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**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC
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MADE IN GERMANY

Metaboards Audit

**Security Assessment
29. June, 2023**

For



SolidProof_io



@solidproof_io

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Version	Date	Description
1.0	21. June 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Layout project• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing• Summary
1.1	27. June 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reaudit

Note - This Audit report comprises a security analysis of the **Metaboard** smart contracts. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic.

Network

Arbitrum

Website

<https://metaboards.games/>

<https://projectpocket.io/>

Twitter

@metaboardsgame

@projectpckt



Description

MetaBoards redefines tabletop strategy with a revolutionary, unique board game - straight to the heart of Arbitrum. Experience the evolution of blockchain gaming in a fully immersive VR world.

Project Engagement

During the Date of 19 June 2023, **Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo



Contract Link

v1.0

- Provided as Files

v1.1

- Provided as Files

Note for Investors: We only Audited a token contract for **Metaboards**.

However, If the project has other contracts (for example, a Presale contract, staking etc), and they were not provided to us in the audit scope, then we cannot comment on its security, and we are not responsible for it in any way.

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

```
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControlEnumerable.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts/security/Pausable.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol  
./libs/SushiLibs.sol
```


Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.0


File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/MPCKT (2).sol	d87077f24201386d1d2b532d4fcf27647ddf59 41

v1.1


File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/ MPCKT.sol	84209c6b0b73039246570bf4e8957801fa45ee4 c

Metrics

Source Lines v1.0



Risk Level v1.0



Capabilities

Components

 Contracts	 Libraries	 Interfaces	 Abstract
1	0	0	0

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.












 Public	 Payable
39	1

External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
37	44	4	1	8

StateVariables


Total	 Public
47	15

Capabilities

Solidity Versions observed	 Experimental Features	 Can Receive Funds	 Uses Assembly	 Has Destroyable Contracts	
<div>>=0.8.11</div>		<div>yes</div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	
 Transfers ETH	 Low-Level Calls	 DelegateCall	 Uses Hash Functions	 ECRrecover	 New/Create/Create2
<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div>yes</div>	<div></div>	<div></div>
 TryCatch	Σ Unchecked				
<div></div>	<div>yes</div>				


Inheritance Graph

v1.0



CallGraph

v1.0



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Is contract an upgradeable
2. Correct implementation of Token standard
3. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
4. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
5. Deployer cannot pause the contract
6. Deployer cannot set fees
7. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
8. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Is contract an upgradeable

Name	
Is contract an upgradeable?	No



Correct implementation of Token standard

ERC20				
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
TotalSupply	Provides information about the total token supply	✓	✓	✓
BalanceOf	Provides account balance of the owner's account	✓	✓	✓
Transfer	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	✓	✓	✓
TransferFrom	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	✓	✓	✓
Approve	Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	✓	✓	✓
Allowance	Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	✓	✓	✓

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer can mint	✓	✓	✗
Max / Total Supply	N/A		

Comments:

v1.1

- The wallets with Minter Role can mint new tokens till the max supply is reached. However, the max supply will be decided at the time of deployment

Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot lock	✓	✓	✓
Deployer cannot burn	—	—	—

Comments:

v1.1

- The owner cannot lock user funds by Setting the max wallet amount to 0 because now the minimum max wallet amount must be 1% of total supply.

Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer can pause	✓	✓	✗

Comments:

v1.1

- The owner can pause the contract



Deployer cannot set fees

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot set fees over 25%	✓	✓	✓
Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100%	✓	✓	✓

Comments:

v1.1

- Fees cannot be set without any limitations

Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses	—	—	—



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Tested	Verified
✓	✓

Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verified / Checked	✓
Partly Verified	⚠
Unverified / Not checked	✗
Not available	—

Modifiers and public functions

v1.1

- ◆ mint
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ burn
- ◆ pause
- ◆ unpause
- ◆ setTaxes
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ setSubTaxes
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ setSellProtection
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ removeLimits
- Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ◆ cleanupLeftovers
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ setMaxWallet
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ setSwapThresh
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ setTradingActive
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ addAmmAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ removeAmmAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ addSystemContractAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ removeSystemContractAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ addExcludeTaxesAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ removeExcludeTaxesAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ addExcludedLocksAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ removeExcludedLocksAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ setVaultContract
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ setOperationsAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ setDevAddress
- Ⓜ onlyTeam

- ◆ transfer
- ◆ approve
- ◆ transferFrom
- ◆ increaseAllowance
- ◆ decreaseAllowance
- ◆ teamTransferToken
- Ⓜ onlyTeam
- ◆ withdrawETH
- Ⓜ onlyTeam

Ownership/Authority Privileges

- ❖ The owner wallet and the wallets that have the “TEAM_ROLE” can update/change the following addresses -
 - AMM Address
 - System Contract Address
 - Addresses Excluded from tax and lock
 - Vault Contract address
 - Operations Address
 - Dev Address
- ❖ The owner wallet and the wallets that have the “TEAM_ROLE” update/change the following values -
 - Set taxes and sub-taxes, but the maximum tax cannot exceed 25%
 - Set max sell per cent and transaction lock time for the accounts that wish to sell large amounts of tokens at once. Moreover, the lock time cannot exceed 1 day, and sell per cent must be lower or equal to 10%
 - Remove limits from the contract
 - Withdraw ETH from the contract's balance to the vault Address
 - Set the swap threshold to any arbitrary value
 - Enable Trading
 - Transfer any type of tokens from the contract balance.

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope

v1.0

File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score
contracts/MPCKT (2).sol	1	————	784	760	487	110	437
Totals	1	————	784	760	487	110	437

Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)

Audit Results

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

Medium Issue Acknowledged

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description	Status
#1	Main	Trading Needs to be enabled	See description	The trading needs to be enabled by the owner in order for regular users to transfer tokens. On the contrary, the owner can authorize the addresses and those addresses will be able to trade tokens. This functionality can be exploited in the following way, For example, there is a presale and the wallets used for the presale can be authorized by the owner. All the tokens obtained can be consolidated into a final wallet address and facilitate trading and selling of the acquired tokens, the last wallet address can be authorized.	ACK
#2	Main	Owner can Lock Funds	See description	The owner can lock user funds by pausing the transfers for regular investors, and also by setting the max wallet amount to zero	Fixed

Low issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description	Status
#1	Main	A floating pragma is set	—	The current pragma Solidity directive is „>=0.8.11“.	Fixed

#2	Main	State variable visibility is not set	37	It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly	Fixed
----	------	--------------------------------------	----	-------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------

Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description	Status
#1	Main	State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states)	103, 106	Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change	ACK
#2	Main	NatSpec documentation missing	—	If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc.	ACK

Audit Comments

We recommend you use the particular form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow the link for more information <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variable, functions etc., do.

29. June 2023:

- Unit tests with 95% code coverage were not provided to SolidProof so we cannot ensure complete functional correctness of the code's logic.
- We recommend **Metaboards** team conduct unit and fuzz tests thoroughly to rule out the possibility of unwanted logical and calculation errors.
- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Read the whole report and modifiers section for more information

SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
SW C-1 36	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
SW C-1 35	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
SW C-1 34	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
SW C-1 33	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
SW C-1 32	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
SW C-1 31	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
SW C-1 30	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
SW C-1 29	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
SW C-1 28	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

SW C-1 27	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
SW C-1 25	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
SW C-1 24	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
SW C-1 23	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
SW C-1 22	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
SW C-1 21	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
SW C-11 9	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-11 8	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
SW C-11 7	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

SW C-11 6	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
SW C-11 5	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
SW C-11 4	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
SW C-11 3	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
SW C-11 2	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
SW C-11 1	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
SW C-11 0	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
SW C-1 08	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
SW C-1 06	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

SW C-1 05	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
SW C-1 04	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
SW C-1 03	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
SW C-1 02	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
SW C-1 01	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
SW C-1 00	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED

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