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Social-ecological fits in water use following institutional shifts of the Yellow River Basin

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ABSTRACT

Increasing competition for water is challenging management institutions of large river basins worldwide. Institutions that successfully support sustainable water resource use are structurally well-aligned with water provisioning and social-ecological demands. However, what constitutes a well-aligned institution in this context is poorly understood. We analyzed institutional shifts in water governance, exploiting two quasi-natural experiments of the Yellow River Basin. First, using a Differenced Synthetic Control method to control economic and environmental contexts, we found the Water Allocation Scheme (87-WAS), which intended to limit water use, unexpectedly resulting in a structural mismatch of the social-ecological system (SES) with increased water use. We then applied a mathematical model to suggest that incentive distortions contributed to the rapid water use under the typical mismatched SES structure. Our analysis highlights the need to evaluate institutional fit in coupled human and natural systems carefully.

Keywords: water use, water management, social-ecological system, institutional fit, collaborative governance

INTRODUCTION

Widespread freshwater scarcity and overuse, resulting in systematic risks to economies, societies, and ecosystems globally, are critical environmental challenges to sustainable development [1–4]. With steadily increasing demand, competition for water is an urgent problem in water governance, where policies often lead to long-term changes in human–water relationships and the redistribution of benefits [5–7]. Despite governments worldwide trying to resolve competition for water through deliberate institutions at large river basins, cascading effects of these initiatives are poorly understood [8–10].

Institutions (such as policies, laws, and norms) can influence regional sustainability by changing the structure of the coupled system, including interplays between social actors, ecological units, or between social and ecological system elements [11–14]. Understanding the complex interlinkages is crucial for developing strategies to effectively manage natural resources and enhance the resilience of social-ecological systems (SES) [15]. Effective ("matched") institutions operate at appropriate spatial, temporal, and functional scales to manage and balance these different relationships and interactions, therefore, supporting (but do not guarantee) sustainability of SES [7,16]. Water governance tends to shift to institutional solutions within a complex basinal system, where societal drivers impact through water use and related technical interventions [17]. Some institutional shifts have desirable water governance outcomes (e.g., the Ecological Water Diversion Project in Heihe River Basin, China [7] and collaborative water governance systems in Europe [18]). However, shifting institutions in a large, complex river basin may create or destroy hundreds of different connections, where matched human-water relationships are not ubiquitous. Therefore, despite widespread recognition of the rising importance of institutions as an approach to water sustainable use within large river (es-

pecially transboundary river) basins, broader cascading effects of these changes are still in open discussion [19–21].

Supporting 35.63% irrigation and *xx*% population with only 2.66% of water resources in China (data from http://www.yrcc.gov.cn, last access: 28 February 2021), the overburdened Yellow River (YR) once dried up in consecutive years. For that, as a pioneer in water governance shifting in China, the YRB started to explore the initial water allocating scheme in the 1970s, then found a successful solution of dring-up in 1998, and promoted entirely since 2008. Throughout, the institutional shifts in 1987 (known as the "87 Water Allocation Scheme, 87-WAS") and 1998 (Unified Basinal Regulation, 98-UBR) were two widely recognized milestones of water governance. Before the remarkable achievement in the restoration of river depletion since the 98-UBR, on the contrary, the first temptation to restrict water uses in the 87-WAS was recognized as a not fulfilling expectations of institutional shift. Until the 87-WAS, stakeholders have free access to the YR water resources, with geographic and temporal differences between freshwater demand and availability. As the mismatch between demands and supply kept increasing, national authorities proposed in 87-WAS allocating specific water quotas between 10 provinces (or regions) along the YR basin. However, this controversial scheme helped little in turning water depletion around until a different strategy expanded the responsibilities of basinal authorities in integrated water management in 1998 and started progress in the restoration.

The shifts in the water governance institution of YR refactored the interplays between humans and water with long-term cascading effects, leaving two quasi-natural experiments for understanding the interactions. By Differenced Synthetic Control method, our analysis of the net effects of institutional shift shows that institutional mismatches contributed to the acceleration of water withdrawals for resource users after 98-WAS. As few large river basins have experienced such radical structural changes several times, our quantitative analysis of institutional shifts in the YR induces a valuable understanding of water sustainable governance by decoupling natural and human interferences. By highlighting potential concerns for ecosystem collapse under structural mismatches, our findings align with the urgent calls for a more dynamic design for water governance institutions to achieve sustainability.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Institutional shifts effect on water use

Here, we use Differenced Synthetic Control (DSC) method, which considers economic growth and natural background, to estimate theoretical water uses scenarios without basinal policy interferences (Methods; S2 in Supplementary Material). Our results suggest that the institutional shift in 1987 (87-WAS) stimulated the provinces to withdraw more water than would have been used without the interference (Figure 2A). From 1988 to 1998, while the estimation of water use only suggests $956.38km^3$, the observed water use of the YRB provinces reached $1038.36km^3$ in sum, 8.57% increased. However, after the institution shifted again in 1998 (98-UBR), the trend of increasing water use appeared to be effectively suppressed. From 1998 to 2008, the total observed water use decreased by $0.49km^3$ per year, while the estimation of water use still suggests $1.03km^3$ increases (Figure 2 B). The increased water uses after 87-WAS aligns with the fact that badly drying-up of the surface streamflow from 1987 to 1998, which was an obvious touchstone of river degradation and environmental crisis (Figure 2C). On the other hand, the environmental crisis of river drying up was effectively resolved after the 98-UBR, though the density of droughts still increased for decades (from 0.47 after 87-WAS to 0.62 after 98-UBR on average) (Figure 2C). In line with previous literature had reported; therefore, the institution shift of 98-UBR contributed a lot to the successful water governance.

Besides environmental background, our forecast by DSC takes economic factors into account under the assumptions that the production function between economic volume and water uses remained unchanged (S2 in Supplementary Material). It means the forecast of water use includes the part caused by the increased economic volume, while the outcomes of economy (GDP in different sectors) of the YRB maintained a parallel trend with other regions during the period (S3 in Supplementary Material Figure ??). Therefore, 87-WAS did not "have little effect" as previous analyses suggested (cites) but led

Figure 1. Institutional shifts and related SES structures in the Yellow River Basin (YRB). See Supplementary Material S1 for detailed introduction for the institutions. A. The national government changed YRB management policies and institutions in 1987 and 1998. As a result, the Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) and the provinces acted differently in different periods. Three different SES structures existed successively in the YRB. B. 1975–1987: Without any constraints, water resources were freely accessible to each stakeholder (the provinces in this case, denoted by red circles) from a one-way but connected ecological unit (the Yellow River, denoted by the blue rectangle). C. 1987–1998: After the implementation of policy 1 in 1987, each user was assigned a quota to withdraw surface water resources, and the YRCC (yellow triangle) was tasked with reporting on water quota use. D. 1998–2008: After the implementation of policy 2, stakeholders had to apply for water resources from the YRCC, which then licensed water use according to the quota. Under this institution, the YRCC had direct two-way connections between provinces and ecological components.


Figure 2. Effects of two institutional shifts on water resources use and allocation in the Yellow River Basin (YRB). A. water uses of the YRB before and after the institutional shift in 1987 (87-WAS); B. water uses of the YRB before and after the institutional shift in 1998 (98-UBR). While the blue lines are statistic water use data, the grey ones are the estimation from the Differenced Synthetic Control method with economic and environmental background controlled. C. Drought intensity in the YRB and drying up events of the Yellow River. The size of the grey bubbles denotes the length of a drying upstream.

to increased water use because the difference between prediction and observation will be trivial when the shift was just a blank policy by applying DSC method. Water use efficiency is another crucial factor in interpreting the differences besides the economic factors (e.g., irrigated areas and industrial outcomes) considered and controlled

by the method. In addition to the expansion of irrigation area after the 87-WAS, water uses per unit of irrigation area also rapidly widened the gap with the average level of the rest provinces, while the industry water use hardly changed (S3 in Supplementary Material Figure ??). As a previous report sigh: although the key to alleviating the drought

is saving water in the irrigated areas, the tragedy of scrambling for water appeared in provinces and irrigated areas In terms of the average ratio of water-saving irrigation area (refer to drip or sprinkler irrigation systems and canal lining), although there was a significant increase in the whole country after 1987, the YRB did not rapidly open a obvious gap until about 1994 (Figure ??). As a result, despite the irrigation area expanding, scrambling for water resources without any incentive to optimize water efficiency accelerated holistic water use. This accelerated growth in water use was contrary to the original intention of the 87-WAS in conserving the limited water, and this failure of the institution was a major barrier to the sustainability of the Yellow River

The cascading effects of the two institutional shifts were very different, while their reframed SES structures have direct differences. In our study period, the institution shifted between three different structures (Figure 1 A to C). However, the YRCC, whose primary official response to the river before 1998, the mandate was to conserve the riverway environment, construct and maintain infrastructures, and report on and analyze water consumption (after the 87-WAS) in the YRB, i.e., connecting the ecological nodes (different river reaches) horizontally [22]. Thus, until the institutional shift of 98-UBR, with no necessity to apply for a water permit from YRCC, there were no horizontal connections (cooperations or agreements) between the various stakeholders (provinces) directly connected to the ecological sections. Empirical studies in many different fields indicate that this structure is likely to be mismatched, as isolated stakeholders struggle with holistically maintaining interconnected ecosystems [23–26]. The cascading effect of the 87-WAS once again demonstrates that the more stakeholders, the more difficult it is to have a win-win situation of environment and interests [27] which calls for exceptional understanding and caution to the structure of hampering sustainability [24,26].

Mechanism of institutional shift effects

Next, we explored the mechanisms linking the structures and the outcomes by analyzing regional disparity in influenced water use for each province by institutional shifts. Differences in provincial responses to 87-WAS are vital to understanding the mechanism of in-

stitutional shifts' impacts. Our results show that the proportion of accelerated water consumption in each province (the proportion of actual water consumption exceeding the predicted water consumption by the model) has a significant correlation to the Yellow River water consumption in each province (Figure 3A). However, the apparent acceleration effect of the 87-WAS was only prominent in the significant water-using provinces (Neimeng, Henan, and Shandong), and there were no evident impacts for most provinces (Figure 3B). In particular, Shandong and Inner Mongolia, both provinces that exceeded the prescribed water uses of the 87-WAS, used xx% and XX% more water uses than predicted by the model from 1987 to 1998, respectively. On the contrary, the satisfaction of each province with the water allocation stipulated by the 87-WAS (expressed by the difference between the actual water allocation of each province and the expected planning value) is not significantly correlated with this acceleration effect.

We analyzed mathematically why the mismatched structure made win-wins holistically elusive in the institution shift of 87-WAS (method and Supplementary Material S4). Our model suggests that for users who are already economically efficient, greater marginal returns from water induce the acceleration of extracting resources for future economic growth (Figure ??). Therefore, isolated stakeholders reacted variety to the similar marginal cost, and the institution of 87-WAS thus triggered an incentive distortion besides the initial intention of sustainable water use. On the contrary, the presence of central management (by the YRCC in this case, after 1998) can effectively reduce marginal ecological costs as stakeholders take corresponding responsibilities to the YRCC (Supplementary Material S4). The alignments of differences in institutional structures and outcomes echo the hypothesis of successful governance in SES by indirectly (or vertically) creating links between different stakeholders (in the YRB cases, through administration).

Authentic the water quota (or the initial water rights) in our case studies went through a stage of "bargaining" among stakeholders (from 1982 to 1987) [7,22], where each province attempted to demonstrate its development potential related to water use. With information asymmetry between

Figure 3. A. The partial correlation coefficient between wate uses (WU) of Yellow River (YR), unsatisfied ratio (compared with requirements in water plan and supply in the 87-WAS), and the average accelerated ratio. B. Average accelerated ratio of water uses for each province in the YRB during the decade after 87-WAS (from 1987 to 1998). Mian users: Major water consumption provinces (over the median). Overused: violate the 87-WAS in average water uses.

upper-level decision-makers and lower-level stakeholders in water use allocation, those with more current water use might have greater bargaining power. After 1987, the logical next step for provinces was to attempt to justify bargaining for larger quotas rather than immediately adopt resource-conserving transformations, as the trend of the water consumption intensity denotes (Supplementary Material S4). Studies show that the volume and efficiency of large water users need more water than their quota (in the 87-WAS) if only considering the economic factors when designing the institution. In practice, therefore, although the affected provinces may not have directly encouraged excessive resource use because of the institutional shift, they had a larger incentive to show their economic potential [28,29]. As a result, while competing for potential water quotas, the provinces tended to hide the ecological costs behind economic development.

With increasingly fierce competition for water, worldwide basins are developing institutions for governance (whether through self-organization or government intervention) [12,30,31]. Adopting an overall quota plays a vital role in preventing the overuse of Common-pool Resources, like exclusive and competitive water resources. However, various outcomes following institutional shifts of YRB demonstrate that stakeholders may react to quota with distortion when pursuing returns isolated under mismatched SES

structures. History also shows that, after 87-WAS, provinces, especially water-intensive ones, challenged it and continued to appeal for larger quotas. After YRCC as governing agent coordinated between stakeholders since 98-UBR, the external appeal of provinces for larger quotas turned into internal innovation to improve water efficiency. Agents matching the ecological scale appear widespread as motifs in SES of successful governance, whether in fisheries, forests, or groundwater management, suggesting that reducing independent stakeholders linked to fragmentation is an essential primary mechanism for a structure to produce good results.

Novel insights and policy implications

Since the structures introduced by 87-WAS and 98-UBR are recurring motifs in many SES, our proposed mechanism is crucial to understanding such coupled systems. Furthermore, we explored the causal linkages between the SES structures and sustainability (outcomes) in quasi-natural experiments of the YRB, which provides an informative case study for two main reasons. First, the sharp structural shifts in YRB management enabled us to quantitatively estimate the net effects of changes in high-level institutional design on water use. Institutions that determine water allocation include bottom-up agreements or social norms as well as top-down quotas or regulations, with different ef-

fects on SES structure [7,32]; top-down regulations can trigger immediate institutional shifts, and sharp SES structural changes [32,33]. In comparison with investigations of more gradual changes induced by bottom-up institutional shifts, exploring the impacts of a top-down change substantially diminishes potential problems of omitted variables in the quantitative analysis of SES and clarifies the causal link between SES structure and outcome. Second, we can better understand the influence of structural alignments under a fixed basin by comparing the net effects of three different institutional structures split by two institutional shifts in the YRB. Although socioeconomic units within a basin benefit from water resources in large river basins all over the world, and many locations have shown increased levels of regulation, few basins have experienced such radical SES structural changes several times (see Supplementary Material S1). Thus, the YRB provides a valuable setting for understanding the direct impacts of changes in the SES institutional structure. Finally, one of the limitations of our method is that it is difficult to rule out the effects of other policies over the same time breakpoints. However, since scholars have reached a consensus on the importance of the two institutional shifts of 87-WAS and 98-UBR, the differences in their results still provide important references for understanding water governance.

Our results and discussion deepen the understanding of SES structure and strengthen the basic understanding that the mismatched structure formed by isolated stakeholders is not conducive to institutional solutions to environmental sustainability. Moreover, the subsequent success of 98-UBR has proved the importance of institutional scale matching both theoretically and practically; that is, it is necessary to emphasize the establishment of potential connections between stakeholders by agents consistent with the scale of the ecological system (in this case, basinal scale and the YRCC). Furthermore, according to our analysis of plausible scenario assumptions based on our model, when stakeholders anticipate that technological advances will amplify the benefits of water quotas in the future, the incentive distortion will be reinforced (see Supplementary Material S4). However, an institution allowed stakeholders to compensate for the shadow value (i.e., potential returns sacrificed due to water con-

straints and water scarcity) [34] of future water use would weaken incentive distortion (e.g., through water rights transfer) (see Supplementary Material S4). Policymakers can also propose a more dynamic institution by increasing the frequency of quota updates that responds to changing conditions and will adapt more effectively to its social-ecological context (see Supplementary Material S4).

Calls for a redesign of water allocation institutions in the YRB in recent years also illustrate the importance of dynamic quota setting (see Supplementary Material S1) [35]. Following the institutional reforms of 1998, the Yellow River has not dried up since 1999. However, given recent changes in the YRB, its rigid resource allocation scheme can no longer meet the new demands of economic development [22]. As a result, the Chinese government has embarked on an ambitious plan to redesign its decades-old water allocation institution (see Supplementary Material S1). Other SESs around the world face similar problems in establishing successful institutions for governance [12,36–38]. These initiatives can benefit from our analysis by actively considering and incorporating social-ecological complexity and incentive structures when developing new approaches that avoid unsustainable outcomes. Our research provides a cautionary tale of how a mismatched structure of institutions can be a double-edged sword when attaining sustainability.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We estimated and analyzed the net effects of two SES structural changes of water use. The actual water use of the Yellow River Basin was peroxided by the sum of the water use of the target group provinces. To quantify water use, we used synthetic control methods to estimate possible trends of water use in the absence of institutional shifts. In addition, as a robustness test, we conducted a matched placebo test (creating a "null model") to exclude the effects of other factors that were contemporaneous with the institutional shifts. Finally, we created an economic model based on marginal revenue to provide a theoretical explanation for the observed "sprint effect" phenomenon. A brief technical overview is given in Supplementary Material S2.

Dataset and variables

We used China's provincial annual water consumption dataset from 1978 to 2012. This publicly available dataset was obtained from the National Water Resources Utilization Survey; details are accessible from Zhou (2020) [39]. A total of 10 provinces or regions have been directly affected by the water allocation institutional shifts in the YRB, accounting for 8.6% of the total population of China (in 1990). Eight provinces have been particularly affected because of their greater dependence on the water resources from the Yellow River (see Supplementary Material S2). Therefore, we divided the dataset into a "target group" and a "control group", treating provinces that were greatly affected as the target group ($n = 8$) and provinces that were not affected by the institutional shifts as the potential control group ($n = 20$).

We focused on two features of water use in the YRB: total water use and diversification of water allocation. The actual water uses are given by the dataset, but when the synthetic control method is used to predict the water use of the control group, other independent influences need to be considered. Thus, we used economic features that are highly related to water use to extrapolate demand (e.g., agriculture, industry, service industry, and domestics, see Supplementary Material S2, Table 1 To measure resource allocation diversification between the upper, middle, and lower reaches, we used "entropy" as a simple index,

$$Index_{entropy} = \sum_i p_i * log(p_i)$$

Where p_i is the proportion of water uses for region i to the total water uses in the basin. A larger index value indicates the proportion of water resources actually used is closer to the average among the upper, middle, and lower reaches.

Synthetic Control

Synthetic control is an effective identification strategy for estimating the net effect of historical events or policy interventions on aggregate units (such as cities, regions, and countries) by constructing a comparable control unit [40–42]. In this study, we used a comparative event approach and compared actual post-institutional shift induced water use changes with an appropriate counterfactual of what the water use change would have been. The counterfactual was built as the optimally weighted average of provinces not exposed to the institutional shifts. The synthetic control method generalizes the difference-in-differences estimator and allows for time-varying individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity [43,44]. In practice, each of the units (i.e., provinces) in the treated group were affected by institutional shifts in 1987 and 1998, each of which was taken as the "shifted" point t_0 and the two steady institutions as t for analyzing in each shift. The synthetic control method generates the control unit by assigning a weight matrix W to units of the potential control group, so that the treated unit and its control unit are similar in each variable before t_0, i.e.,

$$\min(V_i^{t<t_0} - W_i * F_{control}^{t<t_0})$$

where V_i is a vector that indicates all features of a unit i of the treated group, and $F_{control}$ is a matrix that consists of all features and units of the potential control group. W_i is the weight matrix for target unit i. We minimized the root mean square error (RMSE) by using the Synth package in R [?,?]. All codes are accessible in the repository.

In accordance with the idea of dimensionality reduction, we constructed a series of comparable control units that were most similar in characteristics to the treated units. Because the units of the control group were not affected by the institutional shifts, after giving the same weight to the total water use of the control group $M_i * WU_{control}$, the result $W_i * WU_{control}$ could be considered a reasonable estimation of the untreated situation. The net effect of the water allocation institutional shift was then estimated by calculating the difference of water uses after the institutional shift between the treated group and the control group, compared with the water use difference before the shift.

Placebo Test

For robustness, we conducted a placebo test because the synthetic control method neglects the influences of overall changes in factors in the same year by simply dividing time periods according to institutional shifts. Three steps were required to apply the placebo test: (1) For each province in

the target group, we calculated the Euclidean distance of vectors between all provinces in the potential control group. (2) After ranking the distances, the three provinces with the most similar economic context were used to generate an average paired treatment target unit. (3) We performed the same synthetic control analysis for this paired target (i.e., the potential control group excluding the three provinces in step 2). In this way, we theoretically constructed a pseudo-treated unit and performed the same synthetic control treatments. Because these placebo tests were directed at units unaffected by the institutional shifts, the results can be regarded as a reasonable baseline expectation or null model from which to assess the changes caused by other factors.

Economic model

In order to understand the mechanisms underlying the empirical results, we developed a dynamic economic model to analyze how institutional change could have led to the sprint effect in water use. Specifically, we modeled individual provincial decision-making in water resources before quota execution. The analysis result implied that the underlying driver of CPR overuse was incentive distortion.

In developing the model, we highlighted the main features of the YRB, as well as the water use institutions of 1987 and 1998. We proposed three intuitive and general assumptions.

Assumption 1. (Water-dependent production) For simplicity, water is assumed to be the only input of the homogenous production function $F(x)$ of each province because of its irreplaceability. $F(x)$ is continuous and satisfies the Inada Conditions, i.e., $F'(x) > 0, F''(x) < 0$ (the diminishing marginal returns assumption), $F'(0) = \infty, F'(\infty) = 0$. The production output is under perfect competition, with a constant unit price of P.

Assumption 2. (Ecological cost allocation) Under the assumption that the ecology is a single entity for the whole basin involved in N provinces, the cost of water use is equally assigned to each province under any water use. The unit cost of water is a constant C.

Assumption 3. (Multi-period settings) There are infinite periods with a constant discount factor β lying in (0,1). There is no cross-

period smoothing in water uses.

Under the above assumptions, we can demonstrate three cases consisting of local governments in YRB to simulate their water use decision-making and water use patterns.

Case 1. Decentralized institution: This case corresponds to a situation without any high-level water allocation institution (i.e., before 1987, see Figure 1 B).

When each province independently decides on its water use, the optimal water use $\hat{x}_i^*$ in province i satisfies:

$$F'(x) = \frac{C}{P \cdot N}$$

When the decisions in different periods are independent, for $t = 0, 1, 2 \ldots$, then:

$$\hat{x}_{it}^* = \hat{x}_i^*$$

Case 2. Mismatched institution This case corresponds to a mismatched institution (i.e., 1987 ~ 1998, see Figure 1 C).

The water quota is determined at $t = 0$ and imposed in $t = 1, 2, \ldots$ The total quota is a constant denoted as Q, and the quota for province i is determined in a proportional form:

$$Q_i = Q \cdot \frac{x_i}{x_i + \sum x_{-i}}$$

Under a scenario with decentralized decision-making with a water quota institution, given other provinces' water use decisions remain unchanged, the optimal water use $\widetilde{x}_{i0}^*$ of province i at $t = 0$ satisfies:

$$F'(x_{i,0}) = \frac{C}{P \cdot N} - \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot f(Q \cdot \frac{x_{i,0}}{x_{i,0} + \sum x_{-i,0}}) \cdot$$

$$Q \cdot \frac{\sum x_{-i,0}}{(x_{i,0} + \sum x_{-i,0})^2}.$$

When future water use is constrained by a water quota, the dynamic optimization problem of province i is shown as follows:

$$max \quad P \cdot F(x_{i,0}) - \frac{C \cdot \sum x_{i,0} + x_{-i,0}}{N} + \beta P \cdot F(x_{i,1}) + \beta^2 P \cdot F(x_{i,2}) + \ldots$$

$$= P \cdot F(x_{i,0}) - C \cdot \frac{x_{i,0} + \sum x_{-i,0}}{N} + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} P \cdot F(Q \cdot \frac{x_{i,0}}{x_{i,0} + \sum x_{-i,0}})$$

First-order condition: $P \cdot F'(x_{i,0}) - \frac{C}{N} + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} [P \cdot f(Q \cdot \frac{x_{i,0}}{x_{i,0} + \sum x_{-i,0}}) \cdot Q \cdot \frac{\sum x_{-i,0}}{(x_{i,0} + \sum x_{-i,0})^2}] = 0$

where $f(\cdot)$ is the differential function of $F(\cdot)$.

The optimal water use in province i at t=0 $\widetilde{x}_{i,0}^*$ satisfies $P \cdot F'(x_{i,0}) = \frac{C}{N} - \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot P \cdot f(Q \cdot$

$$\frac{x_{i,0}}{x_{i,0}+\sum x_{-i,0}}) \cdot Q \cdot \frac{\sum x_{-i,0}}{(x_{i,0}+\sum x_{-i,0})^2}, \text{ i.e., } F'(x_{i,0}) =$$

$$\frac{C}{P \cdot N} - \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot f(Q \cdot \frac{x_{i,0}}{x_{i,0}+\sum x_{-i,0}}) \cdot Q \cdot \frac{\sum x_{-i,0}}{(x_{i,0}+\sum x_{-i,0})^2}.$$

Case 3. Matched institution

This case corresponds to the institution under which the YRCC centrally managed water allocation between provinces (i.e., 1998 ~ 2008, see Figure 1 D).

When the N provinces decide on water uses as unified whole (e.g., the central government completely decides and controls on the water use in each province), the optimal water use x_i^* of province i satisfies:

$$F'(x) = \frac{C}{P}$$

We propose Proposition 1 and Proposition 2:

Proposition 1: Compared with the decentralized institution, a matched institution with unified management decreases total water use.

Because F is monotonically decreasing, based on a comparison of costs and benefits for stakeholders (provinces) in the three cases,

$$\widetilde{x}_i^* > \hat{x}_i^* > x_i^*$$

The result of $\hat{x}_i^* > x_i^*$ indicates that individual rationality would deviate from collective rationality when property rights are unclear [?], because of the common-pool characteristics of water [?,?].

The difference of $\widetilde{x}_i^*$ and $\hat{x}_i^*$ stems from two parts: the marginal returns effect and the marginal costs effect. First, the "shadow value" provides additional marginal returns of water use in $t = 0$, wwhich increases the incentives of water overuse by encouraging bargaining for a larger quota. Second, the future cost of water use would be degraded from $\frac{P}{N}$ to an irrelevant cost.

The optimal water use under the three cases implies that mismatched institutions cause incentive distortions and lead to resource overuse.

Proposition 2: The quota determination of the mismatched institution increases the incentives of current water use.

The intuition for this proposition is straight-forward in that all provinces would use up their allocated quota under a relatively small Q. As Q increases, the quota would provide higher future benefits for a

pre-emptive water use strategy. Since the provincial water use decisions are exactly symmetric, total water use would increase when each province has higher incentives for current water use. This situation corresponds to a "sprint" effect, where the total water use dramatically increases in the "sprint" period.

Extensions of the model are shown in Supplementary Material S3.

CONCLUSION

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