




Proof checking in the Linux kernel

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Agenda

- eBPF, Proof Carrying Code and why we need a proof-checker in the kernel
- Logical Framework with Side Conditions (LFSC)
- An LF proof
- Shortcomings of the implementation
- Conclusion



eBPF and why we want formal verification

- eBPF is a virtual machine that gives sandbox functionality with kernel privileges.
- limbo between usability and safety
- programs are checked by static analysis called the eBPF verifier.
 - 19k lines of code.
 - many bugs, making eBPF security hazard
 - disabled by default in most Linux distributions.




Figure: Loading process of eBPF¹



Proof Carrying Code

- code producer is responsible for ensuring the correctness
- code consumer shall check that proofs have not been tampered and that a certificate is valid.




Figure: Structure of PCC



Logical Framework - with Side Conditions?

- An extension of the simply typed lambda calculus with dependent product type
 - $\prod_{x:A} B(x)$, with $A: \mathcal{U}$ and $B: A \to \mathcal{U}$
 - if $x \notin FV(B)$ then $A \to B$
- Used for computer-assisted proofs using the Curry-Howard correspondence

Formal Logic	Type Theory
⊤ (true)	()
\perp (false)	void
\land (conjunction)	product type
∨ (disjunction)	sum type
ightarrow (implication)	function type
\forall (universal quantification)	$\Pi(\text{dependent type})$

- LFI extend LF with implicit arguments
- LFSC extend LFI with Side Conditions



LFSC syntax

Figure: Syntactical categories of LFSC



LFSC typing

Figure: Bidirectional typing rules for LFSC



2 + 2 = 4 using cvc5 and LFSC

```
(check
2 (@ t1 (int 4)
  (@ t2 (int 2)
  (@ t3 (= (a.+ t2 (a.+ t2 (int 0))) t1)
5 (# a0 (holds (not t3))
6 (: (holds false)
7 (eq_resolve _ _ a0
8 (trans _ _ _
9 (cong _ _ _
10 (refl f_not)
11 (trans _ _ _
12 (cong _ _ _
13 (cong _ _ _ _
14 (refl f_=)
   (trust t3))
16 (refl t1))
17 (trust (= (= t1 t1) true))))
   (trust (= (not true) false))))))))))
```

 $\neg(2+2=4)$

```
\begin{split} & \text{eq\_resolve}: \prod_{f:T} \prod_{g:T} \prod_{p_1:[f]} \prod_{p_2:[f=g]} [g] \\ & \text{trans}: \prod_{t_1:T} \prod_{t_2:T} \prod_{u_1:[t_1=t_2]} \prod_{u_2:[t_1=t_3]} [t_1=t_3] \\ & \text{cong}: \prod_{a_1:T} \prod_{b_1:T} \prod_{a_2:T} \prod_{b_2:T} \prod_{u_1:[s_1=b_1]} \prod_{u_2:[s_2=b_2]} [s_1 \, s_2 = b_1 \, b_2] \\ & \text{refl}: \prod_{t:T} [t=t] \\ & \text{holds}: \prod_{t:T} T \\ & = \det_{t:T} T \\ \end{aligned}
```

 $\neg(2+2=4)=\bot$

eq_resolve (7)

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Why can we also prove 2 + 3 = 4?



Why can we also prove 2 + 3 = 4?

```
1 (declare apply (! t1 term (! t2 term term)))
2 (declare f_a.+ term)
3 (define a.+ (# x term (# y term (apply (apply f_a.+ x) y))))
```

 $a.+:(\lambda x:term.\lambda y:term.term)$



Why can we also prove 2 + 3 = 4?

```
1 (declare apply (! t1 term (! t2 term term)))
2
3 (declare f_a.+ term)
4
5 (define a.+ (# x term (# y term (apply (apply f_a.+ x) y))))
```

```
a.+:(\lambda x:term.\lambda y:term.term)
```

We could just as well use -, as the definition is as follows:


```
1 (declare f_a.- term)
2 (define a.- (# x term (# y term (apply f_a.- x) y))))
```

This is a problem if we want to use it to make proofs by hand, but in a PCC context, it will suffice, as long as we are sure the in the kernel VC generator is sound.



Shortcommings

- Implementation in this thesis is not fast.
- \bullet Approach follows a typically staged compilation. Parser \to Transformation \to Typechecking.
- Overhead in both memory and runtime.
- Ifscc takes an online approach, where parsing, and type checking happens all at once (no intermediate stages)





Conclusion

- Side Conditions might be unnecessary
- Formal verification of eBPF programs will take longer than the eBPF verifier but can be done fairly efficiently, but not with the approach tried in my work.
- Proposal is to take a similar approach to Ifscc and implement it in Rust, as it seems like a doable solution.

