Kimai Infrastructure Migration

Date: 11-07-2025

Github Repository

https://github.com/subadevanc/Kimai-TechForce/

Presented by

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Phase 1 Design and Planning

Task 1.1 - High-Level Design (HLD)

Project Overview

- The project migrates the Kimai timesheet app to a secure, multi-cloud setup.
- It replaces manual hosting with automated, containerized deployment.
- Docker + Apache are used to run the app in isolated containers.
- Jenkins CI/CD pipeline automates code build, test, and deployment.
- AWS hosts the core infrastructure: app, Jenkins, Bastion, and database.

- GCP handles monitoring and metrics via Grafana + Prometheus.
- Terraform provisions all cloud infrastructure as code.
- Security is enforced using IAM roles and firewall rules.
- Monitoring provides real-time health checks and usage stats.
- The new setup ensures better scalability, performance, and automation.

Problem Statement

- On-prem Kimai lacks auto-scaling and redundancy.
- No CI/CD leads to manual deployments.
- Poor visibility into system health.
- No centralized monitoring or alerts.
- Risk of data loss or breach in local setup.
- High maintenance and operational cost.

No version-controlled infrastructure.

Problem Objectives

- Deploy Kimai in a cloud-native Docker container.
- Set up automated CI/CD pipeline using Jenkins.
- Provision infrastructure using Terraform.
- Enable real-time monitoring and logging.
- Implement secure, scalable environment.
- Use only free-tier or cost-effective resources.

Ensure backups and security for data.

Cloud Storage


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
Technology Stack


- Docker for app containerization.
- Apache + PHP for Kimai runtime.
- Jenkins for continuous integration/deployment.
- Terraform for infrastructure provisioning.
- AWS EC2, RDS, IAM, SGs for core hosting.

GCP Compute Engine for monitoring.


PostgreSQL for backend database.







Infrastructure Diagram High-Level Design



Phase - 1 Task 1.2 Low-Level Design (LLD)

Network Design – AWS

• VPC CIDR: 10.0.0.0/16

• Public Subnet: Jenkins, Bastion

• Private Subnet: Kimai App, RDS

• Internet Gateway for public subnet

- NAT Gateway for private instances
- Custom Route Tables per subnet
- Security Groups for access contro

Network Design – GCP

- GCP VPC CIDR: 10.1.0.0/16
- Private subnet for monitoring stack
- Grafana and Prometheus installed
- Firewall allows metrics from AWS app subnet
- Logs and metrics are pulled securely

• No public access to monitoring instance

Compute Design

- EC2 t2.micro for App, Jenkins, Bastion.
- GCP e2-micro for Monitoring Node.
- Free-tier eligible instances to reducecost.
- Auto Scaling Group for App Server.
- Min: 1, Max: 3 instances.
- Trigger: CPU > 70% for 5 minutes.

Storage Design


- EC2 Volumes: 20 GB gp2 (SSD).
- RDS PostgreSQL: db.t3.micro instance.
- 20 GB allocated storage.
- Backups enabled with 7-day retention.


- Encrypted at rest.
- Database not publicly accessible.


CI/CD Pipeline Design


- GitHub push triggers Jenkins job Jenkins
- stages:
- Checkout
- Docker Build
- Simulated Test
- Push Image
- Deploy to EC2
- Docker image hosted on DockerHub or ECR

















Infrastructure

Diagram Low-Level Design





Infrastructure Diagram Low-Level Design



Phase 2: Infrastructure as Code (IaC)

Objective:

To write modular, reusable, and version-controlled Terraform code to automate the provisioning of the infrastructure designed in Phase 1.

Tools Used:

Terraform v1.12.2 Infrastructure as Code AWS EC2 Testing and deployment environment Visual Studio Code / Notepad Writing .tf files AWS CLI Configure credentials for Terraform

Folder Structure:

techforce-infra-migration/
└─ terraform/
\vdash — main.tf
├— variables.tf
├— outputs.tf
└─ modules/
├— network/
$\mid \hspace{0.1cm} \mid$ — main.tf
│
└── outputs.tf
├— compute/
$\mid \hspace{0.1cm} \mid$ — main.tf
│
└── outputs.tf
└── security/
├— main.tf
— variables.tf
└─ outputs.tf

Modules Developed: A.

Network Module:

Files created:

main.tf: VPC, public and private subnets resources variables.tf: VPC CIDR, public/private subnet CIDRs outputs.tf: Outputs VPC ID and

subnet IDs

B. Compute Module:

Files created:

main.tf: EC2 instance resources (bastion and Jenkins)

variables.tf: AMI ID, instance type, key pair, subnet IDs, security groups outputs.tf: Outputs instance IDs and public IPs

C. Security Module:

Files created:

main.tf: Security group rules for bastion host and Jenkins

variables.tf: Input variables for security configurations outputs.tf:

Outputs security group IDs

Backend Configuration:

Configured in terraform/main.tf:

```
terraform { backend
"s3" {
  bucket = "my-terraform-state-bucket-012"
  key = "terraform/state" region
= "eu-north-1"
```

```
dynamodb_table = "terraform-lock-table"
}
```

Purpose:

To store Terraform state file remotely and enable state locking for team collaboration.

AWS Credentials Setup:

Configured using:


aws configure


Access Key ID

Secret Access Key


Default region name


Default output format






After creating instance's name and tag we are supposed to create a new key pair for the instance created.







Errors Faced and Solutions:

Error	Reason	Solution
Unsupported argument in module	Variables not defined in module variables.tf	Added missing variable definitions
No valid credential sources found	IAM user/role permissions missing	Configured AWS CLI with credentials
S3 403 Forbidden	Bucket policy or IAM permissions missing	Updated IAM permissions and bucket policy


Outcomes:

Modular Terraform code for:

Network infrastructure (VPC, subnets)

Compute resources (EC2 instances for bastion and Jenkins)

Security configurations (security groups)



Remote backend configuration with S3 and DynamoDB.


Verified provisioning success using terraform plan and apply.


PHASE 3: APPLICATION DEPLOYMENT AND CI/CD

OBJECTIVE:

To containerize the Kimai application and create a fully automated CI/CD pipeline for its deployment.

TOOLS & TECHNOLOGIES USED:





PROJECT STRUCTURE:

STEP BY STEP WORKFLOW: STEP 1:

PREPARE WEBSITE FILES

index.html was created with simple UI content for Kimai homepage.

These files were copied inside the docker/ folder.

STEP 2: DOCKERFILE (INSIDE DOCKER/ FOLDER)

FROM nginx:alpine
WORKDIR /usr/share/nginx/html
COPY index.html . EXPOSE 80

This Dockerfile uses a lightweight NGINX base image and replaces the default page with your index.html.


STEP 3: JENKINSFILE (INSIDE JENKINS/ FOLDER)

```
pipeline { agent
any
  environment {
    DOCKER IMAGE = "kalaisk/kimai-html:latest"
 }
stages { stage('Checkout') {
steps {
git url: 'https://github.com/subadevanc/Kimai-
TechForce.git'
}
stage('Build Image') { steps {
dir('docker') {
bat "docker build -t ${DOCKER IMAGE}."
stage('Push to DockerHub') {
steps { withCredentials([usernamePassword(credentialsId:
'docker-token', usernameVariable: 'DOCKER USER',
passwordVariable: 'DOCKER_PASS')]) { bat """
echo %DOCKER PASS% | docker login -u %DOCKER USER% --
password-stdin
 docker push${DOCKER IMAGE}
  }
```

}
}
}


STEP 4: JENKINS PIPELINE SETUP

Open Jenkins Dashboard → New Item →
 Pipeline



2. Set GitHub repo URL:


https://github.com/subadevanc/Kimai-TechForce.git




3. Jenkinsfile path: jenkins/Jenkinsfile



4. Add DockerHub credentials in Jenkins → Credentials → ID = docker-token



5. Click Build Now




STEP 5: DEPLOY DOCKER IMAGE ON AWS EC2

- 1. Launch EC2 Ubuntu 24.04 instanceGo to AWS
 - \rightarrow EC2 \rightarrow Launch instance

Choose Ubuntu 24.04


Allow SSH (22) and HTTP (80) in Security Group

Download your .pem key (e.g., phase2.pem)



2. SSH into EC2 ssh -i "phase2.pem"

ubuntu@13.60.234.66



3. Install Docker

sudo apt update sudo apt install docker.io -y sudo systemctl enable docker sudo systemctl start docker

4. Pull & Run Docker Image

sudo docker pull kalaisk/kimai-html:latest sudo docker run -d --name kimai-html -p 80:80 kalaisk/kimai-html:latest

```
Error response from daemon: No such container: htmlsite
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-23:-/myhtmlsite$ sudo docker stop kimai-html
kimai-html
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-23:-/myhtmlsite$ sudo docker rm kimai-html
kimai-html
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-23:-/myhtmlsite$ sudo docker rm kimai-html
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-23:-/myhtmlsite$ sudo docker run -d --name kimai-html
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-23:-/myhtmlsite$ sudo docker stop kimai-html
kimai-html
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-23:-/myhtmlsite$ sudo docker rm kimai-html
kimai-html
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-23:-/myhtmlsite$ sudo docker pull kalaisk/kimai-html:latest
latest: Pulling from kalaisk/kimai-html
fe9768ub168s: Already exists
3b7962d9902: Already exists
3b7962d9902: Already exists
9b790647036: Already exists
95971aeb101e: Already exists
92971aeb101e: Already exists
9422e893cb8e: Pull complete
0ipest: sha256:968b7ddde66fddc8f7ff2u07u79d3e56d9cfe29e65acef66215722641f5e214
Status: Domnloaded nemer image for kalaisk/kimai-html:latest
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-23:-/myhtmlsite$ sudo docker run -d --name kimai-html -p 80:80 kalaisk/kimai-html:latest
ubuntu@ip=172-31-36-33:-/myhtmlsite$ client_loop: send disconnect: Connection reset

PS C:\Users\kalai\Domnloads>
```

5. Open Your Website

In browser:

http://13.60.234.66



Welcome back

Don't have an account yet? Register here.

Privacy policy Site notice Contact

G Google	G itHub			
Email address				
Email address				
Password				
Password				
Login				
Forgot your password?				

PHASE 4: SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION

OBJECTIVE

The goal of this phase is to implement robust security controls at every layer of the infrastructure—network, system, application, and identity—ensuring secure deployment and limited access exposure of critical resources.

1. NETWORK HARDENING

- Implemented AWS Security Groups as per the LLD to control inbound and outbound traffic.
- Allowed only necessary traffic:
 - Port 22 (SSH) open for Bastion Host to allow remote access.
 - o Port 80 (HTTP) open for web access to the Kimai application.
- Ensured that no application or database server is exposed directly to the internet.
- Deployed the Application Load Balancer (ALB) in public subnets across 2 Availability Zones,
 making the service highly available and internet-facing.

Evidence:

Security Group configuration




Fig1: AWS Security Group kimai-ssh-access configured with minimal permissions to ensure limited exposure.

Application Load Balancer (ALB)




Fig2: ALB Configuration

2. SECURE REMOTE ACCESS

- Deployed a Bastion Host in the public subnet.
 - Allowed SSH (port 22) access only from a trusted IP range.
- All other EC2 instances (Application Servers, Jenkins) were placed in private subnets.
 - o These allowed SSH only from the **Bastion Host's security group**.
- SSH Key-Based Authentication was enforced.
 - Disabled password login by modifying sshd_config.

Evidence:

Bastion Host in Public Subnet




Fig3: Bastion Host deployed in public subnet with assigned public IP address for remote access.

```
### Action of the Company of the Com
```

Fig4: Password authentication disabled in /etc/ssh/sshd_config; only SSH key-based access is allowed, fulfilling secure remote access compliance.

3. IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT (IAM)

Activities:

- Created IAM roles for each major component: o JenkinsRole, AppServerRole, BastionRole
- Attached least privilege policies to each role, e.g.:
 - JenkinsRole: Read from ECR, CloudWatch Logs
 Bucket for logs
- Ensured no access keys were hardcoded.
 - Used IAM Role-based access on EC2 instances.
 - Validated via curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
 Evidence:

IAM Roles List



Fig5: IAM roles like JenkinsRole and cloudwatch-agent were created and configured for secure, temporary credential-based access via EC2.

Custom Policies Attached- IAM Policies




Fig6: IAM role JenkinsRole configured with custom permissions (JenkinsECRPolicy, JenkinsLogsPolicy), attached to EC2 instance to ensure secure, keyless access to AWS resources.

Jenkins EC2 Instance with IAM Role




Fig7: IAM role JenkinsRole attached to EC2 instance to ensure keyless access to AWS services, with port 22 restricted to a trusted IP for secure administration.

4. SECURITY AUDIT AND VALIDATION

Tools Used:

- Nmap to scan exposed ports from public IPs
- AWS Security Hub for configuration compliance

Nmap Scan





Fig8: Nmap scan results confirming that only essential ports (22 for SSH and 80 for HTTP) are open on the EC2 instance

```
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-07-10 14:14 IST
Nmap scan report for ec2-13-60-234-66.eu-north-1.compute.amazonaws.com (13.60.234.66)
Host is up (0.37s latency).
Not shown: 998 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.12 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.29.0
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 172.82 seconds
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-07-10 14:16 IST
Pre-scan script results:
| broadcast-avahi-dos: neclarative: Checkout SCM)
   Discovered hosts:
     224.0.0.251
   After NULL UDP avahi packet DoS (CVE-2011-1002).
  Hosts are all up (not vulnerable).
Nmap scan report for ec2-13-60-234-66.eu-north-1.compute.amazonaws.com (13.60.234.66)
Host is up (0.88s latency).
Not shown: 998 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
80/tcp open | http://stream_changes_from_https://github.com/subadevanc/Kimai-TechForce.git
|_http-stored-xss: Couldn't find any stored XSS vulnerabilities.
 http-vuln-cve2011-3192:
   VULNERABLE:
   Apache byterange filter DoS
     State: VULNERABLE
     IDs: BID:49303 CVE:CVE-2011-3192
       The Apache web server is vulnerable to a denial of service attack when numerous
       overlapping byte ranges are requested.
     Disclosure date: 2011-08-19
     References:
       https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175
       https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/49303
       https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-3192
       https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/55976
|_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.
|_http-csrf: Couldn't find any CSRF vulnerabilities.
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 355.76 seconds
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-07-10 14:22 IST
RTTVAR has grown to over 2.3 seconds, decreasing to 2.0
Nmap scan report for ec2-13-60-234-66.eu-north-1.compute.amazonaws.com (13.60.234.66)
Host is up (1.8s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp closed http
```

Fig9: Security audit using nmap confirms that all unnecessary ports are blocked by firewall/security groups

This phase successfully implemented multiple layers of security, including IAM roles, security group configurations, and SSH hardening, to protect the infrastructure from external threats. By enforcing strict access controls and eliminating public exposure of critical resources, the environment is now well-secured and aligned with best practices — making it suitable for production-level deployment.





1. Monitoring Setup (Prometheus + Grafana)


Monitoring was achieved using Prometheus to scrape metrics from EC2 instances via Node Exporter, and Grafana for visualization.

Dashboards were created to monitor CPU, memory, and disk usage

Prometheus configuration included jobs for node-exporter, and Grafana was connected to Prometheus as a data source








2. Centralized Logging (CloudWatch Logs)

CloudWatch Agent was installed and configured on EC2 to push logs (e.g., cloud-init.log) to AWS CloudWatch.

The log group was integrated with Grafana via the CloudWatch data source to visualize logs directly in Grafana dashboards.

IAM roles with CloudWatchAgentServerPolicy were attached for permission to publish logs.



3. Alerting Configuration (Grafana Unified Alerting + AWS SNS)

Grafana alert rules were created for CPU, memory, and disk usage thresholds.


When thresholds were breached, alerts were triggered and routed through SNS to email notifications.


A dedicated SNS topic was created, subscribed via email, and confirmed by the user.

Alerts such as CPU High and Memory Low were tested and triggered successfully.

This monitoring and alerting system strengthens operational excellence and reliability of the deployed infrastructure.

It provides real-time system awareness, immediate alerting via email, and complete log traceability via CloudWatch.





Lessons Learned

Grafana alert queries require careful configuration (e.g., "Range" type, step settings).

Alert testability improves with mock queries like 'vector(100)'.

SNS integration can be reused across alerts and was effective for email-based alerts.

CloudWatch Logs are powerful for log retention, especially when visualized in Grafana.