

# Performing a Denial-of-Service Attack from the WAN

ETHICAL HACKING & LAB ASSIGNMENT 3

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# **Executive Summary**

# Highlights

In this lab, I will explore denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to understand how different network protocols can be flooded to overwhelm target systems and disrupt services. I will conduct TCP, UDP, and HTTP flood attacks, starting by configuring the network interface on a Kali sniffer using ifconfig and capturing packets with tcpdump. Using the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) on a Windows machine, I will generate extensive traffic and analyze it with capinfos to measure the data volume and impact. This will give me insight into how quickly such attacks can exhaust network resources and compromise service availability.

# **Objectives**

My objectives in this lab are to understand DoS attack mechanics and their impact on network resources by executing TCP, UDP, and HTTP floods. I will set up the network, capture packets, and analyze traffic using tools like ifconfig, tcpdump, and capinfos on Kali Linux to observe how each attack overwhelms services. By simulating attack conditions with LOIC from an external network, I will learn to identify the unique traffic patterns for each protocol. Observing the high traffic volumes generated will help me understand the strain DoS attacks place on networks, and I'll gain practical experience with sniffer tools for real-world network analysis.

# Lab Description Details

Below command to see all of the available options for tcpdump

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

RX bytes:46295 (45.2 KiB) TX bytes:16198 (15.8 KiB)


lo Link encap:Local Loopback
   inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
   inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
   UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
   RX packets:86 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
   TX packets:86 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
   collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
   RX bytes:4558 (4.4 KiB) TX bytes:4558 (4.4 KiB)

rootekali2:-# tcpdump --help
tcpdump version 4.6.2
OpenSSL 1.0.1k 8 Jan 2015
Usage: tcpdump [ -abbdDefhHIJKlLnNOpqRStuUvxX#] [ -B size ] [ -c count ]
   [ -C file_size ] [ -E algo:secret ] [ -F file ] [ -G seconds ]
   [ -i interface ] [ -j tstamptype ] [ -M secret ] [ --number ]
   [ -r file ] [ -s snaplen ] [ --time-stamp-precision precision ]
   [ -T type ] [ --version ] [ -V file ]
   [ -W file ] [ -W filecount ] [ -y datalinktype ] [ -z command ]
   [ -Z user ] [ expression ]
```


To start tcpdump sniffing on the eth0 interface

```
Enforce US Keypoard Layout view Fullscreen Send Ctri+Alt+Del
Applications 🕶
                Places ▼ $-Terminal ▼
                                                            Tue 19:15
                                                           root@kali2: ~
        File Edit View Search Terminal Help
                     inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0
inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
UP L00PBACK RUNNING MTU:65536
                                                   Mask:255.0.0.0
                                                                  Metric:1
                     TX packets:86 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:86 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
RX bytes:4558 (4.4 KiB) TX bytes:4558 (4.4 KiB)
                   i2:~# tcpdump --help
      tcpdump version 4.6.2
libpcap version 1.6.2
OpenSSL 1.0.1k 8 Jan 2015
       -G seconds ]
                                                             tstamptype ] [ -M secret ]
                                    interface
                                    in|out|inout]
file ] [ -s snatype ] [ --versfile ] [ -W filuser ] [ expres
3
```

In Low Orbit Ion Cannon we locked 203.0.113.100 as our targeted IP address. And selected TCP as protocol, by clicking "IMMA CHARGIN MAH LAZER" and after 30 secs stopping the flooding button will give the packets captured and packets received by filters.



To view the total of packet in the TCPcapture file





The picture shows the total number of packets captured in the number of packets data

To start topdump sniffing on the eth0 interafce for UDP

```
root@kali2:~# tcpdump -i eth0 -nnttt -s 0 -w UDPcapture.cap
tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
```

In Low Orbit Ion Cannon we locked 203.0.113.100 as our targeted IP address. And selected UDP as protocol, by clicking "IMMA CHARGIN MAH LAZER" and after 30 secs stopping the flooding button will give the packets captured and packets received by filters.





The picture shows the total number of packets captured in the number of packets data

To start the tcpdump sniffing on the eth0 interface for HTTPS

```
Strict time order: True

root@kali2:~# tcpdump -i eth0 -nnttt -s 0 -w HTTPcapture.cap
tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
```

In Low Orbit Ion Cannon we locked 203.0.113.100 as our targeted IP address. And selected HTTP as protocol, by clicking "IMMA CHARGIN MAH LAZER" and after 30 secs stopping the flooding button will give the packets captured and packets received by filters.




Image shows the LOW ORBIT ION CANNON interface

To view the total number of packets in HTTPcapture.cap file





Image shows the total number of packets captured in the number of packets data


To start tcpdump sniffing on the eth0 interface for HTTP

```
root@kali2:~# tcpdump -i eth0 -nntttt -s 0 -w HTTP2capture.cap
tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 byt
es
```

In Low Orbit Ion Cannon we locked 203.0.113.100 as our targeted IP address. And selected HTTP as protocol, and we unchecked the wait for reply button for this. By clicking "IMMA CHARGIN MAH LAZER" and after 30 secs stopping the flooding button will give the packets captured and packets received by filters.



This shows the total number of packets in the HTTP2capture.cap file




This picture shows the number of packets captured in the number of packet data

```
File Edit View Tools Help
 access.log - Notepad
 File Edit Format View Help
 oo. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Des
 |175.45.176.200 - - [30/0ct/2024:10:42:18 -0400] "A cat is fine too. Des
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 175.45.176.200 - - [30/Oct/2024:10:42:20 -0400] "A cat is fine too. Des
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 175.45.176.200 - - [30/Oct/2024:10:42:21 -0400] "A cat is fine too. Des
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175.45.176.200 - - [30/Oct/2024:10:42:23 -0400] "A cat is fine too. Des
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oo. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Des
oo. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu~A cat is fine too. Des
175.45.176.200 - - [30/Oct/2024:10:42:24 -0400] "A cat is fine too. Des
```


This picture shows the entries that state "A cat is fine too"

# Supporting Evidence


These are the challenges to complete during the lab




This picture shows the flag found in cat ip3.txt




This screenshot shows the flag found in xampp folder



This screenshot shows the flag found in apache folder



This screenshot shows the flag found in logs folder



This screenshot shows the flag found in access.log folder

# Conclusion & Wrap-Up

### Summary with:

#### Observations

During this lab, I observed how each type of denial-of-service (DoS) flood—TCP, UDP, and HTTP—generated significant traffic on the network, affecting the target's ability to respond to requests. The TCP and UDP floods quickly saturated the network bandwidth, while the HTTP flood created a massive spike in traffic that disrupted web services specifically. Packet analysis with tcpdump and capinfos clearly demonstrated the immense load these attacks placed on the network in a short period, highlighting the resource consumption associated with DoS attacks

#### Identified risks

The primary risk identified was the ease with which an attacker can overwhelm services and exhaust network resources, potentially leading to extended downtime and compromised availability of critical applications. The attacks also showed that, depending on the protocol, various aspects of the network stack are vulnerable. For instance, a TCP flood targets the connection-handling capacity, while HTTP floods exploit web service responsiveness, indicating that comprehensive defense strategies are needed across all layers.

## Suggested recommendations

To mitigate these types of attacks, I would recommend implementing rate limiting, establishing firewall rules to detect and block excessive requests, and using Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) to flag unusual traffic patterns. Implementing a Web Application Firewall (WAF) specifically for HTTP traffic could also reduce the impact of HTTP floods. Network segmentation and using redundant resources may also help maintain service availability during such attacks.

#### Your successes & failures

I successfully set up each type of flood attack, capturing and analyzing traffic with tcpdump and capinfos. However, I initially struggled with configuring the network interface for packet capture on the sniffer machine, which delayed the setup. Once resolved, the packet capture and flood attacks went smoothly, though managing and interpreting the high volume of data generated by the attacks required careful handling.

### Challenges

One significant challenge was managing the immense amount of traffic generated during each attack, as the network became quickly congested. This led to some delays in packet capture and analysis, highlighting the potential for real-world attacks to slow down even monitoring systems. Additionally, interpreting the data to quantify the impact on specific services required detailed analysis, especially when discerning differences in impact between TCP, UDP, and HTTP floods.

> This table prioritize remediation steps based on the potential impact of each risk on network and service performance.

Risk	Description	Risk Priority	Remediation
Network Bandwidth Exhaustion	High volume of packets floods the network, consuming all available bandwidth and slowing down services.	High	Implement rate limiting and configure firewall rules to detect and block abnormal traffic patterns.
Service Downtime	Targeted services (TCP, UDP, HTTP) become unresponsive, affecting application availability.	High	Use Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) to identify DoS patterns and dynamically adjust network traffic.
Connection Saturation (TCP Flood)	The TCP flood overloads the target's connection capacity, blocking legitimate connections.	Medium	Deploy SYN cookies to manage excessive TCP requests and configure the firewall to limit incoming TCP connections.
Application Layer Exhaustion (HTTP Flood)	Web services have become unresponsive due to the high HTTP traffic volume.	Medium	Utilize a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to manage excessive HTTP requests and restrict HTTP requests based on origin.
Resource Exhaustion on Monitoring Systems	High traffic load can overwhelm network monitoring tools, hindering traffic analysis.	Low	Implement resource scaling for monitoring systems and apply filters to capture relevant traffic without saturation.