# Attack path-based Detection Engineering

Leveraging BloodHound for robust defense





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Detection Engineer and Security Researcher

- Purple teaming, Threat hunting
- IR and Compromise assessments

Former documentary photographer Father of 2 boys "I like **warm hugs**"

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## What can you expect today?

Some slides with several lists

Me, using some graphs to explain the value of lists

Some more lists

Near real-time Blue team use cases for BloodHound






## This has always bugged me

"DEFENDERS THINK IN LISTS.
ATTACKERS THINK IN GRAPHS.
AS LONG AS THIS IS TRUE, ATTACKERS WIN"
John Lambert, 2015



## A year later, BloodHound was released





#### Path based detection and enrichment

Most red teams rely on BloodHound in their operations for uncovering lateral movement paths.

Sadly, we don't see many detection teams leverage it for mitigations and detections, not even talking about enrichment or alert investigations.


In some cases we see it being used, but only a handfull times a year, in a very manual way.


There must be a better way.





#### It's not the lack of documentation







#### BloodHound for blue











## BloodHound challenges for red and blue

Frequently scanning adds complexity and sometimes friction between teams

Hard to reach all subnets for session data


It is always a moment in time snapshot

Local user and group modifications are mostly invisible

How do you know a session is still active? Or if there are more?




## Why are sessions so important?








## The power of *love* logs





#### **FalconHound**



https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconHound



## **Built for easy implementation**







Configure your API creds

Update the config file with your keys

Define actions you want to run

Schedule the agent to run every 5/10/15 mins, whichever you prefer and your env can take.














## Process flow – simplified example





## Some example actions

Keep the session information in BloodHound up to date, without scanning!

Mark machines/users with alerts as Owned

Repeatedly query for paths to high value targets, for instance from owned to sensitive resource

Add new users or group modifications

Calculate new paths or chokepoints based on this information



## YAML based configuration

```
Debug: false
                               # Enable to see query results in the console
                               # Sentinel, Watchlist, Neo4j, CSV, MDE, Graph, Splunk
   SourcePlatform: MDE
  Ouery:
       let timeframe = 15m;
       DeviceNetworkEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(timeframe)
        where ActionType == "InboundInternetScanInspected"
        where RemotePort in (3389,445,389,636,135,139,161,53,21,22,23,1433)
        summarize LastSeen=arg_max(Timestamp, * ), PublicPorts=make_set(RemotePort) by DeviceId,DeviceName, PublicIP=RemoteIP
        project LastSeen, PublicPorts, DeviceId, DeviceName, PublicIP, LocalIP
              - Name: Sentinel
Targets:
  - Name: Neo4j
   Enabled: true
   Query:
     WITH toUpper($DeviceName) as DeviceName, $PublicPorts as PublicPorts
     MATCH (c:Computer {name:DeviceName}) SET c.exposed = true, c.ports = PublicPorts, c.exposedSince = $LastSeen
    Parameters:
     DeviceName: DeviceName
      PublicPorts: PublicPorts
     LastSeen: LastSeen
  - Name: Watchlist
   Enabled: true
   WatchlistName: FH_MDE_Exposed_Machines
   DisplayName: MDE Exposed Machines
    SearchKey: DeviceName
```



Active: true

Overwrite: false

## Some practical blue uses

Generate watchlists for users and devices with a known, harder to mitigate path

Dynamically raise the severity of alerts for these entities

Generate alerts based on new paths found in Bloodhound

Tracking uncommon sessions across a path, as a lateral Movement indicator

Uncover risky resources or unintentional paths



#### Demo

```
%????????;;'
                 %??++;;;;??????''+
               ++++%??%%%???;;???''+;
          ???++++;??????%#%?????;;;'';
          +;;+????????!#.....?%%??
        +;;;+??????????.;%##%%%%%%??
     ##??;;;???';;??????%%%######%%%%#??.
     #?;;;??;;;';;?????+?+?%%... %???????'
    +;;';?'';''';;;;;;???????.. +''.????'
   #+;;;';''''';;;''''.....'
    ';'';;';;;;;';;..''....'.''.
       FalconForce Sentry
                                     FalconHound v1.3.0
              ;''.'''.......
                11111......1?
                                     Usage: FalconHound -[options]
                                     https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconHound
Usage: FalconHound -[options]
Options:
 -actionlist
       Get a list of all enabled actions, use in combination with -go
  -actionsdir string
       Path to the actions directory (default "actions/")
  -adxinit
       Initialize the Azure Dara Explorer table (requires database admin permissions) and -go
  -config string
       config file name (default "config.yml")
  -debug
       Enable debug mode, for all executed actions
  -go
       Run all actions in the actions directory
  -help
       Print this help message
  -ids string
       comma separated list of action IDs to run
  -keyvault
       Use the keyvault specified in the config for secrets
  -lookback string
       Override the timeframe in the queries, use the KQL supported format (1d,1h,15m,etc)
  -skip string
       Skip the input processor for the specified source platform, comma separated list of platforms
```

## Running actions at a big corp

```
falconforce@0xff-neo4j:~/falconhound$ ./falconhound -go -ids SEN New Sessions -lookback 14d
                                                %????????::
                                              %??++;;;;??????!'!+
                                            ++++%??%%%???;;???''+;
2024/02/23 20:48:23 L [>] Writing
                                      ???++++:??????%#%?????:::'':
2024/02/23 20:48:24 [=] All done
                                      +;;+?????????.'#.....?%%??
falconforce@0xff-neo4j:~/falconhous
                                                                                                                                              67 0.74 0.32
                                    +:::+???????????.??.:%##%%%%%%%??
                                                                                                                                              2:27:13
              %??++;;;;??????
                                 ##??:::???!::???????%%%#######%%%%%#??.
            ++++%??%%%???;;???
                                 #?;;;??;;;';;?????+?+?%%... %????????
        ???++++;??????%#%??????;
        +;;+?????????.'#......
                                +;;';?'';''';;;;;;;???????.. +''.????'
       +;;;+??????????,??.;%##%
                               ;##+';;;';';;''';;
    ##??;;;???';;??????%%%######
                                #+;;;';''''';;;''''.....'
    #?:::??:::'::??????+?+?%%...
   +;;';?'';''';;;;;;???????...;##*';;;';';''';'''
                                ';'';;';;;;;';;..''....'.'
                                   #+:::/3/1///:::////
    FalconForce Sentry
                                                                     FalconHound v1.3.0
                                                                                                                                              in/containerd
                                             Usage: FalconHound -[options]
                                                                                                                                              in/containerd
                                                                     https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconHound
                                                                                                                                              in/containerd
2024/02/23 20:48:48 [ ] Starting r
2824/02/23 20:48:48 [+] Found 17
                          2024/02/23 20:48:48 [ Starting run
2024/02/23 20:48:49 [+] Running 1
                          2024/02/23 20:48:48 [+] Found 17 .yml files in actions/
2024/02/23 20:48:49 [+] Using conf
                                                                                                                                              init
2024/02/23 20:48:49 [i] Overriding 2024/02/23 20:48:49 [+] Running 1 active queries...
2024/02/23 20:48:49 [3] Running qui 2024/02/23 20:48:49 [+] Using config file: /home/falconforce/falconhound/config.yml
2024/02/23 20:49:14 | |>| Process
2024/02/23 20:49:14 . [>] Writi 2024/02/23 20:48:49 [i] Overriding timeframe to 14d for all active queries
                          2024/02/23 20:48:49 [E] Running query "Get new logon sessions" (SEN_New_Sessions) in Sentinel
                                                                                                                                               00wit
                          2024/02/23 20:49:14 4 [>] Processing 339319 results...
                                                  4 [>] Writing to Neo4j
                          2024/02/23 20:49:14
                          2024/02/23 20:52:28 [=] All done ... finished in 219 seconds
                          falconforce@0xff-neo4j:~/falconhound$
```

er 174 kehz; 2 running

ish -eu /startup/docker-entrypoint.sh ne onhound -go -ids SEN New Sessions -lookb ava/openjdk/bin/java -cp /var/lib/neo4j/ ava/openjdk/bin/java -cp /var/lib/neo4j/ ava/openjdk/bin/java -cp /var/lib/neo4j/ onhound -go -ids SEN New Sessions -lookb onhound -go -ids SEN New Sessions -lookb onhound -go -ids SEN New Sessions -lookb ava/openjdk/bin/java -cp /var/lib/neo4j/ /stend/systemd --user in/dockerd -H fd:// --containerd=/run/co falconforcempts/0 vstend/systemd-journald vstend/systend-udevd /stend/systemd-timesyncd /stend/systemd-timesyncd



## Creating new sessions

```
2023/07/28 22:30:10 [] Starting run
2023/07/28 22:30:10 [] Found 9 files in actions/test/
2023/07/28 22:30:10 [+] Found 9 files in actions/test/
2023/07/28 22:30:10 [+] Running 3 active queries...
2023/07/28 22:30:10 [*] Running query "Get Sessions from MDE" in MDE
("AccountDomain": "FALCONFORCE", "LogonType": "Interactive", "Timestamp": "2023-07-25T16:31:35.73966792", "min_Timestamp_arg1":0, "DeviceName": "PC-2.FALCONFORCE.LOCAL", "AccountSid": "S-1-5-21-2953915480-1169422843-688089779-1103", "AccountName": "STUDENT-USER")
2023/07/28 22:30:10 [*] Writing to Neo4]
MATCH (x:Computer (name: "PC-2.FALCONFORCE.LOCAL") MATCH (y:User {objectid: 'S-1-5-21-2953915480-1169422843-688089779-1103'}) MERGE (x)-[r:HasSession]->(y) SET r.since="2023-07-25T16:31:35.7396679Z' SET r.source="falconhound"
```





## Time out sessions and set new edge

```
Name: N4J_CLN_Remove_Older_Sessions
Synopsis: Removes the HasSession relation and replaces it with HadSession if the session is older than 3 days
ID: N4J_CLN_Remove_Owned
Description: Removes the HasSession relation and replaces it with HadSession if the session is older than 3 days
Author: FalconHound
Version: '0.8'
Info: |
 tbd
Active: true
Debug: false
SourcePlatform: Neo4j
Query: |
    MATCH (c)-[R:HasSession]->(u)
    WHERE duration.between(datetime(R.since), datetime()).days > 3
   MERGE (c)-[r:HadSession]->(u) SET r.till=datetime() SET r.source='falconhound' SET r.reason='timeout' DELETE R
Enhance:
Targets:
                                                     neo4j$ MATCH p=()-[r:HadSession]→() RETURN p LIMIT 25
                                                     **
Grant
                                                                                                                                 Relationship properties @
                                                     m
                                                                                                                                              timeout
                                                                                                                                 reason
                                                     Α
                                                                                                                                               falconhound
                                                                                                                                 source
                                                                                                                                               "2023-07-29T20:33:06.357000000Z"
```



## Cutting edge-stensions and property additions

HadSession
 HasConsent
 MfaDeviceSharing
 MfaEmailSharing
 MfaPhoneSharing
 AZHasRole > Eligible

AlertIds > Owned Publicly exposed ports Known exploitable CVEs Azure Dynamic Groups MFA Properties App Consent Scope And much more



#### How can we use this?


With this data we can build detections based on for example an increase in direct or nested paths from for example:


Owned users / computers to high value resources

```
DemoFalconHound CL
  where EventID s == "N4J Owned User to HighValue"
  where EventData_s != "]]"
  extend EventData=parse_json(EventData_s)
  sort by TimeGenerated asc
  extend PrevEventData=prev(EventData)
  extend diff=set_difference(EventData, PrevEventData)
  where diff!="[]"
  mv-expand diff
  extend TargetName=diff.Name,DirectCount=diff.Direct, DirectPath=diff.DirectNames, NestedCount=diff.Nested, NestedPath=diff.NestedNames
  project-away EventData, diff, EventData s, PrevEventData
                   Add bookmark
TimeGenerated [UTC]
                              TargetName
                                                            DirectCount
                                                                               DirectPath
                                                                                                                            NestedCount
                                                                                                                                               NestedPath
                                                                                                                                                                            EventID_s
                                                                                                                                                                                                           Description_s
    01/09/2023, 13:04:18.788
                              ADMINISTRATORS@BALLPIT...
                                                                               ["ADMINISTRATOR@BALLPIT.INT","ADMINISTRA...
                                                                                                                                               ["ADMINISTRATOR@BALLPIT...
                                                                                                                                                                            N4J_Owned_User_to_HighValue
                                                                                                                                                                                                           Counts all direct and
     01/09/2023, 13:04:18.788
                              DOMAIN ADMINS@BALLPIT.I...
                                                                               ["LYNX-ADM@BALLPIT.INT","DOMAIN ADMINS@...
                                                                                                                                               ["LYNX-ADM@BALLPIT.INT",...
                                                                                                                                                                            N4J_Owned_User_to_HighValue
                                                                                                                                                                                                           Counts all direct an
     01/09/2023, 13:04:18.788
                              DOMAIN ADMINS@BALLPIT.I...
                                                                               ["SEAL-ADM@BALLPIT.INT","DOMAIN ADMINS@...
                                                                                                                                               ["SEAL-ADM@BALLPIT.INT","...
                                                                                                                                                                            N4J_Owned_User_to_HighValue
                                                                                                                                                                                                           Counts all direct an
```



## Owned user to high value targets







Search for a node

Database Info

domainsid

exploitabl

exploits

samaccou

ntname

## Unexpected sessions from accounts with SPN

<pre>1 let KerberoastableUs 2 SecurityEvent 3   where EventID in ( 4   where LogonType !i 5   where not(SubjectUs) 6   where TargetUserSi 7</pre>	sers=_GetWatchlist( <mark>'FH</mark> _ (4624,4625) in (3,7)	Kerberoastable_Users')   por TargetUserName endswith 'ssers)	roject Sid;	rharasetahla He	ers!)   project N	lamo •		
☐ TenantId		TimeGenerated [UTC] ↑↓	SourceSystem	Account	AccountType	Computer	EventSourceName	Channel
☐ > 3b6c13cd-041d-41d	d5-88b4-32742a558494	01/12/2023, 10:41:03.165	OpsManager	NORTH\jon.snow	User	ws02.essos.local	Microsoft-Windows-Security	Security
3b6c13cd-041d-41d	d5-88b4-32742a558494	01/12/2023, 10:41:03.165	OpsManager	NORTH\jon.snow	User	ws02.essos.local	Microsoft-Windows-Security	Security
01/12/2023, 10:45:27.311		Searches	for kerberoastabl	e users with a session o	on a computer	[{"Comp	uter":"WS02.ESSO N4J_Ke	erberoastable_U
TenantId	3b6c13cd-041d-41d	5-88b4-32742a558494						
SourceSystem	RestAPI							
TimeGenerated [UTC]	2023-12-01T10:45:2	7.3112562Z						
Description_s	Searches for kerbero	astable users with a session	on a computer					

[{"Computer":"WS02.ESSOS.LOCAL","ComputerHasAlerts":false,"ComputerIsExposed":true,"ComputerIsVulnerable":null,"UserHasAlerts":false,"UserName":"JON.SNOW@NORTH.SEVENKINGDOMS.LOCAL","ComputerIsExposed":true,"ComputerIsExposed("C



N4J\_Kerberoastable\_User\_with\_Session

FalconHound\_CL

Kerberoastable User with a Session on a Computer

EventData\_s

EventID\_s

Name\_s

Type


## Follow-up query in the data

Query results can be augmented with BloodHound queries for further analysis


	Tenantid	
	SourceSystem	RestAPI
	TimeGenerated [UTC]	2023-10-13T14:55:07.6708278Z
	BHQuery_s	MATCH a=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*]->({highvalue:TRUE})) RETURN a
	EventID_s	N4J_Owned_User_to_HighValue
	Description_s	Counts all direct and nested shortest paths to HighValue nodes from owned users
>	EventData_s	[{"Direct":1,"DirectNames":[' T',"Nested":1,"N
	Name_s	AD Owned User with a path to high value assets
	Туре	DemoFalconHound_CL



#### How can we use this?



ame	Value
Outbound transitive objects	5024
nbound transitive objects	6
Total objects in BloodHound	7203
Path to sensitive resources	TRUE




ss was injected w...
- 0081 - DEV - Pro...
- 0229 - DEV - LSA...
- 0272 - DEV - Jav...
- 0273 - DEV - Une...
- 0286 - DEV - Sus...
- 0292 - DEV - NE...
ERTED] A process ...
ERTED] (AUTO] - 0...



#### How can we use this?

Alert on a lateral movement path being traversed

**AND** (attempt to) predict the next steps to investigate





## Real-world example - Bears reading emails



January 25, 2024



Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps

Microsoft Defender XDR

Microsoft Entra


The Microsoft security team deta systems on January 12, 2024, an investigate, disrupt malicious act actor further access. The Microso threat actor as Midnight Blizzard as NOBELIUM. The latest inform Center (MSRC) is posted here.

As stated in the MSRC blog, give resourced and funded by nation strike between security and busi no longer sufficient. For Microso to move even faster.



#### Microsoft Breach:

What happened? What should Azure admins do?





Microsoft Breach: What Happened? What Should Azure Admins Do?















Microsoft disclosed the details of their breach at the hands of Midnight Blizzard. In this video, we explain and demonstrate what happened, and provide some analysis on what the real impact of




## Bears reading emails





## Bears reading emails – and potentially more





## Hunt down account sharing or hijacking



## Implementation recommendation

#### **Sharphound & Azurehound**

Periodically

Not all details are in the logs

Incremental collections with LDAP filter

Sessions not needed

Run it every week/month

#### FalconHound

Every 15 minutes

Set as a scheduled task / cron job

Collects sessions, new objects

New / updated path calculations

Watchlists / Lookup lists for detections



## **BloodHound Community/Enterprise**

BloodHound CE / Enterprise APIs rely on objectids (SIDs)

Logs don't contain SIDs

BloodHound CE is currently supported through Neo4j

BH API support is under development





## Why you should consider implementation

Up to date sessions, MFA settings, Alerts, Vulnerability info etc

Coverage for unexpected account sharing

Continuous attack-path detection, including lateral movement detection

Input for detection enrichment and dynamic alert prioritization

Great resource for incident investigations and impact assessments




## Defenders think in lists, Attackers think in graphs.

Defenders can leverage attack graphs to make more lists.

As long as this is true, attackers can't win.

## FalconHound, available now!





https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconHound

Contributions welcome!





# Thank you! <3









