## Extension of Model Extraction Using API Queries

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#### Introduction

- Al models are expensive and widely deployed.
- Attackers can extract models using only API queries.
- This project extends an existing attack to:
  - Other activation functions (LeakyReLU, Tanh, Sigmoid)
  - Multi-class classifiers

### Background

- Given attack in the paper works for ReLU activated, single output models.
- Works on the fact that ReLU is piecewise linear and can be modeled using matrix multiplications by mapping 1s and 0s.

### Background

- Broad attack steps:
  - Collect boundary points
  - 2 Recover model signature
  - Recover weights
  - 4 Recover biases
  - Filter functionally equivalent models

# Scope of Project

- Extension to other activation functions
- Extension to multi-class outputs

# **Extension to other Activation Functions**

### Extension to LeakyReLU

ReLU vs. LeakyReLU:

$$ReLU(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x < 0 \\ x & \text{if } x \ge 0 \end{cases}$$

LeakyReLU(x) = 
$$\begin{cases} \alpha x & \text{if } x < 0 \\ x & \text{if } x \ge 0 \end{cases}$$

#### Math behind the ReLU attack

$$f_{\theta}(x) = A^{(k+1)} \cdots \left( I_{P}^{(1)} (A^{(1)} x + b^{(1)}) \right) \cdots + b^{(k+1)}$$

$$= A^{(k+1)} I_{P}^{(k)} A^{(k)} \cdots I_{P}^{(2)} A^{(2)} I_{P}^{(1)} A^{(1)} x + B_{P}$$

$$= \Gamma_{P} x + B_{P}$$

### Extension to LeakyReLU

- ullet Changes in approach: Replace 0s with lpha in diagonal matrices.
- Code update: Modified forward pass in f\_cheat() and get\_maps() and signature comparison in compare\_model\_signatures().

#### Extension to LeakyReLU

```
for j in range(di):
        if ps[i][j] == 1:
             DMs[i][j][j] = 1
             DMs[i][j][j] = LEAKY ALPHA
for i in range(layer num):
   h = np.matmul(ws[i], h) + bs[i]
   if i != layer num - 1:
       h = np.where(h > 0, h, LEAKY ALPHA * h)
assert len(h) == 1
soft label = np.squeeze(h)
       map.append(tp)
       h = np.where(h > 0, h, LEAKY ALPHA * h)
return map
```

Figure: Changes for LeakyReLU

#### Extension to Tanh

• Approximate tanh as piecewise linear:

$$anh(x) pprox egin{cases} -1 & ext{if } x < -1 \ x & ext{if } |x| \leq 1 \ 1 & ext{if } x > 1 \end{cases}$$

• Define active region as  $-1 \le x \le 1$ .

#### Extension to Tanh

- Change in approach:
  - Change the regions for which 1s and 0s are mapped onto the matrix.
  - 2 Add a bias vector to take care of  $\pm 1$

0

$$f_{\theta}(x) = A^{(k+1)} \cdots \left( I_{P}^{(1)} (A^{(1)} x + b^{(1)}) + V_{P}^{(1)} \right) \cdots + b^{(k+1)}$$
$$= \Gamma_{P}' x + B_{P}'$$

Changes were made in the f\_cheat() and get\_maps() function.

#### Extension to Tanh

```
tp = np.squeeze((h > -1) & (h < 1)).astype(int)
tp = convert_array_into_scalar(tp)
map.append(tp)

# optional: still mask h as before, or choose a new transformation
h = np.tanh(h)

for i in range(layer_num):
    h = np.matmul(ws[i], h) + bs[i]
    if i != layer_num - 1:
        h = np.tanh(h)

assert len(h) == 1</pre>
```

Figure: Changes for Tanh

### Extension to Sigmoid

- Approximate sigmoid:
  - 0 if x < -2
  - 0.25x + 0.5 if  $-2 \le x \le 2$
  - 1 if x > 2
- ullet Activation slope = 0.25 in linear region.
- Add constant bias for inactive neurons.

### Extension to Sigmoid

- Change in approach:
  - Change the regions for which 1s and 0s are mapped onto the matrix.
  - 2 Add a bias vector to take care of 0, 0.5 and 1.
- Changes were made in the f\_cheat() and get\_maps() function and compare\_model\_signatures().

### Extension to Sigmoid

```
compute the diagonal matrix
for i in range(hidden layer num):
    di = di s[i+1]
    for j in range(di):
         if ps[i][j] == 1:
              DMs[i][j][j] = 0.25
if i != layer num - 1:
   tp = np.squeeze((h > -2) & (h < 2)).astype(int)
   tp = convert array into scalar(tp)
  map.append(tp)
  h = sigmoid(h)
for i in range(layer num):
    h = np.matmul(ws[i], h) + bs[i]
    if i != layer num - 1:
        h = sigmoid(h)
```

Figure: Changes for Sigmoid

# **Extension to Multi-class outputs**

#### Multi-Class Extension: Relative Activation

- The attack works on the relative values of output neurons, not absolute values.
- If one neuron has a larger value than another, it is selected as the predicted class.
- Hence, the attack reduces to extracting relative weights between pairs of neurons.
- For two neurons with weights  $w_1$  and  $w_2$ , if we can recover  $w_1 w_2$ , we can reconstruct both:
  - Initialize  $w_1$  arbitrarily.
  - Compute  $w_2 = w_1 (w_1 w_2)$ .

### Pseudo-Model Representation

- Construct a pseudo-model where output weights encode only the differences between original weights.
- The existing single-output attack can then be applied to this difference-model.
- After extracting differences, one weight vector (e.g.,  $w_1$ ) is initialized randomly.
- Other output weights are reconstructed relatively.
- This strategy generalizes to *k* output neurons by applying pairwise differences iteratively.

### Implementation Challenges

- Provided repository code failed on our custom-trained models, despite matching architecture.
- Likely due to undocumented pre-processing in the original implementation.
- Our workaround: Normalize inputs and divide by 100.
- Extraction worked  $\sim$ 50% of the time this was used as a **baseline**.
- Success varied due to randomness in starting point and boundary direction.

### Hyperparameter Tuning and Results

- Tuned three key hyperparameters:
  - Precision: controls stride accuracy
  - L1 Error: filters out unequal gammas
  - MS (step size): affects weight sign calculation
- LeakyReLU performed well with default settings.
- $\bullet$  For Tanh and Sigmoid, reduced MS to  $10^{-4}$  for better performance.

#### Results

Activation	Precision	L1 Error	Step Size	PMR
ReLU	$10^{-12}$	$10^{-2}$	$10^{-4}$	1.000
LeakyReLU	$10^{-12}$	$10^{-2}$	$10^{-6}$	0.994
Tanh	$10^{-12}$	$10^{-2}$	$10^{-4}$	0.998
Sigmoid	$10^{-12}$	$10^{-2}$	$10^{-4}$	0.988

Table: Comparison of model extraction success rate (PMR)

#### Limitations and Future Work

- Couldn't extract 3-class classifiers with provided base code.
- Unreliable behavior on custom models with 2+ hidden layers.
- Future work:
  - Improve base algorithm robustness
  - Generalize to deeper and more complex models

#### Conclusion

- Successfully extended extraction attack to:
  - LeakyReLU, Tanh, Sigmoid
  - Multi-class classifiers
- Reinforces risks of exposing models via public APIs.
- Stronger model security is essential.