

**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC** 

MADE IN GERMANY

# vEmpire

# Audit

Security Assessment 01. April, 2022

For



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Version	Date	Description
1.0	26. March 2022	<ul><li>Layout project</li><li>Automated-/Manual-Security Testing</li><li>Summary</li></ul>
1.1	29. March 2022	· Reaudit
1.2	01. April 2022	Mainnet address added

#### **Network**

Ethereum (ERC20)

#### Website

https://v-empire.io/

#### **Telegram**

https://t.me/vempirediscussion

#### **Twitter**

http://twitter.com/vempiredigital

#### Medium

https://medium.com/@v-empire.digital

#### **Discord**

https://discord.gg/Wk3aF3PNKM

#### **Youtube**

https://youtube.com/c/vEmpireDDAO

#### **Description**

vEmpire DDAO is the world's largest Decentralized Metaverse Investment Organization. The official vEmpire protocol incorporates different strategies to incentivize Metaverse token staking to fund the battle against centralisation.

vEmpire is entirely focused on protecting decentralized technologies through virtual property and Metaversal asset acquisition.

### **Project Engagement**

During the 24th of March 2022, **vEmpire Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.





#### **Contract Link**

#### v1.0

- · Github
  - https://github.com/v-Empire/vEmpire/blob/ dc38c85e618fa7a93f1798d52aad9f8bdd9a6a70/smart-contract/ contracts/staking/MasterChefAPE.sol
  - Commit: dc38c85e618fa7a93f1798d52aad9f8bdd9a6a70

#### **v1.1**

- Github
  - https://github.com/v-Empire/vEmpire/commit/ 132b5addbfa3714fdc8c9c733793e676e3239ec8

#### **v1.2**

- Mainnet
  - https://etherscan.io/address/ 0xe95da387aa48cb7c87af5dcfca7b57840b165be1
  - https://etherscan.io/address/
     0x67d44f4201176d6678f7dcaed1efc875eff3be42

# **Vulnerability & Risk Level**

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

### Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

# **Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)**

#### Imported packages:

Dependency / Import Path	
@openzeppelin/contracts/GSN/Context.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol	1

#### **Tested Contract Files**

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

#### **v1.0**


File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/MasterChefAPE.sol	2886a68349c0e38a39569420aa36ff25a6bad002

#### **v1.1**

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/MasterChefAPE.sol	11fc5c9bfedbd9f041d3ba9a1215b7c965bd0734

# **Metrics**

# Source Lines v1.0



### **Capabilities**

#### **Components**

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	1	0	0	0

#### **Exposed Functions**

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Version	Version Public	
1.0	17	0

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	2	18	0	1	2

#### **State Variables**

Version	Total	Public
1.0	13	13

#### **Capabilities**

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	=0.6.1 2				


Version	Transfer s ETH	Low- Level Calls	Deleg ateCa II	Uses Hash Function s	EC Rec ove r	New/ Create/ Create2	
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1.0	yes			
	-			

# Inheritance Graph v1.0



# CallGraph v1.0



### **Scope of Work/Verify Claims**

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 2. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



# Write functions of contract v1.0

1. accessAPETokens			
2. addAPETokensInPool			
3. admin			
4. claimAPE			
5. deposit			
6. emergencyWithdraw			
7. emergencyWithdrawRewardTokens			
8. initialize			
9. renounceOwnership			
10. set			
11. transferOwnership			
12. updateRewardEndStatus			
13. updateRewardPerBlock			
14. updateWithdrawStatus			
15 withdraw			

### **Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)**




#### Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	$\checkmark$
Partly Verified	<b>P</b>
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

### **Modifiers and public functions**

#### **v1.0**



Information: Not listed functions are directly imported functions from library (openzeppelin)

#### Comments

- Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations
  - poolInfo.allocPoint
  - VEMPPerBlock
  - rewardEndBlock
- Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
  - withdrawStatus
  - rewardEndStatus = \_status;
- · Only admin address can set following addresses/urls
  - adminaddr

- Only owner can lock following functions with withdrawStatus state variable
  - Withdraw
  - EmergencyWithdraw
- Only admin address can call emergencyWithdrawRewardToken

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.



## **Source Units in Scope**

#### v1.0

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
<b>)</b>	contracts/MasterChefAPE.sol	1		337	331	245	62	203	<b></b>
<b>)</b>	Totals	1		337	331	245	62	203	<b>.</b>

#### **v1.1**

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities	
<b>≥</b> €Q	contracts/MasterChefAPE.sol	7	1	1034	956	488	478	357	<b>■</b>	
<b>≥</b> ≥Q	Totals	7	1	1034	956	488	478	357	<b>■4.02 ※</b>	

#### Legend

Logoria				
Attribute	Description			
Lines	total lines of the source unit			
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)			
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)			
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments			
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)			

## **Audit Results**

# **AUDIT PASSED**

**Critical issues** 

No critical issues

**High issues** 

No high issues

**Medium issues** 

No medium issues

Low issues

No low issues

Informational issues

No informational issues

#### **Test Protocol**

MasterChefAPE

set/update variables

- ✓ should set correct state variables
- ✓ should allow admin and only admin to update admin (65ms)
- ✓ should allow admin and only admin to update

updateRewardEndStatus (65ms)

✓ should allow admin and only admin to update updateWithdrawStatus (53ms)

emergency withdraw reward tokens

- ✓ not allow non-admin to withdraw tokens
- ✓ allow only admin to withdraw tokens (39ms)

Only admin can stop to withdraw tokens

- ✓ allow withdraw staked tokens (74ms)
- ✓ not allow withdraw staked tokens (96ms)

With ERC/LP token added to the field

- ✓ should give out vemp only after farming time (64866ms)
- ✓ should not distribute vemp if no one deposit (630ms)
- ✓ should distribute vemp properly for each staker (911ms)
- ✓ Transfer Ownership (78ms)

Access APE Tokens by Admin

- ✓ Failed if any user(not admin) want to access APE tokens (548ms)
- ✓ Failed if any admin want to access APE tokens more then locked amount (695ms)
  - ✓ Update All variables on stake and access APE tokens (3792ms)

Re-Distribution of APE tokens to all stake holders in rewards

✔ Re-Distribute APE tokens by Admin (1140ms)

Claim APE Reward tokens

✓ Claim APE tokens by stakers (1455ms)

#### **Audit Comments**

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <a href="https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html">https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html</a>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

#### 26. March 2022:

· Read whole report for more information

#### 29. March 2022:

- Bugs were completely fixed by the vEmpire team
- · Read whole report for more information

## **SWC Attacks**

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
SW C-1 25	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>24</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
SW C-1 23	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
SW C-1 21	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>02</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED



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