WIRESHARK EVIDENCE ANALYSIS

Domain Targeted: Stormtheory[.]info

Infected Host IP: 10[.]2[.]23[.]231

Infected Host MAC Address: 00:11:0a:9f:c0:2d

Domain Controller: 10[.]2[.]23[.]2

Infected Hostname: FERGUSON-WIN-PC (10.2.23[.]231)

Other Host Observed: SUTTON-WIN-PC (10.2.23[.]109)

What Happened (Chronological PCAP summary)

The user logs in like normal (FERGUSON), conducting very normal activity. We see activity among msfnsci and isatap which seem to be normal networking behaviors. Another user, (SUTTON) also logs in and conducts normal activity. Later in the frames, we see that the user of Sutton-Win-PC gets hungry and attempts to access the domain rootcafeslc[.]com, which seems to be hosted on a Squarespace server and believed to be safe. At frame 3116, the host of FERGUSON-WIN-PC initiates a tcp handshake with malicious web server hosting the IP 209.141.55[.]226. After the connection was acknowledged, a steganographic JPEG troll11[.]jpg was requested by the host. This JPEG is believed to have maliciously embedded payloads coded within it and once executed, a C2 (Command & Control) connection is established.

The file troll1[.]jpg is classified as a trickbot/trick loader malware. This software infiltrates devices to deliver malicious payloads. The malware is capable of infecting victims' computers, analyzing their system information, and installing other types of threats, such as trojans and stealers as well as establishing persistence via C2 connections for further malware exploitation. The loaders are typically delivered through phishing emails and links and rely on social engineering to trick users into downloading what they believe to be images but in reality, is an executable. The malware utilizes advanced evasion and persistence tactics like code obfuscation or injecting themselves within legitimate processes (like iexplorer[.]exe) to avoid detection.

Once the attacker sent this malicious script embedded in what seemed to be a jpeg file, later in the frames we see a DNS request from the infected machine to dicarkadar[.]com. This web server has been flagged malicious and reported for C2 communications. We see a later query for cranetisti[.]com, another C2 using the same JA3 footprint as dicarkadar. The attacker communicates with the user over TLS encryption, pushing and pulling data until the connection dies because the infected machine can no longer reach it. The attacker seems to get a new IP and establishes a TCP connection before forwarding a malicious assembly file named tinx86. This has been reported for malware in past reports....... to summarize everything else, the attacker used various domains under the same JA3 footprint (believed to be hosted by GoDaddy), used WebSocket connections to evade detection and establish persistence, attempted to exploit vulnerabilities in SMB server, data exfiltration, among other things.

Source: 10[.]2[.]23[.]231

Date Breach Discovered: 2/23/2019 at 7:24:36 PM

Date of Disclosure:

2/23/2019 at 7:49:16 PM (potential Outlook credentials leak)

2/23/2019 at 7:50:15 PM (domain info leak)

2/23/2019 at 7:50:44 PM (system info leak)

2/23/2019 at 7:49:13 PM (potential card info leak)

How Was Disclosure Discovered:

Followed and observed TCP stream of malicious traffic occurring between the IP 190[.]146[.]112[.]216 (suspected C2 server) and our infected machine 10[.]2[.]23[.]231 (FERGUSON-WIN-PC). The attacker made multiple POST requests via HTTP to the infected machine requesting outlook passwords, card/billing info, as well as network and system information.

Summary of Events:

The user makes a GET request to the malicious IP 209[.]141[.]55[.]226 for troll1[.]jpg. This jpeg uses maliciously embedded shellcode to execute what is believed to be vulnerabilities present in the user's browser and system (Windows 7). This eventually redirected the user to dicarkadar[.]com and cranetisti[.]com, two extensively reported C2 servers. From here, the user made two get requests, one for Tinx86[.]exe and one for Sw9JKmXqaSj[.]exe; Both have been extensively reported for malicious activity. After establishing a persistent connection with the machine with multiple backdoors; The attacker establishes WebSocket connections for uninterrupted persistence. We also found evidence of malicious SMB traffic with the attacker attempting to exploit shared folders and services such as samr, lsarpe, IPC\$, NT rename, netlogon, and others using anonymous login attempts. The attacker also attempts to laterally move and escalate privileges, exfiltrate sensitive host data like sysinfo, card info, outlook passwords, etc. Much more information may have been exposed but due to the use of TLS and other encrypted communication methods, we were unable to determine what else was exposed/stolen.

Summary of Investigative Process and System Involved

IP ADDRESSES	REMARKS
10[.]2[.]23[.]2	Stormtheory.info Domain Controller
10[.]2[.]23[.]231	Infected Machine within Storm theory domain
209[.]141[.]55[.]226	Malicious Web Server
46[.]249[.]62[.]199	Malicious Web Server
87[.]236[.]22[.]142	Malicious Web Server
85[.]143[.]218[.]7	Malicious Web Server
213[.]226[.]68[.]112	Malicious Web Server
195[.]123[.]246[.]99	Malicious Web Server
190[.]146[.]112[.]216	Malicious Web Server

RESOLVED DOMAINS	REMARKS
Rootscafelc[.]com	Not malicious, but infected
dicarkadar[.]com	C2 Server
cranetisti[.]com	C2 Server
SUPERHAPS[.]PW	C2 Server
IPECHO[.]NET	Not malicious but used to return information about the user
	(browser identification, http headers, proxy detection etc.)

FILE NAME &	REMARKS	SHA256 HASH		
EXECUTABLES				
Troll1[.]jpg	DLL executable	8cf2cddda8522975a22da3da429339be471234eacc0		
		e11c099d6dcb732cf3cbb		
Sw9JKmXqaSj[.]exe	DLL executable	d43159c8bf2e1bd866abdbb1687911e2282b1f98a7c		
		063f85ffd53a7f51efed4		
Tinx86_14[.]exe	DLL executable	f1b789be1126b557240dd0dfe98fc5f3ad6341bb1a5		
		d8be0a954f65b486ad32a		
win[.]png	Obfuscated	38c6c5b8d6fa71d9856758a5c0c2ac9d0a0a1450f75		
		bb1004dd988e23d73a312		
tin[.]png	Obfuscated	4c957072ab097d3474039f432466cd251d1dc7d915		
		59b76d4e5ead4a8bd499d5		
sin[.]png	Obfuscated	3abae6dd2ddae23b2de2ccbcc160a4a5773bef8934d		
		0e6896d50197c3d3c417f		

Methodology Summary

Our investigation focused on analyzing a captured PCAP file containing suspicious network traffic. The goal was to identify signs of malicious activity, determine the attack flow, and understand the potential impact.

- 1. Event Correlation Using Security Onion and Wireshark: We began by reviewing event logs in Security Onion documents to identify anomalous network behavior and possible indicators of compromise. These were correlated with packet-level details in Wireshark to verify the events and understand the sequence of communication, including suspicious domains, IPs, and file transfers.
- 2. Snapshotting and Network Isolation: During the investigation process, we took snapshots at key stages to preserve our progress and prevent loss of investigative data. Additionally, we analyzed the PCAP in an isolated environment, with the network disconnected, to ensure that no malicious content embedded in the traffic could be executed or affect the analysis system.
- 3. File Extraction and Hashing: Suspicious files observed in the PCAP (e.g., troll1.jpg, Sw9JKmXqaSi.exe) were extracted and saved rather than executed or downloaded. We then

generated SHA-256 hashes using the sha256sum command, allowing us to safely identify the files and investigate them further without executing any code.

4. Malware and Threat Intelligence Analysis: The generated hashes were submitted to VirusTotal for analysis. This provided threat intelligence including file reputation, malware classification, detection across antivirus engines, and associated malicious infrastructure (such as C2 servers and domains). Furthermore, AbuseIPDB, CrowdSec CTI, and urlscan[.]io reinforced our understanding of the intent of these malicious files/domains via MITRE ATT&CK techniques and behavioral history.

This methodology enabled a comprehensive and secure investigation of the PCAP file, helping us uncover the infection vector, attacker behavior, and scope of compromise without risking further contamination.

Obfuscation Techniques Observed:

Use of PADDINGX to evade detection during malware execution.

Obfuscated PE executables avoiding disk writes.

Code embedded in image files (e.g., PNGs) to bypass scanners.

Use of encrypted WebSocket and HTTPS connections to obscure payload delivery and C2 communications.

These findings suggest a coordinated and multi-phased attack using TrickBot and associated malware families, leveraging obfuscation, credential theft, system reconnaissance, and advanced persistence mechanisms.

Member(s) Impacted:

Ferguson-Win-PC[.]stormtheory[.]info

Sutton-Win-PC[.]stormtheory[.]info (Potentially impacted, present in logs but no interaction with malicious subjects was observed)

Type of PII/Confidential Data:

Potential leak of card and billing information (2/23/2019 at 7:49:13 PM)

Potential leak of Outlook Password (2/23/2019 at 7:49:16 PM)

Confirmed leak of Domain Information (2/23/2019 at 7:50:15 PM)

Confirmed leak of System Information (2/23/2019 at 7:50:44 PM)

Type of Incident:

Social Engineering

Where did the incident take place:

Utah (presumably north Utah)

Root Cause:

The host of FERGUSON-WIN-PC initiates a tcp handshake with a malicious web server hosting the IP 209.141.55[.]226. After acknowledgement, a steganographic JPEG troll11[.]jpg was requested by the host. This JPEG is believed to have maliciously embedded payloads coded within it and once executed, a C2 (Command & Control) connection is established.

Corrective Action:

None, Although, at 7:49:35, the user made multiple DNS queries for IP abused databases, the C2 connections persisted

To effectively investigate and rid a system of malware:

- 1. Firstly, to see if a system is infected; Explore autoruns, use process explorer to see active/past processes run. Consider running netstat to view any open communications that may seem suspicious and use Wireshark to further analyze this suspicious traffic.
- 2. If the device is concluded to be infected, it should be disconnected or separated from the main network. If segregated, disable unnecessary ports as they could be hosting the gateway for C2 communications.
- 3. Identify stored credentials, consider changing them all if possible as they are all possibly exposed
- 4. Use FTK Imager or dd (forensic imagers) to create a forensic disk image. This image will be loaded into forensic analysis tools like Autopsy to investigate the presence of malicious files
- 5. Once evidence is collected and transferred to a device capable of forensic analysis, shutdown the machine and boot in safe mode (or equivalent) to clean drive of processes identified as malicious
- 6. If rootkit or persistent action is discovered during any part of the investigation, reimage or reinstall the operating system
- 7. Investigate other systems on network to mitigate the effects of a potential worm infection

Findings: (Split up into major events, referred to as Occurrences)

First Occurrence:

-Malicious TCP connection with 209[.]141[.]55[.]226

-GET request for malicious JPG file 49195 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SAC 80 - 49195 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=146 49195 - 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 80 - 49195 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=312 Win=64240 Len=0 Explanation: TCP Handshake with extensively reported IP Q 209.141.55.226 ⊥ 🗗 ⑦ 🕓 Sign in Did you intend to search across the file corpus instead? Click here ① 5/94 security vendors flagged this IP address as malicious 5/94 209.141.55.226 (209.141.32.0/19) AS 53667 (PONYNET) RELATIONS COMMUNITY 16 Join our Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks Security vendors' analysis () Do you want to automate checks? CyRadar (!) Malicious G-Data ① Malware (!) Malware ESET (i) Suspicious **ADMINUSLabs** O Clean AlLabs (MONITORAPP) ○ Clean ○ Clean Antiy-AVL ○ Clean ○ Clean Blueliv (Clean Clean Chong Lua Dao ○ Clean CRDF Clean Cyble Clean ○ Clean Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on IP 田 A ロ U U I II ··· V 9. 8cf2cddda8522975a22da3da429339be471234eacc0e11c099d6dcb732cf3cbb ⊥ 🗗 🕜 🕓 Sign in Sign up 0 **©** Popular threat label ① trojan.vbkryjetor/ponystealer (1) Trojan/Win32.VBInject.C3039853 Trojan:Win32/VBKryjetor.2c8c259 (1) Trojan:Win/Fareit.Gen (!) Trojan/Win32.VBKryjetor

(1) Win32:Malware-gen

① W32.AlDetectMalware

① Unsafe

Explanation: VirusTotal lookups on Troll1[.]jpg

① Trojan.PonyStealer.E09C91

Win.Malware.Vbkryjetor-9413018-0
 Exe.trojan.vbkryjetor

() Malicious (score: 99)

Second Occurrence:

- -C2 communications with web servers dicarkadar[.]com and cranetisti[.]com
- -C2 server IP: 185[.]246[.]116[.]239



Explanation: DNS Query for dicarkadar[.]com, TCP connection with cranetisti[.]com

```
iation Data
19197 [AcK] Seq=865 Ack=546 Win=64240 Len=0
ation Data
1907 [AcK] Seq=865 Ack=585 Win=64240 Len=0
190 [AcK] Seq=218 Ack=58085 Win=63240 Len=0
1810 Data
1810 Data
1810 Data
1810 [AcK] Seq=1174 Ack=1804 Win=64240 Len=0
190 [XW] Seq=0 Win=1912 Len=0 MSS=1400 WS
```

Explanation: Application Data being sent from infected host to C2

```
49197
443
443
49197
443
443
59866
49197
53
49198
80
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               www.download.windowsuj
one -02-23 19:33:25 8.2b3.tarko.

ength: 109

ersion: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

andom: 5c7/19ffe93:49942d6c89a41a59e343c642a678e3e31bd9019424bb8722a08adc

inpher Suites (ength: 24

inpher Suites (12 suites)

ompression Methods (1 method)

xtensions Length: 44

xtension: renegotiation_info (len=1)

xtension: server_name (len=19) name=cranetisti.com

xtension: server_name (len=19) name=cranetisti.com

xtension: erver_oname (len=6)

Xtension: erver_oname (len=10)

JA1: L10d120400.004e65c6cd0809.004c65c6cd0809.002,003,002f,003,0036,0036,0036,0036,0036,0046

JA3: Fullstring: 709,47:53:-51:04.09174.40172-49161-49162-50-56-19-4,65281-0-10-11,23-24,0]

JA3: Id005c60408d3c535297cd0dffb0ccb9]
```


JA3 Fingerprints

You can find further information about the JA3 fingerprint 1d095e68489d3c535297cd8dffb06cb9, including the corresponding malware samples as well as the associated botnet C&Cs.


Database Entry

JA3 Fingerprint:	1d095e68489d3c535297cd8dffb06cb9
First seen:	2017-08-12 19:56:28 UTC
Last seen:	2020-10-28 11:06:23 UTC
Status:	Blacklisted
Malware samples:	87
Destination IPs:	97
Malware:	Tofsee (*)
Listing date:	2018-11-14 12:52:51

Explanation: JA3 Footprint of C2 Web Server and proof it is blacklisted due to malware




Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on dicarkadar[.]com




Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on cranetisti[.]com

Third Occurrence:


-TCP connection with malicious web server 46[.]249[.]62[.]199



Explanation: Results of VirusTotal scan on Web Server 49[.]249[.]62[.]199




Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup for Sw9JKmXqaSj[.]exe hash




Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup for Tinx86_14[.]exe hash

Fourth Occurrence:


- -Interaction with IP 87[.]236[.]22[.]142 hosting C2 Server superhaps[.]pw
- -Infected host makes GET request to this server, GET /data2[.]php?C68FF38437D96CED
- -Use of WebSocket protocol for persistent, continuous, and uninterrupted connection



Explanation: TCP connection with superhaps[.]pw




Explanation: HTTP request from server to switch protocol to WebSocket connection



Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on superhaps[.]pw domain

Fifth Occurrence:


- -Malicious SMB traffic interaction with infected host and domain controller
- -Attacker attempts to find available SMB shares on network via Probing (IPC\$ and netlogon)
- -Checks to see if they can access IPC\$ and Netlogon share for more system information and to explore vulnerabilities for possible exploitation attempts
- -DC seems to have closed these shares and rejected malicious requests meaning attacker's success was likely limited




Explanation: Malicious probing and reconnaissance of SMB server

Sixth Occurrence:


- -TCP connection with malicious web server 85[.]143[.]218[.]7
- -Multiple GET requests to malicious PNGs from web server 85[.]143[.]218[.]7
- -Malicious requests for: win[.]png, tin[.]png, sin[.]png
- -Malicious server appears to send malicious SMB requests to infected host in attempt to understand internetwork processes




Explanation: Beginning of TCP handshake with web server 85[.]143[.]218[.]7




Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on IP 85[.]143[.]218[.]7 for the web server




Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on win[.]png




Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on tin[.]png



Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on sin[.]png




Explanation: Malicious SMB request from malicious server through infected host




Explanation: Another screenshot of malicious SMB traffic

Seventh Occurrence:

- -Communication with malicious web server 213[.]226[.]68[.]112
- -Blacklisted SSL Certificate detected




Explanation: Malicious traffic over HTTPS with web server




Eighth Occurrence:

- -Malicious connection with web server 195[.]123[.]246[.]99
- -Same JA3 footprint and VirusTotal profile as 213[.]226[.]68[.]112




Explanation: Malicious traffic between 195[.]123[.]246[.]99



Explanation: Results of VirusTotal lookup on 195[.]123[.]246[.]99

Final Occurrence:

- -Interaction with malicious web server 190[.]146[.]112[.]216
- -Web server sends check in response along with 4 POST requests for information on the infected host device
- -Made a request for financial data, one for domain information, one for network information and one for outlook credentials



Explanation: Check-in response from web server 190[.]146[.]112[.]216

Explanation: HTTP Stream of first post request for financial data being returned to the web server


Explanation: HTTP Stream of second post request for Outlook passwords being returned to web server



Explanation: HTTP stream of domain information of host network being returned to malicious web server




Explanation: HTTP stream of system processes and network information pertaining to the host being returned to web server



Noteworthy Mentions:

-Get Backup List Request which obtains information about other systems/computers on a network.



Explanation: Get Backup List Request from malicious host

-ipecho[.]net visited by infected host to return more host information to C2 server (browser identification, proxy detection, etc.)

15236 14:40:28.291339 10.2.23.109	10.2.23.2	DNS	77 crl.microsoft Standard query 0x15a0 A crl.microsoft.com
15255 14:40:30.303739 10.2.23.109	10.2.23.2	DNS	77 crl.microsoft Standard query 0x15a0 A crl.microsoft.com
15455 14:40:34.312890 10.2.23.109	10.2.23.2	DNS	77 crl.microsoft Standard querý 0x15a0 A crl.microsoft.com
15656 14:40:37.917035 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.109	DNS	77 crl.microsoft Standard query response 0x15a0 Server failure A crl.microsoft.com
15999 14:40:46.470491 10.2.23.109	10.2.23.2	DNS	77 crl.microsoft Standard query 0x7b36 A crl.microsoft.com
16108 14:40:46.527507 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.109	DNS	176 crl.microsoft Standard query response 0x7b36 A crl.microsoft.com CNAME crl.www.ms.akadns.net CNAME a1363.dscg.akamai.net
19105 14:41:55.530407 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	81 wpad.stormthe Standard query 0x9810 A wpad.stormtheory.info
19106 14:41:55.530640 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	159 wpad.stormthe Standard query response 0x9810 No such name A wpad.stormtheory.info SOA stormtheory-dc.stormtheory.info
19107 14:41:55.530943 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	76 wpad.localdom Standard query 0xa3be A wpad.localdomain
19114 14:41:55.620746 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	76 wpad.localdom Standard query response 0xa3be No such name A wpad.localdomain
19573 14:42:05.101210 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	90 www.download Standard query 0xbaf6 A www.download.windowsupdate.com
19574 14:42:05.250935 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	299 www.download Standard query response 0xbaf6 A www.download.windowsupdate.com CNAME 2-01-3cf7-0009.cdx.cedexis.net CNAME
19780 14:42:11.732645 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	70 1pecho.net Standard query 0x4112 A 1pecho.net
	10.2.23.231	DNS	134 ipecho.net Standard query response 0x4112 A ipecho.net A 216.239.32.21 A 216.239.34.21 A 216.239.36.21 A 216.239.38.2
23725 14:48:34.065320 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	72 superhaps.pw Standard query 0xe4e0 A superhaps.pw
23726 14:48:34.312083 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	88 superhaps.pw Standard query response 0xe4e0 A superhaps.pw A 87.236.22.142
23842 14:49:35.399923 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	92 112.146.166.1 Standard query 0x85ea A 112.146.166.173.zen.spamhaus.org
23843 14:49:35.522153 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	156 112.146.166.1 Standard query response 0x85ea No such name A 112.146.166.173.zen.spamhaus.org SOA need.to.know.only
23844 14:49:35.523039 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	91 112.146.166.1 Standard query 0x3ad9 A 112.146.166.173.cbl.abuseat.org
23845 14:49:35.636293 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	164 112.146.166.1 Standard query response 0x3ad9 No such name A 112.146.166.173.cbl.abuseat.org SOA need.to.know.only
23846 14:49:35.637159 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	98 112.146.166.1 Standard query 0xd188 A 112.146.166.173.b.barracudacentral.org
23848 14:49:35.734445 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	98 112.146.166.1 Standard query response 0xd188 No such name A 112.146.166.173.b.barracudacentral.org
23849 14:49:35.735581 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	98 112.146.166.1. Standard query 0x2a8e A 112.146.166.173.dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net
23850 14:49:35.880503 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	166 112.146.166.1 Standard query response 0x2a8e No such name A 112.146.166.173.dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net SOA dnsbl-mirrors.uce
23851 14:49:35.881257 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	96 112.146.166.1 Standard query 0x9ea0 A 112.146.166.173.spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net
23852 14:49:36.102761 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	152 112.146.166.1 Standard query response 0x9ea0 No such name A 112.146.166.173.spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net SOA rbldns0.sorbs.net
24135 14:50:14.749873 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	133 _ldaptcp.De Standard query 0x1430 SRV _ldaptcp.Default-First-Site-Namesites.Stormtheory-DC.stormtheory.info
24136 14:50:14.750142 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	211 _ldaptcp.De Standard query response 0x1430 No such name SRV _ldaptcp.Default-First-Site-Namesites.Stormtheory-DC.s
24137 14:50:14.750520 10.2.23.231	10.2.23.2	DNS	102 _ldaptcp.St Standard query 0x90f3 SRV _ldaptcp.Stormtheory-DC.stormtheory.info
24138 14:50:14.750662 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.231	DNS	180 _ldaptcp.St Standard query response 0x90f3 No such name SRV _ldaptcp.Stormtheory-DC.stormtheory.info SOA stormtheory
24713 14:50:26.323411 10.2.23.109	10.2.23.2	DNS	77 www.co.utah.u Standard query 0x16b5 A www.co.utah.ut.us
24717 14:50:26.486292 10.2.23.2	10.2.23.109	DNS	93 www.co.utah.u Standard query response 9x16b5 A www.co.utah.ut.us A 161.119.42.22
24733 14:50:26.961286 10.2.23.109	10.2.23.2	DNS	80 fonts.googlea Standard guery 0xb30d A fonts.googleapis.com

Explanation: snippet of Host visiting IP service

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