

# Flip the virus: Modelling targeted attacks using Flipt with propagation delay

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*Sophie Marien*

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# Samenvatting

Recently, high profile targeted attacks such as the attack on Belgacom [2] (a major Belgian telcom), have demonstrated that even the most secure companies can still be compromised, and that moreover such attacks can go undetected for a while. These kind of attacks are called APT, advanced persistent threats, which are designed to penetrate secretly a computer network, collect sensitive data and stay hidden for many years. A company has every interest to mitigate the risks of an APT and the consequences that it can cause. Fighting against these attacks requires methods that go beyond the standard tools against malware. Because of the stealthiness it is better to prevent the attack than detection and recover after it has done some damage.

A group of researchers at the RSA, van Dijk et al., proposed the game FlipIt (The game of “stealthy takeover”) to model stealthy takeovers. It is a 2-players game composed of a single attacker, a single defender and a single shared resource. The players will compete to get control over the shared resource. Every move of the players will involve a cost and these moves happen in a stealthy way. The objective of the game for each player is to maximise the fraction of time of controlling the resource and minimise the total move cost.

FlipIt does however not take into account that a move may not be instantaneous, but has a certain delay. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to games where both the defender and the attacker play with a periodic strategy. We adapt FlipIt such that we can use it to model the game of defending a company network that is attacked by a virus. The FlipIt formulas are adapted such as to take the delay for virus propagation into account. The goal of this thesis is to find out if there are interesting Nash Equilibria for a game with a virus propagation delay and if we can learn some lessons out of it.

Results toevoegen

**Keywords:** Game theory, Advanced persistent threats, cyber security, FlipIt, stealthy takeovers.

# Samenvatting

Onlangs zijn er gerichte security aanvallen geweest op grote bedrijven, zoals de aanval op Belgacom (een grote Belgische telcom). Deze aanvallen hebben aangetoond dat zelfs de meest veilige bedrijven nog steeds gecompromitteerd kunnen worden, en dat bovendien dergelijke aanvallen onopgemerkt kunnen blijven voor een bepaalde tijd. FlipIt is een model dat door onderzoekers van de RSA (van Dijk et al.) is voorgesteld om dergelijke aanvallen te modelleren. Het is een 2-spelers spel bestaat uit een aanvaller, een verdediger en een gedeelde bron. De spelers proberen om controle te krijgen over de gedeelde bron en ze doen dit op een heimelijke manier. Met FlipIt wordt echter geen rekening mee gehouden dat een aanval niet onmiddellijk is, maar dat dit kan gebeuren met een zekere vertraging. In dit artikel passen we het model van FlipIt zodanig aan dat we het kunnen gebruiken voor heimelijke aanvallen die onderheven zijn aan een vertraging. Resultaat :


FlipIt is een spel geïntroduceerd door Van Dijk et al. Om te begrijpen hoe we het FlipIt spel kunnen aanpassen om virus propagatie in acht te nemen, is het belangrijk om vertrouwd te raken met de concepten van het basische FlipIt spel en de notaties. Daarom beginnen we eerst met een uitleg hoe het basische FlipIt spel werkt en de belangrijkste formules die we in de paper gebruiken.

FlipIt is een spel met twee spelers met een gedeelde bron die de spelers zo lang mogelijk willen beheeren. De gedeelde bron kan een wachtwoord, een netwerk of een geheime sleutel zijn afhankelijk van welke situatie gemodelleerd wordt. In de rest van de paper noemen we de twee spelers de aanvaller, aangegeven met subscript  $A$  en de verdediger, aangegeven met subscript  $D$ .

Het spel begint op  $t = 0$  en blijft voor onbepaalde tijd duren ( $t \rightarrow \infty$ ). De tijd van het spel wordt aangenomen als zijnde continu. Om controle over de bron te krijgen kunnen de spelers  $i$ , met  $i \in \{A, D\}$  de bron flippen. Elke flip zal een zekere kost  $k_i$  impliceren en de kosten kunnen variëren voor elke speler. Beide spelers zullen proberen om hun kosten te minimaliseren. Door een kost in te voeren, voorkomt men dat de spelers te vaak bewegen.

De unieke eigenschap van FlipIt is dat elke flip zal gebeuren op een heimelijke manier, wat betekent dat de speler heeft geen idee dat de andere speler (zijn tegenstander) de bron heeft geflipt. Zo zal de verdediger niet kunnen achterhalen of de bron al is geflipt door de aanvaller tot hij de bron zelf flipt. Het doel van de speler is om zo lang mogelijk de controle te behouden over de bron en terwijl de kost

minimaliseren. Een beweging kan ook leiden tot een "verloren beweging", genoemd een flop. Het kan gebeuren dat de bron reeds onder controle is van de speler. Als de speler flipt wanneer hij of zij al de controle heeft over de bron, dan verspilt de speler een zet omdat het niet leidt tot een verandering van controle en dus een kost verspilt wordt.



FIGUUR 1: Een afbeelding van een Flipit spel waarbij beide spelers periodiek spelen en discrete tijdsintervallen. Elke beweging of flip wordt aangegeven met een blauw of oranje cirkel. De aanvaller is vertegenwoordigd in oranje en speelt met een periode van  $\delta_A = 4$ . De verdediger is vertegenwoordigd in blauw en speelt met een periode van  $\delta_D = 3$ . De blauwe en oranje rechthoeken geven de hoeveelheid tijd die de betreffende speler is in de controle van de bron.

De staat van de bron wordt aangeduid als een tijdsafhankelijke variabele  $C = C_i(t)$ .  $C_D(t)$  is 1 als het spel onder controle is van de verdediger en 0 als het spel onder controle is door de aanvaller. Omgekeerd, zal  $C_A(t)$  1 zijn als het spel onder controle is door de aanvaller en 0 als onder controle door de verdediger. Dus,  $C_A(t) = 1 - C_D(t)$ . Het spel begint met de verdediger in control:  $C_D(0) = 1$ .

De spelers krijgen een uitkering gelijk aan de tijd eenheden zij in het bezit van de bron minus de kosten van het maken van hun bewegingen waren. De kosten van een speler  $i$  wordt aangegeven met  $k_i$ . De totale winst van de speler  $i$  is gelijk aan de totale hoeveelheid tijd die een speler  $i$  de bron van het begin van het spel is in handen tot tijd  $t$ . Dit wordt als volgt uitgedrukt:

$$G_i(t) = \int_0^t C_i(x) dx. \quad (1)$$

Als we de winst van de verdediger en de versterking van de aanvaller moet samenvatten tot  $t$ :

$$G_D(t) + G_A(t) = t \quad (2)$$

De gemiddelde winst tarief van speler  $i$  wordt gedefinieerd als:

$$\gamma_i(t) = G_i(t)/t. \quad (3)$$

En daarmee voor alle  $t > 0$ :

$$\gamma_D(t) + \gamma_A(t) = 1 \quad (4)$$

Laat  $\beta_i(t)$  duiden speler  $i$  gemiddelde voordeel upto tijd  $t$ :

$$\beta_i(t) = \gamma_i(t) - k_i \alpha_i. \quad (5)$$



Dit is gelijk aan de fractie van de tijd de bron is in handen van speler  $i$ , minus de kosten van het maken van de bewegingen.  $\alpha_i$  definieert het gemiddelde zet koers door speler  $i$  tot tijd  $t$ . In een bepaalde wedstrijd zal asymptotische benefit ratio (of eenvoudig gebruikmaken) worden gedefinieerd als  $\liminf$  van het gemiddelde voordeel omdat de tijd  $t$  toeneemt tot oneindig en de gemiddelde voordeel niet beperkend waarden.

$$\beta_i(t) = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \inf \beta_i(t) \quad (6)$$

## strategieën

Omdat de spelers bewegen in een sluipende manier, zijn er verschillende soorten feedback die een speler kan krijgen tijdens het rijden. Dergelijke feedback kan worden verdeeld in twee groepen van strategieën. De niet-adaptieve strategieën en de adaptieve strategieën. Deze worden beschreven in de tabel 1.

Als er geen feedback voor geen van beide spelers, hebben wij een niet-adaptieve strategie. Omdat een speler geen feedback tijdens het spel zal hij spelen op dezelfde manier tegen elke tegenstander. De strategie die niet-adaptieve omdat de speelstrategie niet afhankelijk is van de tegenstander bewegingen. Een interessante subklasse van de niet-adaptieve strategieën die waar de tijdsintervallen tussen twee opeenvolgende bewegingen worden gegenereerd door een vernieuwingsproces. Een voorbeeld hiervan werd strategie is de periodieke strategie waarbij het tijdsverloop tussen twee opeenvolgende bewegingen van de spelers een vast interval. Een exponentiële strategie is vernieuwingsstrategie waarbij het interval tussen twee opeenvolgende zetten exponentieel verdeeld.

In het geval dat er feedback, een speler kan zijn strategie aanpassen aan de ontvangen over de bewegingen van de tegenstander informatie. Afhankelijk van de hoeveelheid informatie ontvangen, kunnen twee subklassen van adaptieve strategieën worden geïdentificeerd. The Last Move (LM) strategieën vertegenwoordigen de klasse waarin wanneer een speler flips zal hij vinden van de exacte tijd dat de tegenstander speelde de laatste keer. In de tweede klasse, genaamd Full History (FH), wanneer een speler flips zal hij vinden van de hele geschiedenis van de beweging van de tegenstander. In dit artikel zullen we ons richten op de niet-adaptieve strategieën. Deze keuze is ingegeven door het feit dat in een zekerheid spel een speler (verdediger of aanvaller) zelden informatie over de bewegingen (laatste zet of volledige geschiedenis) van zijn tegenstander.

Het onderzoek van de verschillende strategieën middels Flipit framework stelt een aantal interessante resultaten leiden:

- periodieke spellen domineren de andere vernieuwing strategieën, wat betekent dat het altijd voordelig om periodiek tegen een tegenstander met een vernieuwing van de strategie te spelen;

Categories	Klassen Strategies
Non-adaptieve (NA)	Vernieuwing - Periodieke - Exponentiële General non-adaptieve
Adaptive (AD)	Laatste move (LM) Full History (FH)

TABEL 1: hiërarchie van de klassen van de strategieën in Flipit

- periodieke games zijn nadelig tegen spelers na een laatste zet adaptieve strategie;
- als de verdediger speelt met een periodieke tarief dat snel genoeg is zal hij de aanvaller te dwingen uit te vallen;
- 

In dit *abstract* environment wordt een al dan niet uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting van het werk gegeven. Wanneer de tekst voor een Nederlandstalige master in het Engels wordt geschreven, wordt hier normaal een uitgebreide samenvatting verwacht, bijvoorbeeld een tiental bladzijden.

Dit is het kort geschreven.

Eigenlijk paper in het nederlands schrijven

Intro – positionering – vraagstelling – oplossingen en contributies

Flipit en cybersecurity

Flipit met delay

Berekeningen

Niet zo lang geleden werden APT's ontdekt. (Introzin moet beter en anders). Bedrijven worden door APTs aangevallen. Belangrijk om APTs tegen te gaan. Geven een grote kost aan de bedrijven. Hun stealthy aspect is vervelend en moeilijk aan te pakken. Preventie is beter dan detectie. Eens ze binnen zijn kunnen we veel schade veroorzaken. Conventionele middelen zoals firewalls, malware detection helpen hier niet tegen. Nieuwe methode nodig. Gametheory FlipIt. FlipIt uitleggen. Deze formules gaan we dan omvormen tot ze wel propagatie delay kunnen modelleren. Hiervan berekenen we ook het Nash equilibrium.

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## Lijst van figuren

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# Hoofdstuk 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Introduction

#### Situation

In this era where digitalization becomes prominent in every aspect of our lives, where technology is growing fast and where businesses are always under attack, security becomes an issue of increasing complexity. Without security, there is no protection to keep somebody out of a system. It is the same as leaving the door of your house wide open for everyone to come in.

Why is it so important to keep a system secure? Many businesses store confidential information on clients, which can be lost and possibly be abused by competitors through data leakage. Also, disruption caused by distributed DoS attacks, may result in businesses failing to meet their service-level agreements. Ultimately, system and network security helps protecting a business's reputation, which is one of its most important assets.

A particular kind of threats are Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). An APT is a targeted cyber attack that is designed to penetrate a network or a system in a stealthy way and that can stay undetected for a long period. This makes it so hard to protect a network or a system against an APT. Bruce Schneier describes an APT as something different and stronger than a conventional threat: *"A conventional hacker or criminal is not interested in any particular target. He wants a thousand credit card numbers for fraud, or to break into an account and turn it into a zombie, or whatever. Security against this sort of attacker is relative; as long as you're more secure than almost everyone else, the attackers will go after other people, not you. An APT is different; it's an attacker who - for whatever reason - wants to attack you. Against this sort of attacker, the absolute level of your security is what's important. It does not matter how secure you are compared to your peers; all that matters is whether you're secure enough to keep him out"* - Bruce Schneier [1].

misschien meer  
zeggen over  
APTs en th-  
reats

### Complication

Since it is so difficult to protect a system or a network against APT's, researchers have been looking for effective ways to predict in advance which defence strategy might be the better one. Game theory is gaining increasing interest as an effective technique to model and study Cyber Security. Game theory analyses the security problem as a game where the players are an attacker and a defender of a system, and where both players have to make decisions. In particular, both players will aim for the strategy that results in a maximal benefit for them. Researchers at RSA, van Dijk et al, made a game theoretic model of targeted attacks. They study the specific scenario where a system or network is repeatedly taken over completely by an without being immediately detected by the defender of the system or network. In game theory, such a game is known as "FlipIt" [12]. This is a two players game where the attacker and the defender are competing to get control over a shared resource. Both players do not know who is currently in control of the resource until they move. In FlipIt every move gives them immediate control over the resource. But what if the attacker moves and it takes a while before the attacker gets full control over the resource? FlipIt does not take into account that a move may not be instantaneous, but has a certain delay. Consider for example a network with different nodes ( laptops, datacenters) as a resource. The attacker drops a virus on one of the nodes and then wait till this virus infects the whole network. The attacker will only be in control of the resource once the whole network is infected.

### Research questions

The game theoretical approach of the FlipIt does not take such delay into account. This can lead us to the following research questions:

- How can we incorporate the notion of delay in the game-theoretical analysis of the Flip-It game for a periodic strategy ?
- Is there an optimal defense strategy against an attacker ?

### Contributions

We propose an addition to the basic FlipIt model to model a scenario where the moves by the attacker will not be instantaneous. Next we analyse what the new Nash equilibria will be and ..

### Overview of the thesis

–opbouw van de thesis uitleggen–

The organisation of this paper is the following. In chapter 2 a brief introduction to Gametheory is introduced to get familiar with the game theoretic concepts that

will be further used in the paper. In the same chapter the FlipIt framework is summarized and the most important conclusions together with the the related work done on FlipIt and the difference with this paper. In chapter 5 , we first introduce the adaptations made on FlipIt to model a FlipIt game with virus propagation. After that formulas are derived to model a FlipIt game with a virus propagation for a specific case where players play a periodic strategy with a random phase. This chapter ends with simulations where conclusions can be derived. Next in Chapter ?? we given an overview of the various ways in which a virus can propagate. We present a method to calculate the speed of the propagation of a virus in a network and how this network can be established to reduce the spreading of a virus. Finally, in Chapter 4 , we discuss the main results and complications and provide directions for further research.





## Hoofdstuk 2

# Introduction to GameTheory

### 2.1 What is cyber security?

Cyber security is a part of security that focuses on securing computer controlled devices such as computers and smartphones, as well as public and private computer networks, including the entire Internet. A private network can be an enterprise network that is protected from the public network such as the internet. The purpose of security is to give certainty that data will not be removed without authorization (Confidentiality) that the data is always accessible (Availability), and that data can not be read or altered by someone who does not have the authorization (Integrity). These are the 3 key attributes of security, also known as the CIA triad.

In order to keep a system secure, it is important to mitigate the possible threats. A threat refers to anything that can breach the security and that can cause a possible harm. Some of the most common threats are spam, malware, spoofing, phishing and DDoS attacks. The biggest threat are caused by malware. This is a piece of malicious program that is designed to penetrate unprotected systems or computers, and getting there to sensitive information. Malware can be divided into different subclasses. These subclasses are not mutually exclusive:

Virus: This is a malicious piece of code that replicates and tries to spread to infect other systems or files. The "I love you" virus is an example of a virus that quickly spreads. This virus propagates via mail systems. If someone opens an email with "I love you" with the virus in the annex this virus spreads itself by sending a mail to everyone in your contact list. So the virus can multiply rapidly and eventually a business network might shut down by the heavy traffic. In this example, there is a need for human interaction to spread the virus. If no one opens the mail the virus can not infect other systems. Unfortunately, there are also viruses that can spread without human interaction. These viruses are referred to as worms. A worm is also a computer program that replicates itself to spread to other computers. Via a computer network, copies of the worm can be forwarded without an intermediary. The worm will use vulnerabilities of the system to infect other computers. The Stuxnet worm is a very famous

worm. Initially this worm spread via infected USB sticks and from then it could spread through the Internet to other computers. The purpose of the Stuxnetworm was to harm the centrifuges in nuclear reactors. Many reactors have been infected. From the standpoint of the defender, it is very important to respond as quickly as possible so that the worm can not spread.

Rootkit:

Trojan:

Backdoors:

A security report of 2014 reveals that 61% of the attacks on companies are caused by malware. A company can take different measures to defend himself against malware. The threats caused by malware can be divided into 3 big groups: known threats (70%), unknown threats (29%) and advanced threats (1%) [1].

toevoegen referentie naar kaspersky APT report

The known threats easy to defend against. Unknown also. Then the remaining 1% are the advanced threats. These threats are also known as APT. APT's are ... In this paper we focus on targeted attacks. Targeted attacks are malware designed to attack exclusively an organisation. Some examples of the biggest most rare APTs to get an understanding of what APTs are capable of and how long they can stay unseen. [1]

site kaspersky apt

An APT is a persistent targeted attack that tries to penetrate a network, harm and stays unseen for a long period of time. The motive of an APT is mostly cyber espionage, stealing sensitive data, sabotage or other ideological attacks. APT stands for Advanced persistent threat. Advanced stands for the fact that these attacks are well funded and that the attacker itself has a great expertise. These APT are not easy to protect against. Not all APTs are technical advanced. The attacker can also try to exploit existing vulnerabilities and hope that his target has not yet secured himself against these vulnerabilities. Persistent is the fact that the attacker keeps on trying to break in to his victim. He will not give up. The attack can be over various years and different steps. The threats stands for the fact that an APT is ..

### Equation

Equation is a complex cyberattack platform where the first known sample is from 2002, but it was only discovered 12 years later in 2014. This APT propagates through usb drives, cd or physical media. It will search for exploits and will self-replicate itself to spread the infection. The purpose of this virus is to steal data and cyberespionage.

### Regin

### Flame

Way of propagation through USB drives, LAN spreading. purpose cyber espionage.

## Black energy

purpose cyber espionage and DDoS, data wiping. prop usb lan

According to [1] the damage of one successful target attack can exceed over 2.54 million dollar. a company needs a defense mechanism to defend itself against apt. Prevention more important than .. een van de manieren om dat te doen is via game theorie.

Security belangrijk. verschillende malware. uitleggen malware. verwijzen naar kaspersky security raport. APT grote threats. voorbeelden van APT's. waarom gametheory gebruiken.

APT report

## 2.2 Intro game theory

Gametheory is a mathematical study to analyse interactions between independent and self-interested agents. To get an understanding of the most important concepts of game theory, a short introduction based on the work of [8] and [3] is given in section 2.3 . For a more detailed and full introduction to game theory, the reader is referred to [8]. In section 2.4 an overview of the FlipIt game is given with the definitions and concepts that will be used throughout the paper. The last section 5.1 will cover the extensions and additions already made on FlipIt.

## 2.3 A brief introduction in Game Theory

Game theory studies the interaction between independent and self-interested agents. It is a mathematical way of modelling the interactions between two or more agents where the outcomes depend on what everybody does and how it should be structured to lead to good outcomes. It has therefore important applications in many area's such as economics, politics, biology, computer science, philosophy and a variety of other disciplines.

One of the assumptions underlying game theory is that the players of the game, the agents, are independent and self-interested. This does not necessarily mean that they want to harm other agents or that they only care about themselves. Instead it means that each agent has preferences about the states of the world he likes. These preferences are mapped to natural numbers and are called the utility function. The numbers are interpreted as a mathematical measure that tells how much an agent likes or dislikes the states of the world.

In a Decision Game Theoretic Approach an agent will try to act in such a way to maximise his expected or average utility function. It becomes more complicated when two or more agents want to maximise their utility and when actions of the agents can affect each other's utilities. This kind of games are referred to as non-cooperative game theory, where the basic modelling unit is the group of agents. The individualistic approach, where the basic modelling is only one agent, is referred as cooperative game theory.

### 2.3.1 Best response and Nash Equilibrium

One of the solution concepts in Game Theory for non-cooperative games is a Nash Equilibrium that we will use in this paper. A Nash Equilibrium is a subset of outcomes that can be interesting to analyse a game. To define this concept we first introduce the concept of best response. The best response for a player is the action of a player that maximizes its pay-off for any given action of the other player. We define  $BR_i$  as the best response function for player  $i$ . The best response for player 1 is given by :  $a_1 = BR_1(a_2)$ . For a Nash Equilibrium each player has a consistent list of actions and each player's action maximizes his or her pay-off given the actions of the other players. Nobody has the incentive to change his or her action if an equilibrium profile is played. We have a Nash Equilibrium for the pair  $(a_1^*, a_2^*)$  where  $a_1^* = BR_1(a_2^*)$  and  $a_2^* = BR_2(a_1^*)$ .

optimal strategy uitleggen

POSTCONDITION: Uitgelegd: Strategien, acties, strategien, spelers, rationeel, Nash, best response

#### List of terms

In the following list a couple of terms that will be used throughout the paper.

*Players:* Players are referred as the ones who are the decision makers. It can be a person, a company or an animal. (they will act rational )

*Actions:* Every player has actions that he or he can do.

*Strategies:* A strategy is the combination of different actions. A pure strategy is only one action.

*Utility function:* The utility function is the mapping of the level of happiness of an agent about the state of the world to natural numbers.

A game in game theory consists of multiple agents and every agent has a set of actions that he can play.

## 2.4 The FlipIt game


FlipIt is a game introduced by van Dijk et al. To understand how to model a FlipIt game with virus propagation it is important to get familiar with the concepts of the normal FlipIt game and its notations. Therefore, we first explain the framework of FlipIt and introduce the most important formulas that will be used throughout the paper.

FlipIt is a two-players game with a shared single resource that the players want to control as long as possible. The shared resource can be a password, a network or a secret key depending on the setting being modelled. In the remainder of the paper

we name the two players the attacker, denoted by the subscript  $A$  and the defender, denoted by subscript  $D$ .

The game begins at  $t = 0$  and continues indefinitely ( $t \rightarrow \infty$ ). The time in the game is assumed as being continuous. To get control over the resource, the players  $i$ , with  $i \in \{A, D\}$ , can flip the resource at any given time. Each move implies a certain cost  $k_i$  and can vary for each player. Both players try to minimize their cost. Adding a cost prevents players to move too frequently.

The unique feature of FlipIt is that every move happens in a stealthy way, meaning that the player has no clue that the other player (his adversary) has flipped the resource. For instance, the defender does not find out if the resource has been compromised by the attacker until he flips the resource himself. The goal of the player is to maximize the time that he or she has control over the resource while minimizing the total cost of the moves. A move can also result in a "wasted move", called a flop. It may happen that the resource was already under control by the player. If the player moves when he or she has already control over the resource, he or she would have wasted a move since it does not result in a change of ownership, so the cost is wasted.



FIGUUR 2.1: A representation of a FlipIt game where both players are playing periodically and at discrete time intervals. Every move or flip is indicated by a blue or orange circle. The attacker is represented in orange and plays with a period of  $\delta_A = 4$ . The defender is represented in blue and plays with a period of  $\delta_D = 3$ . The blue and orange rectangles represent the amount of time the respective player is in control of the resource.

We denote the state of the resource as a time-dependent variable  $C = C_i(t)$ .  $C_D(t)$  is 1 if the game is under control by the defender and 0 if the game is under control by the attacker. Reversely,  $C_A(t)$  is 1 if the game is under control by the attacker and 0 if under control by the defender. So,  $C_A(t) = 1 - C_D(t)$ . The game starts with the defender being in control:  $C_D(0) = 1$ .

The players receive a benefit equal to the time units they were in possession of the resource minus the cost of making their moves. The cost of a player  $i$  is denoted by  $k_i$ . The total gain of player  $i$  is equal to the total amount of time that a player  $i$  has owned the resource from the beginning of the game up to time  $t$ . It is expressed as follows:

$$G_i(t) = \int_0^t C_i(x) dx. \quad (2.1)$$

If we add up the gain of the defender and the gain of the attacker it should sum up to  $t$ :

$$G_D(t) + G_A(t) = t \quad (2.2)$$

The average gain rate of player  $i$  is defined as:

$$\gamma_i(t) = G_i(t)/t. \quad (2.3)$$

And thus for all  $t > 0$  :

$$\gamma_D(t) + \gamma_A(t) = 1 \quad (2.4)$$

Let  $\beta_i(t)$  denote player's  $i$  average benefit upto time  $t$ :

$$\beta_i(t) = \gamma_i(t) - k_i \alpha_i. \quad (2.5)$$

This is equal to the fraction of time the resource has been owned by player  $i$ , minus the cost of making the moves.  $\alpha_i$  defines the average move rate by player  $i$  up to time  $t$ . In a given game, the asymptotic benefit rate (or simply benefit) will be defined as the  $\liminf$  of the average benefit because time  $t$  will increase to infinity and the average benefit may not have limiting values.

$$\beta_i(t) = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \inf \beta_i(t) \quad (2.6)$$

### strategies

Because the players move in a stealthy way, there are different types of feedback that a player can get while moving. These types of feedback can be divided into two groups of strategies. The non-adaptive strategies and the adaptive strategies. These are described in table 2.1.

If there is no feedback for either player, we have a non-adaptive strategy. Because a player does not receive any feedback during the game he will play in the same manner against every opponent. The strategy is called non-adaptive because the playing strategy is not dependent on the opponents movements. An interesting subclass of the non-adaptive strategies is the one where the time intervals between two consecutive moves are generated by a renewal process. An example of such renewal strategy is the periodic strategy where the time between two consecutive moves of the players are a fixed interval. An exponential strategy is a renewal strategy in which the interval between two consecutive moves is exponentially distributed. In case there is feedback, a player can adapt his strategy to the information received about the opponent's moves. Depending on the amount of information received, two subclasses of adaptive strategies can be identified. The Last Move (LM) strategies represent the class where whenever a player flips he will find out the exact time that the opponent played the last time. In the second class, called Full History (FH), whenever a player flips he will find out the whole history of the opponent's move.

Categories	Classes of Strategies
Non-adaptive (NA)	Renewal
	- Periodic
	- Exponential
Adaptive (AD)	General non-adaptive
	Last move (LM)
	Full History (FH)

TABLE 2.1: Hierarchy of Classes of strategies in FlipIt

In this paper we restrict ourselves to periodic strategies. This choice is motivated by the fact that in a security game a player (defender or attacker) rarely has information about the moves (last move or full history) of his opponent.

### Results of the FlipIt game

The study of the different strategies by means of FlipIt framework allows to derive a number of interesting results:

- periodic games dominate the other renewal strategies, meaning that it is always advantageous to play periodically against an opponent with a renewal strategy;
- periodic games are disadvantageous against players following a Last Move adaptive strategy;
- if the defender plays with a periodic rate that is fast enough he'll force the attacker to drop out;
- any amount of feedback about the opponent received during the game, benefits to a player.

## 2.5 Extensions on FlipIt

Various possible ways to extend FlipIt have already been proposed. Laszka et al. made a lot of additions and extensions to the original game of FlipIt. For instance Laszka et al. extended the basic FlipIt game to multiple resources. The rationale is that for compromising a system in real life, more than just one resource needs to be taken over. An example is that gaining access to deeper layers of a system may require breaking several passwords. The model is called FlipThem [5]. Laszka et al. also use two ways to flip the multiple resources: the AND and the OR control model. In the AND model the attacker only controls the system if he controls all the resources of the system, whereas in the OR model the attacker only needs to compromise one resource to be in control of the entire system.

Another addition of Laszka et al. to the game of FlipIt [6] is extending the game to also consider non-targeted attacks by non-strategic players. In this game the defender tries to maintain control over the resource that is subjected to both targeted and non-targeted attacks. Non-targeted attacks can include phishing, while targeted attacks may include threats delivered through zero day attack vulnerabilities. One of the last important additions from Laszka et al. [7] is to consider a game where the moves made by the attacker are still covert but the moves made by the defender are known to the attacker. This means that the attacker can base his attacks on the defender's moves. Both the targeted and non-targeted attacks do not succeed immediately. For the targeted attack the time till it succeeds is given by an exponential distributed random variable with a known rate. The non-targeted attacks are modelled as a single attacker and the time till it succeeds is given by a Poisson process. The conclusion of this paper is that the optimal strategy for the defender is moving periodically. The difference with this paper is that the delay in this paper is dependent on the number of nodes that have to be flipped in a network. This cannot be modelled with the framework in the Laszka et al. paper because the delay is chosen as an exponential distributed random variable. Another difference is that in the case of the Laszka et al. paper, the moves of the defender are considered not stealthy and so the attacker knows when the defender plays.

Other authors used the FlipIt game to apply it on a specific scenario. To be able to use the FlipIt game, modifications were required for the FlipIt model. One of the scenarios by Pham [10] was to find out whether a resource was compromised or not by the attacker. This could be verified by the defender, who has an extra move "test" beside the flip move. The basic idea is to test with an extra action if the resource has been compromised or not. This move involves also an extra cost.

Finally researchers also have investigated the behaviour of humans playing FlipIt. A. Nochenson and Grossklags [9] investigate how people really act when given temporal decisions. Reitter et al. [11] extended the work of A. Nochenson and Grossklags to include various visual presentation modalities for the available feedback during the investigation.



## Hoofdstuk 3

# FlipIt game with virus propagation

### 3.1 Introduction

### 3.2 FlipIt game with virus propagation

Motivatie voor het veranderen van FLipIt naar een FlipIt met viruspropagatie:

### 3.3 Explaining difference between FLipIt with and without virus propagation

A FlipIt game consists of a single resource. To represent the security problem, the game now defines its single resource as a computer network with multiple nodes. One of the players, the defender, will try to defend his network. The defender will do this by flipping all the nodes of the network (i.e. the entire resource) in every move he plays. The attacker, the other player, will try to infect all the nodes in the network. The attacker will do this by flipping the node in the graph that can infect all the nodes in the shortest possible time. After dropping a virus on the first node, it takes a while for the virus to infect the entire network. Since the original FlipIt game works with a single resource that is always flipped entirely, the assumption is made that the attacker is considered to gain immediate full control over the resource when the network has been infected, even it is only one node that has been infected.

In reality however, after dropping a virus on the first node, it takes a while for the virus to infect the entire network. So, the assumption that the attacker has full control over the resource as soon as a node has been infected, is not realistic. The attacker has only control of the network once all or a sufficient number of nodes are infected. The time that it takes for the virus to infect every node (or a sufficient number of nodes) will be denoted as an infection-delay variable  $d$  (called 'delay' for short in the remainder of this paper). If we want to measure how long it takes for

the virus to infect all the nodes in the network, we have to calculate the shortest path from the first infected node to the farthest node. Rather than denoting the time needed for infecting *all* the nodes, the variable  $d$  can also be used to denote the time needed to infect *a sufficient number* of nodes.

Assume that an attacker attacks at time  $t$ , he doesn't get immediate control over the resource, but he only gains control at time  $t + d$ , with  $d$  denoting the time needed to infect a sufficiently number (or all) nodes. If the defender flips the network before the period  $d$  has elapsed (so, somewhere between  $t$  and  $t + d$ ), then the attacker will never gain full control over the resource. This implies that the mathematical formulas for gain and benefit need to be adapted to the fact that the attacker loses part of its benefit because of this delay. In the remainder of this paper, we will adapt the formalization of the FlipIt game using the variable  $d$ .

## 3.4 Formal definition Game

In this section we provide a formal definition of the game and the notation that we will use throughout the paper.

$i$ : Defines the player. Different as in the FlipIt paper where the defender is denoted by the subscript 0 and the attacker by the subscript 1.

$\delta_i$ : The length of the interval between two consecutive moves of player  $i$ .

$\alpha_i$ : The average flip rate of player  $i$ , given by  $\alpha_i = 1/\delta_i$ .

$k_i$ : The cost of player  $i$ 's moves.

$d$ : The delay caused by the virus propagation.

$G_i(t)$ : The total gain of player  $i$  denotes the amount of time player  $i$  is in control over the resource up to time  $t$ .

$\gamma_i$ : The average gain rate of player  $i$  defined as  $G_i(t)/t$

$\beta_i$ : The average benefit rate up to time  $t$  defined as  $\beta_i = \gamma_i - k_i\alpha_i$ .

$opt_i$ : The optimum function.

tekening toe-  
voegen waarop  
de delay staat  
aangeduid

## Playing periodically with virus propagation

This chapter explains how to model a FlipIt game with a virus propagation that infects a network. The first section explains the difference between a normal FlipIt game and a FlipIt game with virus propagation. The next section derives a formula

to calculate the benefit for a FlipIt game with a virus propagation. In the last section we calculate the Nash equilibrium for the benefit formula.

The formalization starts from the model of the non-adaptive continuous basic FlipIt game where players use a periodic strategy with a random phase. This choice is motivated by the assumption that in most organisations, the defence strategy is to periodically defend the network. This corresponds to a periodic defender strategy. A periodic attacker strategy is assumed as well, to be able to compare the results with the periodic strategy of the FlipIt game in [12]. Further research can investigate the effect of relaxing this assumption.

Similarly as in [12], we split the formalization in two cases. The first case is where the defender plays at least as fast as the attacker, the second case is where the attacker plays at least as fast as the defender. For each of these cases, first the benefit formula of the basic case without delay is presented, and then the delay is introduced.

Intuitively we could assume that  $d$  can never be bigger than  $\delta_A$  because then the benefit for the defender would always be 1. This is not always true. It is only true if  $d$  is bigger than  $\delta_D$ , because then the defender will always be in control. For this we only calculate the formulas for the cases where  $d$  is smaller than  $\delta_D$ . We can already conclude that it is no use for the attacker to play when the delay is bigger than  $\delta_D$ .

### 3.4.1 Formalization the benefit formula including the infection-delay

A Periodic strategy is a non-adaptive renewal strategy where the time intervals between consecutive moves are a fixed period, denoted by  $\delta$ . Moreover it has a random phase, that is chosen uniformly and random in the interval  $[0, \delta]$  for the first move. The average rate of play of a player is denoted by  $\alpha_i = \frac{1}{\delta_i}$ .

**Case 1:**  $\delta_D \leq \delta_A$  (The defender plays at least as fast as the attacker.)

Let  $r = \frac{\delta_D}{\delta_A}$ . The intervals between two consecutive defender's moves have length  $\delta_D$ . Consider a given defender move interval. The probability over the attacker's phase selection that the attacker moves in this interval is  $r$ . Given that the attacker moves within the interval, he moves exactly once within the interval (since  $\delta_D \leq \delta_A$ ) and his move is distributed uniformly at random.


The expected period of attacker control within the interval would be  $r/2$ , without considering the delay by a virus. Therefore the benefit for the attacker, without considering the delay, can be expressed as follows:

$$\beta_A(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{r}{2} - k_A \alpha_A = \frac{\delta_D}{2\delta_A} - k_A \alpha_A \quad (3.1)$$

Correspondingly, the benefit for the defender can be expressed as:

$$\beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = 1 - \frac{r}{2} - k_D \alpha_D = 1 - \frac{\delta_D}{2\delta_A} - k_D \alpha_D \quad (3.2)$$

FIGUUR 3.1: The first FlipIt game is one without virus propagation. The second one is with virus propagation and  $d = 1$ . The delay is denoted with an arrow.



However, because of the delay required for virus propagation, the maximal time of control is reduced to  $\delta_D - d$ , see figure 3.1. There is a probability of  $r$  that the attacker will move in the interval of the defender. However, the gain will not be half of the interval. Indeed, the attacker has to play soon enough to gain control, meaning that the attacker has to play during the period of  $\delta_D - d$  during the interval of the defender. The probability that the attacker plays soon enough is  $\frac{\delta_D - d}{\delta_D}$  and this will give the attacker an average gain of  $\frac{\delta_D - d}{2}$ . If the attacker moves after the period of  $\delta_D - d$ , the gain of the attacker will be zero. The probability that this happens is  $\frac{d}{\delta_D}$ . The average gain rate of the attacker can then be expressed as follows if we look at one interval of the defender:

$$\gamma_A(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{1}{\delta_D} \left[ \frac{\delta_D}{\delta_A} \cdot \frac{\delta_D - d}{\delta_D} \cdot \frac{\delta_D - d}{2} + \frac{\delta_D}{\delta_A} \cdot \frac{d}{\delta_D} \cdot 0 \right] \quad (3.3)$$

To derive the benefit, the cost of moving is subtracted from the average gain.

$$\beta_A(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{(\delta_D - d)^2}{2 \cdot \delta_D \delta_A} - k_A \alpha_A \quad (3.4)$$

$$\beta_A(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{\delta_D}{2 \cdot \delta_A} - k_A \alpha_A - \left( \frac{d^2}{2 \cdot \delta_A \delta_D} - \frac{d}{\delta_A} \right) \quad (3.5)$$

The benefit of the defender is expressed as follows:

$$\beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = 1 - \frac{(\delta_D - d)^2}{2 \cdot \delta_D \delta_A} - k_D \alpha_D \quad (3.6)$$

We can easily see that when  $d=0$ , we obtain the formula of the original FlipIt game.

**Case 2:  $\delta_A \leq \delta_D$  (The attacker plays at least as fast as the defender.)**

First let  $r = \frac{\delta_D}{\delta_A}$ . The intervals between two consecutive attacker's moves have length  $\delta_A$ . Consider a given attacker's move interval. The probability over the attacker's phase selection that the defender moves in this interval is  $\frac{\delta_A}{\delta_D} = (1/r)$ . Given that the defender moves within the interval of the attacker, he moves exactly once within this interval (since  $\delta_A \leq \delta_D$ ) and his move is distributed uniformly at random.

A similar analysis as in case 1 for a FlipIt game without virus propagation yields the following benefits:

$$\beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{1}{2r} - k_D \alpha_D = \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} - k_D \alpha_D \quad (3.7)$$

$$\beta_A(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = 1 - \frac{1}{2r} - k_A \alpha_A = 1 - \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} - k_A \alpha_A \quad (3.8)$$

An intuitive solution for the case with a virus would be to subtract the benefit of the attacker received in each interval with the delay similarly as in case 1. This would give us the following formula if we derive it in the same way:

$$\beta_A = \frac{(\delta_A - d)^2}{2\delta_A \delta_D} - \frac{k_A}{\delta_A} \quad (3.9)$$

But this results in an overestimation. How closer  $\delta_A/\delta_D$  is equal to one, the better the approximation. If  $\delta_A/\delta_D = 1$  the result is correct. This formula does not take into account that if the attacker was in control in the previous interval, the delay should not be subtracted, because the delay will not be in control of the defender. This means that we have to look at what happens in the previous interval.

From the defender we know that his moves are instantaneous. It is easier to calculate the benefit of the defender in this case. Because the defender moves slower than the attacker we know that if the defender moves during the interval of the attacker, he only moves once within this interval. The defender will move during the interval of the attacker with a probability of  $\frac{\delta_A}{\delta_D}$ . When this happens the defender will end with being in control at the end of the interval. In the next interval the

attacker will have to regain control, meaning that during the delay, the defender stays in control, see figure 3.2 cases (1) and (2). The defender will keep the control over the resource in the next interval over a period of the delay, namely  $d$ .

Consider a timespan  $\delta_A + d$ , representing the attacker's interval followed by the delay period in his next interval. The defender will never move twice during this timespan because  $\delta_A + d \leq \delta_D$ . Because  $d + \delta_A \leq \delta_D$  the next move of the defender in this second interval will never occur during the delay, meaning that the entire delay can be considered as an extra benefit resulting of a play in the previous interval. So, every time the defender plays, he will get an average gain of  $\frac{\delta_A}{2}$  in the interval where he plays and in the next interval will always receive a extra gain of  $d$ , yielding a total average gain per interval of  $\frac{(d + \frac{\delta_A}{2})}{\delta_A}$

For the case with a virus we consider two cases, Case a and Case b, depending on whether the delay is shorter or longer than the difference between the attacker's and the defender's period.

**Case a:**  $d + \delta_A \leq \delta_D$

The total gain rate of the defender is then the probability that the defender will move during an interval of the attacker multiplied by the total average gain per interval:

$$\gamma_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{\delta_A}{\delta_D} \cdot \frac{(d + \frac{\delta_A}{2})}{\delta_A} \quad (3.10)$$

$$\gamma_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} + \frac{d}{\delta_D} \quad (3.11)$$


This yields in the following benefit formula:

$$\beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} + \frac{d}{\delta_D} - k_D \alpha_D \quad (3.12)$$

The benefit for the attacker will be as follows:

$$\beta_A(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = 1 - \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} - \frac{d}{\delta_D} - k_A \alpha_A \quad (3.13)$$

It is crucial that  $\delta_D$  is at least as large as  $d + \delta_A$ . If not, this would mean that the defender can move during the delay in the interval following the interval where the defender already moved. This would mean that there can be an overlap between the

FIGUUR 3.2: Case 2 where  $d + \delta_A < \delta_D$ 

average gain of  $\frac{\delta_A}{2}$  and the delay. The above benefit formula would then include too much gain for the defender: the potential overlap during the delay would be counted twice.

**Case b:**  $d + \delta_A \geq \delta_D$

To obtain the formula in case of a too long delay, we therefore need to subtract this overlapping gain from the above formula. Since  $\delta_D \geq \delta_A$ , if the defender enters the interval immediately after the attacker has played, then the defender cannot have played in the previous interval. In that case, there is no overlap. So the problem of the overlap only appears if the defender enters late enough and thus only the last part of the delay is subject to overlap. The larger the difference between the interval of the defender and the attacker, the smaller the risk of overlap. Concretely, only the last part of length  $d - (\delta_D - \delta_A)$  is subject to overlap. Hence, the probability of overlap is  $\frac{d - (\delta_D - \delta_A)}{\delta_D}$  and the gain will be half of this interval:  $\frac{d - (\delta_D - \delta_A)}{2}$ . The gain rate to be subtracted is therefore:

$$\frac{1}{\delta_A} \cdot \frac{d - (\delta_D - \delta_A)}{\delta_D} \cdot \frac{d - (\delta_D - \delta_A)}{\delta_D} \quad (3.14)$$

The total gain rate of the defender is obtained by subtracting this term from the gain rate of case a:

$$\gamma_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{\delta_A}{\delta_D} \cdot \frac{(d + \frac{\delta_A}{2})}{\delta_A} - \frac{(d - (\delta_D - \delta_A))^2}{2\delta_D\delta_A} \quad (3.15)$$

$$\gamma_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} + \frac{d}{\delta_D} - \frac{(d - (\delta_D - \delta_A))^2}{2\delta_D\delta_A} \quad (3.16)$$

This yields in the following benefit formula:

$$\beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} + \frac{d}{\delta_D} - k_D\alpha_D - \frac{(d - (\delta_D - \delta_A))^2}{2\delta_D\delta_A} \quad (3.17)$$

The benefit for the attacker will be as follows:

$$\beta_A(\alpha_D, \alpha_A) = 1 - \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} - \frac{d}{\delta_D} - k_A\alpha_A + \frac{(d - (\delta_D - \delta_A))^2}{2\delta_D\delta_A} \quad (3.18)$$

### 3.5 Nash Equilibria

– rechtstreeks uit FlipIt paper –

As a second step, we are interested in finding Nash equilibria, points for which neither player will increase his benefit by changing his rate of play. More formally, a Nash equilibrium for the periodic game is a point  $(\alpha_0^*, \alpha_1^*)$  such that the defender's benefit  $\beta_0(\alpha_0, \alpha_1^*)$  is maximized at  $\alpha_0 = \alpha_0^*$  and the attacker's benefit  $\beta_1(\alpha_0^*, \alpha_1)$  is maximized at  $\alpha_1 = \alpha_1^*$ . To begin with, some useful notation. We denote by  $\text{opt0}(\alpha_1)$  the set of values (rates of play  $\alpha_0$ ) that optimize the benefit of the defender for a fixed rate of play  $\alpha_1$  of the attacker. Similarly, we denote by  $\text{opt1}(\alpha_0)$  the set of values (rates of play  $\alpha_1$ ) that optimize the benefit of the attacker for a fixed rate of play  $\alpha_0$  of the defender. The following theorem specifies Nash equilibria for the periodic game and is proven in Appendix A.

Nash equilibria are points with the property that neither player benefits by deviating in isolation from equilibrium. We can compute Nash Equilibria for the periodic game as an intersection points of curves  $\text{opt0}$  and  $\text{opt1}$ . To determine  $\text{opt0}(\alpha_1)$  we need to compute the derivative of  $\beta_0(\alpha_0, \alpha_1)$  for a fixed  $\alpha_1$ . We consider two cases:



### 3.5.1 case: $\delta_D \leq \delta_A$ or $\alpha_D \geq \alpha_A$

Since

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \frac{\partial [1 - \frac{(\delta_D - d)^2}{2 \cdot \delta_D \delta_A}] - k_D \alpha_D}{\partial \alpha_D} \quad (3.19)$$

If we change every  $\delta = \frac{1}{\alpha}$  in formule 3.19 we get the next formula that is easier to take the derivate of:

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \frac{\partial [1 - \frac{(1/\alpha_D - d)^2 \cdot \alpha_D \alpha_A}{2} - k_D \alpha_D]}{\partial \alpha_D} \quad (3.20)$$

Which gives the following result:

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \alpha_A (\frac{1}{\alpha_D^2} - \frac{d^2}{2}) - k_D \quad (3.21)$$

it follows that if equal to zero  $\alpha_0 = \sqrt{\frac{\alpha_A}{2k_D + d^2 \alpha_A}}$

### 3.5.2 case 2: $\delta_D \geq \delta_A$ or $\alpha_D \leq \alpha_A$

**case A**

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \frac{\partial [\frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} + \frac{d}{\delta_D} - k_D \alpha_D]}{\partial \alpha_D} \quad (3.22)$$

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \frac{\partial [\frac{\alpha_D}{2\alpha_A} + d\alpha_D - k_D \alpha_D]}{\partial \alpha_D} \quad (3.23)$$

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \frac{1}{2\delta_A} + d - k_D \quad (3.24)$$

Dus increasing als  $\alpha_A < \frac{1}{2(k_D - d)}$  and decreasing if  $\alpha_A > \frac{1}{2(k_D - d)}$

**Case b**

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \frac{\partial [\frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} + \frac{d}{\delta_D} - k_D \alpha_D - \frac{(d - (\delta_D - \delta_A))^2}{2\delta_D \delta_A}]}{\partial \alpha_D} \quad (3.25)$$

Uitgewerkt geeft de benefit formule de volgende formule omgezet naar alpha

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \frac{\partial [1 - \frac{\alpha_A}{2\alpha_D} - k_D \alpha_D + \frac{d\alpha_A}{2} + \frac{d\alpha_D}{2} - \frac{d^2 \alpha_A \alpha_D}{2}]}{\partial \alpha_D} \quad (3.26)$$

$$\frac{\partial \beta_D(\alpha_D, \alpha_A)}{\partial \alpha_D} = \frac{\alpha_A}{2\alpha_D^2} - k_D + \frac{d}{2} - \frac{d^2 \alpha_A}{2} \quad (3.27)$$

Als ge dat gelijk stelt aan 0 krijgt ge:

$$\alpha_D = \sqrt{\frac{\alpha_A}{2k_D - d + d^2 \alpha_A}} \quad (3.28)$$

## Hoofdstuk 4

# Conclusion

The final chapter contains the overall conclusion. It also contains suggestions for future work and industrial applications.

### 4.1 trala



## Hoofdstuk 5

# FlipIt game with virus propagation

The optimum functions will be piecewise functions. There will be different optimum functions depending on  $k_D$  and  $d$ . Two cases are considered.

$$k_D \leq d$$

$$\text{if } \delta_A < 2(k_D - d)$$

For case 2.A it is decreasing. Because  $k_D \leq d$  the term  $2(k_D - d)$  will always be negative so  $\delta_A$  will also be negative. This means for case 1 and case 2.b that  $\delta_D = 0$  and so the defender will not play.

$$\delta_A = 2(k_D - d)$$

$\delta_A = 0$  so the attacker will not play. For case 1 and case 2.b the defender will also not play.

$$\delta_A > 2(k_D - d)$$

For case 2.b it is decreasing. Case 2.a it is increasing. For case 1  $2(k_D - d)$  is always negative so the minimum is 0. This means that  $\delta_D \in [0, \sqrt{d^2 + 2\delta_A k_D}]$

$$k_D > d$$

$$\text{if } \delta_A < 2(k_D - d)$$

For case 2.A it is increasing.

$$\delta_A = 2(k_D - d)$$

$$\delta_A > 2(k_D - d)$$

In every case the function is decreasing so the defender will not play.

From this analyses we can compute  $opt_D(\delta_A)$  for two different cases as:

$$opt_D(\delta_A) = \begin{cases} 0, & \delta_A < 2(k_D - d) \\ 0, & \delta_A = 2(k_D - d) \\ [0, \sqrt{d^2 + 2\delta_A k_D}], & \delta_A > 2(k_D - d) \end{cases}$$

For case :

$$opt_D(\delta_A) = \begin{cases} 0, & \delta_A < 2(k_D - d) \\ 0, & \delta_A = 2(k_D - d) \\ [0, \sqrt{d^2 + 2\delta_A k_D}], & \delta_A > 2(k_D - d) \end{cases}$$

---

We still consider the case where  $d < \delta_D$ .

To determine the Nash equilibria we also need to determine  $opt_1(\delta_D)$  by computing the derivative of  $\beta_A(\delta_D, \delta_A)$  for a fixed  $\delta_D$ . We consider 2 cases:

**Case 1:**  $\delta_A \geq \delta_D$

Since

$$\beta_A(\delta_D, \delta_A) = \frac{\delta_D}{2\delta_A} - \frac{k_A}{\delta_A} + \frac{d^2}{2\delta_D\delta_A^2} - \frac{d}{\delta_A}$$

the derivative is:

$$\frac{\partial \beta_A(\delta_D, \delta_A)}{\partial \delta_A} = -\frac{\delta_D}{2\delta_A^2} + \frac{k_A}{\delta_A^2} - \frac{d^2}{2\delta_D\delta_A^2} + \frac{d}{\delta_A^2}$$

it follows that  $\beta_A(\delta_D, \cdot)$  is increasing if  $2k_A < (\delta_D - d)^2/\delta_D$  and decreasing if  $2k_A > (\delta_D - d)^2/\delta_D$ .

**Case 2:**  $\delta_A \leq \delta_D$

**A:**  $\delta_A \leq d + \delta_A \leq \delta_D$

Since

$$\beta_A(\delta_D, \delta_A) = 1 - \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} - \frac{k_A}{\delta_A} - \frac{d}{\delta_D}$$

the derivative is:

$$\frac{\partial \beta_A(\delta_D, \delta_A)}{\partial \delta_A} = \frac{-1}{2\delta_D} + \frac{k_A}{\delta_A^2}$$

it follows that  $\beta_A(\delta_D, \cdot)$  is increasing on  $[0, \sqrt{2k_A\delta_D}]$  and decreasing on  $[\sqrt{2k_A\delta_D}, \infty]$  and thus has a maximum on  $\delta_A = \max\{\delta_D, \sqrt{2k_A\delta_D}\}$ . The maximum between  $\delta_D$  and  $\sqrt{2k_A\delta_D}$  is needed because  $\delta_A$  cannot exceed  $\delta_D$  in this case.

**B:**  $\delta_A \leq \delta_D \leq d + \delta_A$

Since

$$\beta_A(\delta_D, \delta_A) = 1 - \frac{\delta_A}{2\delta_D} - \frac{d}{\delta_A} - \frac{k_A}{\delta_A} + \frac{(d - (\delta_D - \delta_A))^2}{2\delta_D\delta_A}$$

the derivative is:

$$\frac{\partial \beta_A(\delta_D, \delta_A)}{\partial \delta_A} = -\frac{\delta_D}{2\delta_A^2} + \frac{k_A}{\delta_A^2} - \frac{d^2}{2\delta_D\delta_A^2} + \frac{d}{\delta_A^2}$$

it follows that  $\beta_A(\delta_D, \cdot)$  is increasing if  $2k_A < (\delta_D - d)^2/\delta_D$  and decreasing if  $2k_A > (\delta_D - d)^2/\delta_D$ . This is the same result as in case 1.

## 5.1 Extensions on FlipIt

Various possible ways to extend FlipIt have already been proposed. Laszka et al. made a lot of additions and extensions to the original game of FlipIt. For instance Laszka et al. extended the basic FlipIt game to multiple resources. The rationale is that for compromising a system in real life, more than just one resource needs to be taken over. An example is that gaining access to deeper layers of a system may require breaking several passwords. The model is called FlipThem [5]. Laszka et al. also use two ways to flip the multiple resources: the AND and the OR control model. In the AND model the attacker only controls the system if he controls all the resources of the system, whereas in the OR model the attacker only needs to compromise one resource to be in control of the entire system.

Another addition of Laszka et al. to the game of FlipIt [6] is extending the game to also consider non-targeted attacks by non-strategic players. In this game the defender tries to maintain control over the resource that is subjected to both targeted and non-targeted attacks. Non-targeted attacks can include phishing, while targeted attacks may include threats delivered through zero day attack vulnerabilities.

One of the last important additions from Laszka et al. [7] is to consider a game with targeted and non-targeted attacks where the moves made by the attacker do not succeed immediately. This is similar to this paper but it has still some major differences. First the moves by the attacker are still covert but the moves made by the defender are known to the attacker. This means that the attacker knows when the defender plays and can change its strategy depending on the moves of the defender. Our motivation for a defender with stealthy moves is that there is not always an intelligent individual that is behind an APT. Some APTs don't know if the computer is already been recovered. Their purpose is to spread. Not to check if they have already infected. . The second difference is that even though both the targeted and non-targeted attacks do not succeed immediately, the delay is determined differently. For the targeted attack the time till it succeeds is given by an exponential distributed random variable with a known rate. The non-targeted attacks are modelled as a single attacker and the time till it succeeds is given by a Poisson process. In our paper the delay is given by one parameter, that can be the result of any virus propagation model. The third and last difference is that the paper of Laszka has multiple attackers and they try to find the best strategy of the defender against both targeted and non-targeted attacks. The conclusion of this paper is that

beter verwoor-  
den

the optimal strategy for the defender is moving periodically.

FlipIt has also been applied to several cases in system security. Researchers explored different applications of FlipIt for real-world problems, like password reset policies, VM refresh, cloud auditing and key rotation [4].

Other authors used the FlipIt game to apply it on a specific scenario. To be able to use the FlipIt game, modifications were required for the FlipIt model. One of the scenarios by Pham [10] was to find out whether a resource was compromised or not by the attacker. This could be verified by the defender, who has an extra move "test" beside the flip move. The basic idea is to test with an extra action if the resource has been compromised or not. This move involves also an extra cost.

A three-player game has also been investigated where the flipit framework of two players is extended by another player. This player represents an insider that trades value information with the attacker [? ].

Finally researchers also have investigated the behaviour of humans playing FlipIt. A. Nochenson and Grossklags [9] investigate how people really act when given temporal decisions. They found out that the results improve over time but that they are dependent on gender, age, and other individual difference variables. The result also shows that the participants perform generally better when they have more information about the strategy of the opponent which is a computerized player. Reitter et al. [11] extended the work of A. Nochenson and Grossklags to include various visual presentation modalities for the available feedback during the investigation.



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## Fiche masterproef

*Student:* Sophie Marien

*Titel:* Flip the virus: Modelling targeted attacks using FlipIt with propagation delay

*Engelse titel:* Beste masterproef ooit al geschreven

*UDC:* 621.3

*Korte inhoud:*

Hier komt een heel bondig abstract van hooguit 500 woorden.  $\text{\LaTeX}$  commando's mogen hier gebruikt worden. Blanco lijnen (of het commando `\par`) zijn wel niet toegelaten!

Nam dui ligula, fringilla a, euismod sodales, sollicitudin vel, wisi. Morbi auctor lorem non justo. Nam lacus libero, pretium at, lobortis vitae, ultricies et, tellus. Donec aliquet, tortor sed accumsan bibendum, erat ligula aliquet magna, vitae ornare odio metus a mi. Morbi ac orci et nisl hendrerit mollis. Suspendisse ut massa. Cras nec ante. Pellentesque a nulla. Cum sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. Aliquam tincidunt urna. Nulla ullamcorper vestibulum turpis. Pellentesque cursus luctus mauris.

Thesis voorgedragen tot het behalen van de graad van Master of Science in de ingenieurswetenschappen: computerwetenschappen, hoofdspecialisatie Veilige software

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