

# Keep only those privileges that speak to your heart

Automating Active Directory Privilege Clean-up







# Journey

People cannot change their tidying habits without first changing their way of thinking.

**Marie Kondo** 




- 1 Realizing we have a problem/s
- Understanding "The problem"
- Understanding how it affect us
- 4 Prioritize our problems
  - 5 Help others
  - 6 Pray and/or annoy

# Luis F Monge Martínez

Endpoint and Active Directory security in EEAS. Former Incident Handler, Incident Responder, Thread Hunter, Forensic Analyst, Cybersecurity Investigator, IT admin, IT supp., communications operator...

Data analysis lover and in love with Jupyter Notebooks.

Medium: @luckyluk3 GitHub: lucky-luk3





# Realizing we have a problem

The wake up!



### From routine to incertitude





### From routine to incertitude





#### From routine to incertitude



How many admins do we have on our systems?



#### From routine to incertitude



Domain admins? Schema admins? Local admins? DB admins?



### From routine to incertitude





#### From routine to incertitude



What does admin mean? Is everyone admin in some way? Am I the admin of myself?



### From routine to incertitude





# Understanding "The problem"


Let's focus on Active Directory








If you think the solution to a problem is only technical, you are not understanding the problem.





A fool with a tool is still a fool.

**Grady Booch** 







#### Lack of knowledge




#### Show must go on!



#### Lack of tools

- Even if everybody uses AD almost nobody really understands it.
- Excessive rights by default.
- Impact in case of compromise.



- The most over privileged the easiest for operations.
- Security in AD is time demanding and problematic.

- Native tools…
- Commercial tools focus on compliance.
- Open Source or free tools focused in AD configurations.
- EDRs somehow.
- Now BloodHound Enterprise!! Finally!



Relationships	9.801.940
Tenants	0
(a) Key Vaults	1
	2
Resource Groups	11
Subscriptions	3
Management Groups	0
Devices	132.505
Service Principals	10.307
Apps	1.267
<b>€</b> Groups	61.132
Users	69.098



@Lennart

# Understanding "our" problem

Get on with it!



**Increasing visibility** 





### **Increasing visibility**




Easy to deploy https://github.com/SpecterOps/bloodhound-cli

#### Remove these today:

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/find -fix-three-common-ad-issues-andyrobbins/



### **Increasing visibility**





### **Increasing visibility**



Justin Kohler
The BloodHound Enterprise State of Attack Path Management
<a href="https://youtu.be/mm5LU3cX6IU?si=yW6xTYR2x3TfgjTV">https://youtu.be/mm5LU3cX6IU?si=yW6xTYR2x3TfgjTV</a>






**Increasing visibility** 











### Our data - SharpHound

Aces	gmsa	passwordcantchange	smartcardrequired
admincount	HasSIDHistory	passwordexpired	SPNTargets
allowedtodelegate	hasspn	passwordnotreqd	supportedencryptiontypes
ContainedBy	homedirectory	PrimaryGroupSID	title
description	IsACLProtected	profilepath	trustedtoauth
displayname	IsDeleted	pwdlastset	UnconstrainedDelegation
distinguishedname	lastlogon	pwdneverexpires	unicodepassword
domain	lastlogontimestamp	reconcile	unixpassword
DomainSID	lockedout	samaccountname	usedeskeyonly
dontreqpreauth	logonscript	sensitive	useraccountcontrol
email	logonscriptenabled	serviceprincipalnames	userpassword
enabled	name	sfupassword	whencreated
encryptedtextpwdallowed	ObjectIdentifier	sidhistory	



### **Our data - SharpHound**

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distinguishedname	lastlogon	pwdneverexpires	unicodepassword
domain	lastlogontimestamp	reconcile	unixpassword
DomainSID	lockedout	samaccountname	usedeskeyonly
dontreqpreauth	logonscript	sensitive	useraccountcontrol
email	logonscriptenabled	serviceprincipalnames	Userpassword
enabled	name	sfupassword	whencreated
encryptedtextpwdallowed	ObjectIdentifier	sidhistory	



### **Our data - BloodHound**

admincount	enabled	logonscriptenabled	sessions
adminRights	encryptedtextpwdallowed	name	sidhistory
allowedtodelegate	gmsa	objectid	smartcardrequired
constrainedDelegation	gpos	passwordcantchange	sqlAdmin
controllables	groupMembership	passwordexpired	supportedencryptiontypes
controllers	hasspn	passwordnotreqd	system_tags
dcomRights	highvalue	profilepath	title
description	homedirectory	psRemoteRights	trustedtoauth
displayname	isaclprotected	pwdlastset	unconstraineddelegation
distinguishedname	lastlogon	pwdneverexpires	usedeskeyonly
domain	lastlogontimestamp	rdpRights	useraccountcontrol
domainsid	lastseen	samaccountname	whencreated
dontreqpreauth	lockedout	sensitive	
email	logonscript	serviceprincipalnames	



### **Our data - BloodHound**

admincount	enabled	logonscriptenabled	sessions
adminRights	encryptedtextpwdallowed	name	sidhistory
allowedtodelegate	gmsa	objectid	smartcardrequired
constrainedDelegation	gpos	passwordcantchange	sqlAdmin
controllables	groupMembership	passwordexpired	supportedencryptiontypes
controllers	hasspn	passwordnotreqd	system_tags
dcomRights	highvalue	profilepath	title
description	homedirectory	psRemoteRights	trustedtoauth
displayname	isaclprotected	pwdlastset	unconstraineddelegation
distinguishedname	lastlogon	pwdneverexpires	usedeskeyonly
domain	lastlogontimestamp	rdpRights	useraccountcontrol
domainsid	lastseen	samaccountname	whencreated
dontreqpreauth	lockedout	sensitive	
email	logonscript	serviceprincipalnames	



### **Our data – Processing data**



Scan with SharpHound



Process JSON data extracting names, UID, ACES and Properties



Ask BHCE API for extender info



Create Pandas Dataframe



### **Making the correct questions**

- What are the most privileged Users/Groups?
  - Controllables
  - Filtering
  - Name convention
  - Grouping
  - Plotting
  - Export to SCV

• ...

sers[["name", "controllables"]].sor	t_values(by <b>="</b>
name	controllables
LUIS@MYLAB.LOCAL	3572.0
MARIA@MYLAB.LOCAL	3570.0
LOUIS_TYLER@MYLAB.LOCAL	3570.0
TIMOTHY_ESTRADA@MYLAB.LOCAL	3363.0
ALYSSA_LEWIS@MYLAB.LOCAL	3363.0
MARGIE_TORRES@MYLAB.LOCAL	3363.0
LENARD_MACDONALD@MYLAB.LOCAL	3363.0
COURTNEY_MERCADO@MYLAB.LOCAL	3363.0
MAGDALENA_LAMBERT@MYLAB.LOCAL	3363.0
BRENDA_CONWAY@MYLAB.LOCAL	3363.0
	LUIS@MYLAB.LOCAL  MARIA@MYLAB.LOCAL  LOUIS_TYLER@MYLAB.LOCAL  TIMOTHY_ESTRADA@MYLAB.LOCAL  ALYSSA_LEWIS@MYLAB.LOCAL  MARGIE_TORRES@MYLAB.LOCAL  LENARD_MACDONALD@MYLAB.LOCAL  COURTNEY_MERCADO@MYLAB.LOCAL  MAGDALENA_LAMBERT@MYLAB.LOCAL



# Prioritize problems

Let's make this more professional








### From mess to order

Attack paths to DA





### From mess to order

Attack paths to DA




Complicit in escalation

















### Risk process

#### From mess to order





### Risk process

# From mess to order Users

- Controllables
- Controllers
- Path to Domain Admins (Number of Edges)
- In path to Domain Admins (Number)
- Sessions

#### Groups

- Controllables
- Controllers
- Path to Domain Admins (Number of Edges)
- In path to Domain Admins (Number)
- Sessions
- Members
- Mean members controllers Group controllers (Inverted)



### Risk process


#### From mess to order

### Normalized Risk Tuner User: Controllables weight: 1 Controllers weight: 1 Path\_da\_nedges weight: 1 N\_in\_path\_da weight: 1 Sessions weight: Groups: Controllables weight: 1 Controllers weight: 1 Path\_da\_nedges weight: 1 Members weight: 1 Sessions weight: 1 N\_in\_path\_da weight: 1 Usr\_mean\_control weight: 1 Tune Risk


# Understanding "our" problem

Again and better



























# Helping others (Optional)

Understanding the problem. Yes, again.




# Helping others Understanding the root cause

	name	controllables	controllers	path_da_nedges	n_in_path_da	sessions	control_risk_norm_100
8954	Bad.Guy	73501.0	400.0	35.0	678.0	127.0	1.710745



### **Understanding the root cause**





#### **Understanding the root cause**

#### CHECK ORIGIN OF RIGHTS FROM USER/GROUP

Check from which group an user/group is receiving rights.

User/Group name:


Bad.Guy

#### Check rights

	name	controllables	controllers	control_risk
4	DOMAIN ADMINS@MYLAB.LOCAL	3571.0	4.0	4296.0
442	ADMINISTRATORS@MYLAB.LOCAL	3381.0	6.0	3495.0
387	BE-240-ADMINGROUP1@MYLAB.LOCAL	116.0	276.0	460.0
48	SO-160-DISTLIST1@MYLAB.LOCAL	0.0	274.0	297.0
65	SU-ORL-DISTLIST1@MYLAB.LOCAL	0.0	220.0	618.0
105	LO-CHA-DISTLIST1@MYLAB.LOCAL	0.0	221.0	263.0
120	DA-24A-DISTLIST1@MYLAB.LOCAL	0.0	219.0	354.0



#### **Understanding the root cause**





#### **Understanding the root cause**

#### CHECK RIGHTS FROM ORIGEN, LOCATION

Check rights from user/group, location of rights.

User/Group name: Hidden\_admins

Check rights

Rights destination stored in df\_rights\_destination variable.

RightName	destination_type	destination	
GenericAl	OU	OU=OBSOLETE,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	0
GenericAl	OU	OU=HOME,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	1
GenericWrite	OU	OU=MAIL,OU=CENTRALSERVICES,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	2
GenericAl	OU	OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	3
GenericWrite	Explicit	CN=WKS-123301,OU=OFFICES,OU=LOCATION1,OU=REMOTE LOCATIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	4
GenericWrite	Explicit	${\tt CN=REMOTE\ ADMINS,OU=GROUPS,OU=LOCATION1,OU=REMOTE\ LOCATIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCALIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCALIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCALIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCALIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCALIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCALIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCALIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCALIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=M$	5
GenericWrite	OU	OU=USERS,OU=OFFICES,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	6
GenericWrite	Explicit	CN=TERMINAL SERVER LICENSE SERVERS,CN=BUILTIN,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	7
GenericAl	OU	OU=USERS,OU=OFFICES,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	8
GenericAl	OU	OU=OFFICES,OU=BACKUP SERVERS,OU=SERVERS,OU=IT,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	9
GenericAl	Explicit	CN=PRI-1203,OU=PRINTERS,OU=SERVERS,OU=IT,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL	10



#### **Understanding the root cause**



9


10

ITS FROM ORIGEN, LOC

om user/group, location of 💽

n\_admins

ed in df\_rights\_destination variable.



OU=USERS,OU=OFFICES,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL

destination destination\_type RightName

GenericAll

GenericAll

GenericAll

Explicit

OU=OBSOLETE, DC=MY, DC=DOMAIN, DC=LOC OU=HOME, DC=MY, DC=DOMAIN, DC=LOC MAIL,OU=CENTRALSERVICES,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOC. 3 OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCA CN=WKS-123301,OU= TE LOCATIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOC 5 CN=REMOTE ADMINS,OU=0 TE LOCATIONS,OU=FACTORY,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOC OU=USERS,OU=OFFICES,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL OU GenericWrite ICENSE SERVERS, CN=BUILTIN, DC=MY, DC=DOMAIN, DC=LOCAL Explicit GenericWrite

OU=OFFICES,OU=BACKUP SERVERS,OU=SERVERS,OU=IT,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL

CN=PRI-1203,OU=PRINTERS,OU=SERVERS,OU=IT,DC=MY,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL



# Pray and/or annoy

Annoy!



#### The solution

People don't do what you expect but what you inspect.

Louis V. Gerstner





#### The solution

If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.

African proverb









### Sum up

- Educate our admins.
  - Policies.
  - Project admin ≠ AD admin.
  - Temporary rights.
  - Rights segregations.
- Use data visualization.
- Try to help others.



### Sum up

- Educate our admins.
  - Policies.
  - Project admin ≠ AD admin.
  - Temporary rights.
  - Rights segregations.
- Use data visualization.
- Try to help others.

If you don't know your domain, nobody will do it for you.





# Thank you

Questions?



Luis F Monge Martinez