

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC Development | Marketing



Vitreus

Audit

Security Assessment 30. August, 2023

For







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Version	Date	Description
1.0	14. January 2023	Layout projectAutomated-/Manual-Security TestingSummary
∨ 1.1	17. June 2023	· Reaudit
v1.2	30. August 2023	· Added Functionality Audit

Network

Ethereum (ERC20) Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

Website

http://vitreus.io

Telegram

https://t.me/VitreusChain

Twitter

Vitreus: https://twitter.com/VitreusChain

Chad, Founder: https://twitter.com/CollabChad
Brent, Co-Founder: https://twitter.com/crypfool2
Baran: https://twitter.com/Wayne_Lambeau

Jaren: https://twitter.com/mrscryptorabbit

Taylor: https://twitter.com/tcryptol199

Facebook

https://www.facebook.com/VitreusChain

Instagram

https://instagram.com/vitreuschain

Discord

https://discord.gg/vitreus

Youtube

https://www.youtube.com/@VitreusChain

LinkedIn

https://www.linkedin.com/company/vitreus-chain

Description

A permissioned financial services distributed ledger from the infrastructure and software solutions company, Collaborative Digital.

Project Engagement

During the 12th of January 2023, **Vitreus Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.



Contract Link

v1.2

- https://github.com/Vitreus-Essentials/vitreus-contracts/blob/feature/ affiliate-rewards/contracts/VitreusVoucher.sol
- Commit: 75b942e

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	O – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

Dependency / Import Path	Count
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/IERC721Upgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/extensions/IERC721MetadataUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/StringsUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/cryptography/ECDSAUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/introspection/ERC165Upgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165Checker.sol	1
@uniswap/v2-core/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Pair.sol	1
@uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol	1
operator-filter-registry/src/upgradeable/DefaultOperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol	1

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.2

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/VitreusVoucher.sol	58cc34a8f549e484043fd695e1cdf76b4b75024c

Metrics

Source Lines



Capabilities

Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	1	0	0	0

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Ve	rsion	Public	Payable
1.0		44	5

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View	
1.0	37	52	1	2	33	


State Variables

Version	Total	Public
1.0	17	1

Capabilities

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl Y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	0.8.18		yes	yes (1 asm blocks)	


Inheritance Graph v1.2





CallGraph

v1.2



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Is contract an upgradeable
- 2. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 3. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 4. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 5. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 6. Deployer cannot set fees
- 7. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
- 8. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Is contract an upgradeable

Name Is contract an upgradeable? Yes

Comments:

v1.0

- Owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
 - Be aware of this and do your own research for the contract which is the contract pointing to

Correct implementation of Token standard

ERC721						
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified		
BalanceOf	Count all NFTs assigned to an owner	\checkmark	√	\checkmark		
OwnerOf	Find the owner of an NFT	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
SafeTransferFrom	Transfers the ownership of an NFT from one address to another address	√	√	√		
SafeTransferFrom	See above - Difference is that this function has an extra data parameter	√	√	√		
TransferFrom	Transfer ownership of an NFT	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Approve	Change or reaffirm the approved address for an NFT	√	√	√		
SetApprovalForAll	Enable or disable approval for a third party ("operator") to manage all of `msg.sender`'s assets	1	√	√		
GetApproved	Get the approved address for a single NFT	√	√	√		
IsApprovedForAll	Query if an address is an authorized operator for another address	√	√	√		
SupportsInterface	Query if a contract implements an interface	√	√	√		
Name	Provides information about the name	√	1	√		
Symbol	Provides information about the symbol	√	1	√		
TokenURI	Provides information about the TokenUri	√	1	√		

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot mint	√	√	X

Comments:

v1.2

• Owner can mint new tokens with the forceMint function to any arbitrary addresses.



Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot lock	-	-	-
Deployer cannot burn	-	-	-



Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot pause	\checkmark	√	X

Comments:

v1.2

 The owner can pause the mintWithUSDC and depositUSDC function. But keep in mind that the contract is an upgradeable contract that means that the deployer is able to add new functionalities to the contract.

Deployer cannot set fees

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot set fees over 25%	-	-	-
Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100%	-	_	_



Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses	-	-	_



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verified / Checked	\checkmark
Partly Verified	×
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

Modifiers and public functions v1.2



Note: Functions from imported libraries were not listed here.

Comments

- <u>Existing Modifiers</u>
 - onlyAllowedOperator
 - onlyAllowedOperatorApproval
 - onlyOwner
 - whenNotPaused

- initializer
- Owner can
 - · Create new presaleRounds
 - Pause contract
 - · Change Upcoming Rounds
 - Set Payout Registry address
- Only allowed operators are allowed to transfer ERC721 tokens from the contract

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope

v1.2

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
>	contracts/VitreusVoucher.sol	1		1093	1042	458	445	461	<u></u>
2	Totals	1		1093	1042	458	445	461	<u></u> δ 🚻 👣 Σ

Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

Audit Results

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

	High issues found							
Issu e	File	Туре	Line	Description	Status			
#1	Main	USDC Receiver	115	If the msg.sender is the _usdcReceiver address the msg.sender is able to mint tokens for free. We recommend you to check whether the caller is the _usdcReceiver. Same for the deposit	Fixed			
#2	Main	Initialize all the variables	191	_usdc is never initialized but the contract is calling the address. Initialize the variable in the "initialize" function as well.	Fixed			
#3	Main	The owner is able to mint new tokens	424	The owner is able to mint new tokens. Also when the contract is paused. That means that the owner is excluded to mint new tokens.	Ackno wledg ed			

Medium issues

No medium issues

Low issues

Issu e	File	Type	Line	Description	Status
#1	Main	A floating pragma is set	2	The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.8.9"".	Fixed
#2	Main	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero- check)	67	Check that the address is not zero	Fixed

#3	Main	State variable visibility is not set	30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 51, 52, 57	It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly	Fixed
#4	Main	Local variables shadowing	354, 299, 360, 137, 201, 159, 207	Rename the local variables that shadow another component. We recommend you to modify "owner" to something similar like "owner_".	Fixed
#5	Main	Allocation can be set to 0	296	Since the allocation can be set to 0, the availableDeposit amount will be also 0 in L545, L640	Fixed

Informational issues

Issu e	File	Туре	Line	Description	Status
#1	Main	Functions that are not used	251, 304, 309	Remove unused functions. Before removing check the function, it could be possible, that you forget to implement it into the contract	Fixed
#2	Main	Unused state variables	30	Remove unused state variables	Fixed
#3	Main	Pause function	See descripti on	The pause functionality is not implemented in the contract but the "whenPaused" modifier was used. Implement pause functionality for the owner only or remove the modifier.	Fixed
#4	Main	MIsspelling	183	It is recommended to adjust the misspelling in the contract.	Fixed
#5	Main	Check for Zero value	195-199, 205, 212	Checking the msg.value is zero is recommended. Otherwise, the contract should not call the deposit/mint function in general.	Fixed

#6	Main	DIsable initialize	140	The disableInitializers function in the constructor should only be called after the first version of the upgradeable was deployed already. Otherwise the owner cannot call the "initialize" function.	Fixed
				Make sure to implement this function back to the contract before updating the contract implementation.	

Audit Comments 30. August 2023:

- The owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give the owner new privileges
- The Payout Registry interface which is used in the contract was not provided to us in the contract scope so we cannot comment on its security.
- · Read the whole report and modifiers section for more information

SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
SW C-1 25	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>24</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>23</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>21</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> C-11 7	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>02</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED







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