# [Re] Diffusion-Based Adversarial Sample Generation for Improved Stealthiness and Controllability

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#### **Abstract**

- We are doing a reproducibility report based on the paper "Diffusion-Based Adversarial Sample Generation for Improved Stealthiness and Controllability" by 2 Haotian Xue, Alexandre Araujo, Bin Hu, Yongxin Chen. Their Github Repo is 3 here: https://github.com/xavihart/Diff-PGD/tree/main. The paper uses a novel framework to generate adversarial samples. They use a 5 gradient based method guided by a pre-trained diffusion model to try to generate images that appear realistic to the human eye, can fool a wide range of models, and is easy to control how certain regions are modified. In particular, we are evaluating the claims that Diff-PGD outperform baseline 9 methods such as PGD, AdvPatch, and AdvCam in physical-world attacks and 10 style-based attacks specifically. Finally, we are evaluating the claim that Diff-PGD 11 generates adversarial samples with higher stealthiness. 12
- The following section formatting is optional, you can also define sections as you deem fit.
  Focus on what future researchers or practitioners would find useful for reproducing or building

# 16 1 Introduction

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A few sentences placing the work in high-level context. Limit it to a few paragraphs at most; your report is on reproducing a piece of work, you don't have to motivate that work.

## 9 2 Scope of reproducibility

upon the paper you choose.

- 20 The main claims from the original paper are as follows:
  - Diff-PGD can be applied to specific tasks such as digital attacks, physical-world attacks, and style-based attacks, outperforming baseline methods such as PGD, AdvPatch, and AdvCam.
    - 2. Diff-PGD is more stable and controllable compared to existing methods for generating natural-style adversarial samples.
      - 3. Diff-PGD surpasses the original PGD in Transferability and Purification power
    - 4. Diff-PGD generates adversarial samples with higher stealthiness
- We will be exploring the first claim in regards to physical-world 4 and style-based attacks 4 specifically.

## 29 3 Methodology

- 30 We used the authors' code, however, since not all parts of the authors' code have been released, we
- 31 wrote our own code to evaluate a lot of the experiments.

#### 32 3.1 Model descriptions

- We used ResNet-50, ResNet-101, ResNet-18, Wide-ResNet-50, and Wide-ResNet-101 to classify
- images. The parameter 'weights' was set to the default weight for each model.

#### 35 3.2 Datasets

- 36 The original paper used ImageNet, but due to limitations in compute and memory, we used a smaller
- 37 subset of ImageNet with 1000 samples: https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/ifigotin/
- 38 imagenetmini-1000

#### 39 3.3 Hyperparameters

- 40 Describe how the hyperparameter values were set. If there was a hyperparameter search done, be
- sure to include the range of hyperparameters searched over, the method used to search (e.g. manual
- 42 search, random search, Bayesian optimization, etc.), and the best hyperparameters found. Include the
- 43 number of total experiments (e.g. hyperparameter trials). You can also include all results from that
- search (not just the best-found results).

#### 45 3.4 Experimental setup and code

- We ran the code given by the authors. We copied the hyperparameter setup of the authors.
- 47

#### 48 3.4.1 Success Attack Rate

- We wrote our own code to test success rate in attack\_global.py. We used the same hyperparame-
- ters for running Attack\_Global as the authors, except that we chose to use skip=20, to use 78 images
- 51 per iteration to test success rate. If the adversarial sample caused the model to classify the image as
- anything other than it's original classification, we considered it a successful attack.
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## 54 3.4.2 Physical-World Attacks

- 55 We tried our own physical world attack using an image patch of a digitally drawn panda head and a
- 56 laptop as our target object.
- 57
- We use a Galaxy A53 5G to take images from the real world and used a MP C4505ex Color Laser
- 59 Multifunction Printer to print the images in color.
- Due to time and compute constraints, we chose to run 1500 iterations for each method instead of 4000
- 62 like the original model. We chose 1500 because after running one of the original paper's physical
- world attacks, the loss converged after around 1000 iterations.
- 64 We took the adversarial samples generated using each method (AdvCam, AdvPatch, and Diff-PDG)
- and stuck them on a laptop. We then took multiple pictures of the laptop with the sample on top, with
- the sample in various different locations and rotations, and tested for success rate on the these photos
- by classifying them with ResNet-50.
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


Figure 1: Blue line is success rate of classifying an image not attacked. Orange line is success rate of causing a different classification with Diff-PGD. Green line is success rate of causing a different classification with Diff-PGD after applying sdedit at the end (purification???).

#### 59 3.4.3 Style-Based Attacks

#### 3.5 Computational requirements

- Include a description of the hardware used, such as the GPU or CPU the experiments were run on.
- 72 For each model, include a measure of the average runtime (e.g. average time to predict labels for a
- 73 given validation set with a particular batch size). For each experiment, include the total computational
- 74 requirements (e.g. the total GPU hours spent). (Note: you'll likely have to record this as you run
- 75 your experiments, so it's better to think about it ahead of time). Generally, consider the perspective of
- <sup>76</sup> a reader who wants to use the approach described in the paper list what they would find useful.

## 4 Results

- 78 Start with a high-level overview of your results. Do your results support the main claims of the
- 79 original paper? Keep this section as factual and precise as possible, reserve your judgement and
- 80 discussion points for the next "Discussion" section.

#### 81 4.1 Results reproducing original paper

- 82 For each experiment, say 1) which claim in Section 2 it supports, and 2) if it successfully reproduced
- 83 the associated experiment in the original paper. For example, an experiment training and evaluating a
- 84 model on a dataset may support a claim that that model outperforms some baseline. Logically group
- 85 related results into sections.
- 86 skip=20

#### 7 4.1.1 Attack success rate

- 88 We got a very different result for success rate from that of the original paper (fig. 1). In the original
- paper, the success rate of all of the attacks reached 100% after 5 iterations. However, in our case the
- 90 success rate reached only 60%-80% after 15 iterations.
- 91 Since the authors have yet to release their code for success rate, we are unsure what caused this
- 92 difference. We did use a different dataset than the authors, this could be a possible reason.

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## 4 4.1.2 Physical-World Attacks

- 95 None of the adversarial samples generated by AdvCam, AdvPatch, or Diff-PGD were able to perturb
- <sub>96</sub> the classification of the image. This was likely due to the fact that we did not adjust the scale properly.
- 97 This likely means that hyperparameter tuning is very important for physical-world attacks.

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### 99 4.1.3 Style-Based Attacks

#### 100 4.2 Results beyond original paper

- Often papers don't include enough information to fully specify their experiments, so some additional
- experimentation may be necessary. For example, it might be the case that batch size was not specified,
- and so different batch sizes need to be evaluated to reproduce the original results. Include the results
- of any additional experiments here. Note: this won't be necessary for all reproductions.

#### 105 4.2.1 Additional Result 1

#### 06 5 Discussion

- 107 Give your judgement on if your experimental results support the claims of the paper. Discuss the
- strengths and weaknesses of your approach perhaps you didn't have time to run all the experiments,
- or perhaps you did additional experiments that further strengthened the claims in the paper.

#### 110 5.1 What was easy

- Running the code from the original authors to generate adversarial samples was fairly easy, since
- documentation was included in how to run each attack.

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#### 4 5.2 What was difficult

- List part of the reproduction study that took more time than you anticipated or you felt were difficult.
- 116 Be careful to put your discussion in context. For example, don't say "the maths was difficult to
- follow", say "the math requires advanced knowledge of calculus to follow".
- There was little to no documentation on the inner workings of the code, making it more difficult to
- understand a lot of the attack parameters, and what they did, however the naming was quite clear for
- the most part, so this was not too difficult to follow.
- 121 The physical-world attack was a lot more difficult to reproduce than we anticipated. AdvCam and
- AdvPatch both ran fairly quickly, averaging around 2-3s per iteration. However, Diff-PGD averaged
- around 60s per iteration, which took multiple days to run. Because of this, instead of running 4000
- iterations as was done in the original paper, we only ran 1500 iterations for each image.
- None of the models were able to perturb the classification of the image, which was likely due to
- the fact that we did not adjust the scale properly. This likely means that hyperparameter tuning
- is very important for physical-world attacks. However, tuning the model is more challenging for
- 128 Diff-PGD for physical-world attacks, due to how slowly it runs. Another mistake we made was
- assuming the the classifier would classify a closed laptop as a laptop, when in reality it classified
- it as a notebook. We looked into the ImageNet database, and found that most of the images in
- both laptop and notebook classes were of open laptops, while we used a closed laptop. Since the

photo's original label was fed into the model, this could have possibly caused problems with the model.

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## 134 5.3 Communication with original authors

135 We did not communicate with the original authors.

## 136 References

# 137 A Supplementary material

# 38 A.1 Physical attacks