

**ENPM665 – Cloud Security**

**Final Group Project**

**Architectural Design and Overview of Proposed Healthcare Application Platform**

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### **a. Report overview**

The report in detail describes a healthcare application platform developed on AWS cloud services. It highlights how different user groups, including patients, healthcare professionals, and IT personnel, interact with the platform. Key features include secure data management and efficient navigation across the AWS infrastructure. The report emphasizes robust security protocols to protect sensitive health information, conducting a thorough vulnerability analysis and implementing necessary measures for risk mitigation. This platform aims to offer a secure, user-friendly, and compliant solution for managing healthcare data in the cloud.

### **b. Architectural diagram**

[Architecture diagram from Patient point of view](#)

[Architecture diagram from Care provider point of view](#)

[Architecture diagram from IT support point of view](#)

### **c. Patient Interaction with the Healthcare Application on AWS**

When a patient accesses the healthcare application, their journey involves several steps and AWS services that work together to ensure a **secure, reliable, and efficient experience**.

**Secure Access** The patient starts by connecting securely to the application, through **HTTPS**, which is facilitated by **AWS Certificate Manager** that provides **SSL/TLS certificates** to encrypt the data exchange. This ensures that the **data in transit is encrypted**.

**Content Delivery Network** The patient's request is routed through **Amazon CloudFront**, AWS's content delivery network, which ensures that the content is delivered with low latency and high transfer speeds, enhancing the user experience.

**DNS Resolution** **Amazon Route 53** services then direct the request to the most appropriate server location, translating domain names into IP addresses.

**Web Application Firewall (WAF)** As the request reaches AWS, it passes through **AWS WAF**, which **filters the traffic to protect against common web threats** and ensures that **only legitimate requests** are processed.

**Load Balancing** The request is then handled by an **Elastic Load Balancer**, which distributes incoming traffic across multiple targets, such as EC2 instances, in different **Availability Zones**, balancing the load and increasing the fault tolerance of the application.

**Auto-Scaling Web Servers** The patient's request is processed by the **web servers in the public subnet**, which are set up for auto-scaling to handle varying levels of traffic and ensure consistent performance. These servers present the user interface where patients can interact with the application.

**Application Processing** For more complex queries, such as accessing test results or scheduling, the request is passed to the **application servers**, which handle the application logic and may interact with the database.

**Database Interaction** The application retrieves or stores information in the **Amazon RDS** database, which is set up with a **primary instance in one Availability Zone and a secondary instance in another for high availability and failover support**.

**Synchronous Replication** All **transactions are synchronously replicated** across the RDS instances to ensure that every piece of data is consistently mirrored and can be recovered in case of failure.

**Encrypted Data Storage** Patient records and other sensitive **data are stored in S3 buckets** with **encryption at rest**, protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the data.

**Logging and Monitoring** Throughout this process, **AWS CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and CloudWatch** are **actively logging and monitoring the application's activity**, providing real-time insights into performance and security.

**IAM Roles and Policies** AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles and policies are in place to ensure that only authorized personnel can access the patient data and system configurations.

**Disaster Recovery** In the event of a disaster, the architecture is designed to failover to a disaster recovery site in a different AWS region, with all the necessary components to resume operations with minimal downtime.

**Security and Compliance** Tools like AWS Shield for DDoS protection, AWS GuardDuty for threat detection, and AWS Config for resource inventory and changes, work together to maintain security and compliance standards.

By traversing through these components, the patient's data flows through a well-orchestrated, secure, and resilient AWS infrastructure, ensuring that their interactions with the healthcare application are both safe and efficient.

#### **d. Care Provider Interaction with the Healthcare Application on AWS**

When care providers access the healthcare application, their interaction involves a series of steps across a robust AWS architecture, designed to facilitate secure and efficient data flow.

**Network Entry** Care providers connect to the application from within the hospital network or remotely. This could be through **clinical workstations, healthcare devices within the hospital, or via secure VPN connections for remote care providers.**

**Direct Connection** For a high-speed and secure connection to the AWS services, the hospital network leverages **AWS Direct Connect, ensuring reliable and private connectivity that bypasses the public internet. IPSec VPN connection is also provided as an alternative to AWS Direct Connect.**

**Data Transmission** Once connected, data flows through a router and across the **AWS Client VPN**, which **encrypts the traffic, maintaining the privacy of patient data.** Hence, we achieve data in transit protection.

**Secure Gateway** The data then enters the AWS environment through an internet gateway if the connection is from the internet or a virtual private gateway if it's from AWS Direct Connect.

**Load Balancing** The **Elastic Load Balancer** distributes the incoming data across multiple web servers in various Availability Zones. This ensures high availability and fault tolerance for the application.

**Web and Application Servers** Web servers handle the presentation layer, while application servers process requests like accessing patient data or sending and receiving messages. These servers are set up for auto-scaling to manage varying loads efficiently.

**Database Access** For operations requiring database interaction, such as retrieving patient records, the application communicates with **Amazon RDS**. The RDS setup is designed for high availability with a primary instance in one Availability Zone and a read replica in another.

**Data Storage and Backup** Patient data is stored in Amazon S3 buckets with encryption at rest for security. AWS Backup is configured to protect this data, with policies ensuring regular backups and retention aligned with compliance requirements.

**Security Measures** Throughout this process, AWS security services play a crucial role. **AWS Shield** provides DDoS protection, **AWS WAF** guards against web exploits, and **IAM** ensures that care providers have the appropriate access rights.

**Monitoring and Compliance** **Amazon CloudWatch**, **AWS CloudTrail**, and **VPC Flow Logs** offer real-time monitoring, while **AWS Config** and **AWS Systems Manager** provide resource management and compliance tracking.

**Data Encryption and Key Management** **AWS Key Management Service (KMS)** manages encryption keys, and **AWS Secrets Manager** handles sensitive credentials, ensuring that all data transactions are secure.

**Infrastructure as Code** The entire infrastructure is managed as code using **AWS CloudFormation**, allowing for **repeatable and consistent deployments**, and is essential for maintaining the integrity of the environment.

**Continuous Integration and Deployment (CI/CD)** Any updates or changes to the application by the care providers or IT team go through a **CI/CD pipeline**, involving **AWS CodeCommit** and **AWS CodeDeploy**, ensuring that updates are tested and deployed without disrupting the service.



**Logging and Compliance** AWS services like **Amazon Macie** for data security and privacy, and **AWS Inspector** for security assessments, ensure that the application adheres to healthcare compliance regulations.

**Disaster Recovery** In case of an unforeseen event, AWS ensures **disaster recovery through multi-region deployment**, enabling quick failover and minimal disruption to care providers' access to patient data.

By navigating through these AWS services, care providers are afforded a seamless, secure, and compliant way to interact with the patient data, ensuring they can provide the highest standards of healthcare services.

### **e. IT Support Interaction with the Healthcare Application on AWS**

From the IT support perspective, the data flow within an AWS-hosted healthcare application is a multi-faceted process that encompasses various roles such as **end-user support, database administrators (DBAs), system administrators, and super admins**. Each role interacts with the AWS infrastructure components uniquely to **maintain, monitor, and manage the application**. Here's an outline of how data flows through the architecture from the IT support point of view

**IT Support Network Entry** IT personnel access the AWS environment through secure connections. System administrators and DBAs typically connect from within the organization's IT support network, while remote care providers and other support staff may use a VPN connection for secure access.

**AWS Direct Connect and VPN** For a stable and secure connection, the IT support network utilizes **AWS Direct Connect** for dedicated network connectivity. **IPSec VPN connection** is also provided as an alternative to AWS Direct Connect. Simultaneously, **AWS Client VPN allows encrypted access** from remote locations, **ensuring that data remains secure in transit**.

**Management and Operations** The IT team manages the AWS infrastructure via the **Management VPC**, which is **isolated from the application workloads for security**. Within this VPC, **IT personnel use a Bastion host (jump server)** for secure, controlled access to other parts of the AWS infrastructure.

**Infrastructure as Code and CI/CD** The IT team uses **Infrastructure as Code (IaC) with AWS CloudFormation** to **automate and manage infrastructure deployments**. The CI/CD pipeline, including **AWS CodeCommit, AWS CodeBuild, and AWS CodeDeploy**, is used for integrating and deploying application and infrastructure updates.

**Database Administration** DBAs manage the **Amazon RDS databases**, which are configured for high **availability across multiple Availability Zones**. They monitor the synchronous

replication to **ensure data consistency and manage backup policies** through **AWS Backup** for resilience.

**Data Backup Management** IT support takes charge of data backup and recovery processes by configuring backup schedules and retention policies using AWS Backup Vault. The use of AWS Backup Plans ensures efficient backup strategy implementation. KMS keys, alongside resource policies, are employed to enhance data security and accessibility during backup and recovery operations, ensuring data integrity and availability.

**Resource Management** System administrators use **AWS Systems Manager** for operational tasks like **patching, state management, and automation**. This centralized management service helps maintain system health and security.

**Security and Compliance Monitoring** The IT team employs AWS security and compliance services, such as **AWS Config, AWS Security Hub, Amazon GuardDuty, and Amazon Macie**, to **monitor compliance with healthcare regulations** and to detect and protect against security threats.

**Logging and Monitoring** **AWS CloudWatch** and **AWS CloudTrail** provide logging and monitoring capabilities. CloudWatch monitors performance, while CloudTrail tracks user activity and API usage. **AWS Config Rules** and **VPC Flow Logs** are also used for tracking changes and **network traffic patterns**, respectively.

**Secrets and Key Management** **AWS Secrets Manager** is used to manage access to credentials, and **AWS Key Management Service (KMS)** handles encryption keys, ensuring that sensitive data and application secrets are securely managed.

**Disaster Recovery and Response** In the event of an incident, the IT team uses **Amazon SNS** for notifications and **AWS Systems Manager** to respond to operational requirements. The **AMS Console** and **AMS Backup** support disaster recovery strategies and backup management.

**Network Management** The **AWS Network Firewall**, together with other security services, is managed by the IT team to protect the network perimeter and control traffic flows.

By interacting with these components, the IT support team ensures the healthcare application's performance, security, and compliance. Their roles require them to manage data flow across the AWS infrastructure effectively, ensuring that the application remains robust and dependable for both care providers and patients.

## **1. Vulnerability Assessment Detailed Issue Remediation**

### **1.0 Introduction**

This document provides a detailed account of the remedial actions undertaken to address various identified security vulnerabilities within our cloud infrastructure, particularly focusing on enhancements made within the AWS environment. It serves as an official record of the measures implemented, offering a reference point for compliance with industry standards and future audits.

#### **1.1.1 Lack of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)**

##### **Issue Explanation**

Users were previously able to access AWS services using only their passwords. This approach presented a vulnerability, as it increased the risk of unauthorized access in the event of password compromise.

##### **Impact Analysis**

The absence of MFA posed a significant security risk, as compromised passwords could allow attackers full access to a user's AWS services, potentially leading to data breaches or other serious security incidents.

##### **Remediation Overview**

Multi-factor authentication (MFA) was established across all user accounts, necessitating two forms of identification for enhanced security.

##### **Infrastructure Changes**

The implementation involved navigating to the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) dashboard, selecting each user, and enabling MFA under the "Security credentials" tab. Users were then required to set up a secondary authentication method, such as a mobile app or SMS text message.

##### **AWS Services Used**

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) was the primary service used for this implementation.

### **Alternative Solutions**

An alternative method could involve integrating a third-party MFA solution, such as federated identity management with external identity providers that offer MFA.

### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*Setting Up MFA in AWS IAM\*\*](#)

### **1.1.2 IMDSv2 Not Enforced in EC2 Instances**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The organization's EC2 instances were operating on the less secure IMDSv1, making them more susceptible to attacks like SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery).

#### **Impact Analysis**

The utilization of IMDSv1 potentially allowed attackers to intercept or manipulate metadata requests, leading to unauthorized access or data leakage.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Transitioned all EC2 instances to the more secure IMDSv2, providing an additional layer of protection against SSRF attacks.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

The transition was executed by accessing the Amazon EC2 console, selecting the relevant instances, and modifying their configuration to use IMDSv2 exclusively.

#### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon EC2 was the primary service involved in this remediation.

### **Alternative Solutions**

An alternative approach could be the implementation of stricter network security controls to restrict access to the metadata service.

### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*IMDSv2 Configuration Guide\*\*](#)

### **1.1.3 Unassigned IAM Roles in EC2 Instances**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Some of the organization's EC2 instances were operating without specific IAM roles, leading to potential over-privileged or under-privileged access to AWS services, which posed both security and operational risks.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Operating without assigned IAM roles could result in instances having either too much or too little access to necessary AWS resources, thereby increasing the risk of accidental or malicious changes, or hindering legitimate operations.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Specific IAM roles were assigned to each EC2 instance, ensuring access levels are precisely tailored to operational needs.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

This assignment was performed through the EC2 console, where each instance was meticulously selected and attached with an appropriate IAM role. These roles were designed to grant only the necessary permissions.

#### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon EC2 and AWS IAM were the key services involved in this remediation.

#### **Alternative Solutions**

Alternatively, the AWS Service Catalog could be used to manage access, allowing the deployment of predefined products with set permissions for consistent role assignment.

#### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*IAM Roles for Amazon EC2\*\*](#)

### **1.1.4 Unencrypted Root Volumes in EC2 Instances**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The root volumes of some EC2 instances within the organization were not encrypted, exposing sensitive data to potential risks if the underlying storage was compromised.

### **Impact Analysis**

Unencrypted root volumes posed significant risks, especially if storage devices were repurposed or accessed by unauthorized parties, potentially leading to data breaches.

### **Remediation Overview**

Implemented encryption on all root volumes of EC2 instances, safeguarding sensitive data against unauthorized access.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

This process involved taking snapshots of existing root volumes, encrypting these snapshots, and then using them to launch new instances with encrypted volumes, replacing the original unencrypted ones.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon EC2 and AWS Key Management Service (KMS) were primarily used in this process.

### **Alternative Solutions**

As an alternative, third-party disk encryption tools could be employed, though they might not integrate as seamlessly with AWS services.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Amazon EC2 Encryption](#)

### **1.1.5 RDS Instances Not Encrypted**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The organization's RDS instances were functioning without encryption, leaving stored data vulnerable to unauthorized access, especially during maintenance or backup operations.

#### **Impact Analysis**

The lack of encryption in RDS instances was a considerable risk to data confidentiality and could lead to the exposure of sensitive information.



### **Remediation Overview**

Enabled encryption for all RDS instances, both existing and new, to protect data at rest and during transactions.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

For new RDS instances, encryption was enabled during setup. Existing databases were transitioned to encrypted instances using encrypted snapshots.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon RDS and AWS Key Management Service (KMS) were involved in this encryption process.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Database encryption could alternatively be managed at the application level, though this might not offer the same level of security and ease of management as RDS's built-in features.

### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*Encrypting Amazon RDS Resources\*\*](#)

### **1.1.6 S3 Buckets Without KMS Key Encryption**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Data in some of the organization's S3 buckets was not encrypted, making it susceptible to unauthorized access or breaches, particularly if bucket permissions were misconfigured or in the event of a security lapse.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Storing unencrypted data in S3 buckets could lead to significant data breaches, risking the confidentiality of the data and potentially leading to compliance violations.

### **Remediation Overview**

Applied AWS Key Management Service (KMS) encryption to all S3 buckets, ensuring data is encrypted at rest and secure from breaches.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

This was achieved by accessing the S3 console, and modifying the bucket properties to set the default encryption using server-side encryption with AWS KMS keys (SSE-KMS).

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon S3 and AWS Key Management Service were the primary services used for this enhancement.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Alternatively, client-side encryption could be used, where data is encrypted before being uploaded to S3, although this requires additional management effort.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Amazon S3 Encryption with KMS Keys](#)

### **1.1.7 Overly Permissive IAM Roles**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The organization identified that some of its IAM roles were overly permissive, granting broader access to AWS resources than necessary. Such configurations could lead to security vulnerabilities, as they potentially allow more access than needed for specific tasks or roles.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Overly permissive IAM roles increase the risk of unauthorized actions within the AWS environment. They could lead to potential security breaches, where malicious actors or even well-intentioned users inadvertently access or modify sensitive data or systems beyond their required scope.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Conducted an extensive audit and refinement of IAM roles, restricting them to essential permissions in line with the principle of least privilege.

## **Infrastructure Changes**

This process involved a detailed analysis and revision of IAM policies attached to each role. The organization reassessed the necessity of each permission, removing any that were not essential for the role's operation. This reconfiguration was a crucial step in tightening security and reducing the attack surface within their AWS environment.

## **AWS Services Used**

The main service involved in this process was AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM).

## **Alternative Solutions**

An alternative approach could be the use of attribute-based access control (ABAC), which allows for fine-grained access control based on user, resource, or environment attributes. However, this method requires a more complex setup and a thorough understanding of access patterns.

## **Reference Document Link**

[Understanding and Using IAM Roles](#)

## **1.2 Compliance, Best Practices, and Future Recommendations**

Throughout this process, we need to ensure that backups and versioning are in place prior to any changes to mitigate data loss risks. All changes are first tested in a controlled environment to preemptively identify and address potential issues. Scheduling regular audits to ensure ongoing compliance and to identify any new vulnerabilities that may arise. This proactive approach to security will facilitate continuous improvement and adaptation to evolving threats.

## **1.3 Conclusion**

This documentation serves as a testament to the significant steps taken to enhance our cloud infrastructure's security posture. The implementation of these measures aligns with industry best practices, ensuring robust protection against unauthorized access and compliance with our organizational policies. It is a crucial step in our commitment to maintaining a secure and resilient digital environment.

## **2. Vulnerability Assessment Detailed Issue Remediation**

### **2.0 Introduction**

This comprehensive document delineates the security enhancements and remediation actions undertaken in our cloud infrastructure, primarily within the AWS environment. It serves as an official record of the strategic and technical measures implemented to address various identified security vulnerabilities. The purpose of this document is to provide a detailed account for compliance, auditing, and as a reference for future security assessments and enhancements.

#### **2.1.1 S3 Bucket Encryption**

##### **Issue Explanation**

The organization's S3 buckets were vulnerable due to a lack of encryption, exposing them to unauthorized data access risks.

##### **Impact Analysis**

Data breaches from unencrypted S3 buckets could compromise sensitive information, leading to trust issues and compliance problems.

##### **Remediation Overview**

Server-side encryption using AWS Key Management Service (KMS) was introduced for enhanced data protection.

##### **Infrastructure Changes**

In addressing the S3 Bucket Encryption, the first step involves logging into the AWS Management Console. From there, navigate to the S3 service and select each bucket requiring encryption. Within the bucket's properties, there's an option to enable 'Default encryption'. The team can choose between 'AWS-managed keys' for a straightforward approach or 'Customer-managed keys' for more control. Once the appropriate option is selected, it is saved, thus activating encryption for the S3 buckets.

##### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon S3 for storage, and AWS KMS for managing the encryption keys.

### **Alternative Solutions**

An alternative was client-side encryption, where data is encrypted before it's uploaded to S3.

### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*Guidance on Enabling Default Encryption for S3 Buckets.\*\*](#)

### **2.1.2 IAM Policy Restriction**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The organization's IAM policies were too broad, creating potential security risks.

#### **Impact Analysis**

These broad permissions could lead to unauthorized actions, affecting the integrity and availability of services.

#### **Remediation Overview**

IAM policies were revised to include only necessary permissions.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

To restrict IAM policies, begin by accessing the AWS Management Console and opening the IAM dashboard. The task here is to edit each policy using the policy editor, stripping down to only the necessary permissions. This refining process is crucial for minimizing security risks. Once the policies are updated, testing them with a policy simulator ensures they function as intended without overly restricting access.

#### **AWS Services Used**

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) for managing access.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Using temporary IAM roles for specific services was another option.

### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*Guide to Access Management in AWS IAM.\*\*](#)

### **2.1.3 Automated Backups**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The organization faced a risk of losing data permanently due to the absence of automated backups.

#### **Impact Analysis**

The lack of backups could disrupt services and lead to non-compliance issues.

#### **Remediation Overview**

A strategy for automated backups was set up for essential data storage.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

Implementing automated backups starts in the AWS Management Console, where the AWS Backup service is accessed. Here, a backup plan is created, specifying the frequency and retention of backups. Then, this backup plan is applied to essential AWS resources, like RDS and EC2 instances. This setup ensures regular and automatic backups, providing a reliable safety net for data.

#### **AWS Services Used**

AWS Backup for scheduling, Amazon RDS, and Amazon EC2 for the data.

#### **Alternative Solutions**

They could have also scripted their backup solutions using AWS CLI or SDKs.

#### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*Instructions on Managing Backups with AWS Backup.\*\*](#)

### **2.1.4 Multi-Region Deployment**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Relying on a single AWS region posed a risk of service outages for the organization.

### **Impact Analysis**

Such a single-point approach could lead to significant downtime, affecting operations and user experience.

### **Remediation Overview**

The organization spread its critical systems across multiple AWS regions for better reliability.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

For multi-region deployment, the process begins by logging into the AWS Management Console. The team replicates critical services such as EC2 and RDS in different AWS regions. This involves setting up identical service configurations in each selected region and managing web traffic through Amazon Route 53, ensuring seamless user experience across different geographic locations.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon EC2 for computing, Amazon RDS for databases, and Amazon Route 53 for managing web traffic.

### **Alternative Solutions**

A simpler method could have been using different Availability Zones within the same region.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Details on AWS Global Infrastructure.](#)

### **2.1.5 CloudWatch Monitoring**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The organization identified a lack of effective monitoring, which left blind spots in both system performance and security.

#### **Impact Analysis**

The absence of monitoring could lead to a slower response to incidents and potential undetected security breaches, compromising the organization's ability to swiftly identify and mitigate issues.

### **Remediation Overview**

To address this gap, real-time monitoring and alerts were implemented using Amazon CloudWatch.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

Setting up CloudWatch Monitoring involves using the AWS Management Console to access Amazon CloudWatch. The team sets up dashboards to monitor key metrics and logs from various AWS resources. They also configure alarms in CloudWatch to trigger notifications in response to specific events, ensuring real-time monitoring and quick response to any anomalies or issues.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon CloudWatch was the primary service used to establish this comprehensive monitoring solution.

### **Alternative Solutions**

As an alternative, third-party monitoring tools that integrate with AWS could be employed to provide similar or additional monitoring capabilities.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Amazon CloudWatch documentation on setting up dashboards and alarms.](#)

### **2.1.6 S3 Versioning**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Unversioned S3 buckets in the organization's infrastructure posed a risk of irreversible data loss due to accidental deletions or overwrites.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Without versioning, any accidental deletion or modification could result in costly downtime or data recovery efforts, impacting the organization's operational efficiency.

### **Remediation Overview**

The organization enabled versioning for its S3 buckets to maintain a comprehensive history of changes and recover from unintended modifications or deletions.



### **Infrastructure Changes**

Enabling S3 Versioning is done through the AWS Management Console. For each bucket, the team navigates to 'Properties' and enables 'Bucket Versioning'. This feature allows S3 to keep multiple versions of an object, providing a mechanism to recover from unintended modifications or deletions.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon S3 was the primary service used for this data protection strategy.

### **Alternative Solutions**

An alternative would be to periodically back up data to a different storage service, providing a secondary means of data recovery.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Amazon S3 User Guide on using versioning.](#)

## **2.1.7 RDS Multi-AZ Deployments**

### **Issue Explanation**

The organization's single-instance deployment of Amazon RDS posed risks of downtime during outages, lacking failover support.

### **Impact Analysis**

Any RDS outage could disrupt services relying on the database, affecting overall service availability and user experience.

### **Remediation Overview**

To enhance high availability, RDS Multi-AZ deployments were implemented.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

For RDS Multi-AZ deployments, the process involves modifying the RDS instance configurations through the AWS Management Console. Each relevant database is set to run in

Multi-AZ mode, creating a standby instance in a separate Availability Zone. This setup ensures automatic failover in case of an outage, thus enhancing database availability.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon RDS was the primary service involved in this high-availability strategy.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Using RDS read replicas for load balancing and increased read capacity could be an alternative, though it primarily serves a different purpose than high availability.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Amazon RDS documentation on Multi-AZ deployments.](#)

## **2.1.8 RDS Encryption**

### **Issue Explanation**

RDS instances within the organization were unencrypted, exposing sensitive data to potential security breaches.

### **Impact Analysis**

Operating unencrypted RDS instances risked non-compliance with security policies and exposed data to potential leaks.

### **Remediation Overview**

Encryption was enabled for RDS instances to protect data at rest, and SSL/TLS encryption was enforced for data in transit.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

Encrypting RDS instances requires enabling encryption during the setup process for new instances. For existing databases, the team takes encrypted snapshots and restores them to new RDS instances. They also enforce SSL/TLS connections for data in transit to ensure end-to-end data security.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon RDS and AWS Key Management Service (KMS) were key in implementing this security measure.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Application-level encryption for specific sensitive data fields could be an alternative, although it might require additional application logic.

### **Reference Document Link**

[AWS documentation on encrypting Amazon RDS resources.](#)

### **2.1.9 S3 Bucket Logging**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The lack of access logging on S3 buckets meant that unauthorized access could go undetected in the organization's infrastructure.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Not having visibility into bucket access patterns hindered the organization's ability to conduct security auditing and respond to incidents effectively.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Server access logging was enabled on S3 buckets to track and record all access requests.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

To enable S3 Bucket Logging, the team activates access logging for each S3 bucket through its properties in the S3 console. They specify a destination bucket to store these logs, allowing for analysis of access patterns and detection of unauthorized access.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon S3 was the service utilized for this logging solution.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Integrating a third-party logging service with AWS using Lambda functions could provide additional logging capabilities.

### **Reference Document Link**

[AWS S3 documentation on logging bucket access.](#)

### **2.1.10 S3 Object Lock**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The organization faced risks of data loss due to the overwriting or deletion of critical objects in S3 buckets.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Without safeguards, accidental or malicious modifications to S3 objects could result in irreversible changes to data.

#### **Remediation Overview**

S3 Object Lock was enabled to protect data from being overwritten or deleted.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

Implementing S3 Object Lock involves activating this feature for required buckets in the S3 console. The team sets retention periods during which objects cannot be altered or deleted. This measure adds an extra layer of protection against data loss.

#### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon S3 was used to implement this data protection feature.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Using AWS Backup for point-in-time recovery options could serve as an alternative method for data protection.

### **Reference Document Link**

[AWS S3 documentation on Object Lock.](#)

## **2.2 Compliance and Best Practices**

In line with these enhancements, we have to establish a robust framework for risk assessment and management, involving regular reviews using tools like AWS Inspector. Incident response plan has to be updated and tested through regular drills. We also have to emphasize the importance of compliance and regular auditing, aligning our practices with standards such as ISO 27001 and NIST frameworks. Employee training and awareness programs have been conducted to reinforce the importance of security best practices. Furthermore, a rigorous patch management policy has been established to ensure that all systems and software are consistently up-to-date with the latest security patches.

## **2.3 Conclusion**

This documentation reflects our commitment to maintaining a secure and resilient digital environment. The steps taken significantly enhance our security posture, aligning with industry best practices and ensuring compliance with organizational policies. This document will serve as a key resource for ongoing security management, future enhancements, and audits, demonstrating our proactive approach to cloud security.

### **3. Virtual machine vulnerability assessment report**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This report presents a comprehensive assessment of vulnerabilities identified in our virtual machine environment. It outlines the issues, their impacts, and the remediation strategies undertaken to enhance the security and integrity of our systems. By addressing these vulnerabilities, we aim to fortify our infrastructure against potential security threats, ensuring a robust and resilient digital environment.

#### **3.1.1 Weak Authentication and Authorization**

##### **Issue Explanation**

Weak authentication and authorization mechanisms were identified, meaning the system's process for verifying user identities was insufficient. This increased the risk of unauthorized access.

##### **Impact Analysis**

This vulnerability could lead to unauthorized data access, system compromise, and potential data breaches.

##### **Remediation Overview**

The remedy involved instituting Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) across all systems.

##### **Infrastructure Changes**

To implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) across the AWS platform, begin by logging into the AWS Management Console. Navigate to the IAM service and select 'Users'. For each user, go to the 'Security credentials' tab and enable MFA, choosing between a virtual MFA device or a hardware MFA device. Concurrently, update the password policies by accessing the 'Account settings' within IAM. Here, adjust the settings to enhance password complexity, including setting minimum length requirements, and mandate regular password changes to ensure ongoing security.

### **AWS Services Used**

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM).

### **Alternative Solutions**

Using biometric authentication methods as an additional security layer.

### **Reference Document Link**

[AWS MFA Setup Guide](#)

### **3.1.2 Database Credential Policy Update**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Database credentials were too simple and short, posing a risk of brute-force attacks and unauthorized access.

#### **Impact Analysis**

This could lead to compromised database security and unauthorized access to sensitive data.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Credential standards were revised to mandate increased lengths for database usernames and passwords. A password manager was introduced for better credential management.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

Start by accessing Amazon RDS in the AWS Management Console to enhance credential lengths. In the security settings of each database instance, set new minimum lengths for usernames to 8 characters and passwords to at least 12 characters. Following this, establish a password management solution using AWS Secrets Manager. Configure the Secrets Manager to generate and securely store database credentials. Additionally, set up an automated credential rotation process within AWS Secrets Manager to ensure consistent security standards across all databases.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon RDS for database management and AWS Secrets Manager for password management.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Implementing token-based authentication systems for databases.

## **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*AWS Database Security Best Practices\*\*](#)

### **3.1.3 Network Security Measures**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Network rules were excessively permissive, allowing potential unauthorized access from any IP address.

#### **Impact Analysis**

This heightened the risk of external attacks and unauthorized access to network resources.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Network rules were revised to limit traffic to specific, necessary IP ranges, and advanced network segmentation was implemented.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

In the AWS Console, open Amazon VPC to revise network rules. Update the settings in the security group to limit incoming and outgoing traffic to specified, necessary IP ranges. To further bolster security, implement network segmentation by creating multiple subnets within your VPC. Assign each subnet a specific purpose (e.g., production, development) and apply corresponding security groups to control the traffic flow and access.

#### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) and AWS Network Firewall.

#### **Alternative Solutions**

Adopting a Zero Trust Network model, where each access request is fully authenticated and authorized.

## **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*AWS VPC Security Best Practices\*\*](#)



### **3.1.4 Data Encryption Strategy**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Unencrypted Elastic Block Store (EBS) volumes posed a risk to data integrity and confidentiality.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Potential data breaches and compromised data security due to unencrypted storage.

#### **Remediation Overview**

AWS encryption solutions were adopted to secure all existing and future EBS volumes.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

To encrypt Elastic Block Store (EBS) volumes, visit the EC2 dashboard in AWS Console and adjust the volume settings to enable encryption. For existing unencrypted volumes, create encrypted snapshots and subsequently generate new volumes from these snapshots. Manage the encryption keys using AWS Key Management Service (KMS), creating and assigning keys to EBS volumes to ensure secure data encryption.

#### **AWS Services Used**

AWS Elastic Block Store (EBS) and AWS Key Management Service (KMS).

#### **Alternative Solutions**

Using third-party encryption tools to secure EBS volumes.

#### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*AWS EBS Encryption Guide\*\*](#)

### **3.1.5 Patch Management Protocol**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The absence of a systematic patch management strategy left the system vulnerable to known software vulnerabilities.

### **Impact Analysis**

This posed a significant security risk, as unpatched vulnerabilities could be exploited.

### **Remediation Overview**

A patch management strategy was established using AWS Systems Manager to automate the deployment of necessary patches.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

Implement a structured patch management protocol using AWS Systems Manager. Within the Systems Manager, set up the Patch Manager to define specific patching schedules and baselines according to your operational requirements. Ensure that automated patching is enabled and properly configured to maintain the security and integrity of your software.

### **AWS Services Used**

AWS Systems Manager.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Using third-party patch management software for broader coverage.

### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager\*\*](#)

## **3.1.6 Security Group Optimization**

### **Issue Explanation**

Unused security group configurations were identified, creating potential ingress points for malicious actors.

### **Impact Analysis**

These redundant groups could be exploited, increasing the risk of unauthorized access.

### **Remediation Overview**

Unused security groups were decommissioned, and an automated system was implemented for regular review.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

Perform an audit of your security groups using AWS Config to identify any unused configurations. Manually remove these redundant security groups through the VPC dashboard. To maintain a streamlined security posture, implement an automated monitoring system, possibly utilizing AWS Lambda and CloudWatch, to periodically check and flag inactive security groups for review or removal.

### **AWS Services Used**

AWS Security Groups and AWS Config.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Manual periodic audits of security groups.

### **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*Managing Security Groups in AWS\*\*](#)

## **3.1.7 Operating System Upkeep**

### **Issue Explanation**

Several servers were found to be running outdated Linux kernels, exposing them to known vulnerabilities.

### **Impact Analysis**

This increased the risk of system compromises and security breaches.

### **Remediation Overview**

Servers were updated to the latest stable Linux kernel versions, and a subscription to security notifications was established.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

Update the Linux kernels on your servers to the latest stable versions. Use AWS Systems Manager or the EC2 dashboard to identify instances running outdated kernels. Apply updates using standard package management tools like YUM or APT. Additionally, subscribe to AWS

notification services to receive timely updates and alerts regarding new Linux kernel releases and related security notifications.

#### **AWS Services Used**

AWS EC2 and AWS Notification Services.

#### **Alternative Solutions**

Switching to a different operating system with stronger security features.

#### **Reference Document Link**

[Linux Kernel Update Guide](#)

### **3.1.8 Security Patches Application**

#### **Issue Explanation**

The system was missing important security patches, leaving known vulnerabilities unaddressed.

#### **Impact Analysis**

This presented a high risk of exploitation and potential security breaches.

#### **Remediation Overview**

An automated system for managing the application of security patches was developed.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

Develop an automated system for managing security patch applications using AWS Systems Manager's Patch Manager. Configure it to regularly scan and apply necessary security patches to all instances. Schedule these scans periodically to ensure that every instance in your infrastructure is consistently up-to-date and protected against known vulnerabilities.

#### **AWS Services Used**

AWS Systems Manager.

#### **Alternative Solutions**

Manual patch management with regular system audits.

## **Reference Document Link**

[\*\*AWS Patch Management\*\*](#)

### **3.2 Compliance and Best Practices**

In this approach to addressing virtual machine vulnerabilities, we have to rigorously adhere to industry standards and best practices, particularly those recommended by AWS. This includes conducting regular audits and assessments to proactively identify and rectify vulnerabilities, adhering to the principle of least privilege to minimize unnecessary access rights, and employing robust encryption for all data storage and transmission. We should also embrace automated security measures like patch management to stay abreast of emerging threats, and we need to continuously update our security protocols in response to evolving cybersecurity landscapes. These concerted efforts underscore our unwavering commitment to upholding a secure and compliant virtual environment, ensuring the protection and integrity of our digital assets.

### **Conclusion**

The steps detailed in this report signify our proactive stance on security and our ongoing commitment to safeguarding our digital assets. This documentation will be continuously updated to reflect the evolving security landscape and our commitment to maintaining robust defence mechanisms. We believe that these measures collectively fortify our infrastructure against a wide array of security threats.

## **4. Network Assessment Detailed Issue Remediation**

### **4.0 Introduction**

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the network infrastructure, identifying and addressing critical vulnerabilities and security risks. Each case has been systematically analyzed, with a network impact analysis including safety and performance. The goal is not only to expose vulnerabilities but also to implement effective prevention strategies that strengthen network security. Taking this proactive and comprehensive approach is essential to enhance the reliability and security of the network, thereby protecting the digital assets of the medical firm from evolving cyber threats.

#### **4.1.1 VPCs Not Distributed Across Multiple Regions**

##### **Issue Explanation**

The existing setup of the Virtual Private Clouds (VPCs) confines them to only one geographic area. This limitation hampers the network's geographic spread and redundancy capabilities.

##### **Impact Analysis**

This creates a single point of failure, increasing the risk of outages and reduced disaster recovery capabilities.

##### **Remediation Overview**

Expand Virtual Private Clouds (VPCs) across several regions to boost redundancy and resilience. This diversified geographical distribution will safeguard against regional disruptions, enhancing disaster recovery capabilities and ensuring continuous network availability.

##### **Infrastructure Changes**

We have successfully established additional VPCs in other regions. Each new VPC includes its own set of subnets, route tables, and internet gateways. We also configured inter-region VPC peering to ensure seamless connectivity between regions. This ensures that even if one region faces an outage, the others can take over without interrupting services.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon VPC, AWS Region services, VPC Peering.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Use of Availability Zones within the same region for redundancy.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Amazon Region VPC User Guide](#)

## **4.1.2 Poor Network Segmentation**

### **Issue Explanation**

The network initially lacked adequate segmentation.

### **Impact Analysis**

This posed a risk of unauthorized access to sensitive network areas. Increased risk of lateral movement in case of a breach, potentially affecting more resources.

### **Remediation Overview**

Implement enhanced network segmentation.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

The network has been reconfigured to include a more complex segmentation structure. We introduced additional subnets designated for specific purposes such as public-facing services, internal applications, and databases. Each subnet is equipped with its own network ACLs and security groups, ensuring that traffic flow is tightly controlled and only authorized traffic can move between segments.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon VPC, Network ACLs, Security Groups.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Advanced network segmentation solutions from third-party vendors.

### **Reference Document Link**

[HIPAA Network Segmentation and Hardening AWS doc](#)

### **4.1.3 Weak Security Group Configuration**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Security groups were previously not configured to best practices.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Increased exposure to unauthorized access and potential breaches.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Review and strengthen security group configurations.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

We conducted a comprehensive overhaul of the security group settings for both EC2 and RDS instances. New rules were applied to tightly control both inbound and outbound traffic. Special attention was given to critical ports like SSH (port 22) and database ports, where access is now restricted to specific IP ranges or other AWS services.

#### **AWS Services Used**

AWS EC2, AWS RDS.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Third-party security management systems.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Control traffic to your AWS resources using security groups](#)  
[Amazon EC2 security groups for Linux instances](#)



#### **4.1.4 No Web ACLs**

##### **Issue Explanation**

Web Access Control Lists (ACLs) were not present in the initial setup.

##### **Impact Analysis**

This left web applications vulnerable to various attacks.

##### **Remediation Overview**

Implement Web ACLs using AWS WAF.

##### **Infrastructure Changes**

We have successfully deployed AWS WAF across our web-facing endpoints. Custom Web ACLs have been configured with rules tailored to our specific application requirements, focusing on mitigating common web exploits like SQL injection and cross-site scripting. These ACLs are regularly updated to respond to emerging threats.

##### **AWS Services Used**

AWS WAF.

##### **Alternative Solutions**

Advanced third-party web application firewalls.

##### **Reference Document Link**

[AWS WAF Documentation](#)

#### **4.1.5 No Firewall Policies**

##### **Issue Explanation**

The network initially lacked robust firewall policies.

##### **Impact Analysis**

This made the network susceptible to external threats.

##### **Remediation Overview**

Create comprehensive firewall policies.

##### **Infrastructure Changes**

The AWS Network Firewall has been implemented within our VPC infrastructure. We have developed and applied a set of firewall rules and policies that govern all inbound and outbound traffic. These policies are designed to identify and block potentially harmful traffic based on IP addresses, port numbers, and packet inspection.

**AWS Services Used**

AWS Network Firewall.

**Alternative Solutions** Third-party network firewall solutions.

**Reference Document Link**

[AWS firewall](#)

**4.1.6 No Subnet Flow Logs****Issue Explanation**

There were no flow logs for monitoring network traffic.

**Impact Analysis** This hindered the identification of suspicious network patterns.

**Remediation Overview**

Enable VPC Flow Logs for all subnets.

**Infrastructure Changes**

VPC Flow Logs have been activated across all subnets, enabling the capture and monitoring of all network traffic. These logs are being fed into Amazon CloudWatch for real-time analysis and monitoring. This has greatly enhanced our ability to quickly detect and respond to unusual traffic patterns or potential security incidents.

**AWS Services Used**

Amazon VPC

Reference document

[Amazon VPC](#)

**4.1.7 Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall Rule Groups Not Configured****Issue Explanation**

Initially, DNS queries within the network were not filtered, leaving the system vulnerable to contacting harmful domains.

**Impact Analysis**

This lack of DNS-level filtering posed a significant risk, potentially allowing malware-laden or phishing sites to be accessed, compromising network security and sensitive medical data.

**Remediation Overview** Implement DNS Firewall rule groups in Amazon Route 53 Resolver. Infrastructure Changes DNS Firewall rule groups have been configured in the Route 53 Resolver. These rules effectively block or flag suspicious DNS queries based on threat intelligence feeds. We've implemented rules to block known malicious domains and set up alarms for unusual DNS query patterns. This enhancement has significantly increased our DNS query security, adding an essential layer of protection against cyber threats.

#### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon Route 53.

#### **Alternative Solutions**

Use of third-party DNS filtering services for enhanced security.

#### **Reference Document Link**

[Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall](#)

### **4.1.8 Unrestricted SSH Access**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Initially, SSH access to EC2 instances was configured to allow connections from any IP address, increasing the risk of unauthorized access attempts.

#### **Impact Analysis**

This configuration posed a significant security risk, potentially allowing attackers to attempt to breach the EC2 instances, which could lead to compromised security and unauthorized access to sensitive medical data.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Restrict SSH access to a limited set of known IP addresses.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

We have updated the security group configurations associated with our EC2 instances to restrict SSH access. The ingress rules for SSH (port 22) have been modified to allow connections only from trusted IP addresses, specifically those belonging to our corporate network and authorized remote administrators. This change significantly reduces the surface area for potential brute-force or other SSH-based attacks.

### **AWS Services Used**

AWS EC2.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Setting up a Virtual Private Network (VPN) or using AWS Direct Connect for secure, private connections to AWS resources.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Amazon EC2 security groups for Linux instances](#)

## **4.2 Compliance, Best Practices, and Future Recommendations**

Our network assessment ensures compliance with healthcare regulations like HIPAA and adheres to the AWS Well-Architected Framework for optimal performance. Moving forward, we recommend ongoing compliance vigilance and the adoption of emerging AWS security features. Regular best practice reviews, automated compliance tracking, and disaster recovery drills will solidify our network's robustness. Future-proofing should also consider serverless options, zero-trust security postures, and AI/ML integration for enhanced predictive capabilities.

## **4.3 Conclusion**

In conclusion, our network assessment has successfully identified and remediated key vulnerabilities, aligning our infrastructure with stringent compliance standards and industry best practices. We have laid a strong foundation for a secure, efficient, and resilient network environment that meets the demanding needs of healthcare service delivery.

## **5. Disaster Recovery Assessment Detailed Issue Remediation**

## **5.0 Introduction**

This report outlines key issues and fixes in our AWS cloud system, focusing on disaster recovery. It's important for keeping our data safe and services running smoothly, especially in healthcare. Each section explains a problem, its impact, and how we fixed it.

### **5.1.1 No Bucket Versioning**

#### **Issue Explanation**

S3 buckets lack versioning, preventing the storage of multiple versions of an object.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Without versioning, accidental deletions or overwrites can lead to irreversible data loss, critically impacting data integrity.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Enable versioning on all S3 buckets to maintain a history of each object for recovery.

**Infrastructure Changes** Versioning has been enabled on all existing S3 buckets, allowing for the recovery of previous object versions and providing a safeguard against accidental data loss. AWS Services Used Amazon S3.

#### **Alternative Solutions**

Use third-party backup solutions that offer version control.

#### **Reference Document Link**

[Using versioning in S3 Bucket](#)

### **5.1.2 Short Backup Retention Period**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Currently, backups have a minimal retention period.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Short retention periods risk data loss if backups are needed beyond the set timeframe, which is critical for patient data and operational continuity.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Extend the backup retention period to align with the company's data retention policy and compliance requirements.

**Infrastructure Changes**

Backup retention policies have been revised to retain backups for a longer period, ensuring compliance with healthcare data retention standards and providing extended data recovery options.

**AWS Services Used**

AWS Backup.

**Alternative Solutions**

Implement third-party data retention and backup solutions.

**Reference Document Link**

[AWS backup](#)

**5.1.3 Single Region Used****Issue Explanation**

The entire infrastructure is confined to a single AWS region.

**Impact Analysis**

This poses a high risk of service disruption and data loss during regional AWS outages.

**Remediation Overview**

Expand infrastructure deployment across multiple regions to ensure geographical redundancy.

**Infrastructure Changes**

Critical services, including EC2 instances and S3 buckets, have been replicated in multiple regions. This ensures service continuity and data availability in the event of a regional failure.

**AWS Services Used**

Amazon EC2, Amazon S3, Amazon RDS.

**Alternative Solutions**

Utilize multi-AZ deployments within the same region for increased redundancy.

**Reference Document Link**

[AWS Global Infrastructure](#)

**5.1.4 Single AZ RDS Instance****Issue Explanation**

The RDS instances are configured in a single Availability Zone (AZ).

### **Impact Analysis**

Single AZ deployment increases the risk of database unavailability during AZ-specific disruptions, impacting critical healthcare operations.

### **Remediation Overview**

Convert RDS instances to a multi-AZ deployment for high availability and data durability.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

RDS instances have been transitioned to a multi-AZ configuration, ensuring automatic failover to a secondary instance in another AZ in case of an outage.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon RDS.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Use database clustering or mirroring with instances in different AZs.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Configuring and managing a Multi-AZ deployment](#)

## **5.1.5 CloudFormation Termination Protection Disabled**

### **Issue Explanation**

Termination protection for CloudFormation stacks is disabled, risking accidental deletion.

### **Impact Analysis**

Accidental deletion can disrupt services and lead to data loss, especially in complex environments.

### **Remediation Overview**

Enable termination protection on all CloudFormation stacks to prevent unintended deletions.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

Termination protection has been enabled for all existing CloudFormation stacks, providing an additional layer of safety against accidental deletion of resources.

### **AWS Services Used**

AWS CloudFormation.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Regularly audit and monitor stack status using AWS Config or third-party tools.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Protecting a stack from being deleted](#)

### **5.1.6 RDS Instance Deletion Protection Not Enabled**

#### **Issue Explanation**

Deletion protection for RDS instances is currently not activated.

#### **Impact Analysis**

This lack of protection increases the risk of accidental or unauthorized deletion of critical database instances.

#### **Remediation Overview**

Activate deletion protection on all RDS instances to prevent unintentional or malicious deletions.

#### **Infrastructure Changes**

Deletion protection has been enabled for all RDS instances, ensuring that they cannot be deleted without explicitly disabling this protection.

#### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon RDS.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Implement additional database backup and recovery solutions.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Deleting a DB instance](#)

### **5.1.7 EC2 Instance Auto Scaling and Deletion Protection Not Enabled.**

**Issue Explanation** EC2 Auto Scaling and deletion protection are not configured, risking scale-in disruptions and accidental terminations.

#### **Impact Analysis**

Lack of these protections could lead to inadequate resource scaling during peak demands and potential loss of critical instances.



### **Remediation Overview**

Implement EC2 Auto Scaling and enable deletion protection for vital instances.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

Auto Scaling groups have been configured for EC2 instances, with appropriate scaling policies set to handle varying loads. Deletion protection has also been enabled to prevent accidental termination of these instances.

### **AWS Services Used**

Amazon EC2, EC2 Auto Scaling.

### **Alternative Solutions**

Use third-party scaling and monitoring solutions for finer control.

### **Reference Document Link**

[Auto scaling EC2 instances](#)

## **5.1.8 Lack of Disaster Recovery Plan**

### **Issue Explanation**

There is no formalized disaster recovery (DR) plan in place.

### **Impact Analysis**

The absence of a DR plan can result in extended downtimes and confusion during recovery efforts, which is critical for healthcare services.

### **Remediation Overview**

Develop and implement a comprehensive disaster recovery plan.

### **Infrastructure Changes**

A disaster recovery plan has been formulated, outlining clear procedures for data backup, resource allocation, and recovery processes. This includes regular DR drills and employee training on emergency response protocols.

**AWS Services Used** AWS services across various domains for DR implementation.

**Alternative Solutions** Consulting with DR specialists for bespoke DR strategies.

**Reference Document Link** AWS Disaster Recovery

### **Alternative Solutions**

Consulting with DR specialists for bespoke DR strategies.

**Reference Document Link**  
[AWS Disaster Recovery](#)

## **5.2 Compliance, Best Practices, and Future Recommendations**

Our disaster recovery assessment ensures compliance and suggests regular drills, automated backup management, and proactive monitoring as best practices. Looking ahead, adopting AI-driven predictive analytics will strengthen our disaster recovery efforts and maintain operational resilience.

## **5.3 Conclusion**

In summary, the disaster recovery assessment and improvements have enhanced the organization's data protection and business continuity, ensuring the security of its operations.