# SANS FOR578: Cyber Threat Intelligence

# The Cycle of Cyber Threat Intelligence

## Summary

Course Video
SANS Course

## Intelligence

Intelligence is the collecting and processing of information about a competitive entity and its agents, needed by an organization or group for its security and well-being. Intelligence is both a product and a process.

**Cyber Threat Intelligence** is defined as analyzed information about the hostile intent, capability, and opportunity of an adversary that satisfies a requirement. The focus is on the human threat.

## The Intelligence Cycle

Dissemination --> Planning and Direction ---> Collection --> Processing and Exploitation --> Analysis and Production --> Return to Dissemination

## Structuring Your Team to Generate Intelligence

## **Intelligence Team:**

- Security Operations Center
- Incident Response
- System Engineering & IT
- Business Operations
- Vulnerability Management

## **Planning and Direction Fundamentals**

 Intelligence Requirements - request to satisfy a knowledge gap about the threat or operational environment. Objectives that analysts seek to satisfy through the intelligence process. Example: **Strategic**: What business units are at most risk to cyber crime?

**Operational**: What activity groups are currently active in our industry?

**Tactical**: What adversary behaviors should security focus on to identify threats that are the most likely to breach our organization?

### Threat Modeling

### **Your Organization**

- Financial Data --> (Activity Group A)
- Intellectual Property --> (Activity Group A/B)
- System Availability --> (Activity Group C)

### Collection Management Framework

- Analysts must understand where they are getting data, how it is processed and delivered to them, and what questions can they reasonably ask of the data.
- A Collection Management Framework is a view of sources of data, what is available
  in the data, and how that data is processed and exploited

### Collection

### **Key Collection Sources**

### Intrusion Analysis

- Look to your own internal information
- Describes stages of a single intrusion
- Seven stages to defend

#### Malware Collection

- Historically, public threat intelligence reports have been malware reports.
  - Strong focus on malware analysis in the community.
  - Can be misleading as a sole source of collection, but can be highly valuable.
- Leveraged by organizations as a free malware sandbox.
  - Makes the data available to others, including adversaries
- Some popular sites:
  - VirusTotal
  - Hybrid-Analysis
  - Joe Sandbox
- Can create your own
- Useful as a CTI collection source

#### Domains

- Identify all relevant indicators
- Start with single indicator

- Pivot through each data source and add relevant data points
  - C2 Domain
  - Registrant Data
  - IP Resolution
  - Samples calling back to it
- Validate ensure links contain context and are meaningful

#### External Datasets

- Usually exist in the form of IP addresses, digital hashes, filenames, and other Atomic and Computed threat indicators
- Key Aspects:
  - Where is the data coming from?
  - Is the data applicable to the type of threats your organization cares about?
  - How is the data going to be used?
- Highly trusted sources' threat data can be plugged directly into many organization's security architecture to actively identify or block validated threats, but be cautious

### Measuring Threat Feeds

- Plus:
  - Pivots into higher-order context
  - Is focused on your industry threats
  - Has well-articulated understanding of the Collection Management Framework feeding it
  - Openly values quality and accuracy over quantity and speed
- Minus:
  - Ever contains RFC 1918 addresses or public trusted domains like Microsoft.com
  - No context behind info
  - Expectation is plug and play

#### TLS Certificates

- A digital certificate used in secure host-to-host network communications (previously SSL)
- · Collection of TLS certificates (free/paid)
- Can be used to find C2 infrastructure

## **Processing & Exploitation**

**Structured Models: Data into Buckets** 

- Structured models are useful to analysts for many reasons, but a chief reason is simple: data into buckets
  - Allows for the abstraction of the analyst and identification of patterns
  - Kill Chain, Diamond Model, MITRE ATT&CK, VERIS
    - Diamond Model
      - Infrastructure
      - Adversary
      - Capability/TTP
      - Victim
    - MITRE ATT&CK is a documentation of tactics and techniques
      - A useful framework for expressing and documenting tactics and techniques
      - Supported by MITRE and contributed to through many in the community
      - Focuses on tactics and techniques that have been observed in the real world

### Storing Collected Intel

- Often discussed in the context of threat intelligence platform
- The focus is on storing information in a quickly accessible and useful format
- Pros and Cons to each--consider your requirements!

### Storing Platforms

- Open Source
  - CRITS
  - MISP
  - Threat Note
  - YETI
- Pros: Free, ample storage, open source sharing communities
- Cons: Difficult to implement and maintain

## **Analysis and Production**

### **Identifying and Defeating Bias**

- All analysts have bias
- Cognitive biases are constraints on how we as analysts think that influence incorrect decisions, assessments, or rationale
- They allow analysts to create their own version of reality where inaccurate judgements and illogical interpretations occur

### **Confirmation Bias**

- Selectively Supporting One Hypothesis
- Evidence Inclusion
  - Seek supporting evidence
  - Reject refuting evidence
- Significance Biasing
  - Greater significance to supporting data
  - Lesser significance to contradicting data

### **Structured Analytic Techniques**

- Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) are analyst approaches to better evaluate information while reducing the impact of bias
  - Analysts leverage models to abstract data as much as possible from ourselves
  - Sample SATs:
    - Analysis of Competing Hypotheses
    - Devil's Advocacy
    - Team A/Team B
    - Brainstorming
    - Red Team Analysis

### **Analysis: Correlating Clusters**

- Many terms for clusters:
  - threat actors
  - activity groups are unique clusters of intrusions mathematically defined by the analyst/team's analytical weighting (confidence scoring)
  - campaigns,
  - intrusion sets
- Different methodologies to do this

### **Dissemination**

### Assessment = confidence + analysis + evidence + sources

- Know your Audience!
- Intended Audience
  - Intended audience and their goals determine the type of threat intelligence generated and how it is used (strategic, operational, tactical)
- Constructing Assessments

- Can be viewed as an equation
- Assessment = confidence + analysis + evidence + sources
- We assess with that because of
  - High Confidence:
    - Supported by preponderance of evidence
    - No evidence against
    - All but certain
  - Moderate Confidence
    - Significant evidence missing
    - New evidence could invalidate
  - Low Confidence
    - Other equally likely hypotheses exist
    - Little evidence available to support