they share the same prefix.



KERI Identifier KEL VDR **Controls** Verifiable Credential Registry TEL VDR

A KERI KEL for a given identifier provides proof of authoritative key state at each event. The events are ordered. This ordering may be used to order transactions on some other VDR such as a Verifiable Credential Registry by attaching anchoring seals to the KEL events.

The set of transactions that determine registry state form a log called a Transaction Event Log (TEL).

Transactions are signed with the authoritative keys determined by the key state in the KEL with the transaction seal.


The transactions likewise contain a reference seal back to the key event authorizing the transaction.

This setup enables a KEL to control a TEL for any purpose.

In the case of the vLEI the TEL controls a vLEI issuance and revocation registry.

The TEL provides a cryptographic proof of registry state by reference to the corresponding controlling KEL.

Any validator may therefore cryptographically verify the authoritative state of the registry.




Registry with Separable VC Issuance-Revocation TELs

Each VC may be uniquely identified with a content digest.

Each VC also has a uniquely identified issuer using a KERI AID.

This combination enables a separable registry of VC issuance-revocation state.

The state may employ a cryptographic accumulator for enhanced privacy



Identifier System Security

Authentic transmission of data may be verified using an identity system security overlay.



This overlay maps cryptographic key-pairs to identifiers.

When those identifiers are self-certifying they are derived via cryptographic one-way functions from the key pairs.

This provides a self-certifying identifier with a cryptographic root-of-trust.

A key event log (KEL) provide support for secure key rotation without changing the identifier.

Message authenticity is provided by verifying signatures to the authoritative keys pairs for the identifier included in the message.



Cryptographic Material Derivation Code Tables

Length of crypt material determines number of pad characters. One character table for one pad char. Two character table for two pad char.

One Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code Selector

Derivation Code	Prefix Description
0	Two character derivation code. Use two character table.
1	Four character derivation code. Use four character table.
2	Five character derivation code. Use five character table.
3	Six character derivation code. Use six character table.
4	Eight character derivation code. Use eight character table.
5	Nine character derivation code. Use nine character table.
6	Ten character derivation code. Use ten character table.
-	Count code for attached receipts. Use receipt count code table(s)

Four Character KERI Base64 Count Code for Attached Receipt Couplets

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Count Code Length	Qual Length Base64	Code Length Bytes
-AXX	Count of Attached Qualified Base64 Receipt Couplets	0	0	4	4	3
-BXX	Count of Attached Qualified Base2 Receipt Couplets	0	0	4	4	3

One Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
A	Non-transferable prefix using Ed25519 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
B	X25519 public encryption key. May be converted from Ed25519 public signing verification key.	32	1	1	44	33
C	Ed25519 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
D	Blake3-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
E	Blake2b-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
F	Blake2s-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
G	Non-transferable prefix using ECDSA secp256k1 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
H	ECDSA secp256k1 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
I	SHA3-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
J	SHA2-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33

Two Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
0A	Ed25519 signature. Self-signing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0B	ECDSA secp256k1 signature. Self-signing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0C	Blake3-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0D	SHA3-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0E	Blake2b-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0F	SHA2-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66

Attached Signature Derivation Code Tables

Length of crypt material determines number of pad characters. One character table for one pad char. Two character table for two pad char.

Two Character KERI Base64 Attached Signature Selection Code

Derivation Code	Selector Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
0	Four character attached signature code. Use four character table					
1	Five character attached signature code. Use five character table					
2	Six character attached signature code. Use six character table					
-	Count code for attached signatures. Use attached signature count code table(s)					

Four Character KERI Base64 Count Code for Attached Signatures

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Count Code Length	Qual Length Base64	Code Length Bytes
-AXX	Count of Attached Qualified Base64 Signatures	0	0	4	4	3
-BXX	Count of Attached Qualified Base2 Signatures	0	0	4	4	3

Two Character KERI Base64 Attached Signature Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
AX	Ed25519 signature	64	2	2	88	66
BX	ECDSA secp256k1 signature	64	2	2	88	66

Four Character KERI Base64 Attached Signature Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
0AXX	Ed448 signature	114	0	4	156	117
OBXX						
0CXX						

Base64

Base64 Decode ASCII to Binary

Base64 Binary Decoding from ASCII


ASCII Char	Base64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary
A	0	00	000000	Q	16	10	010000	g	32	20	100000	w	48	30	110000
B	1	01	000001	R	17	11	010001	h	33	21	100001	x	49	31	110001
C	2	02	000010	S	18	12	010010	i	34	22	100010	y	50	32	110010
D	3	03	000011	T	19	13	010011	j	35	23	100011	z	51	33	110011
E	4	04	000100	U	20	14	010100	k	36	24	100100	0	52	34	110100
F	5	05	000101	V	21	15	010101	l	37	25	100101	1	53	35	110101
G	6	06	000110	W	22	16	010110	m	38	26	100110	2	54	36	110110
H	7	07	000111	X	23	17	010111	n	39	27	100111	3	55	37	110111
I	8	08	001000	Y	24	18	011000	o	40	28	101000	4	56	38	111000
J	9	09	001001	Z	25	19	011001	p	41	29	101001	5	57	39	111001
K	10	0A	001010	a	26	1A	011010	q	42	2A	101010	6	58	3A	111010
L	11	0B	001011	b	27	1B	011011	r	43	2B	101011	7	59	3B	111011
M	12	0C	001100	c	28	1C	011100	s	44	2C	101100	8	60	3C	111100
N	13	0D	001101	d	29	1D	011101	t	45	2D	101101	9	61	3D	111101
O	14	0E	001110	e	30	1E	011110	u	46	2E	101110	-	62	3E	111110
P	15	0F	001111	f	31	1F	011111	v	47	2F	101111	-	63	3F	111111

Base64 Encode Binary to ASCII

Base64 Binary Encoding to ASCII

Base64 Index Decimal	ASCII Char	ASCII Decimal	ASCII Hex	ASCII 8 bit Binary	Base64 Index Decimal	ASCII Char	ASCII Decimal	ASCII Hex	ASCII 8 bit Binary	Base64 Index Decimal	ASCII Char	ASCII Decimal	ASCII Hex	ASCII 8 bit Binary	Base64 Index Decimal	ASCII Char	ASCII Decimal	ASCII Hex	ASCII 8 bit Binary
0	A	65	41	01000001	16	Q	81	51	01010001	32	g	103	67	01100111	48	w	119	77	01110111
1	B	66	42	01000010	17	R	82	52	01010010	33	h	104	68	01101000	49	x	120	78	01111000
2	C	67	43	01000011	18	S	83	53	01010011	34	i	105	69	01101001	50	y	121	79	01111001
3	D	68	44	01000100	19	T	84	54	01010100	35	j	106	6A	01101010	51	z	122	7A	01111010
4	E	69	45	01000101	20	U	85	55	01010101	36	k	107	6B	01101011	52	0	48	30	00110000
5	F	70	46	01000110	21	V	86	56	01010110	37	l	108	6C	01101100	53	1	49	31	00110001
6	G	71	47	01000111	22	W	87	57	01010111	38	m	109	6D	01101101	54	2	50	32	00110010
7	H	72	48	01001000	23	X	88	58	01011000	39	n	110	6E	01101110	55	3	51	33	00110011
8	I	73	49	01001001	24	Y	89	59	01011001	40	o	111	6F	01101111	56	4	52	34	00110100
9	J	74	4A	01001010	25	Z	90	5A	01011010	41	p	112	70	01110000	57	5	53	35	00110101
10	K	75	4B	01001011	26	a	97	61	01100001	42	q	113	71	01100001	58	6	54	36	00110110
11	L	76	4C	01001100	27	b	98	62	01100010	43	r	114	72	01100010	59	7	55	37	00110111
12	M	77	4D	01001101	28	c	99	63	01100011	44	s	115	73	01100011	60	8	56	38	00111000
13	N	78	4E	01001110	29	d	100	64	01100100	45	t	116	74	01101000	61	9	57	39	00111001
14	O	79	4F	01001111	30	e	101	65	01100101	46	u	117	75	01101010	62	-	45	2D	00101101
15	P	80	50	01010000	31	f	102	66	01100110	47	v	118	76	01101010	63	-	95	5F	01011111

Smith's Identifier System Properties Triangle




May exhibit any two at the highest level but not all three at the highest level

Discovery


Ledger Based

Non-Ledger Based

DNS “Hierarchical” Discovery



DNS “Hierarchical” Discovery





\$ORIGIN example.com.


```

@      3600 SOA ns1.p30.oraclecloud.net. (
zone-admin.dyndns.com. ; address of responsible party
2016072701 ; serial number
3600 ; refresh period
600 ; retry period
604800 ; expire time
1800 ) ; minimum ttl
86400 NS ns1.p68.dns.oraclecloud.net.
86400 NS ns2.p68.dns.oraclecloud.net.
86400 NS ns3.p68.dns.oraclecloud.net.
86400 NS ns4.p68.dns.oraclecloud.net.
3600 MX 10 mail.example.com.
3600 MX 20 vpn.example.com.
3600 MX 30 mail.example.com.
60 A 204.13.248.106
3600 TXT "v=spf1 includespf.oraclecloud.net ~all"
mail 14400 A 204.13.248.106
vpn 60 A 216.146.45.240
webapp 60 A 216.146.46.10
webapp 60 A 216.146.46.11
www 43200 CNAME example.com.
  
```

DHT “Distributed” Discovery



DHT Discovery for KERI



Lookup IP address of any DHT Node Prefix

bootstrap DHT access from any cache (\approx DNS Server cache)

Query DHT for Latest Rotation Event of Controller Prefix

-> Extract Witness Prefixes from Event (\approx CName Record)

Query DHT for IP Address of Witness Prefix (\approx A Record)

Query Witness for KERL of Controller Prefix

Query Watcher Network for Duplicitous KERL of Controller Prefix

Certificate Transparency Problem

“The solution the computer world has relied on for many years is to introduce into the system trusted third parties (CAs) that vouch for the binding between the domain name and the private key. The problem is that we've managed to bless several hundred of these supposedly trusted parties, any of which can vouch for any domain name. Every now and then, one of them gets it wrong, sometimes spectacularly.”

Pinning inadequate

Notaries inadequate

DNSSec inadequate

All require trust in 3rd party compute infrastructure that is inherently vulnerable

Certificate Transparency: (related EFF SSL Observatory)

Public end-verifiable append-only event log with consistency and inclusion proofs

End-verifiable duplicity detection = Ambient verifiability of duplicity

Event log is third party infrastructure but zero trust because it is verifiable.

Sparse Merkle Trees for revocation of certificates

Certificate Transparency Solution

Public end-verifiable append-only event log with consistency and inclusion proofs
End-verifiable duplicity detection = ambient verifiability of duplicity
Event log is third party infrastructure but it is not trusted because logs are verifiable.
Sparse Merkle trees for revocation of certificates
(related EFF SSL Observatory)




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4