Key Event Receipt Infrastructure

A Secure Identifier Overlay for the Internet

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version 2.54
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Resources

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https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.02143
https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/KERI_WP_2.x.web.pdf
https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/presentations/KERI2_Overview.web.pdf
https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/presentations/DuplicityGame_IIW_2020_A.pdf
https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/keri
https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/keripy

DIF
Identity and Discovery WG
https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keri
https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keripy

SSI Meetup
https://ssimeetup.org/key-event-receipt-infrastructure-keri-secure-identifier-overlay-internet-sam-smith-webinar-58/

Background References

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https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.02143

Smith, S. M., "Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI) Design", 2020/04/22
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Certificate Transparency:

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https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668154

Google, "Certificate Transparency,"
http://www.certificate-transparency.org/home

Laurie, B. and Kasper, E., "Revocation Transparency,"
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Human *Basis-of-Trust*

“in person”

I can know you – therefore I can trust you

“on the internet”

I can’t really know you – therefore I can’t really trust you

Replace human *basis-of-trust* with cryptographic *root-of-trust.*

With verifiable digital signatures from asymmetric key crypto –
we may not trust in "*what*" was said, but we may trust in "*who*" said it.

We may *verify* that the *controller* of a private key, (*the who*), made a statement
but not the validity of the statement itself.

The *root-of-trust* is *consistent attribution* via verifiable integral non-repudiable statements

We may build trust over time in *what* was said via histories
of verifiably attributable (to *whom*) consistent statements i.e. *reputation*.

The Internet Protocol (IP) is *bro-ken* because it has no *security* layer.



Instead …

We use *bolt-on* identity system security overlays. (DNS-CA …)

Identity System Security Overlay

Establish authenticity of IP packet's message payload.





The overlay's security is contingent on the mapping's security.



Identifier Issuance

Administrative Identifier Issuance and Binding





Admin-Certifying Identifier Issuance

DNS Hijacking

A DNS hijacking wave is targeting companies at an almost unprecedented scale. Clever trick allows attackers to obtain valid TLS certificate for hijacked domains.

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/01/a-dns-hijacking-wave-is-targeting-companies-at-an-almost-unprecedented-scale/







BGP Hijacking: AS Path Poisoning

Spoof domain verification process from CA. Allows attackers to obtain valid TLS certificate for hijacked domains.

Birge-Lee, H., Sun, Y., Edmundson, A., Rexford, J. and Mittal, P., "Bamboozling certificate authorities with {BGP}," vol. 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium, no. {USENIX} Security 18, pp. 833-849, 2018 https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee

Gavrichenkov, A., "Breaking HTTPS with BGP Hijacking," BlackHat, 2015 https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf

AS path poisoning



I own 2.2.2.0/23

- Everyone sees announcement but looks less suspicious
- Connectivity preserved
- Almost any AS can perform
- Very stealthy
- Perfect setup to intercept traffic with certificate

Vulnerability of domains: sub-prefix attacks

- Any AS can launch
- Only prefix lengths less than /24 vulnerable (filtering)



Identity System Security Overlay



Spanning Layer





Hourglass


All Necessary Applications
Fewer Applications
Spanning Layer S
Weaker (fewer applications)
All Possible Supports
More Supports

Platform Locked Trust



Trust Domain Based Segmentation



Each trust layer only spans platform specific applications

Bifurcates the internet trust map

No spanning trust layer

Waist and Neck





Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance and Binding





Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance

Basic SCID







`BDKrJxkcR9m5u1xs33F5pxRJP6T7hJEbhpHrUtlDdhh0`

`did:un:BDKrJxkcR9m5u1xs33F5pxRJP6T7hJEbhpHrUtlDdhh0/path/to/resource?name=secure#really`

Self-Addressing SCID







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Multi-Sig Self-Addressing SCID







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Delegated Self-Addressing SCID







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Self-Signing SCID







Ledger Registration





The access identifier may have a self-certifying primary root-of-trust, but the registered identifier does not, even if its format appears to be self-certifying.

Autonomic Identifier (AID) and Namespace (AN)

auto nomos = self rule

autonomic = self-governing, self-controlling, etc.

An *autonomic* namespace is

self-certifying and hence *self-administrating.*

AIDs and ANs are *portable* = truly self-sovereign.

autonomic prefix = self-cert + UUID + URL = universal identifier

Trust Basis


controller
who's infrastructure ?
source-of-truth
?
verifies
validator
binding
identity
system
security
overlay
binding
key-pair
binding
identifier

Administrative Trust Basis



Algorithmic Trust Basis



Autonomic Trust Basis



Autonomic Identifier System



KERI

Zooko's Trilemma

Desirable identifier properties: secure, decentralized, human meaningful

Trilemma: May have any two of the three properties but not all three.

One way to sort of solve the trilemma is to uniquely register a human meaningful identifier on a ledger controlled by a different identifier that is secure and decentralized but not human meaningful.



Unified Identifier Model

AID: Autonomic Identifier (primary)

self-managing self-certifying identifier with cryptographic root of trust

secure, decentralized, portable, universally unique

L*ID*: Legitimized Human Meaningful Identifier (secondary)

legitimized within trust domain of given AID by a verifiable authorization from AID controller

authorization is verifiable to the root-of-trust of AID

Forms *AID*|*LID* couplet within trust domain of AID



KEY Event Based Provenance of Identifiers

KERI enables cryptographic *proof-of-control-authority* (*provenance*) for each identifier.

A *proof* is in the form of an identifier's *key event receipt log* (KERL).

KERLs are *End Verifiable*:

End user alone may verify. Zero trust in intervening infrastructure.

KERLs may be *Ambient Verifiable*:

Anyone may verify *anylog*, *anywhere*, at *anytime*.

KERI = self-cert root-of-trust + certificate transparency + KA^{2}CE + recoverable + post-quantum.

KERI for the *DID*ified

KERI non-transferable ephemeral with derivation code ~ did:key

KERI private direct mode (one-to-one) ~ did:peer

KERI public persistent indirect mode (one-to-any) ~ Indy interop, did:sov etc

KERI = did:un (did:uni, did:u) (all of the above in one method)

`did:un:`*`prefix`*`[:`*`options`*`][/`*`path`*`][?`*`query`*`][#`*`fragment`*`]`

KERI Agnosticism and Interop

KERI itself is completely agnostic about anything but the *prefix* !

`???:prefix[:options][/path][?query][#fragment]`

The KERI layer establishes control authority over a *prefix*

Any and *All* namespaces that share the same *prefix* may share the same KERI trust basis for control establishment over that *prefix* and hence that namespace.

Interop happens in a layer above the KERI layer

All we need for bootstrapping interop is some indication that the *prefix* inside identifier is KERI based (KERI trust basis).

Autonomic Identity System

why, *how* – *who* controls *what*, *when*, and *how*?

Root-of-Trust

cryptographic autonomic identifier = *why*, *how*

Source-of-Truth

controller of the private key = *who*

Loci-of-Control

authoritative operation = *what*, *when*, *how*

System Design Trade Space




end verifiable
self-certifying root-of-trust
pre-rotation
portable
KERI
duplicity detection
spanning layer
separated control
scalable

Key Event Message



Event Chaining



Inconsistency and Duplicity



inconsistency: lacking agreement, as two or more things in relation to each other

duplicity: acting in two different ways to different people concerning the same matter

Internal vs. External Inconsistency

Internally inconsistent log = not verifiable.

Log verification from self-certifying root-of-trust protects against internal inconsistency.

Externally inconsistent log with a purported copy of log but both verifiable = duplicitous.

Duplicity detection protects against external inconsistency.

Duplicity Game

Cate promises to provide a consistent pair-wise log.

Local Consistency Guarantee

How may Cate be duplicitous and not get caught?



private (one-to-one) interactions

Duplicity Game

Service promises to provide a consistent log to anyone.

Local Consistency Guarantee

How may Cate/Service/Agent be duplicitous and not get caught?

Cate
Controller
Log

Truncate Log

Delete Log

Service/Agent
Controlled by Cate
Log

A

B A

Log V1 Log V2

Log V2

Eve
Validator
Log

Joe
Validator
Log

highly available, private (one-to-one) interactions

Duplicity Game

Service promises to provide exact same log to everyone.

Global Consistency Guarantee

How may Cate and/or service be duplicitous and not get caught?

Cate
Controller
Log

Breaking the promise of global consistency is a provable liability.

Global consistency may only matter after Eve and Joe need to interact not before.

Service
Controlled by Cate
Log

Truncate Log

?

isolate network

isolate network

A

Delete Log

A

Doug
Global Duplicity
Log

log V1

log V2

Eve
Validator
Log

Ambient Duplicity Detection

Joe
Validator
Log

global consistent, highly available, and public (one-to-any) interactions

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`did:un:`*`prefix`*`[:`*`options`*`][/`*`path`*`][?`*`query`*`][#`*`fragment`*`]`

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Any and *All* namespaces that share the same *prefix* may share the same KERI trust basis for control establishment over that *prefix* and hence that namespace.

Interop happens in a layer above the KERI layer

All we need for bootstrapping interop is some indication that the *prefix* inside identifier is KERI based (KERI trust basis).

Self-Certifying Identifier Prefixes

All crypto material appears in KERI in a fully qualified representation that includes a derivation code prepended to the crypto-material.

Identifier prefixes are fully qualified crypto-material.

Event Sequencing



Establishment Events



Establishment Subsequence



Non-Establishment Events







Seal (Anchor)

seal provides evidence of authenticity

A *seal* anchors arbitrary data to an event in the key event sequence thereby providing proof of control authority for that data at the location of the anchoring event.

Seals make KERI both privacy preserving and *data semantic agnostic.*

Context independent extensibility via externally layered APIs for anchored data instead of context dependent extensibility via internal linked data or tag registries.

Interoperability is total w.r.t. establishment of control authority.

Minimally sufficient means.

Pre-Rotation







Digest of *next* key(s) makes pre-rotation post-quantum secure

Key Infrastructure Valence







Repurposed Keys





Univalent Key Roles

Repurposed Rotation to Interaction



Rotation Only



Delegation (Cross Anchor)



Interaction Delegation



Scaling Delegation via Interaction



Rotation Delegation





Scaling Delegation via Rotation



Δ→ X : Delegation to X

Δ← A : Delegation from A

Security Concepts

Availability, Consistency, and Duplicity

Harm to controller: Unavailability, loss of control authority, externally forced duplicity

Harm to validator: Inadvertent acceptance of verifiable but forged or duplicitous events

Local vs. Global Duplicity Guarantees

Direct Mode vs. Indirect Mode Operation

Malicious Controller vs. Malicious Third Party

Live Exploit vs. Dead Exploit

Controller Protection vs. Validator Protection

Protection to controller: key management, promulgation consensus, redundancy.

Protection to validator: verifiable logs, verification consensus, duplicity detection

Ledger Attack Vectors

TABLE I

ATTACK VECTORS RELATED TO THE ATTACK CLASS IN BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS. WE ALSO SHOW, BY REFERENCING TO THE PRIOR WORK, HOW EACH ATTACK AFFECTS THE ENTITIES INVOLVED WITH BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS. FOR INSTANCE, ORPHANED BLOCKS AFFECT THE BLOCKCHAIN, THE MINERS, AND THE MINING POOLS.

	Attacks	Blockchain	Miners	Mining Pools	Exchanges	Application	Users
Blockchain Structure	Forks [26]	✓					
	Orphaned blocks [27]	✓	✓	✓			
Peer-to-Peer System	DNS hijacks [28]		✓	✓	✓		✓
	BGP hijacks [29]		✓	✓			✓
	Eclipse attack [30]		✓				✓
	Majority attack [31]	✓	✓			✓	
	Selfish mining [32]	✓	✓	✓			
	DDoS attacks [33]	✓	✓	✓			
	Consensus Delay [34]		✓	✓			✓
	Block Withholding [34]		✓	✓			
	Timejacking attacks [35]		✓	✓		✓	
	Finney attacks [36]		✓	✓			✓
Blockchain Application	Blockchain Ingestion [37]	✓					
	Wallet theft [38]				✓	✓	✓
	Double-spending [39]	✓					✓
	Cryptojacking [40]					✓	✓
	Smart contract DoS [41]	✓				✓	✓
	≈ Reentracy attacks [42]					✓	✓
	≈ Overflow attacks [42]					✓	✓
	≈ Replay attacks [41]	✓		✓		✓	✓
	≈ Short address attacks [42]					✓	
	≈ Balance attacks [41]					✓	✓

Exploring the Attack Surface of Blockchain: A Systematic Overview https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.03487.pdf

Ledger Attack Effects

TABLE II

IMPLICATIONS OF EACH ATTACK ON THE BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEM IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRIOR WORK. FOR INSTANCE, FORKS CAN LEAD TO CHAIN SPLITTING AND REVENUE LOSS. AS A RESULT OF A FORK, ONE AMONG THE CANDIDATE CHAINS IS SELECTED BY THE NETWORK WHILE THE OTHERS ARE INVALIDATED. THIS LEADS TO INVALIDATION OF TRANSACTION AND REVENUE LOSS TO MINERS.

	Attacks	Chain Splitting	Revenue Loss	Partitioning	Malicious Mining	Delay	Info Loss	Theft
Blockchain Splitting	Forks [26]	✓	✓					
	Orphaned Blocks [27]		✓					
P2P System	DNS hijacks [28]		✓	✓				✓
	BGP hijacks [29]		✓	✓				✓
	Eclipse attacks [30]			✓				
	Majority attacks [31]	✓	✓		✓			
	Selfish mining [32]		✓		✓			
	DDoS attacks [33]				✓			✓
	Consensus Delay [34]					✓	✓	
	Block Withholding [34]		✓		✓			
	Timejacking attacks [35]	✓	✓		✓	✓		
	Finney attacks [36]		✓					
Blockchain Application	Blockchain Ingestion [37]						✓	
	Wallet theft [38]		✓					✓
	Double-spending [39]							
	Cryptojacking [40]	✓			✓			✓
	Smart contract DoS [41]		✓			✓		✓
	≈ Reentracy attacks [42]		✓					✓
	≈ Overflow attacks [42]							✓
	≈ Replay attacks [41]		✓				✓	
	≈ Short address attacks [42]		✓					✓
	≈ Balance attacks [41]		✓					✓

Exploring the Attack Surface of Blockchain: A Systematic Overview https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.03487.pdf

Apples-to-Apples

Ledger:

Network paid by transaction fees

(more or less competitive within the network)

Successful exploits without compromised keys

Controller:

Highly available nodes of other's choosing

Must trust that a majority are honest

No recovery if keys compromised

Validator;

Need full copy of ledger (big)

Need full access to network

Must trust that a majority are honest

KERI:

Networks paid by transaction fees

(competitive across all networks)

Controller:

Highly available nodes of own choosing

Must "*trust*" that a majority are honest

Successful exploits must compromise keys

Recovery if keys compromised

Validator:

Need full copy of KEL (small)

Need full access to network of own choosing.

Must "*trust*" that a majority are honest

Protocol Operational Modes

Direct Event Replay Mode (one-to-one)

Indirect Event Replay Mode (one-to-any)

Direct Mode: A to B



Direct Mode: B to A



Indirect Mode Promulgation Service



Establishment Events



Indirect Mode
Promulgation and Confirmation Services



Indirect Mode Full



Indirect Mode with Ledger Oracles



Separation of Control

Shared ledger = *shared control* over *shared data*.

Shared *data* = *good*, shared *control* = *bad*.

Shared control between controllers and validators may be problematic for governance, scalability, and performance.

KERI = *separated control* over *shared data*.

Separated control between controllers and validators may provide better decentralization, more flexibility, better scalability, lower cost, higher performance, and more privacy at comparable security.

Live Exploit (current signing keys)

Hard Problem:

Recovery from Live Exploit of Current Signing Keys



Pre-rotation provides protection from successful *live* exploit of current signing keys.

Live Exploit (next signing keys)



Difficulty of inverting *next* key(s) protects against successful *live* exploit.

Dead Exploit (stale next signing keys)



Any copy of original history protects against successful *dead* exploit: First Seen Wins

Witnessing Rules

An honest witness will only *witness*, (i.e. create, store, and promulgate a receipt for), at most *one and only one version* of any event.
That event version must first be verified.
A verified event version must be signed by the controller's authoritative keys as determined by prior events.
A verified event version must be consistent with all prior events.

Agreement

A *state of agreement* about a version of an event is defined with respect to *set* of witnesses in agreement:
Each witness in that *set* has witnessed the same version of that event and each receipt in that set has been promulgated to every other witness in that *set*.
The size of an agreement is the number of contributing witnesses in the *set*.
The associated *agreement* include a receipt from each witness in the *set*.
This state of agreement is provable to any validator, watcher, juror, or judge via a verifiable fully receipted copy of the event i.e the *agreement*.
This copy provides *proof of agreement*.
Such a proof may be obtained via any verifiable KERL that includes that version of that event.

Definitions

$N =$ number of witness

$M =$ size of agreement

$F =$ faulty witnesses

V *Validator*

C *Controller*

Threshold of Accountable Duplicity

TOAD

$\boldsymbol{M}_C$

$\boldsymbol{M}_V$

Sufficient Agreement

Controller's Guarantee

$$\boldsymbol{M} \geq \boldsymbol{M}_C$$

Validator's Choice

$$\boldsymbol{M}_V \geq \boldsymbol{M}_C$$

Algorithm Objectives

Any pre-existing copy or digest of original KERL available to Validator protects Validator from future dead exploits.

KAACE provides fault tolerance from live exploit.

A successful but recoverable live exploit is a compromise of the controller's current signing keys and/or a compromise of the witnesses' signing keys.

A) WRT Controller, a successful live exploit of the witnesses' would prevent sufficient agreement thereby inducing a recovery operation.

B) WRT Validator, a successful live exploit would produce undetectably duplicitous but sufficient agreement about current events.

(KAACE immune agreement prevents this, i.e. Validator is immune)

Detectable vs Undetectable Duplicity

Witness Duplicity

Witness Duplicity is Detectable.

Controller Duplicity

Controller Duplicity wrt witnesses is undetectable if a sufficient number of witnesses are not duplicitous and sufficient agreement is small enough.

(KA²CE)
Keri's Agreement Algorithm for Control Establishment

Produce Witnessed Agreements with Guarantees



Agreement Constraints

N = number of witness

M = size of agreement

F = faulty witnesses

V *Validator*

C *Controller*

Proper Agreement

$$F + 1$$

Bounds on Sufficient Agreement

$$M > F$$

$$M \leq N - F$$

$$F < M \leq N - F$$

Intact Agreement

$$N \geq 2F + 1$$

One Agreement or None at All (*Immune*)

first seen rule limits liveness induces recovery rotation

$$\left|\widehat{N}\right| = N \qquad \left|\widehat{M}_1\right| = \left|\widehat{M}_2\right| = M$$

Overlapping Sets

$$\widehat{M}_1 \bigcup \widehat{M}_2 = \widehat{N}$$



One honest witness if:

$$\left|\widehat{M}_1 \bigcap \widehat{M}_2\right| \geq F+1$$

$$\left|\widehat{M}_1 \bigcup \widehat{M}_2\right| = \left|\widehat{N}\right| = N$$

$$\left|\widehat{M}_1\right| + \left|\widehat{M}_2\right| = \left|\widehat{M}_1 \bigcup \widehat{M}_2\right| + \left|\widehat{M}_1 \bigcap \widehat{M}_2\right|$$

$$2M = N + F + 1$$

$$M \geq \left\lceil \frac{N+F+1}{2} \right\rceil$$

$$M \leq N - F$$

Immune Agreement

$$\frac{N+F+1}{2} \leq M \leq N - F$$

Example Values

Immunity

F	N	3F+1	$\left\lceil \frac{N+F+1}{2} \right\rceil$	N-F	M
1	4	4	3	3	3
1	5	4	4	4	4
1	6	4	4	5	4, 5
1	7	4	5	6	5, 6
1	8	4	5	7	5, 6, 7
1	9	4	6	8	6, 7, 8
2	7	7	5	5	5
2	8	7	6	6	6
2	9	7	6	7	6, 7
2	10	7	7	8	7, 8
2	11	7	7	9	7, 8, 9
2	12	7	8	10	8, 9, 10
3	10	10	7	7	7
3	11	10	8	8	8
3	12	10	8	9	8, 9
3	13	10	9	10	9, 10
3	14	10	9	11	9, 10, 11
3	15	10	10	12	10, 11, 12

Recovery from Live Exploit Of Current Signing Keys



Function Stack

KERI





Authorizations after Establishment

On Top of KERI



Design follows the *Hourglass Model* of a stack of thin layers

Rotate Prefix vs Rotate Keys

Non-transferable may not rotate keys. May only rotate prefix
Rotate prefix good for bootstrapping. No key event log (KEL) needed.
If prefix has no persistent value outside its function and its function may be marshaled by some other prefix controller then rotating prefix may be preferred.

Events


Inception Event Data
Header
version v1
prefix C
sn 0
ilk icp
Key Config
sith initial
public keys initial
threshold key digest next
Witness Config
toad initial
witnesses initial
Other Config
cnfg initial
signatures initial
Rotation Event Data
Header
version v1
prefix C
sn 1
ilk rot
digest prev
Key Config
sith current
public keys current
threshold key digest next
Witness Config
toad new
witnesses prune
witnesses graft
Payload
data seals
signatures current
Delegating Rotation Event Data
Header
version v1
prefix C
sn 5
ilk rot
digest prev
Key Config
sith current
public keys current
digest next
Witness Config
toad new
witnesses prune
witnesses graft
Data (Seals)
Delegated Event Seal
prefix D
digest event
signatures current
Delegating Interaction Event Data
Header
version v1
prefix C
sn 4
ilk ixn
digest prev
Data (Seals)
Delegated Event Seal
prefix D
digest event
signatures current

State Verifier Engine



Delegated State Verifier Engine



Witness Designation





Witnessed Key Event Receipt

$$\left\langle \varepsilon_k^C \right\rangle W_0^C \sigma_{W_0^C}^C$$

$$\left\langle \varepsilon_k^C \right\rangle W_0^C \sigma_{W_0^C}^C W_1^C \sigma_{W_1^C}^C$$

Generic Event Formats



Generic Inception

$$\varepsilon_0^C = \left\langle \nu_0^C, C, t_0^C, \texttt{icp}, K_0^C, \widehat{C}_0^C, \eta_0^C\left(\left\langle K_1^C, \widehat{C}_1^C \right\rangle\right), M_0^C, \widehat{W}_0^C, [cnfg] \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_0^C$$

$$\widehat{C}_0^C = \left[C^0, \ldots, C^{L_0^C - 1} \right]_0^C$$

$$\widehat{C}_1^C = \left[C^{r_1}, \ldots, C^{r_1 + L_1^C - 1} \right]_1^C$$

$$\widehat{W}_0^C = \left[W_0^C, \ldots, W_{N_0^C - 1}^C \right]_0^C$$

$$\widehat{\sigma}_0^C = \sigma_{C^{s0}} \ldots \sigma_{C^{s S_0^C - 1}}$$

Generic Rotation

$$\varepsilon_k^C = \left\langle \nu_k^C, C, t_k^C, \eta_k^C\left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C\right), \texttt{rot}, K_l^C, \widehat{C}_l^C, \eta_l^C\left(\left\langle K_{l+1}^C, \widehat{C}_{l+1}^C \right\rangle\right), M_l^C, \widehat{X}_l^C, \widehat{Y}_l^C, [seals] \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^C$$

$$\widehat{C}_l^C = \left[C^{r_l^C}, \ldots, C^{r_l^C + L_l^C - 1} \right]_l^C$$

$$\widehat{C}_{l+1}^C = \left[C^{r_{l+1}^C}, \ldots, C^{r_{l+1}^C + L_{l+1}^C - 1} \right]_{l+1}^C$$

$$\widehat{X}_l^C = \left[X_0^C, \ldots, X_{O_l^C - 1}^C \right]_l^C$$

$$\widehat{Y}_l^C = \left[Y_0^C, \ldots, Y_{P_l^C - 1}^C \right]_l^C$$

$$\widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^C = \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_0}} \ldots \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_{S_{kl}^C - 1}}}$$

Generic Interaction

$$\varepsilon_k^C = \left\langle \nu_k^C, C, t_k^C, \eta_k^C\left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C\right), \texttt{ixn}, [seals] \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^C$$

$$K_l^C$$

$$\widehat{C}_l^C = \left[C^{r_l^C}, \ldots, C^{r_l^C + L_l^C - 1} \right]_l^C$$

$$\widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^C = \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_0}} \ldots \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_{S_{kl}^C - 1}}}$$

Generic Delegating Event Formats





Generic Delegated Event Formats



Inception Delegation

$$\widehat{\Delta}_0^D = \left\{ D, t_0^D, \eta_k^C \left(\varepsilon_0^D \right) \right\}$$ Delegated Event Seal

$$\varepsilon_0^D = \left\langle \nu_0^D, D, t_0^D, \mathtt{dip}, K_0^D, \widehat{D}_0^D, M_0^D, \widehat{W}_0^D, \left[perms \right], \widehat{\Delta}_k^C \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_0^D$$

$$\widehat{D}_0^D = \left[D^0, \ldots, D^{L_0^D - 1} \right]_0^D$$

$$\widehat{W}_0^C = \left[W_0^C, \ldots, W_{N_0^C - 1}^C \right]_0^C$$

$$\widehat{\Delta}_k^C = \left\{ C, t_k^C, ilk, \eta_k^C \left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C \right) \right\}$$ Delegating Event Location Seal

$$\widehat{\sigma}_0^D = \sigma_{D^{s0}} \ldots \sigma_{D^{s S_0^D - 1}}$$

Rotation Delegation

$$\widehat{\Delta}_k^D = \left\{ D, t_k^D, \eta_k^C \left(\varepsilon_k^D \right) \right\}$$ Delegated Event Seal

$$\varepsilon_k^D = \left\langle \nu_k^D, D, t_k^D, \eta_k^D \left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^D \right), \mathtt{drt}, K_l^D, \widehat{D}_l^D, M_l^D, \widehat{X}_l^D, \widehat{Y}_l^D, [perms], \widehat{\Delta}_k^C \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^D$$

$$\widehat{D}_l^D = \left[D^{r_l^D}, \ldots, D^{r_l^D + L_l^D - 1} \right]_l^D$$

$$\widehat{X}_l^D = \left[X_0^D, \ldots, X_{O_l^D - 1}^D \right]_l^D$$

$$\widehat{Y}_l^D = \left[Y_0^D, \ldots, Y_{P_l^D - 1}^D \right]_l^D$$

$$\widehat{\Delta}_k^C = \left\{ C, t_k^C, ilk, \eta_k^C \left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C \right) \right\}$$ Delegating Event Location Seal

$$\widehat{\sigma}_{kl} = \sigma_{C^{+r_l^D + s_0}} \ldots \sigma_{C^{r_l^D + s_{S_{kl}^D - 1}}}$$

Delegated Interaction

$$\varepsilon_k^D = \left\langle \nu_k^D, D, t_k^D, \eta_k^D\left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^D\right), \texttt{ixn}, \left[seals\right] \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^D$$

Receipt Messages

$$\rho^{C}_{\tilde{W}^{C}_{ls}}\left(\varepsilon^{C}_{k}\right)=\left\langle \nu^{C}_{k},C,t^{C}_{k},\texttt{rct},\eta^{C}_{k}\left(\varepsilon^{C}_{k}\right)\right\rangle W^{C}_{l0}\sigma^{C}_{W^{C}_{l0}},\ldots,W^{C}_{lN^{C}_{s}-1}\sigma^{C}_{W^{C}_{lN_{s}-1}}$$



$$\rho^{C}_{V}\left(\varepsilon^{C}_{k}\right)=\left\langle \nu^{C}_{k},C,t^{C}_{k},\texttt{vrc},\eta^{C}_{k}\left(\varepsilon^{C}_{k}\right),\widehat{\Delta}^{V}_{k}\right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}^{C}_{V_{l}}$$

$$\widehat{\Delta}^{V}_{k}=\left\{V,\eta^{V}_{k}\left(\varepsilon^{V}_{k}\right)\right\}$$

Witness Rotations

$$\widehat{W}_0 = \left[W_0 , W_1 , \cdots , W_{N-1} \right]$$

$$\widehat{W}_l = \left(\widehat{W}_{l-1} - \widehat{X}_l \right) \bigcap \widehat{Y}_l$$

$$\widehat{X}_l \subseteq \widehat{W}_{l-1} \quad \widehat{Y}_l \not\subset \widehat{W}_{l-1} \quad \widehat{X}_l \not\subset \widehat{W}_l$$

$$N_l = N_{l-1} - O_l + P_l$$

$$M_l \leq N_l$$

$$\left| \widehat{X}_l \right| = O_l \quad \left| \widehat{Y}_l \right| = P_l \quad \left| \widehat{W}_l \right| = N_l$$

$$\widehat{U}_{l-1} \subseteq \widehat{W}_{l-1} \qquad \left| \widehat{U}_{l-1} \right| \geq M_{l-1}$$

$$\widehat{U}_l \subseteq \widehat{W}_l \qquad \left| \widehat{U}_l \right| \geq M_l$$

$$\left| \widehat{U}_{l-1} \bigcup \widehat{U}_l \right| \leq M_{l-1} + M_l$$

Complex Weighted Signing Thresholds

$$\widehat{C}_l = \left[C_l^1, \ldots, C_l^{L_l} \right]_l$$

$$\widehat{K}_l = \left[U_l^1, \ldots, U_l^{L_1} \right]_l$$

$$0 < U_l^j \leq 1$$

$$\widehat{s}_k^l = \left[s_0, \ldots, s_{S_k^l - 1} \right]_k^l$$

$$\bar{U}_l = \sum_{i=s_0}^{s_{S_k-1}} U_l^i \geq 1$$

$$\widehat{C} = \left[C^1, C^2, C^3 \right]$$

$$U_l^j = 1 / K_l$$

$$\widehat{K} = \left[1/2, 1/2, 1/2 \right]$$

$$\widehat{K}_l = \left[1/2, 1/2, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4 \right]_l$$

$$\widehat{K}_l = \left[\left[1/2, 1/2, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4 \right], \left[1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2 \right], \left[1, 1, 1, 1 \right] \right]$$

BACKGROUND



KERI

Cryptographic Material Derivation Code Tables

Length of crypt material determines number of pad characters. One character table for one pad char. Two character table for two pad char.

One Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code Selector

Derivation Code	Prefix Description
0	Two character derivation code. Use two character table.
1	Four character derivation code. Use four character table.
2	Five character derivation code. Use five character table.
3	Six character derivation code. Use six character table.
4	Eight character derivation code. Use eight character table.
5	Nine character derivation code. Use nine character table.
6	Ten character derivation code. Use ten character table.
-	Count code for attached receipts. Use receipt count code table(s)

Four Character KERI Base64 Count Code for Attached Receipt Couplets

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Count Code Length	Qual Length Base64	Code Length Bytes
-A*XX*	Count of Attached Qualified Base64 Receipt Couplets	0	0	4	4	3
-B*XX*	Count of Attached Qualified Base2 Receipt Couplets	0	0	4	4	3

One Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
A	Non-transferable prefix using Ed25519 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
B	X25519 public encryption key. May be converted from Ed25519 public signing verification key.	32	1	1	44	33
C	Ed25519 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
D	Blake3-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
E	Blake2b-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
F	Blake2s-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
G	Non-transferable prefix using ECDSA secp256k1 public singing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
H	ECDSA secp256k1 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
I	SHA3-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
J	SHA2-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33

Two Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
0A	Ed25519 signature. Self-signing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0B	ECDSA secp256k1 signature. Self-signing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0C	Blake3-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0D	SHA3-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0E	Blake2b-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0F	SHA2-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66

Attached Signature Derivation Code Tables

Length of crypt material determines number of pad characters. One character table for one pad char. Two character table for two pad char.

Two Character KERI Base64 Attached Signature Selection Code

Derivation Code	Selector Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
0	Four character attached signature code. Use four character table					
1	Five character attached signature code. Use five character table					
2	Six character attached signature code. Use six character table					
-	Count code for attached signatures. Use attached signature count code table(s)					

Two Character KERI Base64 Attached Signature Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
A*X*	Ed25519 signature	64	2	2	88	66
B*X*	ECDSA secp256k1 signature	64	2	2	88	66

Four Character KERI Base64 Attached Signature Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
0A*XX*	Ed448 signature	114	0	4	156	117
OB*XX*						
0C*XX*						

Four Character KERI Base64 Count Code for Attached Signatures

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Count Code Length	Qual Length Base64	Code Length Bytes
-A*XX*	Count of Attached Qualified Base64 Signatures	0	0	4	4	3
-B*XX*	Count of Attached Qualified Base2 Signatures	0	0	4	4	3

Base64

Base64 Decode ASCII to Binary

Base64 Binary Decoding from ASCII

ASCII Char	Base64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary
A	0	00	000000	Q	16	10	010000	g	32	20	100000	w	48	30	110000
B	1	01	000001	R	17	11	010001	h	33	21	100001	x	49	31	110001
C	2	02	000010	S	18	12	010010	i	34	22	100010	y	50	32	110010
D	3	03	000011	T	19	13	010011	j	35	23	100011	z	51	33	110011
E	4	04	000100	U	20	14	010100	k	36	24	100100	0	52	34	110100
F	5	05	000101	V	21	15	010101	l	37	25	100101	1	53	35	110101
G	6	06	000110	W	22	16	010110	m	38	26	100110	2	54	36	110110
H	7	07	000111	X	23	17	010111	n	39	27	100111	3	55	37	110111
I	8	08	001000	Y	24	18	011000	o	40	28	101000	4	56	38	111000
J	9	09	001001	Z	25	19	011001	p	41	29	101001	5	57	39	111001
K	10	0A	001010	a	26	1A	011010	q	42	2A	101010	6	58	3A	111010
L	11	0B	001011	b	27	1B	011011	r	43	2B	101011	7	59	3B	111011
M	12	0C	001100	c	28	1C	011100	s	44	2C	101100	8	60	3C	111100
N	13	0D	001101	d	29	1D	011101	t	45	2D	101101	9	61	3D	111101
O	14	0E	001110	e	30	1E	011110	u	46	2E	101110	-	62	3E	111110
P	15	0F	001111	f	31	1F	011111	v	47	2F	101111	_	63	3F	111111

Base64 Encode Binary to ASCII

Base64 Binary Encoding to ASCII

Base64 Index Decimal	ASCII Char	ASCII Decimal	ASCII Hex	ASCII 8 bit Binary	Base64 Index Decimal	ASCII Char	ASCII Decimal	ASCII Hex	ASCII 8 bit Binary	Base64 Index Decimal	ASCII Char	ASCII Decimal	ASCII Hex	ASCII 8 bit Binary	Base64 Index Decimal	ASCII Char	ASCII Decimal	ASCII Hex	ASCII 8 bit Binary
0	A	65	41	01000001	**16**	Q	81	51	01010001	**32**	g	103	67	01100111	**48**	w	119	77	01110111
1	B	66	42	01000010	**17**	R	82	52	01010010	**33**	h	104	68	01101000	**49**	x	120	78	01111000
2	C	67	43	01000011	**18**	S	83	53	01010011	**34**	i	105	69	01101001	**50**	y	121	79	01111001
3	D	68	44	01000100	**19**	T	84	54	01010100	**35**	j	106	6A	01101010	**51**	z	122	7A	01111010
4	E	69	45	01000101	**20**	U	85	55	01010101	**36**	k	107	6B	01101011	**52**	0	48	30	00110000
5	F	70	46	01000110	**21**	V	86	56	01010110	**37**	l	108	6C	01101100	**53**	1	49	31	00110001
6	G	71	47	01000111	**22**	W	87	57	01010111	**38**	m	109	6D	01101101	**54**	2	50	32	00110010
7	H	72	48	01001000	**23**	X	88	58	01011000	**39**	n	110	6E	01101110	**55**	3	51	33	00110011
8	I	73	49	01001001	**24**	Y	89	59	01011001	**40**	o	111	6F	01101111	**56**	4	52	34	00110100
9	J	74	4A	01001010	**25**	Z	90	5A	01011010	**41**	p	112	70	01110000	**57**	5	53	35	00110101
10	K	75	4B	01001011	**26**	a	97	61	01100001	**42**	q	113	71	01110001	**58**	6	54	36	00110110
11	L	76	4C	01001100	**27**	b	98	62	01100010	**43**	r	114	72	01110010	**59**	7	55	37	00110111
12	M	77	4D	01001101	**28**	c	99	63	01100011	**44**	s	115	73	01110011	**60**	8	56	38	00111000
13	N	78	4E	01001110	**29**	d	100	64	01100100	**45**	t	116	74	01110100	**61**	9	57	39	00111001
14	O	79	4F	01001111	**30**	e	101	65	01100101	**46**	u	117	75	01110101	**62**	-	45	2D	00101101
15	P	80	50	01010000	**31**	f	102	66	01100110	**47**	v	118	76	01110110	**63**	_	95	5F	01011111

Smith’s Identifier System Properties Triangle



May exhibit any two at the highest level but not all three at the highest level

Discovery

Ledger Based

Non-Ledger Based

DNS “Hierarchical” Discovery



Diagrams from https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/what-is-dns/

DNS “Hierarchical” Discovery






```
$ORIGIN example.com.
                        @               3600 SOA   ns1.p30.oraclecloud.net. (
                        zone-admin.dyndns.com.    ; address of responsible party
                        2016072701              ; serial number
                        3600                    ; refresh period
                        600                     ; retry period
                        604800                  ; expire time
                        1800                    ) ; minimum ttl
                        86400 NS    ns1.p68.dns.oraclecloud.net.
                        86400 NS    ns2.p68.dns.oraclecloud.net.
                        86400 NS    ns3.p68.dns.oraclecloud.net.
                        86400 NS    ns4.p68.dns.oraclecloud.net.
                        3600 MX    10 mail.example.com.
                        3600 MX    20 vpn.example.com.
                        3600 MX    30 mail.example.com.
                        60 A     204.13.248.106
                        3600 TXT   "v=spf1 includespf.oraclecloud.net ~all"
                        mail            14400 A     204.13.248.106
                        vpn               60 A     216.146.45.240
                        webapp            60 A     216.146.46.10
                        webapp            60 A     216.146.46.11
www                     43200 CNAME example.com.
```

DHT “Distributed” Discovery



Diagrams from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table

Kademlia



Diagrams from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kademlia

DHT Discovery for KERI

Resolve Node Prefix to IP Mapping

Prefix to Inception/Latest Rotation Event Caching
-> Extract Witness Prefixes from Event

Witness Prefix to IP Mapping

KERL Query to Witness Node

Diagrams from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table

Diagrams from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kademlia

Certificate Transparency Problem

“The solution the computer world has relied on for many years is to introduce into the system trusted third parties (CAs) that vouch for the binding between the domain name and the private key. The problem is that we've managed to bless several hundred of these supposedly trusted parties, any of which can vouch for any domain name. Every now and then, one of them gets it wrong, sometimes spectacularly.”

Pinning inadequate
Notaries inadequate
DNSSec inadequate
All require trust in 3rd party compute infrastructure that is inherently vulnerable

Certificate Transparency: (related EFF SSL Observatory)
Public end-verifiable append-only event log with consistency and inclusion proofs
End-verifiable duplicity detection = Ambient verifiability of duplicity
Event log is third party infrastructure but zero trust because it is verifiable.
Sparse Merkle Trees for revocation of certificates

Certificate Transparency Solution

Public end-verifiable append-only event log with consistency and inclusion proofs
End-verifiable duplicity detection = ambient verifiability of duplicity
Event log is third party infrastructure but it is not trusted because logs are verifiable.
Sparse Merkle trees for revocation of certificates
(related EFF SSL Observatory)



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4