

# Final Malware Analysis Report: Trojan.Generic.17941000

Name: Sristi Dutta

Intern ID: 387

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## □ Sample Overview

Field : Value

Malware Name : Trojan.Generic.17941000

SHA-256 : 47920080055e1707943b1f993ad547e3b0ea0d1a15ff825c500ad5f934c082e6

File Type : PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386

Target OS : Microsoft Windows

Malware Family : Locky (ransomware variant)

Detected : Yes, by AV and sandbox analysis tools

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## ▣ Executive Summary

**Trojan.Generic.17941000** is a highly obfuscated variant of the *Locky ransomware family*, notorious for its capability to encrypt user files and demand ransom for decryption keys. This malware has been propagated through *targeted spearphishing emails* with embedded malicious URLs that, when clicked, download the primary executable payload.

Upon execution, the malware performs a range of malicious operations:

- **Defense Evasion:** Implements complex obfuscation, packing, anti-debugging (via `int3` breakpoints), and anti-sandbox measures.
- **Payload Deployment:** Downloads additional payloads (.dll/.exe) through HTTP GET requests and executes them using `rundll132.exe`.
- **Persistence Mechanism:** Modifies the registry key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` to maintain execution after reboot.
- **Memory Injection:** Uses `VirtualAlloc`, `WriteProcessMemory`, and `CreateRemoteThread` to inject code into legitimate processes.
- **System Reconnaissance:** Gathers system information, lists active processes, and enumerates registry configurations.

- **Exfiltration and C2 Communication:** Establishes communication with remote C2 servers and exfiltrates sensitive data.

The malware is extremely stealthy, evading traditional antivirus tools and requiring heuristic and behavioral detection strategies. Multiple analysis methods including static disassembly, dynamic execution in CAPEv2 sandbox, YARA rule matches, VirusTotal inspection, MISP threat intelligence, and MITRE ATT&CK technique correlation were used to confirm the threat level and origin.

It shows strong structural and behavioral similarity to Locky ransomware samples previously active in wide-scale campaigns between 2016–2021 but has now resurfaced with updated obfuscation and command-and-control mechanisms.

#### Key findings include:

1. 59+ antivirus engines on VirusTotal flag this sample.
2. Uses *encoded PowerShell* and *mutexes* to evade endpoint detection.
3. Connects to known malicious IPs in Romania, China, and the USA.
4. Tags from MISP confirm it belongs to the ransomware + infostealer categories.
5. MITRE mapping shows engagement across multiple kill chain phases.

Given its advanced evasion and destructive capabilities, Trojan.Generic.17941000 poses a **severe threat** to organizations, especially those without updated endpoint defenses or threat intelligence integration. Immediate containment, eradication, and threat hunting across the network are essential.

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### YARA Rule Matches

Rule Name	Description
<code>Locky.yar</code>	Generic rule detecting Locky ransomware patterns
<code>win.locky_auto.yar</code>	Automatic match against Locky obfuscation samples

1. `Locky.yar`

```
rule Locky{
  meta:
    author = "kevoreilly"
    description = "Locky Payload"
    cape_type = "Locky Payload"
  strings:
    $string1 = "wallet.dat" wide
```

```

        $string2 = "Locky_recover" wide
        $string3 = "opt321" wide
    condition:
        //check for MZ Signature at offset 0
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and all of them
    }
2. win.locky_auto.yar
rule win_locky_auto {
    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2024-10-31"
        version = "1"
        description = "Detects win.locky."
        info = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.6.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.locky"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20241030"
        malpedia_hash = "26e26953c49c8efafbf72a38076855d578e0a2e4"
        malpedia_version = "20241030"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
    * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected
    from the
    * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-
    Signator.
    * The code and documentation is published here:
    * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
    * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
    * number of families, only single samples are documented.
    * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will
    offer.
    * Take the described generation method also into consideration when
    you
    * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence
    levels.
    */

    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { 51 51 8b00 6a00 8d4d0c 51 ff750c }
                        // n = 7, score = 2100
                        // 51 | push ecx
                        // 51 | push ecx
                        // 8b00 | mov eax, dword ptr [eax]
                        // 6a00 | push 0
                        // 8d4d0c | lea ecx, [ebp + 0xc]
                        // 51 | push ecx
                        // ff750c | push dword ptr [ebp +
0xc]

        $sequence_1 = { 760a 68???????? e8???????? a1????????
2b05???????? 6a1c }
                        // n = 6, score = 2100

```

```

// 760a | jbe 0xc
// 68??????? |
// e8??????? |
// a1??????? |
// 2b05??????? |
// 6a1c | push 0x1c

$sequence_2 = { 50 c745f8??????? e8??????? 8d85f0fdffff 50 }
// n = 5, score = 2100
// 50 | push eax
// c745f8??????? |
// e8??????? |
// 8d85f0fdffff | lea eax, [ebp - 0x210]
// 50 | push eax

$sequence_3 = { 99 83e207 8d3c02 33d2 42 c1ff03 663bca }
// n = 7, score = 2100
// 99 | cdq
// 83e207 | and edx, 7
// 8d3c02 | lea edi, [edx + eax]
// 33d2 | xor edx, edx
// 42 | inc edx
// c1ff03 | sar edi, 3
// 663bca | cmp cx, dx

$sequence_4 = { 99 5e f7fe 8bf0 81fe48922409 760a 68??????? }
// n = 7, score = 2100
// 99 | cdq
// 5e | pop esi
// f7fe | idiv esi
// 8bf0 | mov esi, eax
// 81fe48922409 | cmp esi, 0x9249248
// 760a | jbe 0xc
// 68??????? |

$sequence_5 = { 6a00 ff15??????? 85c0 751e ff15???????
c745f8??????? }
// n = 6, score = 2100
// 6a00 | push 0
// ff15??????? |
// 85c0 | test eax, eax
// 751e | jne 0x20
// ff15??????? |
// c745f8??????? |

$sequence_6 = { 8907 8bc7 c9 c20400 ff15??????? 8945fc }
// n = 6, score = 2100
// 8907 | mov dword ptr [edi], eax
// 8bc7 | mov eax, edi
// c9 | leave
// c20400 | ret 4
// ff15??????? |
// 8945fc | mov dword ptr [ebp - 4], eax

$sequence_7 = { 7314 8b4e1c 8b431c 3bc8 7c0a }
// n = 5, score = 2100
// 7314 | jae 0x16

```

```

// 8b4e1c | mov ecx, dword ptr [esi + 0x1c]
// 8b431c | mov eax, dword ptr [ebx + 0x1c]
// 3bc8 | cmp ecx, eax
// 7c0a | jl 0xc

$sequence_8 = { 5b c21000 e9???????? 8bff 55 8bec 56 }
// n = 7, score = 1400
// 5b | pop ebx
// c21000 | ret 0x10
// e9???????? |
// 8bff | mov edi, edi
// 55 | push ebp
// 8bec | mov ebp, esp
// 56 | push esi

$sequence_9 = { 03d8 8b442408 f7e1 03d3 5b c21000 e9???????? }
// n = 7, score = 1400
// 03d8 | add ebx, eax
// 8b442408 | mov eax, dword ptr [esp + 8]
// f7e1 | mul ecx
// 03d3 | add edx, ebx
// 5b | pop ebx
// c21000 | ret 0x10
// e9???????? |

$sequence_10 = { 66ab e9???????? 8d12 e9???????? }
// n = 4, score = 700
// 66ab | stosw word ptr es:[edi], ax
// e9???????? |
// 8d12 | lea edx, [edx]
// e9???????? |

$sequence_11 = { ebcf 90 8d36 90 }
// n = 4, score = 700
// ebcf | jmp 0xffffffffd1
// 90 | nop
// 8d36 | lea esi, [esi]
// 90 | nop

$sequence_12 = { 5e c21000 8bff 55 8bec 33c0 8b4d08 }
// n = 7, score = 700
// 5e | pop esi
// c21000 | ret 0x10
// 8bff | mov edi, edi
// 55 | push ebp
// 8bec | mov ebp, esp
// 33c0 | xor eax, eax
// 8b4d08 | mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]

$sequence_13 = { 6a61 e9???????? 90 58 }
// n = 4, score = 700
// 6a61 | push 0x61
// e9???????? |
// 90 | nop
// 58 | pop eax

$sequence_14 = { 6a63 e9???????? 90 8d36 }

```

```

        // n = 4, score = 700
        // 6a63                | push                0x63
        // e9????????         |
        // 90                  | nop
        // 8d36                | lea                 esi, [esi]

$sequence_15 = { 66ab e9???????? 58 90 e9???????? 90 }
        // n = 6, score = 700
        // 66ab                | stosw              word ptr es:[edi], ax
        // e9????????         |
        // 58                  | pop                eax
        // 90                  | nop
        // e9????????         |
        // 90                  | nop

$sequence_16 = { 66ab 90 e9???????? 8d00 }
        // n = 4, score = 700
        // 66ab                | stosw              word ptr es:[edi], ax
        // 90                  | nop
        // e9????????         |
        // 8d00                | lea                 eax, [eax]

condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 1122304
}

```

These YARA rules confirm high-confidence identification of a Locky variant using common function call patterns, encrypted strings, and section entropy analysis.

## □ Entry Point Disassembly

Initial instructions:

- |                 |                                |                                |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| • call 0x414d95 | • int3                         | • lea esp, [esp]               |
| • jmp 0x40e3a9  | • int3                         | • lea esp, [esp]               |
| • int3          | • int3                         | • mov eax, dword ptr [ecx]     |
| • int3          | • mov ecx, dword ptr [esp + 4] | • mov edx, 0x7efefeff          |
| • int3          | • test ecx, 3                  | • add edx, eax                 |
| • int3          | • je 0x40e570                  | • xor eax, 0xffffffff          |
| • int3          | • mov al, byte ptr [ecx]       | • xor eax, edx                 |
| • int3          | • add ecx, 1                   | • add ecx, 4                   |
| • int3          | • test al, al                  | • test eax, eax                |
| • int3          | • je 0x40e5a3                  | • je 0x40e570                  |
| • int3          | • test ecx, 3                  | • mov eax, dword ptr [ecx - 4] |
| • int3          | • jne 0x40e54c                 |                                |
| • int3          | • add eax, 0                   |                                |

## Key Observations:

1. `int3` instructions as padding and anti-debugging

2. Low-level pointer dereferencing (e.g., [ESP+4]) and register operations
3. Memory register access patterns suggest a custom decryptor stub
4. Entrypoint is obfuscated with multiple junk instructions
5. Likely decrypts payload at runtime into memory, then executes via jump

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## Static Analysis Summary

Attribute	Detail
File Size	~ 308 KB (315,392 bytes)
Imports	Kernel32.dll, User32.dll, Advapi32.dll
Packed	Yes (custom packer)
Entry Point Behavior	Memory access, ECX register use, junk instructions
Suspicious APIs	VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread
Code Obfuscation	Confirmed via control-flow tricks and invalid jumps

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## Dynamic Analysis


### Behavior Observed:

- Drops multiple payloads (DLLs and executables)
- Executes using rundll32.exe
- Registry key creation for persistence
- Command-line execution via cmd.exe
- Spawns PowerShell child processes for stagers
- Performs DNS lookups to known bad domains
- Connects to 3 known IPs for payload download or data exfil

### Detected Artifacts:

- Executed with mutex to prevent reinfection
- Dropped decoy documents in C:\Sristi\Internship\

	47920080055e1707943b1f993ad547e3b0ea...	7/29/2025 8:10 PM	File folder	
	_0_HELP_instructions	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	HTML File	10 KB
	c95be716c9b221cae2d6997a7eeb60436bc...	7/29/2025 6:22 PM	UNKNOWN File	476 KB
	d6eea4e31996262e78c610fb1b1dd725574...	7/29/2025 8:51 PM	INFECTED File	308 KB
	DKMF3HMC-0PCJ-CYIG-3E94-0DC1803E...	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	ZEPTO File	38 KB
	DKMF3HMC-0PCJ-CYIG-06F1-8BF4F841...	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	ZEPTO File	37 KB
	DKMF3HMC-0PCJ-CYIG-A4A7-00A297FB...	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	ZEPTO File	144 KB
	DKMF3HMC-0PCJ-CYIG-ADA9-B123F0E0...	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	ZEPTO File	121 KB
	DKMF3HMC-0PCJ-CYIG-C789-00D9EBC9...	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	ZEPTO File	63 KB
	DKMF3HMC-0PCJ-CYIG-CAE6-A50A662...	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	ZEPTO File	187 KB
	DKMF3HMC-0PCJ-CYIG-D94B-B4F6BEC8...	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	ZEPTO File	614 KB
	DKMF3HMC-0PCJ-CYIG-D532-D189D599...	7/29/2025 8:14 PM	ZEPTO File	12 KB



- <http://update.cdn.safewebs.org/bad.exe>
- <http://soft.8download.me/payload.bin>

- Sandbox evasion detected via sleep timing check
- Environment verification using common sandbox artifacts



# MITRE ATT&CK Mapping (Matched)



T1059.003	Windows Command Shell	Execution	0	0	3
T1129	Shared Modules	Execution	0	0	3
T1098	Account Manipulation	Persistence	0	0	1
T1112	Modify Registry	Persistence	0	0	4
T1543.003	Windows Service	Persistence	0	0	2
T1543	Create or Modify System Process	Persistence	0	1	1
T1546.015	Component Object Model Hijacking	Persistence	0	0	1
T1547	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Persistence	0	1	0
T1134.001	Token Impersonation /Theft	Privilege Escalation	0	1	3
T1055.001	Dynamic-link Library Injection	Privilege Escalation	0	0	1
T1098	Account Manipulation	Privilege Escalation	0	0	1
T1055.003	Thread Execution Hijacking	Privilege Escalation	0	1	1
T1543.003	Windows Service	Privilege Escalation	0	0	2
T1055	Process Injection	Privilege Escalation	0	0	2
T1543	Create or Modify System Process	Privilege Escalation	0	1	1
T1546.015	Component Object Model Hijacking	Privilege Escalation	0	0	1
T1055.015	ListPlanting	Privilege Escalation	0	0	1
T1547	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Privilege Escalation	0	1	0

T1055.011	Extra Window Memory Injection	Privilege Escalation	0	1	0
T1134.003	Make and Impersonate Token	Privilege Escalation	0	1	0
T1134.001	Token Impersonation /Theft	Defense Evasion	0	1	3
T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	Defense Evasion	0	4	7
T1622	Debugger Evasion	Defense Evasion	0	1	3
T1070.006	Timestomp	Defense Evasion	0	1	2
T1055.001	Dynamic-link Library Injection	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1070.004	File Deletion	Defense Evasion	0	0	2
T1222	File and Directory Permissions Modification	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1112	Modify Registry	Defense Evasion	0	0	4
T1055.003	Thread Execution Hijacking	Defense Evasion	0	1	1
T1497.003	Time Based Evasion	Defense Evasion	0	0	3
T1055	Process Injection	Defense Evasion	0	0	2
T1480	Execution Guardrails	Defense Evasion	0	0	2
T1497.001	System Checks	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1497.002	User Activity Based Checks	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1564	Hide Artifacts	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1027.002	Software Packing	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1564.003	Hidden Window	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1055.015	ListPlanting	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1027.009	Embedded Payloads	Defense Evasion	0	1	0

T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Defense Evasion	0	0	2
T1055.011	Extra Window Memory Injection	Defense Evasion	0	1	0
T1497	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1027.005	Indicator Removal from Tools	Defense Evasion	0	0	2
T1027.007	Dynamic API Resolution	Defense Evasion	0	0	1
T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded File	Defense Evasion	0	1	0
T1134.003	Make and Impersonate Token	Defense Evasion	0	1	0
T1003	OS Credential Dumping	Credential Access	0	0	1
T1555	Credentials from Password Stores	Credential Access	0	0	1
T1622	Debugger Evasion	Discovery	0	1	3
T1614	System Location Discovery	Discovery	0	0	1
T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Discovery	0	0	9
T1010	Application Window Discovery	Discovery	0	1	3
T1012	Query Registry	Discovery	0	1	4
T1057	Process Discovery	Discovery	0	1	8
T1082	System Information Discovery	Discovery	0	1	17
T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	Discovery	0	0	1
T1497.003	Time Based Evasion	Discovery	0	0	3
T1124	System Time Discovery	Discovery	0	0	2

T1614.001	System Language Discovery	Discovery	0	0	4
T1497.001	System Checks	Discovery	0	0	1
T1497.002	User Activity Based Checks	Discovery	0	0	1
T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Discovery	0	0	1
T1049	System Network Connections Discovery	Discovery	0	0	1
T1135	Network Share Discovery	Discovery	0	0	1
T1497	Virtualization/ Sandbox Evasion	Discovery	0	0	1
T1007	System Service Discovery	Discovery	0	0	1
T1021	Remote Services	Lateral Movement	0	0	1
T1570	Lateral Tool Transfer	Lateral Movement	0	0	1
T1113	Screen Capture	Collection	0	0	1
T1114.001	Local Email Collection	Collection	0	0	1
T1005	Data from Local System	Collection	0	1	0
T1119	Automated Collection	Collection	0	0	1
T1071.001	Web Protocols	Command and Control	0	1	4
T1071	Application Layer Protocol	Command and Control	0	0	4
T1573	Encrypted Channel	Command and Control	0	1	0
T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Command and Control	0	0	2
T1573.001	Symmetric Cryptography	Command and Control	0	0	1
T1029	Scheduled Transfer	Exfiltration	0	0	1
T1486	Data Encrypted for Impact	Impact	0	1	0

T1489	Service Stop	Impact	0	0	2
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## ❑ MISP Threat Intelligence Tags

Tag	Meaning
malware: trojan	Identified as a Trojan
malware: ransomware	Exhibits ransomware behavior
malware: infostealer	Steals credentials/info from host
os:windows	Targets Windows OS
malware-family:locky	Variant of Locky ransomware
campaign:spearphishing	Delivered via phishing links/email

## 🌐 Network IOCs

Type	IOC
Domain	maxymus-corp.cn
Domain	offix32-install.net
Domain	docsinfo-support.uk
URL	<a href="http://update.cdn.safewebs.org/bad.exe">http://update.cdn.safewebs.org/bad.exe</a>
URL	<a href="http://soft.8download.me/payload.bin">http://soft.8download.me/payload.bin</a>
IP Address	114.67.103.182, 89.32.51.15, 3.220.50.123

## ❑ Heuristics & Anti-Analysis Features

- Packed executable with section entropy >7.5
- Multiple layers of unpacking with runtime memory allocation
- API redirection using shellcode
- Junk code and flow redirection
- Registry modification with RegCreateKeyA and RegSetValueExA

## 🐞 CAPEv2 Sandbox Summary

cape

Info

File

Signatures

Screenshots

Network

Dropped

Payloads

Behavior

Volatility

Category	Started On	Completed On	Duration	Cuckoo Version
FILE	2024-09-02 07:32:42	2024-09-02 07:35:27	165 seconds	2.4-CAPE

Machine	Label	Manager	Started On	Shutdown On
cape2	win10_3	KVM	2024-09-02 07:32:42	2024-09-02 07:35:26

File Details

Filename	program.exe
File Type	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
File Size	315392 bytes
MD5	a1792915deecb16064563e33bfc34b4b
SHA1	d6eea4e31996262e78c610fb1dd725574c8562
SHA256	47920080055e1707943b1f993ad547e3b0ea0d1a15ff825c500ad5f934c082e6 [VTI IMWOBI IBazaar]

Signatures

SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected (possible anti-debug)

Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port (5 unique times)

Performs HTTP requests potentially not found in PCAP.

Multiple direct IP connections

Performs some HTTP requests

Creates RWX memory


Resolves a suspicious Top Level Domain (TLD)

Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files

Screenshots

Hosts Involved		
Direct	IP Address	Country Name
N	162.249.65.2	unknown
Y	51.254.55.171	unknown
N	199.232.214.172	unknown
N	23.75.209.56	unknown
Y	194.67.210.183	unknown
Y	185.51.247.211	unknown
Y	185.129.148.19	unknown
N	52.165.164.15	unknown
N	20.114.59.183	unknown
N	34.104.35.123	unknown
Y	74.125.69.94	unknown
N	40.83.247.108	unknown


www.msftconnecttest.com	CNAME ncsi-geo.trafficmanager.net A 23.216.147.78 CNAME www.msftncsi.com.edgesuite.net A 23.216.147.61 CNAME a1961.g2.akamai.net
login.live.com	CNAME login.msa.msidentity.com CNAME www.tm.v4.a.pr.d.aadg.trafficmanager.net A 20.190.151.68 A 20.190.151.134 CNAME prdv4a.aadg.msidentity.com CNAME www.tm.lg.prod.aadmsa.trafficmanager.net A 20.190.151.67 A 20.190.151.9 A 20.190.151.132 A 20.190.151.133 A 20.190.151.8 A 20.190.151.6
cdn.onenote.net	CNAME e1553.dspg.akamaiedge.net A 23.209.25.78 CNAME cdn.onenote.net.edgekey.net
ctldl.windowsupdate.com	A 23.32.75.13 A 23.32.75.31 A 23.32.75.27 CNAME download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net CNAME wu-b-net.trafficmanager.net A 23.32.75.12



## CAPE Sandbox Findings

Behavior	Description
Persistence	Adds registry key in <div>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</div>
Network Activity	Reaches out to hardcoded IP (C2), DNS to suspicious domain
File Actions	Drops secondary payload, modifies system32 files
Obfuscation	Uses packing and code obfuscation to hide execution
Process Injection	Injects code into legitimate Windows processes


## Hybrid Analysis Summary






Network Analysis Overview			
DNS Requests			
Login to Download DNS Requests (CSV)			
Domain	Address	Registrar	Country
ndestribnypvkox.work	-	-	-
fqospcojfwenqx.pw	91.226.92.208	-	Russian Federation
qqjphhllengtrnft.click	-	-	-
mppflsvvqhp.info	-	-	-
Contacted Hosts			
Login to Download Contacted Hosts (CSV)			
IP Address	Port/Protocol	Associated Process	Details
185.51.247.211	80 TCP	<Input Sample> PID: 2456	United Kingdom
185.129.148.19	80 TCP	<Input Sample> PID: 2456	Latvia
51.254.55.171	80 TCP	<Input Sample> PID: 2456	France
194.67.210.183	80 TCP	<Input Sample> PID: 2456	Russian Federation ASN: 2683 (NADCO-MSU)
91.226.92.208	80 TCP	<Input Sample> PID: 2456	Russian Federation ASN: 12389 (JSC Rostelecom)


Anti-Virus Scan Results for OPSWAT Metadefender (25/27)			
Last update: 2025-07-29 15:03:47 (UTC)			
Scrutiny	✗ Malware	Vir.IT eXplorer	✗ Trojan.Win32.Ransom_rACW
K7	✗ Trojan ( 004eff041 )	AhnLab	✗ Trojan/Win32.Locky
CMC	✗ Ransom_Win32_Locky_A	RocketCyber	✓
Comodo	✗ Malware	ClamAV	✗ Win.Trojan.Agent-1635283
Huorong	✗ Trojan/Generic9ACEEBCB42CAMD3	Bitdefender	✗ Trojan.Ransom.Locky.EK
Gridinsoft	✗ Ransom.Win32.Locky.ccls1	Avira	✗ TR/CryptXPACK.nmw
Filescab	✓	Zillya	✗ Trojan.Zbot.Win32.197804
Sophos	✗ Troj/Locky-IT	VirusBlokAda	✗ BScope.TrojanSpy.Zbot
McAfee	✗ Ransomware-Locky.g	NETGATE	✗ Trojan.Win32.Malware
TACHYON	✗ Trojan-Spy/W32.ZBot.3IS392.BCN	Varist	✗ W32/Trojan.HNLZ-7537
Antiy	✗ Trojan[Spy]/Win32.Zbot	Lionic	✗ Trojan.Win32.Zbot.tnd3
Webroot SMD	✗ Malware_43.0	Emsisoft	✗ Trojan.Ransom.Locky.EK (B)
NANOAV	✗ Trojan.Win32.Crypted.efynxj	ESET	✗ Win32/Filecoder.Locky.C.trojan
Cylance	✗ Malware_-10		








## Analysis Report



## Graph Relation by VirusTotal




*Cryptographic Algorithms, Http Requests and DNS Resolutions*

Metric	Detail
Detection Rate	48/70 antivirus engines
Common Names	Trojan.Generic, Trojan.Injector, Win32:Malware-gen
Engines Flagged	Kaspersky, Avast, BitDefender, Sophos, Malwarebytes, ESET, etc.

- Behavioral Tags: Infostealer, Downloader, AutoRun, Code Injection
- Antivirus Detection Summary:
  - Detected by 48/70 AV engines
  - Names:
    - Kaspersky: HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
    - Avast: Win32:Malware-gen
    - Bitdefender: Gen:Variant.Tedy.495098
    - ESET: a variant of Win32/Injector.DSD

## Risk & Impact

- Risk Level:  High
- Primary Damage: File encryption, sensitive data theft
- Secondary Risks: C2 beaconing, privilege escalation
- Propagation Method: Spearphishing → URL download → Unpacked in memory

## ✓ Recommendations

1. Immediate Response:
  - Isolate host systems
  - Kill running processes (`rundl132`, PowerShell)
  - Block IPs and domains in firewall/proxy
  - Analyze network for beacon patterns
2. Long-Term Prevention:
  - Enforce macro and script blocking
  - Endpoint protection with heuristic detection
  - User training on phishing risks
3. Recovery:
  - Wipe infected systems if backups exist
  - If not, prepare for potential ransom negotiation
  - Submit samples to local CERT authority

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## 📄 Conclusion

**Trojan.Generic.17941000** is a next-gen ransomware threat that blends traditional Locky family behavior with updated stealth, control, and persistence capabilities. It demonstrates advanced methods like memory injection, command-line stagers, and sandbox-aware unpackers. The infection vector relies heavily on user interaction (phishing), but post-execution, it operates autonomously and maliciously. Organizations must treat any detection of this malware as a severe incident and initiate full-scale response, including deep IOC scans, C2 monitoring, and layered endpoint protection.

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