

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC




SpeedFi

Audit

Security Assessment 14. June, 2022

For







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Version	Date	Description	
1.0	10. June 2022	Layout projectAutomated-/Manual-Security TestingSummary	
1.1	14. June 2022	· New Mainnet address has been added	

Network

Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

Website

https://speed-fi.com/

Telegram

https://t.me/Speed_Fi_Official

Twitter

https://twitter.com/speed_fi

Facebook

https://www.facebook.com/Speed-Fi-DeFi-110771074968175

Instagram

https://instagram.com/speedfi_?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=

Reddit

https://www.reddit.com/u/Speed-Fi/? utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=iossmf

Youtube

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZNcskcYBVQAIb5T6m_QKyQ


Description

Speed-Fi is a multi-functional technological application offering a range of decentralized finance (DeFi) services, including but not limited to multi-network DEX, multi-network Launchpad, NFT supermarket, and WEB3 P2E VR Racing game

Project Engagement

During the 8th of June 2022, **SpeedFi Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.





Contract Link v1.0

- https://www.bscscan.com/address/
 0x4F4189D6731Fd365CC824A7EE71ab4a904596C26#code
- https://www.bscscan.com/address/
 0x0FE196B4d2db5276Bd40bd6CBF63E29A11915e1C#code
- https://bscscan.com/address/
 0x2e91478fd27d1817cble60221e1b1b38de18fcba#code

v1.1

https://bscscan.com/address/
 0x47F5BC2C7c5452950e9c172eB8Bc2b1dfa8Ca839#code



Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low 2 – 3.9		A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:



Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.0

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/UniswapV2Router02.sol	8dd79c15f935559b7b8e7a45bef20751edc1354d
contracts/SpeedFi.sol	282c4003577876ddab3d27127e3c1872fb3d8606
contracts/UniswapV2Factory.sol	4fb7fff822581b1ba8c0db399be46689d216e1af

Metrics

Source Lines v1.0



Capabilities

Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	6	8	15	1

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Version	Public	Payable	
1.0	245	15	

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	200	207	29	52	88

State Variables

Version	Total	Public
1.0	74	40

Capabilities

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl Y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	0.6.12 ^0.8.1 3		yes	yes (4 asm blocks)	


Version	Transfer s ETH	Low- Level Calls	Deleg ateCa II	Uses Hash Function s	EC Rec ove r	New/ Create/ Create2
1.0	yes			yes	yes	yes → Asse mblyCa ll:Nam e:crea te2

Inheritance Graph

v1.0



CallGraph v1.0



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 5. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Correct implementation of Token standard

	ERC20							
Function	Function Description							
TotalSupply	Provides information about the total token supply	√	√	\checkmark				
BalanceOf	Provides account balance of the owner's account	\checkmark	√	\checkmark				
Transfer	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	√	√	✓				
TransferFrom	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	√	√	√				
Approve	Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	√	√	√				
Allowance	Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	√	√	√				

Write functions of contract v1.0

1. SweepStuck	1. createPair	1. addLiquidity
2. approve		2. addLiquidityETH
3. changeRouterVersion	2. setFeeTo	3. removeLiquidity
4. decreaseAllowance		4. removeLiquidityETH
5. excludeFromBurn	3. setFeeToSetter	5. removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens
6. excludeFromFee		6. removeLiquidityETHWithPermit
7. includeInBurn	setMigrator	
8. includeInFee		7. removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens
9. increaseAllowance		8. removeLiquidityWithPermit
10. lock		9. swapETHForExactTokens
11. manualSwapAndLiquifyTokens		10. swapExactETHForTokens
12. removeTxLimit		11. swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens
13. renounceOwnership		12. swapExactTokensForETH
14. setAllFees		13. swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens
15. setBuyMaxTxAmount		14. swapExactTokensForTokens
16. setDevelopmentAddress		15. swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens
17. setMarketingAddress		16. swapTokensForExactETH
18. setMinTokensToSell		17. swapTokensForExactTokens
19. setPairAddress		
20. setRouterAddress		
21. setRouterAddressAndCreatePair		
22. setSellMaxTxAmount		
23. setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled		
24. transfer		
25. transferForeignToken		
26. transferFrom		
27. transferOwnership		
28. unlock		

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot mint	-	_	-
Max / Total Supply		1000	000000



Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot lock	\checkmark	√	X
Deployer cannot burn	-	-	_

Comments:

v1.0

- · Owner can lock user funds by
 - blacklisting addresses
 - Setting buy max tx amount to 0
 - Setting sell max tx amount to 0
- Tokens
 - · will be burned while tx

Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot pause	-	_	-



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)




Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	\checkmark
Partly Verified	P
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

Modifiers and public functions

v1.0



Comments

· Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations

- minimumTokensBeforeSwap
- Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
 - swapAndLiquifyEnabled
 - _isExcludedFromFee
 - _isExcluded
 - excluded
- · <u>Deployer can set following addresses</u>
 - uniswapV2Pair
 - uniswapV2Router
 - developmentAddress
 - marketingAddress
 - owner
- Existing Modifiers
 - onlyOwner
 - lockTheSwap
 - lock
 - ensure
- · Only owner can transfer contract balance to his own address
- Tx amounts can be set to 0

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope

v1.0

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
≥ €	contracts/UniswapV2Router02.sol	4	6	821	429	353	45	580	.Š.÷.
≥ € Q%	contracts/SpeedFi.sol	5	5	1019	799	596	50	650	<u></u>
≥ €	contracts/UniswapV2Factory.sol	6	4	473	431	332	60	363	■# * 6 . . •
≥ € Q%	Totals	15	15	2313	1659	1281	155	1593	

Legend

Attribute	Description				
Lines	total lines of the source unit				
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)				
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)				
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments				
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)				

Audit Results

AUDIT PASSED

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

No medium issues

Low issues

No low issues

Informational issues

No informational issues

Alleviation

<u>#1</u>

File: Main

Type: Variable has no functionality, L948-950

Description:

State variable has no functionality in the contract.

- _buyBurnFee
- _buyMarketingFee
- _buyDevelopmentFee

Remove unnecessary state variables

SpeedFi Team: It is declared to fetch information from the public state into any application from the contract so the data modification is needed in buy percentages as well even if it's not defined or used anywhere.

#2

File: Main

Type: State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states),

L436 L437 L438 L439 L431 L432 L411

Description:

Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change

SpeedFi Team: This has been kept as it is since the buy fee need to be modified for data fetching in applications from the contract.

Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

13. June 2022:

· Read whole report and modifiers section for more information



SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
SW C-1 25	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>24</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>23</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
SW C-1 21	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED







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<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
SW C-1 03	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
SW C-1 02	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED