



SOLIDProof

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**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC
Development | Marketing**


MADE IN GERMANY

KERC

Audit

Security Assessment
18. July, 2023

For



SolidProof_io



@solidproof_io

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Disclaimer

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| Version | Date | Description |
|---------|---------------|--|
| 1.0 | 26. June 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Layout project• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing• Summary |
| 1.1 | 28. June 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reaudit |
| 1.2 | 18. July 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Updated Token Contract Review |

Note - This Audit report comprises a security analysis of the **KERC** smart contracts. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic.

Network

Arbitrum One

Website

<https://kerc.io>

Discord

<https://discord.gg/kerc>




Description

Krypto ERC (KERC) is the next-gen traditional business, and we provide our users with new opportunities by connecting two major industries: primary and alternative healthcare (PAH) and cryptocurrency. We transform the traditional brick-and-mortar primary care businesses into turnkey tech-driven crypto assets and allow investors of any capital size to access high-yielding sustainable earnings in USDC directly from our investments into the traditional businesses which usually require enormous amounts of capital, knowledge, and compliance to participate.

Project Engagement

During the Date of 23 June 2023, **KERC Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo



Contract Link

v1.0

- <https://github.com/KERC20/audit-token-and-presale>
- Commit: 219d0e956769003112a5dba3c1657b9c7c0405a3

v1.1

- <https://github.com/KERC20/audit-token-and-presale>
- Commit: [89a0070](#)

v1.2

- **Deployed Token Address** - <https://arbiscan.io/address/0x2389f6A46562AE5f1557Db8562c39Ef553f3832B>
- The remaining contracts are the same as the previous version

Note for Investors: We only Audited a token, presale, and a vesting contract for the **KERC Team**. However, Suppose the project has other contracts (for example, a staking contract etc.) that were not provided to us in the audit scope. In that case, we cannot comment on its security and are not responsible for it in any way.



Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

| Level | Value | Vulnerability | Risk (Required Action) |
|----------------------|---------|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken. | Immediate action to reduce risk level. |
| High | 7 – 8.9 | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible. |
| Medium | 4 – 6.9 | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario. | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period. |
| Low | 2 – 3.9 | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective. | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |
| Informational | 0 – 1.9 | A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code. | An observation that does not determine a level of risk |

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

| Dependency / Import Path | Count |
|--|-------|
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol | 2 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol | 1 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol | 1 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Permit.sol | 2 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol | 1 |

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.0


| File Name | SHA-1 Hash |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| contracts/tokens/ KERC.sol | f887450294c0e06a5531201ad5842839f25f5e86 |
| contracts/vesting/ Vesting.sol | 82aefd8dff91808f0faaa6ea40670b28db25b8f4 |
| contracts/raise/ Presale.sol | ef8e2a74c8c0257ed9e9f3d92e8490a23314ea58 |

v1.2


| File Name | SHA-1 Hash |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| contracts/tokens/ KERC.sol | b4fb5c7bc53b580f78bc196da75202eadf37ac48 |
| contracts/vesting/ Vesting.sol | e15d6e18fc171baf90e43c259407e80da8d28df5 |
| contracts/raise/ Presale.sol | e0765956a29aa97001c47413715d165ce83bcf4e |

Metrics

Source Lines v1.2



Risk Level v1.2



Capabilities

Components

| | | | |
|---|---|--|--|
|  Contracts |  Libraries |  Interfaces |  Abstract |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.





| | |
|--|---|
|  Public |  Payable |
| 18 | 0 |

| External | Internal | Private | Pure | View |
|----------|----------|---------|------|------|
| 11 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 7 |

StateVariables

| | |
|-------|--|
| Total |  Public |
| 19 | 17 |


Capabilities

| Solidity Versions observed |  Experimental Features |  Can Receive Funds |  Uses Assembly |  Has Destroyable Contracts |
|----------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| <code>=0.8.18</code> | | | | |


|  Transfers ETH |  Low-Level Calls |  DelegateCall |  Uses Hash Functions |  ECRrecover |  New/Create/Create2 |
|---|---|--|---|--|--|
| <code>yes</code> | | | | | <code>yes</code> → <code>NewContract:KercVesting</code> |

|  TryCatch | Σ Unchecked |
|--|--------------------|
| | <code>yes</code> |

Inheritance Graph v1.2



CallGraph v1.2



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Is contract an upgradeable
2. Correct implementation of Token standard
3. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
4. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
5. Deployer cannot pause the contract
6. Deployer cannot set fees
7. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
8. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Is contract an upgradeable

| Name | |
|-----------------------------|----|
| Is contract an upgradeable? | No |



Correct implementation of Token standard

| ERC20 | | | | |
|--------------|---|-------|--------|----------|
| Function | Description | Exist | Tested | Verified |
| TotalSupply | Provides information about the total token supply | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| BalanceOf | Provides account balance of the owner's account | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Transfer | Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| TransferFrom | Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Approve | Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Allowance | Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|----------------------|-------------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot mint | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Max / Total Supply | 500_000_000 | | |

Comments:

v1.2

- Owner cannot mint new tokens manually

Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot lock | — | — | — |
| Deployer cannot burn | — | — | — |



Deployer cannot pause the contract

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|-----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot pause | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |



Deployer cannot set fees

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|--|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot set fees over 25% | — | — | — |
| Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100% | — | — | — |



Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|---|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses | — | — | — |



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

| Tested | Verified |
|--------|----------|
| ✓ | ✓ |

Legend

| Attribute | Symbol |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Verified / Checked | ✓ |
| Partly Verified | 🚩 |
| Unverified / Not checked | ✗ |
| Not Available | — |

Modifiers and public functions v1.2

Presale

```
◆ participate
Ⓜ canParticipate
◆ participateWithPermit
Ⓜ canParticipate
◆ setHasEnded
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ setTargetAmt
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ setHardCapAmt
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ setTokens
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ setTimes
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ setEndTime
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ withdrawETH
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ withdraw
Ⓜ onlyOwner
```

Vesting

```
◆ release
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ emergencyWithdrawETH
Ⓜ onlyOwner
◆ emergencyWithdrawToken
Ⓜ onlyOwner
```

Ownership Privileges

❖ [Presale.sol](#) -

- Set/Update the end time, but the new end time must be greater than the existing end time, which means the sale can only be extended.
- Set/Update the start and end time of the deposit
- Set supported tokens for the presale
- Withdraw any tokens from the contract balance to the “raiseReceiver” address.
- The owner can change the hard cap of the presale at anytime

❖ Vesting.sol -

- Withdraw ETH and foreign tokens from the contract. The owner cannot withdraw vested tokens from the contract. They will be released according to the vesting schedule.
- Only the owner can release vested tokens to their own wallet.



Source Units in Scope

v1.2

| File | Logic Contracts | Interfaces | Lines | nLines | nSLOC | Comment Lines | Complex. Score |
|----------------------------|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|----------------|
| KERC/contracts/Vesting.sol | 1 | ———— | 113 | 110 | 80 | 14 | 58 |
| KERC/contracts/Presale.sol | 1 | ———— | 263 | 250 | 174 | 33 | 113 |
| KERC/contracts/KERC.sol | 1 | ———— | 47 | 47 | 24 | 14 | 32 |
| Totals | 3 | ———— | 423 | 407 | 278 | 61 | 203 |

Legend

| Attribute | Description |
|------------------|---|
| Lines | total lines of the source unit |
| nLines | normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines) |
| nSLOC | normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines) |
| Comment Lines | lines containing single or block comments |
| Complexity Score | a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...) |

Audit Results

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

No medium issues

Low issues

| Issue | File | Type | Line | Description | Status |
|-------|-------------|--|-----------|---|--------|
| #1 | Vesting.sol | Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check) | 33 | Check that the address is not zero in the constructor because it cannot be changed once the contract is deployed. | Fixed |
| #2 | Presale.sol | Missing Events Arithmetic | 174 — 188 | Emit an event for critical parameter changes | Fixed |

Informational issues

| Issue | File | Type | Line | Description | Status |
|-------|-------------|-------------------------------|------|---|--------|
| #1 | All | NatSpec documentation missing | — | If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc. | Open |
| #2 | Presale.sol | Missing zero value check | 60 | Check that the value is not zero | Fixed |

Audit Comments

We recommend you use the particular form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow the link for more information <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variable, functions etc., do.

18. July 2023:

- There is still an owner because the contracts are yet to be deployed (The owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Read the whole report and modifiers section for more information



SWC Attacks

| ID | Title | Relationships | Status |
|---------------------------|---|--|--------|
| SW C-1 36 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method | PASSED |
| SW C-1 35 | Code With No Effects | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |
| SW C-1 34 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | CWE-655: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| SW C-1 33 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay | PASSED |
| SW C-1 32 | Unexpected Ether balance | CWE-667: Improper Locking | PASSED |
| SW C-1 31 | Presence of unused variables | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |
| SW C-1 30 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information | PASSED |
| SW C-1 29 | Typographical Error | CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator | PASSED |
| SW C-1 28 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|---------------|
| SW C-1 27 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality | PASSED |
| SW C-1 25 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order | PASSED |
| SW C-1 24 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition | PASSED |
| SW C-1 23 | Requirement Violation | CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller | PASSED |
| SW C-1 22 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity | PASSED |
| SW C-1 21 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |
| SW C-1 20 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values | PASSED |
| SW C-11 9 | Shadowing State Variables | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| SW C-11 8 | Incorrect Constructor Name | CWE-665: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| SW C-11 7 | Signature Malleability | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| SW C-11 6 | Timestamp Dependence | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
| SW C-11 5 | Authorization through tx.origin | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| SW C-11 4 | Transaction Order Dependence | CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | PASSED |
| SW C-11 3 | DoS with Failed Call | CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions | PASSED |
| SW C-11 2 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
| SW C-11 1 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| SW C-11 0 | Assert Violation | CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation | PASSED |
| SW C-1 09 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer | PASSED |
| SW C-1 08 | State Variable Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| SW C-1 07 | Reentrancy | CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow | PASSED |
| SW C-1 06 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| SW C-1 05 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |
| SW C-1 04 | Unchecked Call Return Value | CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value | PASSED |
| SW C-1 03 | Floating Pragma | CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime | PASSED |
| SW C-1 02 | Outdated Compiler Version | CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities | PASSED |
| SW C-1 01 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation | PASSED |
| SW C-1 00 | Function Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |



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