zkEVM design, optimization and applications

Guest Lecturer: Ye Zhang





Zero Knowledge Proofs

Instructors: Dan Boneh, Shafi Goldwasser, Dawn Song, Justin Thaler, Yupeng Zhang





















What is Scroll?

A scaling solution for Ethereum



What is Scroll?


An EVM-equivalent zk-Rollup

Outline




- Background & motivation
- Build a zkEVM from scratch
- Interesting research problems
- Other applications using zkEVM





















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







Zk-Rollup






However, ...






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
Scroll: a native zkEVM solution






Scroll: a native zkEVM solution









zkEVM

- Developer friendly
- Composability
- Hard to build ⁽³⁾
- Large proving overhead ⊗

Scroll: a native zkEVM solution







zkEVM

- Polynomial commitment
- Lookup + Custom gate
- Hardware acceleration
- Recursive proof

zkEVM flavors (by Justin Drake)



Language level

Transpile an EVM-friendly language (Solidity or Yul) to a SNARK-friendly VM which differs from the EVM. This is the approach of Matter Labs and Starkware.

Bytecode level

Interpret EVM bytecode directly, though potentially producing different state roots than the EVM, e.g. if certain implementation-level data structures are replaced with SNARK-friendly alternatives. This is the approach taken by Scroll, Hermez, and Consensys.

Consensus level

Target full equivalence with EVM as used by Ethereum L1 consensus. That is, it proves validity of L1 Ethereum state roots. This is part of the "zk-SNARK everything" roadmap for Ethereum.

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zkEVM flavors (by Justin Drake)



Language level

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The workflow of zero-knowledge proof



Program


Constraints

Proof


```
def hcf(x, y):
    if x > y:
        smaller = y
    else:
        smaller = x

for i in range(1, smaller + 1):
        if((x % i == 0) and (y % i == 0)):
            hcf = i

return hcf
```



AIR








Polynomial IOP +

PCS


The workflow of zero-knowledge proof





The workflow of zero-knowledge proof







١	w_1	w_2	w_3	w_4	w_5	 w_{n-1}	$\boldsymbol{w_n}$



\boldsymbol{w}_1	w_2	w_3	w_4	w_5	 w_{n-1}	W_n

$$(a_1w_1 + \dots + a_nw_n) * (b_1w_1 + \dots + b_nw_n) == (c_1w_1 + \dots + c_nw_n)$$



\boldsymbol{w}_1	w_2	w_3	w_4	w_5	 w_{n-1}	\boldsymbol{w}_n

$$(a_1w_1 + \dots + a_nw_n) * (b_1w_1 + \dots + b_nw_n) == (c_1w_1 + \dots + c_nw_n)$$

$$(2w_1 + 1) * (3w_1 + 4w_2) == (w_{n-2} + 2)$$

$$(w_3 + 2) * (w_4) == (w_n + 1)$$

$$\dots \dots$$



\boldsymbol{w}_1	w_2	w_3	w_4	w_5	 w_{n-1}	\boldsymbol{W}_n	
$input_0$	$input_1$	$input_2$	va_1	vb_1	 vc_1	vd_1	

$$(a_1w_1 + \dots + a_nw_n) * (b_1w_1 + \dots + b_nw_n) == (c_1w_1 + \dots + c_nw_n)$$

$$(2w_1 + 1) * (3w_1 + 4w_2) == (w_{n-2} + 2)$$


$$(w_3 + 2) * (w_4) == (w_n + 1)$$

$$\dots \dots$$

I know a vector {input, va, vb, vc, ...} that satisfies all those constraints

Plonkish Arithmetization





Plonkish Arithmetization



\mathbf{a}_0	a ₁	a ₂	a ₃	a ₄	T _o	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output					
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1					
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2					
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3					
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4					
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
	,	witnes	8			Table '	1	Tah	2 ما

witness

Table 1

Table 2



a_0	a ₁	a ₂	a ₃	a ₄	T ₀	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output					
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1					
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2					
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3					
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4					
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
							_		

$$va_3*vb_3*vc_3-vb_4=0$$

witness

Table 1

Table 2



a ₀	a ₁	a ₂	a ₃	a ₄	T _o	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output					
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1					
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2					
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3					
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4					
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
	,	witnes	s			Table '	1	Tab	le 2

$$va_3*vb_3*vc_3-vb_4=0$$

- High degree
- More customized



a_0	a ₁	a ₂	a_3	a ₄	T _o	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output					
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1					
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2					
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3					
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4					
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
	•	witnes	s			Table '	1	Tab	le 2

$$vb_1 * vc_1 + vc_2 - vc_3 = 0$$

- High degree
- More customized



a ₀	a ₁	a ₂	a ₃	a ₄	T ₀	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output					
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1					
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2					
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3					
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4					
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
	,	witnes	S			Table '	1	Tab	le 2

$$vc_1 + va_2 * vb_4 - vc_4 = 0$$

- High degree
- More customized

Plonkish Arithmetization – Permutation




a ₀	a ₁	a ₂	a ₃	a ₄	T ₀	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output					
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1					
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2					
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3					
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4					
γa_5	vb_5	vc ₅ /		vd_5					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
va_6	vb_6	€oc ₆		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
	,	witnes	S			Table '	1	Tab	le 2

$$vb_4 = vc_6 = vb_6 = va_6$$

Plonkish Arithmetization – Lookup argument





Plonkish Arithmetization – Lookup argument



a ₀	a ₁	a ₂	a ₃	a ₄	T ₀	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output	0000				
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1	0001				
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2	0010				
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3	0011				
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4	0100				
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5	0101				
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		nd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7	Lool	кир	1101				
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6	1110				
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7	1111				
	,	witnes	s			Table	1	Tab	le 2

 $vc_7 \in [0, 15]$

Plonkish Arithmetization – Lookup argument



a ₀	a ₁	a ₂	a_3	a ₄	T _o	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output	0000	0000	0000		
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1	0000	0001	0001		
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2	0000	0010	0010		
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3	0000	0011	0011		
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4	0000	0100	0100		
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5	0000	0101	0101		
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		nd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7	Lool	kup	1111	1101	0010		
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6	1111	1110	0001		
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7	1111	1111	0000		
	•	witnes	S			Table	1	Tab	le 2

$$vc_7 \in [0, 15]$$

$$va_7 \oplus vb_7 = vc_7$$

Plonkish Arithmetization – Lookup argument



a ₀	a ₁	a ₂	a ₃	a ₄	T ₀	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output	0000	0000	0000		
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1	0000	0001	0001		
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2	0000	0010	0010		
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3	0000	0011	0011		
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4	0000	0100	0100		
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5	0000	0101	0101		
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		nd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7	Lool	kup	1111	1101	0010		
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6	1111	1110	0001		
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7	1111	1111	0000		
	witness				Table 1			Tab	le 2

$$vc_7 \in [0, 15]$$

$$va_7 \oplus vb_7 = vc_7$$

RAM operation

Plonkish Arithmetization – Constraints



a ₀	a ₁	a ₂	a_3	a ₄	T ₀	T ₁	T ₂	T ₃	T ₄
$input_0$	$input_1$	input ₂		output					
va_1	vb_1	vc_1		vd_1					
va_2	vb_2	vc_2		vd_2					
va_3	vb_3	vc_3		vd_3					
va_4	vb_4	vc_4		vd_4					
va_5	vb_5	vc_5		vd_5					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					
va_6	vb_6	vc_6		vd_6					
va_7	vb_7	vc_7		vd_7					

$$vb_1 * vc_1 + vc_2 - vc_3 = 0$$

 $va_3 * vb_3 * vc_3 - vb_4 = 0$
 $vb_4 + vc_6 * vb_6 - va_6 = 0$

•••••


$$vb_4 = vc_6 = vb_6 = va_6$$

 $(va_7, vb_7, vc_7) \in (T_0, T_1, T_2)$


witness Table 1

Table 2











- EVM word size is 256bit
 - Efficient range proof
- EVM has zk-unfriendly opcodes
 - Efficient way to connect circuits
- Read & Write consistency
 - Efficient mapping
- EVM has a dynamic execution trace
 - Efficient on/off selectors






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
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



```
Transaction:
{
    from: "0xEA674fdDe714fd979de3EdF0F56AA97168898ec8",
    to: "0xac03bb73b6a9e108530afF4df5077c2b3d481e5a",
    gasLimit: "21000", maxFeePerGas: "300",
    maxPriorityFeePerGas: "10", nonce: "0",
    value: "10000000000"
}
```






























Execution trace			Step 1			
step	opcode					
1	PUSH1 80		Step 2			
2	PUSH1 40					
3	ADD					
• • •	• • •		Step 3			
•••	• • •		3300			
n	RETURN					
			Step n			










Step context

- Codehash
- Gas left
- Program counter, Stack pointer






Step context

- Codehash
- Gas left
- Program counter, Stack pointer

Case switch

- Select opcodes & error cases
- Exactly one is switched on





Step context

- Codehash
- Gas left
- Program counter, Stack pointer

Case switch

- Select opcodes & error cases
- Exactly one is switched on

Opcode specific witness

- Extra witness used for opcodes
- i.e. operands, carry, limbs, ...

EVM circuit - ADD



Step 1

Step 2

Code	hash	gas	PC	SP	root
sADD	sSUB	sMUL	******	*****	•••••
sErr1	sErr2	sErr3	******	*****	•••••
a_lo	a_hi	b_lo	b_hi	c_lo	c_hi
•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••	•••••
codel	nash'	gas'	PC'	SP'	root'

Step n


Step context

Case switch

Opcode specific witness


EVM circuit - ADD






EVM circuit - ADD






EVM circuit - Hash





EVM circuit - Hash






The architecture of zkEVM circuits





EVM circuit



The architecture of zkEVM circuits








The architecture of zkEVM circuits





The workflow of zero-knowledge proof




Proof Constraints Program Step context Step 1 sADD * (pc' - pc - 1) == 0sADD * (sp' - sp - 1) == 0Step 2 sADD * (gas' - gas - 3) == 0 Case switch sADD * (1 - sADD) == 0sMUL * (1 - sMUL) == 0a_hi b_lo b_hi c_lo c_ State root Ethereum Virtual Machine sADD + sMUL + ... + sERRk == 1 (EVM) Opcode specific witness Stack Step n sADD*(a lo+b lo-c lo - carry0* 2^128)== 0 State Machine sADD*(a hi+b hi+carry0-c hi - carry1*2^128)== 0 TX_1 Memory TX_2 Plonk IOP EVM circuit R1CS bitwise opcodes. TX_n range check bytecode stack/memory/etc. pc,opcode **Plonkish** Transaction Bytecode Block context Fixed table Keccak table RAM table table **KZG AIR** RAM circuit MPT circuit circuit circuit **ECDSA** Signature circuit

lookup

table


The proof system for zkEVM






The proof system for zkEVM





Two-layer architecture






- The first layer needs to handle large computation
 - Custom gate, Lookup support ("expressive", customized)
 - Hardware friendly prover (parallelizable, low peak memory)
 - The verification circuit is small
 - Transparent or Universal trusted setup
- Some promising candidates
 - Plonky2/Starky /eSTARK
 - Halo2/Halo2-KZG
 - New IOP without FFTs (i.e. HyperPlonk, Plonk without FFT)
 - If Spartan/Virgo/... (sumcheck based) or Nova can support Plonkish

Two-layer architecture






- The second layer needs to be verifier efficient (in EVM)
 - Proof is efficiently verifiable on EVM (small proof, low gas cost)
 - Prove the verification circuit of the former layer efficiently
 - Ideally, hardware friendly prover
 - Ideally, transparent or universal trusted setup
- Some promising candidates
 - Groth16
 - Plonk with very few columns
 - KZG/Fflonk/Keccak FRI (larger code rate)

Two-layer architecture






- The first layer is Halo2-KZG (Poseidon hash transcript)
 - Custom gate, Lookup support
 - Good enough prover performance (GPU prover)
 - The verification circuit is "small"
 - Universal trusted setup
- The second layer is Halo2-KZG (Keccak hash transcript)
 - Custom gate, Lookup support (express non-native efficiently)
 - Good enough prover performance (GPU prover)
 - The final verification cost can be configured to be really small

The layout






- The first layer needs to be "expressive"
 - EVM circuit has 116 columns, 2496 custom gates, 50 lookups
 - Highest custom gate degree: 9
 - For 1M gas, EVM circuit needs 2^18 rows (more gas, more rows)
- The second layer needs to aggregate proofs into one proof
 - Aggregation circuit has 23 columns, 1 custom gate, 7 lookups
 - Highest custom gate degree: 5
 - For aggregating EVM, RAM, Storage circuits, it needs 2^25 rows

The performance





- Our GPU prover optimization
 - MSM, NTT and quotient kernel
 - Pipeline and overlap CPU and GPU computation
 - Multi-card implementation, memory optimization
- The Performance
 - For EVM circuit
 - CPU prover takes 270.5s, GPU prover takes 30s (9x speedup!)
 - For Aggregation circuit
 - CPU prover takes 2265s, GPU prover takes 149s (15x speedup!)
 - For 1M gas, first layer takes 2 minutes, second layer takes 3 minutes

Outline



- Background & motivation
- Build a zkEVM from scratch
- Interesting research problems
- Other applications using zkEVM


Circuit - Randomness



Step 1 Step 2 step context case switch opcode specific witness Step n

Circuit - Randomness






Break down 256-bit word into 32 8-bit limbs.

$$A = a_0 + a_1 * 256 + a_2 * 256^2 + \dots + a_{31} * 256^{31}$$






Break down 256-bit word into 32 8-bit limbs.

$$A = a_0 + a_1 * 256 + a_2 * 256^2 + \dots + a_{31} * 256^{31}$$

$$A_{RLC} \equiv a_0 + a_1 * \theta + a_2 * \theta^2 + \dots + a_{31} * \theta^{31} \pmod{F_p}$$






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- θ should be computed after $a_0, ..., a_{31}$ are fixed
 - Multi-phase prover: synthesis part of witness, derive witness






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- θ should be computed after $a_0, ..., a_{31}$ are fixed
 - Multi-phase prover: synthesis part of witness, derive witness
- RLC is useful in many places
 - Compress EVM word into one value
 - · Encode dynamic length input
 - Lookup layout optimization





Break down 256-bit word into 32 8-bit limbs.

$$A = a_0 + a_1 * 256 + a_2 * 256^2 + \dots + a_{31} * 256^{31}$$

$$A_{RLC} \equiv a_0 + a_1 * \theta + a_2 * \theta^2 + \dots + a_{31} * \theta^{31} \pmod{F_p}$$

- θ should be computed after $a_0, ..., a_{31}$ are fixed
 - Multi-phase prover: synthesis part of witness, derive witness
- RLC is useful in many places, remove it?
 - Compress EVM word into one value → high, low for EVM word
 - Encode dynamic length input → fixed chunk, dynamic times
 - Lookup layout optimization


Circuit - Layout



Execution trace		Step 1
step	opcode	
1	PUSH1 80	Step 2
2	PUSH1 40	
3	ADD	
• • •	•••	Step 3
• • •	• • •	
n	RETURN	
		Step n

Circuit - Layout






- The execution trace is dynamic
 - → enable different constraints
 - → permutation is not fixed
 - → hard to use standard gates

Circuit - Layout






- The execution trace is dynamic
 - → enable different constraints
 - → permutation is not fixed
 - → hard to use standard gates

Better way to layout?

- We have 2000+ custom gates
- Different rotation to access cells


Circuit - Dynamic size






Circuit - Dynamic size





Circuit - Dynamic size






- Some bad influences
 i.e. Maximum number of Keccaks
- i.e. Mload is more costly (more rows)i.e. Pay larger proving cost for padding

Can we make zkEVM dynamic?


Prover – Hardware & Algorithm





Prover – Hardware & Algorithm





Our prover


- GPU can make MSM & NTT really fast
 Bottleneck moves to witness generation & data copy
- Need large CPU memory (1TB -> 300GB+)

Hardware friendly prover?

- Parallelizable & Low peak memory
- Don't ignore the witness generation
- Run on cheap machines, more decentralized

Prover – Hardware & Algorithm





Best way to compose different proof system?

- The first layer needs to be "expressive"
- The second layer needs to be verifier efficient (in EVM)
- Should we move to smaller field?
 (Breakdown/FRI with Goldilocks, Mersenne prime)
- Should we stick to EC-based constructions?
 (SuperNova, Cyclic elliptic curve with fast MSM)
- More options waiting for you → Reach out to us!

Security – Audit & Soundness



Why? Code risk. fn signextend_gadget_exhaustive() { let pos_value: [u8; 32] = [0b011111111u8; 32]; let neg_value: [u8; 32] = [0b10000000u8; 32]; let pos_extend = 0u8; let neg_extend = 0xFFu8; for (value, byte_extend) in vec![(pos_value, pos_extend), (neg_value, neg_extend)].iter() { test_ok((idx as u64).into(), Word::from_little_endian(value), Word::from_little_endian(.map(|i| if i > idx { *byte_extend } else { value[i] }) .collect::<Vec<u8>>(), PSE ZK-EVM circuits: 34,469 lines of code



Screenshot From Vitalik

Security – Audit & Soundness



Why? Code risk.

```
fn signextend_gadget_exhaustive() {
276
              let pos_value: [u8; 32] = [0b011111111u8; 32];
             let neg_value: [u8; 32] = [0b10000000u8; 32];
             let pos_extend = 0u8;
             let neg_extend = 0xFFu8;
             for (value, byte_extend) in vec![(pos_value, pos_extend), (neg_value, neg_extend)].iter() {
                 for idx in 0..33 {
                     test_ok(
                          (idx as u64).into(),
                         Word::from_little_endian(value),
                          Word::from_little_endian(
                                  .map(|i| if i > idx { *byte_extend } else { value[i] })
                                  .collect::<Vec<u8>>(),
291
292
```

PSE ZK-EVM circuits: 34,469 lines of code

- The best way to audit zkEVM circuit?
 (In general, VM circuit based on IR)
 - Audit Manually
 - Formal verification for some opcodes


Outline




- Background & motivation
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Applications – zkRollup








zkEVM

- Prove n Txs on layer 2 are valid
- Verify proof in smart contract


Application - Enshrine blockchain






Application - Enshrine blockchain






Application - Enshrine blockchain








- Prove layer 1 block directly
- Recursive proof
- One proof for blockchain

Applications – Proof of exploit






Prove I know a Tx that can change the state root to state root'
 (Prove I know a bug that can change your balance, etc)

Applications – Attestation ("zk oracle")





Finally, ...



We are building cool things at Scroll!

- Scroll is a general purpose scaling solution for Ethereum based on zkRollup
- Building a native zkEVM using very advanced circuit arithmetization + proof system
- Building fast prover through hardware acceleration (GPU in production) + proof recursion
- We are live on the testnet with a production-level robust infrastructure

There are a bunch of interesting problems to be solved!

- Protocol design and mechanism design
- Zk engineer & research for practical efficiency

Thank you!





