C 16

No.67[[1]](#footnote-1)

<On the continuing acceptance of my theoretic convictions and practical intents>[[2]](#footnote-2)

<a) Re-actualization of my intents by investigating sense>

Self-examination[[3]](#footnote-3) – an activity of the Ego in relation to itself. It has some intent as any activity. I do not only have some intent with this and that, but at times also with myself; and perhaps not only at times. If for example I am a moral person[[4]](#footnote-4), then I am constantly within some intent directed towards myself to give my whole life the form of univocality and wholeness. It has its impact on my actions in the form of the appropriate, of the decent or the indecent as well (which is against the norms, of the acting with a bad conscience).[[5]](#footnote-5)

In the self-examination as a moral person I actualize the general intent, <that is> not in the single action, but in its generality as a general will in expressivity. It is the expression of my habitual volitional decisiveness. Thus a volitional act makes its appearance as a mental process in my life-stream [301], in which exactly this being comes to consciousness and expression in a lasting and universal volitional decisiveness with the sense “This is my general practical will”, “This is the way I want to live, I in general in a volitional acting way, this is the way I want, thus I am determined, thus I have decided once and for all, I am in this will”.[[6]](#footnote-6) Likewise a simple will (not like this ethical one a will of the higher order directed towards volitional decisions) is expressed. My will always means a lasting decisiveness, and thus in all equally accepted expressions for the future, the “I will” = I have the intention, I am within a will, I have decided to make that journey in autumn.

The judgment expressing the fact of my will among other facts as something which simply is, is implied in such expressions, or rather in their sense. But still we need to distinguish here. To investigate sense for example as an ethical volitional Ego, that is, going back to the will I “have”, in which I am the one I am, reactivate it so that I am currently willing within this will. In other words, I go over into the self-experience of my “Thus I will”. I explicate it in an experiencing way, and possibly I clarify it incrementally, the way I otherwise apprehend, experience and bring to distinctness and clarity an “opinion”, a conviction, a knowledge and the like, which I already have, in an actualizing way. The expression possibly following along gives expression to the sense, the identifiable and repeatedly identified. That to which I return is something “recognized” in the recognizing return to that, which I already have, to which belongs the “I can repeat and identify the repeated”. The expressing with the help of general apprehensions reducing to types, which do not only enter by way of the actual use of the words though (in which I possibly want to speak for others as well, as speakingly I am originally used to). Insofar there is a judging and quite commonly a predicative judging in all investigating-my-sense and terminating-as-a-result-in-a-“sense-investigation”.

The judging though, which is discussed in the logic, is to be differentiated: Judging in theoretical interest and judging, in which a self-examination is expressed; and thus a theoretical experience directed towards true being, “interested” in that, and an experience in general, here a self-investigative one.

[302] The theoretical interest, that means a peculiar intent <directed> towards true being, or at first, as in curiosity and thus otherwise as well, where it is nothing new, the intent to apprehend the experienced as what it is, as something identical, to dedicate it to oneself lastingly, to take it into one’s knowledge or cognition; possibly universally as a general theoretic interest being for a system of acquisitions of cognitions, acquired identities I always recur to, which I can ever again identify in a recognizing way. To secure my having, to gain a system of secured acquisitions, that is the interest here for true being, fulfilling itself through justification; on top of that the intent to be able to become thus according to a true being, according to a being not only continuously certain to me but for anyone in an identical sense, that is <a> theoretical interest, interest in a truth anybody needs to acknowledge with insight in a justifying way, simply as justifiable for anyone with insight.

If I investigate my sense on a theoretical having, on a conviction I have already acquired and as a theoretical one through evident justification, then the respective sentence, the respective truth being accepted by anyone in my conviction are to be distinguished, on the other hand the experience, the judgment of my sense-investigation: “I am in the certainty.” I “have” the evident justification. I have convinced myself, and I am convinced of this and that.

Likewise we need to differentiate everywhere of course, and I do not indeed have certainties everywhere, the content of which is a theoretical one: certainties of the will, lasting ones, single and universal positions of the will; I have personal decisivenesses without currently experiencing them, without currently performing the new act as the mental process of an act “I am convinced, I am determined.” Without currently explicating, explaining more closely, depicting and clarifying that, which I am driving at, which I am certain of.[[7]](#footnote-7)

And to even be theoretically interested in such things – this is generally far from me. A second, theoretical intent is combined with the volitional intent (possibly already at a new practical willing, being primal instituting for a habitual will, and then again at some intent to investigate sense) where it takes place. (Thus for example if I live as a phenomenologist in the universal “professional” theoretical interest, and actualize it in “phenomenological attitude” and do not only investigate my sense in my intent as a phenomenologist, as in a universal methodical sense-investigation, but live in this attitude, in this [303] interest, living straight on for a stretch and making it thematic as a “phenomenon” afterwards, etc.)

If I investigate sense though not as a phenomenologist in that, which I aim at as a mathematician or as a businessman or as a citizen or as an ethical person, then it serves; I am already within my practical function. I already am in the ethic or the respective professional attitude prior to the sense-investigation in that, this itself is already actualized. Its being actualized does not yet signify this sense-investigation.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Sense-investigation is ambiguous: 1) the currently-becoming-aware-of-some-intent you already have; it re-enters my mind, I “remember” it: it becomes current again; 2) “I investigate sense” in a quite common, in the widest sense, I wake up, I “arrive at my sense-investigation”; the day, the horizon of my intents, possibly my “life horizon” as such, becomes current. The sense-investigation in the pre-eminent intents of the day, of my life and thus in general with regard to any special intent being current already, with regard to its What – but the sense-investigation simply becomes current in such a way that I wake up with some intent; but I am thereby directed towards the What.

I already have an experience, in a certain way, my habitually general intent is actual, vitalized, now in my vividly streaming immanent life present. But this vividness is indeed not, and thus with regard to this intent, an immanent thematic experience.[[9]](#footnote-9) I do not direct my view on the intent and <on that> which is my intent. Sense-investigation in one’s intent and in the What of this intent is itself some intent on a higher level. It is living in the intent[[10]](#footnote-10), or rather grasping it differently, to not direct the experiencing view in a thematic way towards my having that intent, but to be thematically directed towards its What. Having become current my professional intent has entered the awake consciousness. I have woken up in that. I am current in the intent, and this implies: I am thematically directed towards that which I intend, in thematic will. This is the merely-becoming-aware-of-one’s-intent. Now, the special sense-investigation in that which I intend, the new intent, is directed towards making distinct and clarifying the indistinct an unclear What. If now one objects: May I possibly say there, I had already experienced it, my intent, when I as a businessman [304] am on my way to my office or [when I] already am at my office, since I only actually experience it when I investigate sense? Of course the answer to this is: 1) the immanent mental living of the intent’s waking up is not a thematically immanent experiencing that, which is some intent itself, while the immanent original occurring as that is not some experiencing-in-an-intending-way; 2) the immanent, mentally lived What of the intent is something immanent, as it is simply unclear, and thematic experience does not change the unclarity; 3) the intent-experience has woken up, but this at first in the sense of an awakening. This means: the awakened intent is not the intent “itself” yet, I only experience it myself through actualization (clarification).

In the originality of presentiating streaming the now awakened will emerges as a mental living, the “memory” of my will, my formerly instituted intent. Now memory of my will is not the will itself, but its memorial modification; but nevertheless, while it is streaming as a mental living, I will, I am willing now, willing in this memorial mode. At first this “memory” is an empty modification, awakened will in the empty mode, possibly at the same time forerunning into some memorial intuition. Does this mean an intuitional doxic recollection of the former decision and possibly of the chain of execution, with an eventually finalizing simple will [recollection] of the steps of actualization up to the point that I have so far come in an actualizing way?

If I jump out of bed in the morning, I am at once in the intent of my daily work – “to my book!” That which I do at first, the habitual thing immediately after rising has its special and complete deliberation, but at the same time [it has] the character of a way, bringing into contact the beginning of the way towards fulfilling the “day’s intent”, similar to the way to the working-place of the laborer, of the businessman to his shop or his office. Thus the beginning already has its volitional sense related to the day’s intent, which is only awakened in an empty way and is still an attendant meaning in the empty mode, being a moment of the mental living in the primal streaming present – a volitional attendant meaning, an attendant mode of the now current will being already an acting one, but which is properly current in its intent in the proper, thereby acting actualization.

Eventually it is thus in every action, insofar as I do not temporarily stop it as a proper action, through a pre-sense-investigation in the aim and the intermediary parts of the way there, of the single actions for example, being self-contained and still belonging to the total action as intermediary members. Now we also count intermediary sense-investigations among the unity of an action. The intermediary sense-investigations also have the function in actions, the final aim of which is not completely [305] determined, to determine it more closely from the already actualized, possibly to already notice thereby that it is not appropriate thus; and then the inappropriate emerges in the sense-investigation and clarification in that, in which it disturbs the purpose, and this (the volitional modalization) is at the same time the motive for repeated clarification, in order to save us from futile work.

The intent horizon-like reaches beyond the actualizing next happening in every action further looking ahead, nay, properly speaking, we have in every action the horizon of the volitional anticipation being a will and yet “anticipation” of the respectively still pending will in the mode of the actingly actualizing one.

When I wake up I jump out of bed, and I so to say jump into my will, that, which “time has come for” now. I wake up, I remember where I am, and the Where is the Now, the *hic et nunc* is already a memory, the bedroom of my apartment is the Now, is and used to be. My Yesterday prior to the falling asleep, and from there the continuity of my Prior, has been woken up, is a memory, tying that which is given perceptually to the continuity of former perceptions. Of course this does not only relate to my external perceptual field, or rather, my perceiving. I wake up – with a volitional memory as well; the act of perception at the same time is my intent, founding as that, which had been stopped by the sleep (and prior to that by breaks for the meals and the evening rest).

It may be that I am in a half sleep when I wake up, not completely awake yet, viewing the things, the room, but not being quite clear about how I had come here (for example in a foreign hotel room). It indeed designates a past (awakening), indistinct, but I am still in yesterday’s room, in which I went to bed, and thereby [I am] not at all in Yesterday’s Today. It may also be that I have taken over a special and extraordinary intent, as on a journey, and that I do not remember it at once (“what where my plans for today?”); there is now an indistinct memory, a vague one, which has to become the determined one first of all, instead of the memory of my determined intent. Thus we need to distinguish different modes of memory.

<b) Keeping and continuing acceptance of convictions in the disruption of wakefulness>

Anyway, my streaming present has the following structure due to the form of wakefulness: 1) It is itself a streaming perceptual primal present, unthematic in streaming, but as that streamingly keeping that which just now [306] has streamed away in the original form of retention (original form of the after-memory) and the protentional anticipation. As respective “perception” (as a phase of this streaming constituting itself as a streaming), it keeps these primal memories in continuously simultaneous changes within itself; 2) As an awake present it is an act present, and as that the Ego-centralization belongs to it and not possibly single scattered mental processes of an act. The Ego-center is everywhere in the living present in a way difficult to describe, and there is activity everywhere in different modes. No phase of the primal present, in which there is no act (and affection) in the play, that is, itself as something according to a mental process and [as something] unthematically perceptual, as all mentally living life.

New acts set in during the streaming, and they change their modes; but the Ego in this change, which is never some actual disappearing, persists as that of the act, or rather, as an Ego of the act sense unitarily going through these changes.[[11]](#footnote-11) The mode of deleting and in general the modes of modalizing are distinguished. The Ego is, it persists in a constant “position” (it is that, which keeps [something] accepted), until it possibly becomes doubtful, stumbles in this position, in its “standing” and possibly comes to deletion, in which it denies the position (acceptance) and takes on a counter-position (instead makes something else accepted, by which it sticks as its own which is lasting now). That which is accepted by it is kept (keeping-an-act). The formerly lasting acceptance is again taken on in the approving decision, and becomes a restituted unity of acceptance, etc. The modalized, etc., remains a keeping in another sense.

<We thus find> in the course of the streaming present some continuing, possibly quite new instituting of acceptances and anyway of beginning acts under keeping in a different sense. But[[12]](#footnote-12) this change is a change of “proper” activity at the same time (actuality in the pregnant sense), and of improper [activity]. We conceived of the improper one here as a keeping – that is the act’s mode of “memory” directed backwards, but not as that of the mere mental process, and yet not memory in the common sense. The still-acceptance of the act’s Whereto in the vividly streaming present is within it, <is> in every phase of the unbroken awake streaming an actual acceptance, although not always in the current, [307] in thematic performance, in which the Ego is originally directed towards the Whereto of the act. At first one may say, exactly in the frame of this streaming, as long as the still keeping, the “memory” goes on in one with the current act phases, namely the retention, thus long and thus far the Ego remains in its concretely unitary act, in its unitary being accepted, implying the keeping.

One will add then, tentatively: The streaming mental living in every Now is, as far as it has the form of affectivity and activity, properly something awake. That which is mentally lived therein, therefore the Ego is awake in the most proper sense, that, to which it is directed, the other retentional, therefore the Ego is “sleeping”. The streaming is a streaming being awake under going over from being awake therefore and sleeping.

We thus have streaming present as a streaming of proper waking, and this is respectively the momentarily finite present. In addition to that we have the sphere of the “sleeping one” continuously enlarging within the streaming, of inactivity, of the “unconscious” for the Ego in its proper active sense.

But now[[13]](#footnote-13) this eventually encloses the whole waking period up to the normal sleep – that is, the Ego is not awake now for anything, active for anything, it therefore does not any more enrich the streaming-unconscious, or: the unconscious does not change through taking on continuous acceptances, since no active acceptances derive from the Ego, from its actuality, continuing as modes of unconsciousness. We thus have within the waking period, speaking in a pun, streaming on “memory”, the process of the streaming into the “inwardliness” of the unconscious from active “outwardliness” (from the patence into the latence). Thus far on retention.

And the protention? The passive, retentional streaming away has degrees of vividness and strength of anticipating the coming due to the mediacy of its intentionality, which comes up in the central, now primal impressional as fulfilling it itself – or else disappoints in a modalizing way the anticipation with regard to the act of prior acceptance. But this is added by the distant associations within the simultaneous present; but, which is even more important here, [within] the successive one. The associated from the retentional past (within the unity of the waking: of the day) is awakened, this awakening already enables as simultaneous thus successive multiplicities.

Can we exempt from the keeping acts, already for the option of affective multiplicities?

[308] That which is already awakened or already unitary through awakening, unitarily associated, can itself (and as a configured multiplicity) re-awake.[[14]](#footnote-14) Awakening is memory in a new sense, in a more proper one; the memory shows that which is unconscious, has become unconscious. And is this awakening not some affection? I see that to which I am directed. That, which it awakens in simultaneity or succession, has already been shown at that in a secondary way. It appeals to me, to activate it; at first in the form of advertance. – The original action in the Now, simultaneous association, action in the simultaneity, “perceiving” or recollecting with regard to the woken up retention – the New is the change of retention here into affection and action and of the “re” – actualizing action, the mode of the Again (which properly speaking lies in another form also within entering the perception (as a re-activating of something similar, afterwards activating, activating in an apperceiving way) of the simultaneously-awakened). Thus the streaming unitary awoke present has got new kinds of structures brought to light.

Furthermore we need to consider: the fantasizing, the as-if-waking and [as-if]-activity, the “dreaming awake” within an awake present and within the concretely streaming course of waking; furthermore the fantasy in function; game of seriousness and leisure, change again of the game into some seriousness of a second level.

Altogether exhibiting all functions of the passive structures and of all functioning modes of affectivity and activity, belonging to the unity of some waking.

If we go over from one awake period to the next, and then regard the chain of wakings as such, then the question may be, what gives unity to them. But this is the question on those structures of some waking, which have not been touched on by now, by which it is retentionally connected to the former one, initially the next that has preceded, and then the structures, through which acts and results of acts of the former ones make an appearance in the current waking as awakened still-acceptances (implicitly are there for example prior to the awakening as unawakened still current acceptances) together with the appertinent recollections and sense-investigations.

The day is some continuously streaming on performing, acquiring, every phase contains the inheritance of the former one’s whole continuity; the evening implies the day’s total acquisition, of course for the most part in the respectively [309] last mode of sedimentation, in the respective mode of the unconscious, of the evening-horizonlike, <in that> way, in which the evening simply is the day’s evening.

The respective current thing has a “dark” background, its horizon, in which I can intrude, which I can inquire, guided by something contingent or actively prepared associations. Thus space-time is constituted as a horizon and fulfilled time, as that which I can reproduce and run through, ever again. The day begins with waking up from sleep, from my dream. A dreamless sleep, properly speaking, is a hypothesis.

Some initially temporalizing process as pre-egoical, some external from active and in this sense “passive” process, as “pre-association”, mere associative fusion. In a certain sense proper association is the being-reminded-of-something, from something associating, from that, which I am already awake for right now, which I already am at as (an active) Ego, woken up for something else, simply “reminded” of that.

We have some inactive pure fusion in the form of the sense-fields and of the secondary ones through simultaneous streaming within simultaneity. In the succession, the most original one from streaming, we have the outstandingnesses as having grown through breakings of the fusion on the basis of the streaming retentional meltedness and fusion, bridged by the still remaining fusion. These outstandingnesses, special unities, enter the retentional stream as such, on this basis now the fusion of a second level, namely the distant fusion, the passive distant association.

[310]

No.68

<The remaining in the personal being and in the togetherness>[[15]](#footnote-15)

<a) Modes of the sinking of acts (and of their acceptances) in the “unconscious”, their dependence on the activity of the keeping-in-one’s-grip in the living present>

The personal being in the togetherness.

I[[16]](#footnote-16) and my acts. 1) Unity of an act in the streaming primal present as unity of a primal habituality in the activity itself; on the other hand the 2)nd sense of habituality.

Every act sinks into the „unconscious“ - but in a different way. The event, that the act is modalized, that the position-taking it performs, the acceptance of being or the practical acceptance (that of the proposal, already that of a practical option) breaks, may already happen in the primal present, i.e., the primal modality of the certainty of being, certainty of the should-be (practical certainty) changes into doubt, etc., or even into the modality of deleting. A first habituality, a first keeping is the continuous one, and during the sinking into the primal past (of the first [becoming] unconscious, nay, in a certain way becoming non-actional), remaining-in-certainty, keeping the being or the should-be, being furthermore directed towards that in certainty. A modalization, as an act modality, is itself an act. I can also remain in denial or in doubt, not only continuing in this mode of being accepted (in this position-taking), but stick to the sunken acceptance with regard to the „being still conscious“ in the being sunken. The modalization may then through transition into a new one, then [sic!] again loose the acceptance it has performed and received; such a row of changes of the [311] modalization has its own unity and is not a chain, in which the members continuously inherit their acceptance in the keeping. But it may be, that a restitution of the former acceptance happens as a way of modalization, as an affirmative re-taking: The Not-not-thus for example results from the Not-thus and with regard to the Thus, which has temporally been accepted formerly, the Still-thus.

The having-accepted and keeping[-accepted] in the primal shape is continuously at the accepted being, i.e. continuously-being-directed-towards-it. Or else: The act is in actual and proper performance, and it is this in the mode (primal mode) of actuality, when I am directed towards the What of the act (its Whereto of direction) by paying attention. This being directed to by paying attention, continuously united with the continuously unitary sinking of the What in its „passive“ unity, changes continuously. And it belongs to the concrete lasting act in its unbroken performance, that in every new phase the paying attention continues within the primal mode and that this primal mode for its part changes and that thus a unity of concrete activity is constituted as an act, as a lasting act, living on in the duration with regard to every phase of the just-now in keeping acceptance, being co-accepted in every momentary present. The keeping implies the kept directedness, and every still-acceptance implies the modified mode of attention as direction of the Ego in the way of the still-being-directed. But it is not a mere directedness, as if that were something for itself, as little as that, which as to content is still conscious in passive retentionality, is still a grasping <by> itself, but there is  some constant directing-oneself-now and a constant having-performed streaming on and being-still-accepted, having-been-directed and being-still-directed within the act’s streaming <of the> living performing-now. The concretely living act is as a concrete, directed performance. Currently the Ego is with the accepted - to which this whole continuity of directed modes of acceptance belongs and thus unity of a concrete direction towards the concrete What, concrete being present with the concretely unitarily lasting [accepted], that is, [the] evermore anew and evermore still accepted.

But now finally the concrete act stops[[17]](#footnote-17) - i.e. the primal modal performance falls away with the final phase of the immanent act time, constituting itself. But the act, which is not continuously performed does not stop streaming on in still living certainty of being accepted (certainty of being or certainty of the should-be of the accepted). It is not an act any more now, which [312] I am properly still performing, I am no more active now in the proper sense, occupied with this or that.

But the act, which has streamed away, streamed away but still sinking, still has an acceptance which is an acceptance for me now; and even if I am now currently not directed towards the accepted, <as> a current performer of an act, still the sinking, modified being directed in the modified performing still belongs to me, and being modified I am furthermore in direction, and I am the one, for whom that is furthermore accepted, which I have given acceptance to and am keeping.

A new mode of this keeping needs to be distinguished though. After I have stopped to perform this act, after it has reached the mode of the perfected and has gone as a proper act, I can keep currently in my grip its result, simply that, which has now currently been brought to bear, keep it actively. Thus for example in the performance of a new act, directing myself towards something new, implementing the new act intention and bringing it to perfection. That which has newly been brought to bear is then not isolated by itself, but has currently been given acceptance to and is perfected as being accepted, in one with that, which has „still“ remained in the current grip. Like within an act continuously perfecting itself the stretches of the act that have flown away still function, their continuing acceptances co-found the on-going total acceptance, thus we have here a unity of a combined act, an act synthesis, combining two acts for the unity of an act, but a combination and unity of an act, coming to pass by the act, which has passed in the one-after-the-other not only remains as such for me, the act subject, in continued acceptance (through the mode of mental process, in which its having-flown-away exists here), but it has at the same time the mode of the co-functioning within this mode, of the current keeping, which is the basis for the new act being linked to it and for the winning-acceptance and then for the being kept. This essentially belongs to all act syntheses as such, generating a single act.

We thereby have gained a new sense of contrast between current and non-current acts. An act, streaming away after its perfection is not current any more, is not, properly speaking, an act any more, as which <it> has its source-point of the primal proper activity, of the primal proper giving-acceptance-to, of taking a position and primal proper being-present. This is the one contrast. Accordingly all act’s stretches of the proper act, being stretches of the having-flown-away of the primal proper act phases which have just now passed, are currently not active stretches any more.

[313] But in the other sense it is them, and they are in that current function, which first of all makes possible the concrete act as such and provides sense and possibility in the source-now continuously creating primal acceptance.

But rather more important is the difference, where the acts are complete ones, and are acts, combining to unitary total acts, whereas the connection happens in the immanent temporality by the act, which has flown away, remaining “current” as functioning in the composition.

Once more we meet a new mode when transgressing the sphere of the primal present. For every act it reaches that far, as it is after its perfection in modes of the still vivid keeping. That which is given acceptance, is still in the grip, although, as we want to presuppose, no act intention is in advance directed towards a unity of acceptance, going beyond its proper perfection of acceptance through a new and possibly then again through further acts towards a final perfection and a synthetic performance thereby concluding itself. In other words: The act does not function as an initial piece for an act synthesis. The accepted unity constituted in it still remains in my grip though, the grip becomes ever more loser, and eventually the act seems to dissolve into a nothing. The Ego seems to have lost the rays of direction and the results of acceptance, flowing into one another, being still in the retentional darkening and blurring, although becoming indistinct. In the literal sense the act seems to have sunken into unconsciousness, into a being-not-an-act, being-nothing.

However now the seriousness of this nothing may be, it is certain, that the change of the darkening and for the Ego of the having-still-in-the-grip, having-still-in-experiential-acceptance leads towards a limit, denoting the limit of the primal living present from this act; and of course with regard to every complex act we arrive at some finally functioning, and from there to the same case, we have just now discussed, towards some finally no more functioning being-still-conscious, having-still-within-the-grip.

[314]

<b) Lasting interests, instincts and habits of the single one and the community>

We reach something new when considering the following: We have lasting interests, the professional interest – a unity of manifold special interests stretching through the whole life, emerging anew, resolving itself, thereby not disappearing and with regard to the past still in co-effect.

Interests, this does not mean respectively proceeding acts of the primal present. My job and the professional actions as acts in professional interest (professional practice as a general name for the entire professional actions, possibly like a process in their temporal course) – my fatherly interest and the acting in the interest. The ethical interest, in which I live. My religion, my religious life interest – habits and habitual interests. Primal instincts and instinct interests; the periodical interest of nutrition, the constant interest for nutrition going through life.

Horizons of interest, lasting interests, instituted through a decision, through an act determining a horizon of future acts in the universality, creating a direction-to.

Generally: peculiarity of the common will, predelineating future special wills, a general practical directedness (act-like directedness towards a practical sphere as such). Instinctive and habitual directedness, having an act horizon as an anticipated horizon of acceptance – without any institution by way of a generally circumscribing act. These are interests in the pregnant sense.

Doxic acts, acquisitions of knowledge actualizing “being” in peculiarity, within the evermore being world practical <acts>, acts of the will, acquisitions of the should-be, actualizing something that should be, goodnesses, lasting acquisitions.

Goods that are consummated; goods that remain lasting goods; the good-for-something, the serving, object in the fulfilling, in the enjoying doing; the ever again serving, ever again fulfilling a practical striving – even if relatively as a means.

Different ways of practical horizons – I, directed through the horizon. Anticipated acceptances, anticipated acts, but already modes of accepting within the anticipation. Like the past acts belonging to a horizon of interests with its course of some current making known of interests. The acquisitions in the actuality of acquiring and of the just now still consciously having acquired. The kept acquisitions – those of the memory. How [315] are they as being kept ones, how as that [are they] still accepted, how does an acquisition become a property being accepted and not vivid within the frame of primal present.

The memory so to say turned forward corresponds to the memory turned back – the horizon of the practical future, the practical proposal, the system of intent, towards which I live, making up the respective interest in the preferred future direction.

The interest in the pregnant sense – the lasting interest, the lastingly unitary horizon of interests.

Double sense of horizon: The horizon of special interests within the universality of a lasting interest, a universality meaning something different itself in the institution of interests through universal acts of the will and through the institution in the form of the “innate” instincts and the constitution of habits. Another sense of horizon, the horizon of acts and horizon of the acquisitions of acts.

Interest in a broader sense and relativity of the persisting of an interest. “Fleeting” interests and “lasting” interests.

A fleeting affection of strongly affective strength forces acts, that is, advertance, in a doxic way: perceiving by perceiving attentively, cognizance; emotional stimuli, possibly curiosity, doing something in a playful way, the result does not become a lasting acquisition; the acceptances are forgotten in a special way. The playful values, goods (formations of value) are devaluated, “thrown away”, let fallen in a special way – not “let fallen” like failing as deleting within an interest, not as irrelevant, as segmented and the like, pushed aside.

They are not forgotten as such, insofar as recollection can naturally lead back to them. But I do not have the interest of the game’s acceptance any more – it is only different if the game (sport) itself <has become> the unity of an interest persisting beyond the moment, beyond the hour, [if it] belongs into the unity of a circle of interests reaching beyond the vivid present.

Co-existence of a manifoldness of persisting interests, synthesis of the interests and the decline of interests, the letting fall, co-existence – mere collectivity of interests. The acts, the doings of interests, proceeding stretchwise, having let fallen only as acts, under further preservation of the interests; that is, gaining acceptance of the activities, form of life falling into stretches, in which now this interest, now that is satisfied. Main interests and side interests, although not serving ones. Single interests as life interests, and still not unity of a universal [316] life interest, unifying all interests, to which all are subordinate as serving ones.

Organizing unification up to the constitution of a concrete life interest spanning the whole future life, and thereby the constitution of a special respective life past and [life] future as past of the respective acceptances as still surrounded by the vivid interest – past as still accepted in respective certainty and as respectively modalized, respectively deleted in details. From there lasting goods of life derive. In the continuous synthesis and constant correction constitution of a life directed towards univocality in the unity of a total interest, of a unity of life performance, of a total target, in total succeeding under elimination of that which fails in between.

In all this one will only have thought of he interests of an Ego, that is, for oneself, only of one’s “own” interests. We have interests in the solitary (primordial) Ego-sphere, co-existing (in simultaneity or succession) and going along each other indifferently, and interests standing within circumstances of embracing and being embraced as well as of combinedness towards an interest embracing the combined ones. The embracing may be that of the whole with regard to its parts (whereby one should scoop the peculiar sense of wholeness and combinedness from the phenomena) and that of the universality (one that is ambiguous itself) and specialty. All that taken in such an abstractive way, that for acts of the alter Ego there was no consideration.

Communication of personal life is act communication of subjects communicating with each other, and either communication of acts or of interests in the way of the collective simultaneity and co-existence as such or in the way of another intersubjective unity of the acts, or rather, interests, in which the single acts, interests become one with each other in the way of embracing-embraced or combined ones among embracing ones. This is repeated anew for interests already intersubjectively united, co-existing themselves again “unconnected”, which are running “alongside each other” or are intimately one.

Still one may not overlook that the merely intersubjective co-existence is a way of intersubjective unity and eventually has behind it or presupposes the being for each other and with each other of the persons standing in current and potential empathy, who are thus together in the widest community, in the community of a surrounding world as the same world for them all and correlatively as a unitary humanity, in which for every [317] one all others are fellow men – although not “companions” therefore, comrades, not friends of a circle of friends, not dining partners, not fellow citizens, not compatriots, not having the same language, not associates, members of a trade company, co-researchers in some science, not members of a church or special community, etc. The widest community, that of some humanity, with the correlate of a closed world (an expression, which may be taken more lax or quite strict), has exactly that as a form, which means humanity in the widest and most empty sense, a habitual acceptance showing itself in current empathies and horizons of empathy instituted in every person’s life of consciousness: open universe of co-persons as universe of the immediate and mediate, explicit and implicit community of empathy. This is the same for all socialities as that which is the space form for the reduced nature. It is so to say the social space and of course with the help of the inseparable unity of simultaneous temporality and temporality of succession the social space temporality or else form of the historical space temporality. We thus understand the unity of some lasting humanity as vividly unitary existence together, in the persisting together of this same humanity as analogue of the space temporality in the common sense, through which the one physical nature stretches, in which all physical realities are localized and extended – similar to single persons as persons being quasi localized and extended in humanity, each at its social place, in its union as a special shape, etc.

Under the title empathy I perform an act of foreign experience, an act, which in its intentionality, the peculiarly appresenting and apperceiving [intentionality] in a farther reaching way through appresentation, “encompasses” the foreign acts, the foreign presentations and appresentations, perceptions and app<erceptions>, embraces them intentionally, implies them. It is similar to my embracing my past acts as having been currently in my now current remembering presentiations. I therefore say, I am as a present Ego in community with my past ones; and without this community with me myself, an own past would make no sense for me. In empathy community the other persons, the Ego-subjects are within my Ego, at first the co-present ones, implied within my primordial originally vivid present, and from there in my human concrete present, and it is only in this way that <the> other ones are there for me, the other ones with regard to their acts, but the other ones as well as Ego-subjects, having [318] habitual acceptances which they have themselves acquired from primordiality, and having themselves their own being in their persisting directions of interest. But man, always already knowing himself to be in a community of empathy, in a co-humanity, in advance and as a mature man investigating sense, already knows himself in socialities, in sociality; and here new special forms here of the embracing and the combining of acts and interests come into question.

Family, club, companionship of various kinds according to the above examples. Let us take a companionship in purpose: My persisting interest is unitary with that of those being different for me. My interest, currently my intent, my willing being directed, embraces its interest, or rather, its intent, its directedness, my giving acceptance to and having-accepted and that to which I am directed as the instituting one, that which is his and his Whereto. But this in such a way, that I am also conscious of the other one within the interest attitude (living in the interest and possibly actualizing it) as embracing myself likewise *vice versa*.

No. 69

<Lust and non-lust affection in the primal sphere>[[18]](#footnote-18)

Affection and emotion in the primal sphere[[19]](#footnote-19).

It is the emotions which or as which the hyletic data or rather the sensual objects motivate (affect) the active Ego, “attract” it or “reject” it. The willing-towards corresponds to (or is) the attracting, to the rejecting the willing-against. Generally we speak of the disgusting, malodorous, etc. as arousing reluctance; nay, to say, we felt reluctance against something is equal to: <It is> very unpleasant. After all, also “pleasant” and “unpleasant” already imply some “will content”. (Later the problem of the hunger drive must be set.)

[319] What is this willing-towards and willing-against in the “being attracted” and “being rejected”? Is it not a being affected by something in the primal sphere, which is for itself, desire towards the hyletic, towards something distinct, something unitary, or rather, away from it? Do we thus not have a positive and a negative desire? But we need to now take into account as well the not-being-directed-to and being-directed-to, or rather, directing-oneself to. What is the affecting by itself, that which practices “lust affection” prior to the advertance? How does it affect, appeal to the Ego? It attracts it, the attraction comes from it towards the Ego, and attention means: I follow, and now I am at it. But by my being this, I am indeed constantly attracted; thus in one constantly being attracted by the date and being directed towards it constantly from the Ego, continuously following. Is not my egoical being-merely-attracted an egoical mode, necessarily a prior mode of every “enjoying” being present and within itself a changing mode of desiring, i.e., that of the enjoying desiring? Do we not say in a correct way: lust as mere lust affection, lust stimulus stimulates prior to the joy of lust, motivates enjoying ones, and proper lust affection were thus still a special I mode in contrast to the act’s mode, founding this one essentially? The differentiation between lust affection (whether prior to or in the “advertance”, prior to or in the Ego activity) and lust itself as being-in-the-mood-for, joy of lust (lust in the common sense). Lust affection would be the more common one, and “mere” affection would simply mean the affection prior to the “advertance”.

“Pleasure”, this is then nothing else but a constant desiring, willing towards, as “mere” affection, constantly implying in itself and essentially pleasure affection, that, which initially motivates the desiring intention; thus it is not the desiring that has different modes, but pleasure itself, the affecting, depending on whether it is answered by the Ego with willing towards or willing-against or not. But the talking of the willing’s fulfilling already presupposes the essential options of the willing-towards, whereas the willed has “disappeared”, or whereas the affecting pleasure is decreasing. Pleasure intensity has its correlate in the satisfaction of the willing-towards.

Is this egoical desiring here something else but an act, eventually an act as such, that is, the willing-towards and the fulfilling itself which is willing towards? And is not kinesthetic always involved thereby, at least in the form of the keeping rigid and still of the kinesthetic movement as will of the remaining there?

But how about the being disgusted, how about the background affection of the disgusting, motivating “advertance” as well, possibly “forcing” it? Affection as such indeed is affection towards advertance, [320] but advertance means: The Ego is motivated to become active, to activate the positive affection (pleasure affection) in a positively willing way, willing against the negative affection. Thus advertance is essentially “willing” or “unwilling”, and as the case may be, in this primal cases being directed towards a remaining-there enjoying the pleasure (or increasing-within-the-remaining-there) or directedness towards a not-remaining-there suffering unpleasure (directed towards or away, and still both in the mode “there” and directed).

Up till now we only considered impressionally lasting hyletic data within the vivid present, and these as practicing lasting emotional affection. This may be stronger or weaker (intensity of pleasure affection for example). Not to be confused according to the above: “mere” affection, as only inviting the Ego to action, and affection as such, also within the action. The intensity of the “desiring” corresponds to the intensity of pleasure as that of enjoying, willing towards. But it may be quite different (hunger).

Then of course no difference can be made understandable between desiring and willing, and thus neither a difference is to be understood between willing as such and acting. But we need to constantly keep an eye on kinesthetic as well. As an active Ego – I am constantly active as an awake one, and thereby of course always affected – and I am an Ego in the constant “I move”, “kinesthetically”. The, or some primal sphere is kinesthetic in this regard (whether it is founding for each and every I-move (egoical process), is a problem). To say that kinesthetic are no hyletic data, and thus no data at all of a similar function as the hyletic ones as such, that means, they do not originally affect, they are not in themselves pleasant or unpleasant. It is only after objectivation, e.g. as some bodily movement and linking with something else, that that, which may be pleasant or unpleasant does grow.

Intent and will to act are only possible within the constitutive composition of horizons, eventually of objects and object worlds, the separation of abilities, of some ability as a practical option and executing doing. Lasting acquisitions need to have been already constituted from the Ego’s activity as objects in object worlds, things experienced as things in proximity and distance, with abilities of experiencing activation and explication, with abilities to make ineffective the disgusting in its disgustingness through distancing oneself, that the “enjoy” of the embarrassing remains suppressed, etc. Thus, this leads to new modes of the will, and eventually human willing, human plan, action, humanized world as world of practical formations, etc. Thereby [321] we have not yet mastered all difficulties though. An index of the same is the question on the primal instinct, having natural objectivation as a correlate, and the question on how the primal hyletic emotional affections, if they are in the same way now pleasure affections, now unpleasure affections, shall motivate objectivation. But how that, when we had to take into account in advance that not only one but many instincts are at work at once, in such a way that the primal objectivation resulting in nature, takes place in the frame of a general normality, in which only pleasure affection emerges, excluded the extreme intensities as “exceptions”. There may only be larger or smaller pleasure affection in this and unpleasure through diminuition. The Aristotelian “All men enjoy *aisth<esis>* from nature” gains its truth.

But do we not have to say that every hyletic thing has its pleasure affection in an originally preferred normal sphere (nothing excessive) and within the being-there, enjoying its pleasure, every associative unity of fusion, unity of the distinctness its unitary affection and pleasure – thus still fusion.

The[[20]](#footnote-20) possible happenings need to be studied prior to the emerging of kinesthetic: Change of the hyletic date within its field, also change of the whole field. In the awakening as such I ask on what motivates the attention of the Ego.[[21]](#footnote-21) Is the Ego active at a date, that is, in the “willing”? What is possible there? It shall be an enjoying behavior, enjoying pleasure; the pleasure intensity at first keeps on the same height. If the hyletic date remains unchanged in its impressional present, and the field does not change as well (the kinesthetic <are> presupposed as keeping still, <in order> to possibly extinct their influence), then the pleasure affection will remain unchanged in its intensity – for a while, then it sinks (blunting).

Furthermore, change of the date may come up and thereby a constant change of the affection’s intensity going hand in hand, and determined thereby functionally the intensity of the joy, i.e., a change unpleasant for me. But the change may also lead to an increase of the pleasure, of the joy, also to an up and down in increasing and decreasing; [322] whereby though the up and down itself may again be pleasant, may be enjoyed, and it may take place an increasing in the up and down at the coming Up, which is to be expected, etc.

How can such happenings be made completely understood? Let us take a hyletic date, which lasts for a stretch in an unchanged way in unchanged affection, or rather, in constant pleasure enjoyment; constantly the date has its protentional horizon, egoically its horizon of affection and of enjoyment. I enjoy by constantly expecting, approaching new enjoyment, and also the enjoyment that has constantly streamed away is “still” living. As the impressional consciousness-of the hyletic date is not the respective momentary impression, thus [is] neither the affection and the enjoyment of the date as “good”. Furthermore: if constantly future is predelineated within the temporalization of the still vivid past, then the enjoying does not only last as a temporal extending of the momentary enjoyments (the enjoying willing towards)[[22]](#footnote-22), constituting itself as an extension only parallel to that of the hyletic date. Rather the hyle predelinetaed as a unitary shape (here as shape of the unchanging) and the unitary shape of this affection, determined, predelineated as well through the continuity of hyletic phase affections is founding for a continuously streaming affection of a higher step. This shape itself, concretely that of the coming hyle in one with the corresponding affections coming along <with> it – coming in the form of the unitary prior formation -, does affect. In our case, I do not only constantly keep on enjoying, but I also enjoy as hoping towards future, I enjoy, insofar as the future persisting affects me in pleasure in the same intensity and is enjoyed along. Here thus affect 1) every hyletic phase; 2) the shape of the hyletic future’s lasting in one with the present in its streaming.

We have a primary pleasure and a secondary one for its being as a continuous starting point for a continuation of the respective shape. If now the future shape, if the streaming present is one with a streaming future shape, letting decrease its pleasure degrees with the hyle’s change, then this affects me towards unpleasure, unpleasure for the now not positively hopeful, but for the “feared for”. It arrives in prior certainty, but, although only on the lowest step pleasure affections are predelineated here, “unwillingly”.

[323] Here thus lies the difference that not merely hyletic data themselves affect in their impressionality, but also already hyletic anticipations of data, that is, as “values”, as positively affecting and becoming enjoyed. The future’s good is quite suspended at the disappearing of data. But I am still conscious of them and not only as a hoped for good which has been, but the hoped for good which has been as such is something itself that affects, that is, in unpleasure (like on the other hand something not good which has been affects in pleasure).

No. 70

<The instinct of “curiosity” and other interests as motives for the specific advertance towards the affecting objects or hyletic data>

1)[[23]](#footnote-23) The instinct of “curiosity” – that means primal affection, starting from distinct “contents”[[24]](#footnote-24), and even primal conditions at first[[25]](#footnote-25) already fulfill the conditions of the distinction, the single and multiple (configurative) one; but then also for their degree of affection, whereas its constant kinesthetic change (transition into bigger abundance, bigger width (quasi-magnitude, massiveness), in increases as such of intensity-like moments of any kind) plays its part. Interest in this change, in the “I follow” of the kinesthetic and formation of the will to rule over these kinesthetic and their impact, whereby intentional unities are constituted, the change as change of appearance of the one appearing and of a field of unities, in which this is one among other ones. The affection derives from the passively constituted unity of the temporal consciousness as standing within the kinesthetically happening process, and it proceeds in the direction towards the unities constituting themselves thereby, constituting themselves by the Ego’s acts happening in answer to the affection. The hyletic What changing itself, the single and configuratively multiple one, and everything that is acquired there, “is interesting” and habitually remains in interest. The being conscious to me in the widest sense is some affecting-me, and a conspicuous “consciousness” is a being-with, [324] being-actively-interested. If we now call “curiosity” a feeling of pleasure, then this pleasure at the being-with is so to say within the enjoyment, but here in itself the continuing affection. One may not say though: The hyletic date is prior to the advertance and it has the character of pleasure, which is that, due to which it wakes my curiosity, as if pleasure were once again a date that affects. The date is already there for me prior to that, simply as affecting, we certainly have the difference of the date and its degree of affection, the degree of the addressing-me. In addition to that the remembering modifications (recollections, recollected date, not only with the having-affected-me, but affecting-me-now-again-as-having-been). An object world is constituted, something being is a horizon of being, something being though as being accepted in certainty with the option of modalization.

2) But how now about the other emotions already delineating special hyletic data, and then again emotions being aroused by special objects and genres of objects in a peculiar way, for example a “charming” configuration of colors and sounds (harmony). Or a festive scent – a pleasantly and unpleasantly singeing heat, etc. – taken at first impressionally. If curiosity - if the general interest in the being is proceeding with the affections peculiar to it, active doings, actively enjoying pleasure (pleasure for the being as to be cognized and for the cognized as such), wherever thus only in the being-with pleasure comes into question, then the new kind of affection hinders this process. This <felt> as being especially delightful binds to itself and to that, which is delightful in it, and to the special mode of givenness, in which pleasure is current. But with regard to the now emerging option of unpleasure for an object, instead of drawing nearer and persisting there, it motivates the distancing and activities of removal as such.

We try to say: We have special affections and activities here, special ones in contrast to the general ones, through which a there-for-me and eventually objectivity in general, world, is; and this implies that these special affections are founded in the general ones and the special strivings, the special ways of activity in the willing and un-willing are founded in the general acts, through which in general something is there for me as substrate of the special feelings, etc. That which charms me, is there for me at first, and if it were still a mere hyletic date, it is there through its distinctness as a unity or as configuration of unities and through the further one starting the [325] interest in being. Now I am not interested in mere being, in the mere this-there and its knowledge – this means, terminating therein – but in its beauty or the unpleasantness, etc. But then the interest in being is simply restricted and in service in the limitation and, as founding for the special interest, for the enjoyment, for example of the beauty of that which is constituted for me as being (or a modification of being).

Whole partial universes then are distinguished from the universe of the already being, for example the beautiful flowers, a genre of value objects, or the genre of nutrition, of food, the special kind of affective strength of which is realized in the performance of certain bodily actions of the “eating”.

The lowest, all founding interest thus is that of the primal and ever more functioning curiosity, or let us better say, the experiencing, and indeed taking as the lowest, the sensuously experiencing interest. We understand by “valuing interest”, in the widest sense by practical interest, every behavior resting on special value affections, feeling in an enjoying way, but also intending, planning, executing [behavior].

The world of being things corresponds to the experiencing interest, on the lowest level nature, the world of pure, “value free” being; to the valuing interest, or rather, to the practical one [corresponds] the realm of the goods, and thus here the practical acts in the widest sense correspond to the experiencing doing (experiencing acts) there.

But I was talking of value objects and of practical acts, those of their generation and of their enjoyment. But we need to show first, how the valuing affections and the valuing actions founded by them objectivate for their part, how from the lowest world of nature a world grows on the highest level, in which goods emerge as objects, as a genre of objects with multiple special genres, and how accordingly also a higher founded “experience” and a higher interest in being (curiosity, eventually theoretical interest) grows. The differentiation is relativized: The world being on a higher level becomes again a world of relative things, insofar as the objects of goods may as well be valued in new ways, etc.

[326]

No. 71

<The formation of kinesthetic systems in the instinctive fulfillment of drive. Instinctive striving as a moment of affection>

How[[26]](#footnote-26) shall we consider the primal functioning of kinesthetic? How shall we consider them as egoical processes? Egoical processes are affections and actions. Is not primal affection an instinct, that is, a way of the empty striving still lacking the “purposive idea”, fulfilled in a respectively discovering act? The instinctive drive thus is the preliminary form of the proposal, like the fulfilling of the drive [is] the preliminary form of the proper act. This would imply:[[27]](#footnote-27) The hyle from the beginning is not affecting in that sense, as if the answering act were immediately directed towards it as an ending, as “good” in itself and at once instinctively “app<erceived>”.

Let us try a construction: 1) The first awake actions, the first affections immediately finding instinctive fulfilling, like the suckling actions of the newborn. As soon as the smell of mother’s breast emerges and the sensation of the lips’ touch, an instinctive direction towards the drinking is aroused, and an originally adjusted kinesthetic enters the game. The kinesthetic has its company of “kinesthetic emotions” in advance, emotional data running along. What is the pure Egoical in kinesthetic? Nothing else but the affection awoken by the emotions of deception (smell, etc.) in the Ego.[[28]](#footnote-28) If there is no drinking soon, how is it there? Like the smell alone awakens something further, so to say an empty app<erception>, not having a “conscious” goal. If then touch emerges, the way towards the fulfilling is even more so a continuing instinctive drive, being unfulfilled intention. Then motions of swallowing in the fulfillment, etc., as bringing fulfillment, as discovering the instinctive drive. These thus are the modes of the desiring, modes of the will so to say: preliminary modes, but with corresponding complexes of sensation belonging to the discovering of this fulfillment.

Thereby a periodical flaw, a periodical change between phases of intention of replete fulfilling (pleasure), absence of pleasure, new instinctive [327] intention, etc. Thereby unity of a directed intention of a mediate kind soon is formed through the whole periodical chain or as continuously pre-directed intention towards this chain form and already with a “purposive idea”.

The “hunger” though is diminished in the course of proceeding and synthetic fulfillment, and eventually vanishes. This means, the “affection”, i.e., the instinctive intentionality of drive, has a degree, an intensity diminishing towards zero.

2) How about the “kinesthetic of kicking” now, or rather, the instinctive drives, to which we owe the constitution of nature, of the world?[[29]](#footnote-29)

Initially we need to say: The hunger drive terminates in a pleasure, [in] an active fulfilling in a smell, taste, in a concretely bodily “well-being”, being a chain of periodical shape, being as a whole one a unitary hyletic process, being full of pleasure, making the instinctive drive constantly as an “end”, as the actively fulfilled, [the] intended and fulfilled.

If we now consider the hunger to be satisfied, that the corresponding hyletic data, otherwise functioning as *termini a quibus,* do not have this function now, do not trigger any desire, neither thus any continuing of the desire through unwillingly entering intermediary fulfillments, directing towards the *term<inus> ad qu<em>.* There are still some other instinctive drives, primal ones, in question, simply having their say now, now becoming over-powerful through the brisk hunger.

Now possibly the “joy to kick” would come into question first, to move the body in movement of the members, and the formation of a power over these movements, the formation of a kinesthetic system being available afterwards.

The kinesthetic hyle is not only a process, but an instinctive process, an egoical one, a continuous one in “intention” and fulfillment, being constantly intermediary, insofar as being fulfilled it is some new affection soon, awakens new intention, and converts into new fulfillment “on its own accord”, without terminating in a single hyletic total state of this sphere. The degrees of tension – there we need to differ the degreed (e.g. in lifting and letting fall back the hand, the foot), which is hyletic, and the degree of the instinctive intention, which only comes into question as a complete ceasing through becoming “tired”.

[328] The instinctive intention and instinctive pleasure of fulfillment does not relate to the final state, but the whole process, to continuously let the momentary intention be fulfilled and again, as the carrier of new intentions, let it go over towards new fulfillments; thus <the> unity of the process[[30]](#footnote-30) of the intention-fulfillment, this is itself the telos, that is, that the instinctive intention, going unitarily in advance towards this intermingling of intentionality and its relaxation, and is not fulfilled itself as a unitary one in a phase, but in constant doing.

This primal instinctive process furthermore relates to other hyletic happenings, those in the other regions. Optic data stimulate movements of the eyes and in one with that kinesthetic as such, like the kinesthetic will be a whole at first; correspondingly haptic happenings arouse “reflex movements” and stimulate from there the kinesthetic system.

The kinesthetic movement, however it has come into process, may temporally become “thematic” for itself, the Ego is awake for that and at first it has its satisfaction of pleasure within the process, itself as a telos. The kinesthetic fulfillments now, that is, the processes of hyletic happenings of the kinesthetic have their “innate” systematic. In the course de facto happening, the shapes of movement repeating themselves are distinguished, and the tendency instinctively goes towards repetition of similar ones and then the same respectively, towards regaining the former kinesthetic and still not persisting at it as a telos, but a movement soon[[31]](#footnote-31) proceeding and repeating, still articulated in repetitions, and thus eventually towards exercise and reign, which the available system has constituted and is happy in running through the well-known and in the ability to gain it in a repeating way. We thus would need to say, the instinct, having its impact on the kinesthetic, eventually goes towards the constitution of the governed system as a unity of accessibility, lying within one’s ability, [of an] optional regeneration of every layer.

Thus roughly the construction, if it is right that every kinesthetic sphere for itself is an instinctive connection, which [329] may have an impact by itself, may be discovered in of a kinesthetic system’s habituality of formation and implied therein of its partial systems.

But let us have a look at the thing from the hyletic fields and especially the quasi-extensive hyletic fields. We have there the optical field, therein conspicuous data – affecting ones. This shall not mean that a primal interest is directed towards them themselves, but they affect, this means, they are a *terminus a quo* for instinctive intentions. These are eventually fulfilled in the constitution of “sight things”, if we put aside by abstracting the combined instinctive tendencies. The instinctive excitation of oculomotoric kinesthetic belongs to that – but not for itself alone, but other kinesthetic systems are excited as well, which we first need to abstract from.

As soon as the oculomotoric kinesthetic starts, this is a discharge of the excited optical intention, but a discharge, which is only a transgression, and on which the view paying attention at first does not embark, always directed towards the optical. This date changes in the course of the kinesthetic, not in the way of a co-running of kinesthetic-hyletic emotions, but they are instinctive, spontaneous processes, the optical change, the process of adumbration. The view is directed towards that, this means: The process of the optical and kinesthetic change does not run alongside each other, but in the unity of an intentionality, going over from the optical date into the kinesthetic and leading back through it into the optical again, and in such a way, that every optical is a *t<erminus> ad qu<em>*, but functions as a *t<erminus> a quo* at the same time.

But in the change of the kinesthetic we always have <a> change of the optical field, and every distinguishing has its own row of changes, a unity of change. This would thus be initially affecting, and characterized in its course of change as a *t<erminus> ad qu<em>*, i.e. proceeding “due to” the kinesthetic.

[330]

No. 72

<Attempt to differ between affections and emotions of pleasure and unpleasure>

1. Background emotions,[[32]](#footnote-32) something not funny, whistle, bad smell – scent;
2. Do we not need to distinguish between affection and emotion? Objection: “Something draws my attention towards it, but emotionally I am indifferent”. What does this “indifferent” mean here? Neither liking nor disliking? It is neither funny nor not funny. If we say pleasure, if we say beautiful, pleasant, then this is something having a degree indeed, but continuously the quale pleasure, and this eventually disappears; similarly unpleasure, the quale unpleasure with a zero of unpleasure. Is the *adia<phoron>* a quale of emotion as well and not a disappearing of the emotion?

Transition: a beaming light phenomenon, wonderful! But further increase, still wonderful, but at the same time “rejecting”, hurting, hurting the eye. Pleasure does not go over into unpleasure continuously, but the increase of pleasure and from some point on some accompanying and increasing unpleasure. Increase of the pleasant warmth – slowly the heat becomes sensible, ever more unpleasant. Warmth in its intensity, pleasure then in its increase of pleasure.[[33]](#footnote-33)

I allow the intensity of warmth to further increase, the pleasure diminishes, becomes zero, and unpleasure sets in. May we thus describe? All that may take place without my enjoying devotion or turning away in disgust.

Something attracts my view, and its beauty attracts me – a scent, I become attentive and enjoy it.

I notice a smell, it is neither an especially pleasant one, nor especially unpleasant – “peculiar”, foreign – the unfamiliar becomes distinct, is apparent to me; perhaps only unusual in this surrounding, [331] in which it is abnormal (like some kind of smell , being normal in a chemical laboratory, emerging in the woods).

Does not every smell somehow touch the emotion? But is the emotion a quality, shading through blending, the *ad<iaphoron>,* a mixture of pleasure and unpleasure?

Eating. Pleasure for the date of taste – pleasure as satisfaction, pleasure for nutrition, hunger pleasure, depending on my being hungry. The hunger drive. As the case may be the same food, smell or taste has a different appeal with the Ego as a desiring one striving towards (and active in eating). The intensity, passion of striving towards is different with the same content and the same pleasure for the content, but is the the situation that simple here? Reluctance to eat more. The food, tasting, functions as a stimulus to continue eating and to furthermore enjoy thereby the taste continuously; instinctive drive to eat or to leave aside the eating.

Instinctive drive of objectivation – nature. Pleasure in the recognition of the same. Is that so? At first the normally happening, but quite different pleasure for the content of the date is guiding, and leads to optima, at first towards <an> ever-again-being-able-to-win of the same, and then of the same in optimal givenness – unity in adumbrating ways of givenness. But does this make a thing? Instinctive change of the interest, at first in single dates, then going towards the optimum by cognizing through adumbration; but in the kinesthetic change always some new and yet unifying disappearing and re-finding emerges with the help of other appearances and syntheses of appearance, being interesting themselves; unity of an interest, something identical of the sides, ass<ociation> of similar interests, general interest in objects as such. But this is quite rough.

No. 73

<The steps from the primal desiring towards the intersubjective object world>

1. Primal desiring,[[34]](#footnote-34) primal fulfilling of desire, primal pleasure, most primal activities and primal objects, the primal interest in perceiving, in the on-going gaining of the perception’s object; lowest level nature, of a there-oneself [332] in its all-roundness; Every space object constituted as a “good”, the current experiencing (after the constitutive genesis) a “re-enjoying of the good” or an actualization of the anticipated “enjoyability”; constitution – formation of a horizon of app<erception> as that of a horizon of accessible goods, goods of “curiosity” and of the acquaintedness springing from it, the perception, the experience, the getting to know and recognition. In contrast to that the primal desiring of food, the hunger-satisfaction-desiring, founded in the primal experiencing desiring (curiosity).
2. In the general field (and horizon) of things a realm of nutrition, nutritional goods, of goods as such in a special, <in> normal sense. The spatial-thing-world a world, in which edibilities emerge, which you can search for, which you can keep in a securing way, which you can prepare and concoct; there are animals and men among the spatial objects – which you can devour. Objects of the special pleasure or unpleasure – the special nutritional goods app<erceived> as such and thereby objectivated with the layer of determination “nutrition”, whereby this “feature” already presupposes the spatial object as an experiential object.

The object world – the nature proceeds constitutively. The subjects as objects in a certain way already presuppose nature in its primordialities. The subjects are only thereby objects (are only thereby objectivated), that for nature they are already experiencing subjects, that they have bodies with that as functioning organisms, as in which they mediately reign, and that they do not only have a spatial surrounding world and initially nature as lasting subject features, that they are thus subjects of experiencing (in the literal sense esthetic) interests, but also more primal other interests, of which the constant being in hunger-satisfaction was named, and thus of other special interests, related to pleasure and unpleasure-affections, that is, to special goods being for them. Or the subjects are originally <not only> subjects of “instincts” of objectivation of “something esthetically good”, of experiential goods, but also, and founded therein, of the nutritional instincts, of the objectivation of nutritional goods and of other goods of a higher level.

The subjects emerge as ego<logical> objects in the experiential field of every subject (Ego), and like all objects they are intersubjectively present as experiential objects.

The active doing life: 1) The experiencing, the perceiving, etc. looking at that which is there, color, and form, etc; looking at the objects for use in their characteristics of use, the understanding of the features of use, [333] the tongs as tongs, the spring as spring, etc. the Wherefore and all that in an individually typical way.

2) The enjoying, actualizing something enjoyable, that which is apprehended in an experiencing way as being given as being there, understood as “enjoyable”, affecting the feeling Ego, arousing a need and the practical option of a way of pleasure satisfaction. The enjoyability as character of the experienced, and the enjoying doing as an actualizing one. Thus one may also say, that the objective already has an experiential sense, as “food” for example, and in this regard the experience is activated in an actualizing way. Every thing experienced as good (as the “being there”) has its way to be “enjoyed”, i.e., <to be> actualized in its characteristic as a good, immediately and mediately.

3) The actions of the production of goods. Something experienced, initially taken <as> such, which has not already been experienced as a good, is apprehended as being as changeable in practical option, that it would become a good. This is of course proceeded by the change taking objectively place on its own, leading towards a shape of the being, in which it affects the Ego in a pleasureful way, and is enjoyed as pleasureful; as the other way round, that which already affects by that and originally has the character of the pleasant, looses it in the change, or arouses secondarily unpleasure in the weak, etc.

The analogous app<erception> of an object according to such experiences of change arouses the notion of the option of becoming better or good; and if this change becomes conscious as a practical option, that is, that option as my ability to produce the good, then intent and action of producing a good grow (material goods).

4) The doings of the social communication, those of the intersubjectivity as such, to not merely experience the other one, but to treat him, to give a message to him, to influence him in an indoctrinating way with the intention to form his intellect, his character in an educating way. Insofar I do form the other one as a good, his personal development and also <his> bodily, that is his development as a man towards a nice development, which pleases me when it succeeds. Possibly in pure love, but possibly also as medium towards other goals.

<To> talk to the other one though also fulfills the need for sociability and is immediately an enjoyment, where it does not serve any other purposes. It is the question whether this is, in this case of purely enjoying the social, some general philanthropy, where it does not have the illusory shape of convention, of the conventional game and of the [334] interest, not love, but social “standing” and the power to win, and where otherwise no other social interests merge.

The message may motivate the other one to act or towards some intent, the speech may in advance be a request towards an agreement, to take some action together with me or to something as some service to me, through promising a reward at that, etc. An arrangement, a contract has some habitual acceptance, some habituality connecting the respective subjects of the reciprocal and unifying determination, and thereby a constant acceptance related to time as that of its common life, which expires as future will (simply as a *fiat*-will), after the wanted is actualized in an active way. Thus the coming-to-an-agreement is an action, leading towards a common decision (the agreement itself), combining with later exertion towards the unity of an action. But not all common performances (working shapes from community) thus grow from agreement, e.g. not necessarily <a> scientific theory.

Agreement in communication, taking part in the life of other ones being there as well through the following understanding of the original expression and of the message. Non-agreement in the following understanding, in the coincidence with the other one; I may perform some co-acceptance, struggle with him, in contrast to that sympathy and antipathy, love for the whole person – hatred for the person, possibly threatening the being through the hate will, will to destroy the other one and vice versa.

The struggling action of the persons as persons, the struggles of individuals within the communalization and communities (already combined towards personalities of a higher order) for sovereignty, or rather, for the change of the power relations in sovereignty and service.

We need to clarify this mess!!

[335]

No. 74

<The constitutive steps of the composition of higher level objects from primal affection towards the complete intersubjective world. Constituting and experiencing acts>

Constitution of objects as unities of lasting “interests”, as persisting acquisitions of will actions, in which a goal is acquired respectively as a “good”[[35]](#footnote-35), that may ever again be “enjoyed” (experienced) in certain corresponding actions giving access. But objects are only objects in object horizons, or rather, in a universal horizon of acquaintedness and unacquaintedness. It is not easy to explain this more exactly. Initially we need to differ: 1) the passive primal intentionality, that of passive temporalization of unities, we may not call objects; 2) The affections, such unities practice, as stimulating the Ego as a feeling Ego; 3) The constituting acts in their different modes functioning in the unity of a constitution. These are the acts from which only the object app<erception>, on the lowest level primordial “nature” (the “first” “world” app<erception>) emerges that one, in which a world is there as experienceable and experienced in the invariant form of spatio temporality and every single object is already experienced as an object in the open world horizon.[[36]](#footnote-36) 4) These constituting acts (that enter into the experiencing acts as implicit foundation) are contrasted by exactly these experiencing ones, which we thus may not call constituting ones, although a static analysis, explication, therefore still is correctly called a constitutive analysis.

Experiencing acts are special app<erceptions> standing in the field of a universal app<erception>, <i.e.> actualizing acts, actualizing the final acquisitions, so to say causing enjoyment. As we did with the acts (being thus steps of the will) we need to differ the affections: final ones, primal affection (that is a primal emotion) and later affection, the primal affection of non-objects, but intentional unities, and the later affection of app<erceived> ones and eventually of object unities.

[336] The exhibition takes place in the inquiry back and then initially in the primordial reduction. The objectivation happens towards manifold directions and in cumulations. It becomes apparent that the object regions correspond to that. All objects and regions constituting themselves, necessarily have a single connection and necessarily form a single world, the primal core of which, the constitutive primal <cause> and reason was world, which is nature. Thus the regions are differed into primal region and founded region. A new kind of affection corresponds to every new region as the object determining the constitutive dimension.

The objects of a higher step have a) a layer, which rested on the affective stimulus field and the affective performances of the lower step determined by it, and b) a layer of the affection field, that of affections of a higher step, and correspondingly <they have> a double constitutive composition from constituting acts in contrast to the acts of the experiencing actualization of lower step app<erceptions>, in which the “ready” objectivity is experienced and “presumed” in empty modes of the experience. Experience and opinion of a physical thing is not constituting with regard to the thing; it is a cognizance of the thing or a pre-conception, fulfilling itself in cognizance, intention towards things.

But the construction of the complete world now is more complex through the functions of empathy. For as soon as it sets in the primordial first “world” (spatio-objectivity) gets the intentional character of the common one; but it is not in this regard already a new object layer instituted by special affections and actions, only later communality is objectivated itself. But still new affections and constituting acts emerge with the new empathy, if not with regard to the things as such; and that which is constituted anew are the subjects as “objects”, and especially as governing in their bodies and “experiencing world” with their help, but also in a certain way at the special objects called bodies a new object layer or rather, man as something psychophysical.

Apart from the unities of passive temporalization basic essentially kinesthetic, involuntary happenings belong to the first constitution, being quite immediate egoical happenings though (so to say passive happenings of the will, actions that can be changed into voluntarily to be mastered ones through practice). Then the “association” of kinesthetic with affecting “data” (the practice) and voluntary, or rather, facultative connections of kinesthetic abilities, and “following them” appearances, etc., associative and active syntheses of a higher step, aimings [337] and aims of a higher step, object app<erceptions> with an inner horizon, in combination with that external horizons as horizons already of such objects and thereby a whole field with an open horizon. An object field and objects <are> only app<ercept>ible as an object of their “world”, every object <is> completely apperceived as in the givenness of “sides”, each <has> its exterior and an exterior there-as-well. From there the Ego, if it is affected at all, is affected by objects, and by turning towards it, it means and experiences, it is directed towards the object, and this affection is actualized in the enjoying form through the first apprehending and then synthetic experience, all-round and explicating.

Most primal affection (primal mode), primal advertance: feeling in the primal mode “enjoying”, its What. Primal mode of the hyle: impression, changes into the empty modes, both change in the primal temporalization continuously primal impressionally in streaming. What is primal affection as a primary one and “still-consciousness”, still-affection? But now the still-affecting, the “empty conscious” affects again in an unmodified affection, a new, “unmodified feeling”: the missing, etc. Difficult descriptions!

We thus have there experiencing acts in contrast to the primal constituting ones. The constitution at first terminates in acts, in which objects are experienced as known ones and ever again to be actualized through accesses. The transference through app<erception> results in experience of unknown objects of the same object form – constitution of the invariant form (region), which needs to be distinguished afterwards through abstraction. It is accepted in the order of the constitutive composition: an already constituted object field may include objects which do not only affect as objects of their “region”, and thus do not only awaken the habitual will interest, motivating experience, but they may affect in new ways, that is, arouse a new kind of emotions, and thereby not only as the respective objects and the feeling so to say defining them. The former one is founding in this new affection. The founding does not now affect into the direction of the already constituted object world, or rather, towards the object itself, in order to get to know it through explicating, etc., but it practices in a new direction or it gives a new direction to the Ego. From there a new objectivation, a new constitution starts, such a one of a higher step, e.g. affection of hunger and pleasure of food (food instinct, -drive), food objects as things, but as food with a new kind of objective characteristics.

This implies as something fundamental: These basic types of affections (and emotions) do not fuse – they do not blend, as little as will acts [338] and directions of the will. They do not result in a “melting”, a melting is “unhistorical”. Still, they change from the form of the Together in explicit clarity into the modified form of the weird unclarity, which is still explicable, attributable to clarity.

(The new affection, the new instinct, going towards the co-subjects and subjects as such.)

If we stick to the primordial abstraction and that which within the same is to be shown as constituting and constituted, then we find in it the primordial nature with the distinguished physical body. It is distinguished by its being constituted in a special way, its co-functioning with all other objective things and of course by the Ego being the functioning one in the proper sense and the functioning in an experiencing way within the constituted body. I am as an Ego everywhere “present”, but not constituted as an object as long as simply not a special constitution has objectivated me, let alone that I were worldly constituted as a psychophysical object, as a worldly real one with a physical body and soul. As an Ego thereby performing in a constitutive way, as center of all constituting affections and actions, I am constantly a mentally living-performing one, constantly “conscious” as temporalized and temporalizing itself, but not conscious in the common sense, not an intentional object in the natural sense, the first <sense> of intentionality for us. How does the proper “I”-objectivation come about and in one with that the objectivation of other ones, eventually of other men, whereby it is the question as well, what the former shall be there?

The question transforms into this one: How does the “anonymously” functioning Ego and its anonymously constituting life together with respective habitualities become originally “interesting”? That means here (interest is a double concept as well and to be distinguished from the “naturally” objective concept of interest): How does a primal affection originate, in which the anon<ymous> Ego may be affected by itself and by other Egos? We already have some empathy in the primordial sphere, but set out of function, and anon<ymous> itself. It is empathy, in which another Ego, another constitution, another primordiality and primordial nature is appresented. What is as being necessary “accepted” in an already founding way? What am I already directed to habitually? What is in ever new awakening of my “lasting” interest, or, which is the same, what does affect me already and constantly as an identical object, in the “experience” of which I may find satisfaction? Otherwise expressed: What is my object world and within its frame my special world of goods? Simply that, which I stated above as being objective in the primordiality. But with the help of the anon<ymous> app<resentation> (or with the help of my [339] functioning as an empathizing Ego) the foreign primordial object world is in co-acceptance.[[37]](#footnote-37)

Unity is the governing Ego, which does not become objective in functioning therefore.[[38]](#footnote-38)

How does the other one and [how] do I become of aff<ecting> interest now? <A> primordial object field with the physical bodies is always already formed in me when empathy takes place, whereby thus both physical bodies are already objects as well, but in a pairing.

The surrounding of the object without further ado is app<erceived> as common, not in such a way as if the other one and I would face each other as human objects. Thus there is neither a psychophysical object “there” without further ado, nor the identical common body as carrier of a layer, of a horizon of experienceable psychic characteristics that are to be known. First of all the problem is, how the other man as a real object, as an object of a new regional horizon as horizon of possible explicit experience – cognizance – comes about; and again, in how far <the> other man does not have another way of objectivation; prior to that though, in how far he becomes an “object of possible experience” as such.

First of all, what is present if we take empathy into the constituting game? That is, this physical body there as a body, and another Ego governing therein, related to the common surrounding world, looking at that, which I look at myself, etc. Of course the other one is app<erceived> with an analogous peculiarity, already changed according to his bodily position though, and [with a] surrounding world, and yet primal, with the beginning of empathy as constitution. May this not say: object of possible experience in a similar sense to an already constituted thing? That, which comes into question here is the new interest in the other Ego, that is, in its pairing with my own Ego thereby entering interest itself. The interest is not an object interest yet, and not an interest in the foreign and proper body, namely not the experiencing interest, terminating in the already objective. The interest in the object, that of the old object sphere nature, has become a pervasive interest, thus the whole object field as an already acquired object horizon and horizon of possible [340] current interests of the terminating cognizance. A new direction of interest (a new terminating one) is now coming up, towards the Ego as that which governs in its body, thereby experiencing, and otherwise occupied with the things, and thus towards me. I am not only experiencing though, an interested one in being a spatial object, and thus occupied with following the being of these and those things. I also have the primal (instinctive) direction of interest in food, and thus [in] nutritional goods already in the field of the objects. This does not designate a mere object region, a class, a type distinguished as an object type, and now and then especially interesting me – in the experiencing interest; but a separate sphere of goods therein, which has a unity in the nutritional interest, and indeed may construct a special app<ercep>tive unity, a class, since certain features of experience indicate the enjoyableness, although they have only gained their distinction from desiring food and [from] the activity towards food, and a unity, which is not merely an objective unity of experience, but a unity from the new “interest”. The problem is here again first, how food is objectivated in a factual way, namely like a “factual” consideration.

No.75

<Acting, positive and negative desiring, pleasure, unpleasure>

Differentiation between 1) the egoical tension in the acting, in the realizing doing of proposals; I, directed through the way towards the final goal, continuously realizing in the going through, continuous tension and relaxation in one, until the goal is reached. The most primal ability, the most primal strength of the Ego;

2) The being affected of the volitional Ego, the desiring, being attracted in a desiring way and being there (in the emotion) in turning to, being kept by that in the pleasure as enjoyed pleasure conditionally; a) affection as background affection, attracting the Ego[[39]](#footnote-39) ; b) Affection as affection in the mode of the being-there of the Ego, to that degree of the affection already prior to [341] and up to the attention. Completely different degree: stronger or weaker pleasure, related to both modes in the same way.

Difference between the What of the pleasure and the pleasure itself; Enjoying of the Ego is that in the being-at-the-What-in-the-set-of-states-of-pleasure (and not for example that, “which has the character pleasure as an object”, although it becomes pleasurably app<ercept>ible as bringing pleasure to me).

Change of the What, grounded under increasing the pleasure, founds a continuous pleasure of a higher step of that, which is the increase, decrease [is] an unpleasure of this What. The primal What, the primal pleasurable (and not pleasurable), the hyletic as primal core everywhere present. On top of that the primal constant change in one with the involuntary kinesthetic. Entering of something “overwhelmingly” pleasurable makes the kinesthetic freeze, I enjoy. App<erception> of a possible increase disturbs the enjoyment through the deficit; desire (wishing, longing for) as: I strive for the optimum, for the possible height of increase. The beginning of the desired creates an enjoyment in the form of the pleasure of fulfillment – fulfillment simply of the desiring (and not of an acting). The Ego is active by its bringing the Ego mode of active doing into the kinesthetic processes (which are not hyletic and do not originally affect in a pleasurable or not pleasurable way). Dominating these processes under formation of the connections of the Ego and Thus, whereby the improvement, the optim<um> of being pleasurable is on the side of Thus. Disappearing of that which is full of pleasure from the field – loss. Repeating of the kinesthetic; desiring something pleasurable, which would result in pleasure – negative desire.

Accordingly this two-sidedness always belongs to the acting.

But many things are still missing. That which is not pleasurable coerces the Ego towards it as well – we need to have consideration for this from the beginning. Proper “enjoyment”, in the positive sense, is being there in a desiring way, in fulfilling a desire. But even more, pure enjoying is meant; if there is something not pleasurable in the field of the living present, then it disturbs the enjoying of something pleasurable, which has already attracted the Ego. The desiring life is positively directed, goes towards pure enjoyment by creating a universal desiring with a distinct content, and in continuation towards the optimum in the increase. Negative desiring is directed against all breaking in of something negatively pleasurable, against all decreases, disturbances. Desire is the basis of all action. Desiring is not a willing yet, is not a mode of the Ego activity itself yet. Action thus is related to enjoyment – thus in the lowest hyletic sphere.

The degree of desire and enjoying pleasure though is quite different from the degree of the Ego’s activity, of the striving with changing [342] force, of the winning through against “resistance”. The objects that shall become according to the wish within the action, are resistances for the acting Ego, insofar as they demand a tension of the force in the acting transformation (movement, change, etc.)

No. 76

<Note on pure reflection as objectifying access towards the streaming>[[40]](#footnote-40)

Pure reflection, not reflection on the ground of world acceptance, as a human reflection, recollection, voluntary repetition, direction of view towards the identical and then towards something else ever again, then towards the identical structure.

Do we not have to say, of course it is the “apperceiving” Ego, through which the stream becomes physical? But the mere streaming simply becomes physical through the viewing, etc. and through the facultative possibility of the ever-again. The being prior of the streaming being is simply to be made physical “any time”, and can only thus be described transcendentally.

No.77

<Reduction to the Ego and reduction to the living present>

Reduction[[41]](#footnote-41) to the Ego is not reduction to the living present yet, to the so to say immanently living, but at first reduction to myself as the Ego having world in acceptance of being and itself as a man in acceptance of being – or else: as an Ego having world in its acts, in its mental livings, its habitualities, simply as being accepted by it, as pregiven, given world.

This Ego is the immanent in its immanent temporality, the Ego of the stream of consciousness as the endlessly extended stream of time with present, past, future, with an identical Ego pole of simultaneous [343] and successive acts, habitualities, etc; the Ego, which always has appearances of things, appearances of the self of its humanity and thus appearance of world as such in new subjective ways, therein always the world (surrounding world) appearing as constituted in this and that way, an ever again different one, etc.

But this does not need to be reflected, I do not need to reflect and to have it thematically and explicitly, except possibly in empty generality. I, the meditating one living in this immanent temporality, can simply have world, and then practice epoché in this universal acceptance “world”, and thus have the “world phenomenon”. In the thematic view: I, directed towards something worldly and world, Ego pole and pole of the object.

Thus, I only arrive at the primal phenomenal present through inquiry back (in the epoché) from the constantly being world, as being accepted by me in its being sense, according to the ways of acceptance, according to all subjective ways of the having-accepted-them, the ways in which it is meant, and the substantial sense contents, belonging to it in the acceptance. I thereby perform a reflection on my subjectivity as that one bringing to acceptance of being for me something worldly and world in totality in its What and How; I get to know the subjectivity as the one performing this – myself as a mundane subject, that is, as a cognizing subject. Inquiring back in such a way I arrive at my absolute, concrete being and absolute “life”, thus eventually also at my action inquiring back and [at my] reflecting itself as transcendentally taking place in its concrete-constituting “connection”.

No. 78

<Note on the Ego as center of my acts’ rays>

The[[42]](#footnote-42) Ego as center of the acts – radiating of the acts in mental living within the immanent field. Acts and acquisitions of acts, constituting sense; acts as instituting, repeating acts, activity of identification and differentiation, of the relationship, the connection, takings together, etc. acquisitions, from which ever new acquisitions arise through activity.

In the sphere of immanence and its multi-dimensional streaming emerging of the “formations” – that which emerges as a “date”, and that which the Ego “adds” as apperception – primal dates.

[344] The constant temporalization of the field of mental living as “field of data” – the reduction to the “data”, to “mental livings”. Now the secondary temporalization of the Ego, its acts, its acquisitions, but also the horizons of apprehending.

What is this after all: Radiating of the acts from the Ego, radiating into the field of mental processes? What is that, a temporalized act? If we take temporalization as objectivation, then is temporalized nature, men and animal; therein the Ego and the Ego’s act, Ego-habituality, world as acquisition of consciousness, acquisition of the act of the respective Ego and for me myself my world and therein the other ones, etc., all that is worldly temporalized, something being in different changes of “being”.

But all being is constituted from the Ego, from the transcendental subjectivity, from the Ego-all. But constitution of being as egoical performance is related back and constantly related back to the field of immanence.

The objective temporality, in which all real is temporalized and related back to all ideal, or even better, the objective nature, in which all Ego as persons (as personal subjects of their acts and their habitualities are naturalized-temporalized), in which furthermore all cultural mentality has its spatialization and temporalization, this objective world is objectively temporalized, by its respectively presenting itself for the Ego currently in immanent experience – the objective temporality points back towards the temporality of mental living, eventually to the “field of immanent perception of something worldly”.

It is perception of something worldly though as an apperception, and there we arrive at the hyletic and the apprehension, at the core of apprehension and the apprehension-as.

No. 79

<The Ego in the living present (U25-U36)>

<a) Temporalization of my acts. Physicalization and humanization of the Ego in the primordial sphere>

Certainly, we can say nothing else, but that the intentionality is changed in its having taken over the shape of an actively performed one, and this is a basic fact we will not get beyond, although it is already a “construction”, as we do neither get beyond the affection in its modes being a pre-active change in the way of [345] the whole intentionality and of the object’s being-for-us. But we need the specific concept of the performance for acts and an active Ego and therein the pregnant concept of the performance with the continuing modes in contrast to later continuing acceptance, which is no performance then.[[43]](#footnote-43)

Now we need to further consider that through the temporalization of the Ego-acts and of the Ego itself humanization comes about, and first of all the self-humanization of the first shape, the physicalization of my Ego.[[44]](#footnote-44) Constitution in all its shapes is association in a constantly enlarging sense. All association presupposes primal association in the sphere of primal temporalization. Where the association does not act, nothing can sediment, and if in this sphere of primal temporalization Ego-acts and Ego do not appear, they cannot enter association either. Now we can understand that a primordial spatiotemporal “world” can only be constituted through some experience, in which the experiencing takes place in bodily doing, so that a worldly object and body are correlatively constituted; and again, that the constitution of one’s own body already means the constitution of the psychophysical Ego.[[45]](#footnote-45) Of course thereby I am not a man yet in the full sense – a man and egoically a human person that as that is only constantly a constituent in its own personal being in the social-personal connection by the fellow men. It is only an abstraction the primordial delivers. But it becomes clear through this reductive-abstractive course that the constitutive performance, resulting in me as a “primordial man”, is founding for the constitution of other ones as objects in the intersubjective spatiotemporality and world, constituting itself at first as “the” world, simply the world of us all, in which we are objects ourselves.

With regard to the psychophysical constitution we need to consider in this connection that not something like the body itself is constituted and the bodily being somehow as an external cover. The body with its organs standing out as members is a sedimentation of abilities of the doing-ability in such and such typical forms. One may not stop at generalities and <one should> also consider that every thing in its constitutive structure (and thing taken generally in its general [structure]) simply carries along the sedimented constitution, and this implies a general sedimented ability of the bodiliness. But a [346] body is constituted in concrete generalities, and <the> special apprehension as the body of this man implies apperceptive anticipations of special abilities, special sedimentations; to be able to not only walk, but also to climb, jump, dance, not only to perceive by groping, but to be able as well to write, but also to cut, to carve, to play the piano and have a skilled hand for that, etc.

The[[46]](#footnote-46) next question relates to the differences of performances, lying outside the unitary act. The continuity making up <the> unity of the act, is a continuity of changes of the one act performance. But it is still, from the beginning to the end, “a real act”, “really in process”.

How about the times before and after the act now? I find myself as the one investigating sense as the Ego having a world, living vividly within the world, knowing itself to be in the time not only in its practice acting in the common sense, reshaping real objectivity, but also in all its natural acts, in which it is always conscious of itself as a man and performing human acts, related to the world. The acts are in the objective world time and are related to something worldly, that is, to something world-temporal.

In the transcendental attitude, where the world is a phenomenon with my mankind, thus becomes an intentional formation of acceptance, I am guided back towards my “transcendental subjectivity” and thereby towards my primal modal present; but thereby, as has just been completely clarified by the last investigation <I am guided back> towards a last time sphere, presupposed in all change of the world phenomena, eventually transcendental time sphere as the transcendental time with the transcendental temporal content, in which the phenomenon world eventually “becomes conscious” to me as a transcendental Ego, simply is my, the transcendental-phenomenological Ego’s, phenomenon. I need to arrive from there at showing, or rather, making clear to me myself, that I, the same Ego, was a “transcendental one” formerly as well, before I performed the transcendental attitude, that for me in my past (for me, the transcendentally minded one through reduction) the transcendental action of the reduction had a beginning, and that prior to that I, as the same Ego, that was an Ego, for which world was a being world in a natural way, and which was psycho-physically conscious of itself as a human Ego, had apperceived itself [as a human Ego].

[347] Furthermore I clarify from there that every other man for me discloses himself from my transcendental present and past as a transcendentally appresented Ego with a transcendentally appresented sphere of the present being his own, and as a transcendental one carrying the world phenomenon as well, which is for me as an identical formation, being for us in community, etc.

Now we move backwards first: I, the one transcendentally investigating sense, find my originally streaming present as a transcendental primal temporalization: As the primal streaming (the primal association) in its “continuity”, its standing and lasting streaming, in which immanent time, itself streaming again, is constituted. In this immanent time are implied my appearances of something worldly, or rather, my respective (and in continuation of my immanent mental processes, my changing world appearances) unitary total appearance of the world, which for its part, constantly changing in this continuation, establishes a synthesis again lying in the immanent sphere: Continuously the same world appears to me.

As a transcendentally-phenomenologizing Ego I am actively directed towards the primal streaming present and towards the immanent sphere temporalized therein, but towards the immanent world’s modes of appearance, as modes of appearance of “the” world.

The immanent acceptances of being, enclosed in the appearances and in the total continuously-synthetic appearance of the world, have a changed mode of performance for me, that of the “not-participating”, that of the being “parenthesized”, whereas the acts, in which the appearances for me, the way they are now immanent ones for me, that is, with the parenthesized acceptances, do not have this modification.[[47]](#footnote-47)

If I later go over to the elaboration of the transcendental phenomenology of the natural world life, then my, the phenomenologist’s, modalities of performance differ from those of the naturally minded transcendental Ego, my, the phenomenologizing’s, ways to live through vivid present and to have them with the content of the phenomenologizing Ego, from those of the non-phenomenologist, as I myself have been prior to that, according to my phenomenological assertion. This implies issues for the structure of the phenomenological study and presentation.

At first I may not know anything of that, which will only be the study’s result. Do I not thus have to start at the phenomenologizing vivid [348] present? But is this not a way of disclosure, and possibly an easy one, in order to gain it?

I still need to begin by contrasting: The standing-on-the-ground-of-the-naturally-being-world-of-experience, or rather, the universally-keeping-in-performance-the-experience-in-a-natural-way with the suspending-their-execution, “taking-them-out-of-acceptance”. My beginning, in other words, is a going back towards the transcendental Ego, namely towards the performer of the activity, through which <the> world is there, simply there, and with that accepted content, being accepted from activity, which the activity of the continued world life presupposes, insofar as every further activity continues the preceding one, counting on its result, its acquisitions, planning and doing something further with that, which has been done. The Ego always already has <something>, where it acts, by which it has something new. Everything it has through acting enters the world it has prior to the acting, and whatever it does, and whenever, that is, always already has. Thus a world, one, which, enriched by ever new acquisitions, is always a new one, and, whenever we question it, whenever we begin in an acting way, always already had acquisitions of the doing.

<b) Acquisition of acceptance and modifications of the continuing acceptance by the Ego>

But the acquisitions’ entering the world, and the world itself as world of acquisitions has the character of acceptance from the Ego, whose acquiring it is, <they are thus acquisitions,> evermore remaining dependent on the Ego, rather: remaining attached to it. That, which has been done is there, the doing is over, the act of the aiming- and reaching-for-this-and-that is over. But the acquisition is an acquisition for the Ego, as long as it continues being accepted by it as fulfillment of the intention. The will act and its implied modes of the will are over, but the “will” is not over. E.g. my scientific manuscript is my scientific manuscript only as long as that which is written in it expresses my scientific conviction. If on further consideration I arrive at the conclusion “failed”, then it moves into the wastepaper basket, as paper. A rotten, unusable instrument has been an instrument, but it is this no more, etc. But the simplest perception of a natural object is already concerned here. It ends as an act, but I acquire knowledge through it, namely the thing henceforth being for me in its connection. But it remains something being there for me in the nature being for me only as long, as my former perception, namely the acceptance of being performed in it, [349] continues being accepted. It depends on the course of my experiences, that is, of my life continuing and acquiring in ever new current experiences, whether this acceptance may remain, whether it further counts to my lasting experience – in the ont<ic> sense – thus to my world, that, which is my experience.

We[[48]](#footnote-48) thus always have this situation and already find it prior to the phenomenological reduction. By investigating sense, I find the world continuously being for me, that is, perceived according to a content in current perception, and beyond that still accepted with contents acquired of old; but beyond the well-known as well the horizon of the constant acceptance of something unknown of the world, that is, acceptance of the world of something known and unknown and still to be cognized, whereas vividly continuing perception always creates a cognizance, possibly something well-known as something still being, verified through new knowledge. Manifold acceptances are in this acceptance, which are changing though, modalizing themselves, that is, especially in their changing into deleted acceptances or into acceptances, which have become dubious, only possible, etc. But it is me, who acquires, has acquired, furthermore adhering or not adhering to the acquisitions of acceptance. Thus, the world has some lasting acceptance from me according to the general, i.e., a lasting being for me, and according to the special a special relief of acceptance, depending on whether I remain at my convictions or change myself as an Ego having in acceptance and not only accepted once or will accept.

Always though the “content”, the “content of objectivation” of that, which is for me as a world, and of that, which is in detail accepted by me as worldly, differs from the “it is or it is not” or is an option, possibility, questionability, etc. Now, the contents, being accepted there or having modalities of acceptance, can and will indeed in general imply acceptance. Acquisitions of acceptance deriving from Ego acts, may indeed, in known manifold ways again be taken over and serve for new acquirings[[49]](#footnote-49), as long as I adhere to them. But how far we ever wish to go back, these two kinds are always necessary: 1) the act, being originally acquiring, creates an acceptance, acceptance of being, acceptance of a content; 2) and the content is always already presupposed, so that an act, a doing, may begin and fulfill its intent with it.

[350] The going back towards the Ego, by which the world is accepted, and which is an Ego creating acceptance, changing acceptances and still ever again creating unitary acceptance – creating due to contents always preceding – is thus a going back towards the primal source of all performances of acceptance as an Ego and towards that, which eventually presupposes the active, the performing Ego as a content.

The system of tasks is predelineated from there. 1) We need to be on the lookout first in the primal modal present and learn to understand it in its double or rather threefold primal modal change, the primal modal not-egoical change, the primal temporalization, in which an Ego foreign hyletic quasi-world has its pre-being; 2) then[[50]](#footnote-50) the Ego, for which this pre-world is and by or in the functioning of which in affection and action the proper world gets created, in a multiplicity of generating steps, to which relative worlds correspond.

But we see that we did not take into account the emotional layer in this two-partition.[[51]](#footnote-51) This is where the following reflection leads to.

c) Emotion and affection. <Their relation to the Ego in the vivid present>

Easily one makes the mistake of being too abstract.

Affection and action – this may not diverge too much. Is affection not a mere prior mode of action, the mode of the awakening of action? The Ego is awakened, it is “called” to act. a) The Ego, which has acted and has acquisitions from there, an acceptance persisting in it as modification of the originally acting one, is awakened for reactivation; b) The Ego apperceives. The potentiality is awakened in it for an acting, which is modification of some former actual doing, but another modification, that through apperceptive analogy.

But how about the postulated primal affections in the primal hyletic sphere? May we say there: This affection here precedes every doing, and the consequent doing, if it has the predominant affective force, shall be the mere turning-to and seeing? But what kind of seeing is that? What kind of activating the “passive” primal impression and protention is that supposed to be? The protention is already passively “fulfilled”. Is it striving then without an Ego, continuously leading towards actualization, constantly awakening [351] new striving, etc.? But how about this construction? Is not every striving already egoical? But[[52]](#footnote-52) how can a striving be egoical, if the Ego, as at the backgrounds of the primal modal hyletic present, is not there at all? Or are these different modes of the “being present there”?[[53]](#footnote-53)

The question of salience belonging here and [of] the significance of feelings and the emotion in the unity of the primal impression (the total one) as mood, but in the way of the streaming constitution with its shaping of the unchange and change. Content and emotion, change of content and change of emotion, contentual affection through the emotion.[[54]](#footnote-54) Emotion as something “attractive” and “repulsing”; the contentual salience mere condition of the affection, not properly affecting; thus, the emotion affects in the way of “attraction”. What does this mean?

Initially we should differ two concepts of affection: 1) the hyletic content “affects” the Ego in the emotion, but then the affection is not a call the Ego answers by turning-to or not turning-to, answers with an act. The content founds the emotion, and the emotion is there with the content. Then we would further have to say: but certainly the single content as part of the whole hyletic-immanent (the constituted) sphere is also emotionally a part. The part is salient and as that a piece of content of a fusion and within of a respective configuration. If the configuration is another one, then the same part has also another partial character, character of relation. As the case may be for example qualitative contrast characters emerge, missing another time. Thereby the characters of emotion are determined as well. But are these emotions only contents of a higher step, emotions of mere founding contents? And are we eventually able to say, that these are also configuratively unified or are components in one with the founding contents of a concrete configuration, to which they essentially contribute in a configuring way? Does this not proceed in infinity?

Still, let us have a closer look at the case. Let us remain there, let us try that the contentual in its configuration determines the emotion in the primal hyletic immanent sphere.[[55]](#footnote-55) The contentual is the Ego foreign, the emotion is already egoical. The “addressing” the content shall not be a call to something, but a feeling being-present of the Ego, that is, not only as a being-present through arriving and reaching. The Ego is not something [352] for itself and the Ego foreign something separated from the Ego, and between them there is no room for a turning to, but the Ego and its Ego foreign are inseparable, the Ego is a feeling one in every content in the connection of content and in the whole connection. Feeling is the Ego’s set of states prior to all activity, and, if it is active, in the activity.

But why do we after all count the emotion in a special way as a part of the Ego as its set of states, and why shall the hyletic content be Ego foreign and not be called a set of states of the same as well?

The talking of the Ego of course is eventually determined by the “polarization” of the Ego acts. In the genetic inquiry back we construct as a beginning the still world-less preliminary field and the preliminary Ego, which is already a center, but not a “person” yet, let alone a person in the common sense of the human person.

The constant genesis, lying in the formation of worldly apperceptions, and correlatively the further formation of the world as being for me, guides the genetic inquiry back: It has become obvious, that every mundane-objective apperception has its genesis, but also the streaming primal modal concrete present has become obvious, in which (with whatever content world is given) all “appearances” of something worldly lie, all opinions and the meant, appearing, experienced, etc., as such and within its How. The constant structure hyle and hyle in characters of emotion now belong to the streaming present, in whose temporalizing-temporalized streaming all genesis is vivid genesis.[[56]](#footnote-56) We differ between unity of the hyle and unity of the emotion. Each has its different way of change, and we may consider in abstractive consideration (abstracting from the already constituted world phenomenon with all its “appearances”, that is, from that, which makes the hyletic data become “shades”, from their “apprehensions”), how a genetic beginning, already resulting in hyle and emotion any way, were to be constructed; but also Ego pole as pole of affection and action.

But we also need a larger accuracy here for the method of this reconstruction. However far we move back in the recollection and however we may imagine a vivid present in free fantasizing there, we always have a vivid present, in which world is conscious, world experienced, etc., that is, to me as an active Ego, being worldly imagined as an Ego-man. There is a problem here we need to emphasize sharply:

[353] De facto I do not have any recollection of a pre-worldliness. Why am I not able to consider even the option of a different recollection? Or is this to be doubted? Equivalent to that: However I fantasize my vivid present anew (which is world-presentiating in the now streaming form and also has been world-presentiating as recollected therein), thus intuitively construct a contingently varied vivid present, it always remains world-presentiating, just that the world is itself respectively an invented change of the de facto world at that. Is this an essential necessity now or do I bind myself, only unnoticed in the otherwise free variation, to my being a man in the world, or rather, to my varying the world and the taking place of coincidence of identity in the variation, thus varying world option into world option, thereby thus only varying my vivid present as one experiencing world, etc.?

May I not proceed otherwise as well, so that this binding indeed makes the starting-point, but is then overcome? Every variation presentiating world is founded on a structure of the primal streaming present, to which my Ego belongs as an Ego anyway, which is affected respectively and is active – from the conscious world.[[57]](#footnote-57)Conscious means: The manifold unitary “*cogito*”, whose *cogitatum* is the world, or rather, the manifold-unitary *cogitata* of the conscious world as their universe belong to the primal streaming present. The whole of the streaming present is a whole *cogito* with an identical Ego pole and as a pole of the manifold *cogitationes*, still making a single whole, a universe, “in” which I, the identical I-“think”, in which I am the Ego of consciousness. I then have to differ for this universe, making up the primal vivid present itself, between: 1) the specific acts, those, in which I live in a distinguished sense, namely as an active one, as an occupied one, occupying myself, occupied though with the cogitated, the intentional objectivities, the worldly ones, simply as respectively meant ones, being accepted by me, the Ego. 2) Furthermore I need to differ *cogitationes* of another mode in the universal milieu of the cogitative present, not of the doing [mode], but of the merely affecting one, possibly facts of transition, transitions, change of an affection into active *cogitatio*. 3) Eventually I have reason to speak of the backgrounds as *cogitationes*, which even do not [354] have an affecting mode, possibly changes of the being-affected, where we will have to speak of something “contentual” though, as we did in the former change. But at first the most general of this differentiation; proceeding now in a “purely phenomenological way”, I will have to talk of content (in the *cogitatum qua cogitatum*) as a pure objective content and of the determinacy of emotions, and possibly use the expression “value” in this last regard. I need to consider precisely in the current consideration, the one explaining the content of the vivid present in a purely phenomenological way, which of titles, objective content, character of the value, or rather, emotion, we need to count among the streaming primal present itself, and which modes the same determines in the different modes of the *cogitationes* distinguished above.

<d) On the esthetic feeling of value>

The beauty of an object as a value, simply value of beauty (or rather, value of non-beauty), “value of indifference”. An object may have its own beauty, and at the same time have a value of contribution as part of a bigger whole, possibly be an *adiaphoron* in itself, only have value due to its taking part. But it may be right to look at the *adiaphoron*, as I have always done, as a value as well, although in a certain way as the “zero” between plus and minus.

Every object has its content, its essence. Beauty is “in an uninterested way” purely based on the essence. This means the same, the existence of the object is out of question for beauty – out of question for the “mind”.

How is the existence for the mind in question? Objects may determine the mind not only purely by their content, but also with the help of their “existence” or non-existence, or rather, through modalities of the existence. The enjoyment, in which beauty is originally actualized (self-given in the mind), is something different from the joy, in that the mind is determined by the being-present or as mourning for the “loss”, for the non-being, no-more-being, etc. Wishing, desiring belong here.

Furthermore to change the willing and acting as having an impact on the real, actual world in such a real way, that that comes into existence, which has been wished for, or rather, has been desired prior to that. The acts, in which the Ego is determined through being and modalities of the being within the “mind”, are the acts of “interest” in a special sense, the other acts of the mind are the “uninterested” acts. But this leads to problems for the relation between beauty (value) and existence.

[355] The[[58]](#footnote-58) beauty of an object already existing, the peculiar value beauty already determined by its [the object‘s] own content. The enjoyment is one with the perception, every new perception will result in the same enjoyment as an enjoyment of the same object according to its own same value. If the object is recollected, then its value is representiated as well, “re-enjoyed”, and thus for every way of consciousness of the object. The fiction of an object is pre-imagined, as if it was. Objects of the same essence, of the same “idea”, have the same value.[[59]](#footnote-59) But as we speak of actually existing and merely possible objects, thus [we speak] of actually existing and possible value objects and concrete values themselves.

A fictum is a fictum, may it also be constituted as a being fictum, and is an object-as-if not with its “beauty” (its value as such) “as-if” not a value itself, and if something “beautiful-as-if” was invented, then something beautiful itself? A presentiation in a picture, the beautiful of the picture’s existence? The beautiful of the picture itself?

The value of existence – subjectively the enjoying its existence, as a mode of the will, fulfilled desiring, willing, willing as striving; the enjoying the existence of the beautiful. Acting and realizing of the existence, i.e., creating a new being from other being in some way of aiming through its change, formation together, etc., in which the beautiful comes into existence, and the beautiful may actually be enjoyed. Being interested in the existence – if the beautiful view could be obstructed, the enjoying its still existence; on the other hand enjoyment of its beauty, the enjoying the existence does not depend on the enjoyment, the certainty of being of every kind suffices. The interest in the being – determined by the option of the non-being or actuality of the non-being.

The creation of a fictum “for its beauty” – what may this mean? To create the fictum as being, so that I may ever again ascertain its existence and enjoy its value – a beautiful fantasy, I repeat it, I intend to memorize it. Precision: I express my “fantasy”, I register it in a physical picture or in literature, I own it as a being fictum (being for me, habitually, from my fantasizing and [from the] repeating identifying my lasting formation of fantasy). Then I have a worldly existing picture and even two things: 1) The picture-thing being a good for me, [356] since it objectively presents a beautiful picture; 2) on the other hand I have raised the picture itself to objective existence mediately by way of pictorial physical presentation and to an existence “for me”, always accessible for me for the time being, and I am its owner as of a being picture.

But now the differentiation I attempted? “Values of content”, uninterested in existence and the existential value? But may we maintain this?

Uninterested – I do not have any purposes lying outside, it does not have any relation to that, for example to my “life purposes”, if I am not an artist. The emotion is purely determined by the content. The content is self-given in the complete intuition of the object – even if it was a view as object – I do not have the actual enjoyment in a presentiation if it is reproductive, not the actual enjoyment, but if the “picture” is created in the modification as a formation of fantasy, as being for me, and <as> my available being one, I have it back and I enjoy its beauty – simply the beauty of the picture, as in the other case that of the real object or of the actual view of an object, of the beautiful appearance, of the beautiful view, which is itself constituted as a proper being.[[60]](#footnote-60)

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<Perception and apperception in the perception of a thing>[[61]](#footnote-61)

Inquiry back[[62]](#footnote-62) on nature and from nature as a guideline.

Phenomenological archaeology, the digging up of the constitutive buildings hidden in its construction members, of the buildings of apperceptive sense performances being readily at hand as world of experience. The inquiring back and then exposing the single performances creating a being sense up to the last ones, the *ἀρχήαι*, in order to give rise again in the mind [357] to the matter of fact unity of the multiply founded acceptances of being with their relative being things. As in usual archaeology: reconstruction, understanding in “zigzag”.

World as world for us – world as world, as it shows itself to us in universal experience in its original being sense, in its general ontological structure – foundation in this ontological sense of experience; nature as ontological core, world and therein afterwards nature as a theme of inquiry back. Reduction of the world and then of nature in universal, actual and possible experience, our experience, towards the world and nature of my own universal experience, and from there of my respective single actual and possible experience: in the stream of my immanent temporality, in which my experience emerges respectively as a “mental living” – question on the ont<ic> purely as that of the temporal and single experience, finite single experience as perception and apperception in one. The proper experiencing and its horizon.

Every finite single experience has again as its proper experienced thing a natural core, the temporal universal experience reduced to its properly perceptive content – the field of perception. This universal temporal experience encloses a single objective experience (counted among that group experience, up to the whole group of the perceptional field). Ont<ically> perceived is something respectively real, a thing of the world, in being reduced it shows as its specifically proper core of experience the side of the thing.

Time stream of the primordial life as stream of mundane apperceptions, therein the stream of the things’ ways of givenness of the sides of the respective field of perception. The sides in there <are> sides with their horizon, sides-of. Side acceptance in a horizon acceptance encompassing it, continuous perception of streaming, synthetic transitions from the givenness of sides towards the givenness of sides, but in continuation fulfilling the intention of horizon. The horizon, that, which is meant beyond the side and by which it is side-of, emerges itself, fulfilling the “meaning”; thus study of this synthesis, through which the perception is build up from perception and separate perceptions (re-presentiated) are combined to an experience through identification – but as this unity is a “meaning” in its unitary sense as well, which needed to be disclosed, to be designated, to be fulfilled through a continuity of possible perceptions. But I will at first put aside the problems implied here, in contrast to the <problems> of the unity of a continuous <perception> as a mental process.

[358] Thus first: world as world of current perception and especially nature, aesthetics of the pure thing of perception, within the possible unity of a perception. What can it show there itself as something identical? As being what will it be apperceived at the same time and necessarily? “Explication” within perception as a form of change belonging to every perception, as to every apperception, explication of the showing properly itself.[[63]](#footnote-63) Ontological moments of explication of the respective perception according to its sense of perception (ontological sense); thus in the *res extensa* its extensional essence and its being in the space, its respective place in the space and concretely its being as moving or resting. The extensional What, the persisting within the changes. The thing as persisting in its changes, not relating to its changes of place in the space, that is, its extensional What.

Deformation: change of shape, that of the “geometric” bodiliness and changes of this bodiliness’s qualification. These changes do as well have their zero-cases. In the unity of a perception, of a possible perception of the same, all these changes can emerge, and identity of the thing is a persisting in these changes as that, which changes within these.[[64]](#footnote-64) A foundation shows itself in the contrasting of these possible changes, in such a way, that you regard one or the other direction of change in an explicating way: the extended quality may change without its shape changing, but the shape (the “extension”) necessarily changes the qualification in its change, which is only what it is, as an extended one of this extension, etc. Duration and bodiliness.

The bodiliness has a surface and has an inside and so [does] also the qualitative thing; but both are not the same: the inside is explicated in planes. This will be important soon.

Question on those ontological moments of the perceptual thing, which may be perceived in the way of proper perception, which, if they are not properly experienced, may emerge themselves in the “side”, in the possible continuity of a continuing perception as perception of the same in the unity of the enlarged perception.

[359] Change here leads us back to unchange. The apperception of the persisting thing as an ont<ological> being sense implies, that it is a constant series of contents, which either continuously remains the same or not in every moment of the concrete duration taken into view – the thing is unchanged or changes. And if it changes, then it is conceivable for the content of every moment of change, <that it> remains the same in all further moments. The sense apperceptively belongs to the essence of change, that it is a continuum of momentary resting so to say.

In the inquiry back: the explication of the unchange is the basis of that of the change. Change has a secondary way of experience, of perception. If we now question, in regarding the possible limit case, which is a basic case here, the <case> of a constantly unchanged object of perception, on the properly perceived, then we cognize a basic differentiation therein: We apperceive the thing as such, having its place in the space. It “is” within the space. But that, which is properly experienced there, is the thing in its What-content, and not the space. And if we speak of the experience of the thing’s motion, then it is clear, that this <happens> with regard to the relation of the sense of change to unchange, that motion is experience in quite another sense than deformation or change of the shape or decomposition.

No. 81

<Constitution of the unitary temporality through recollection. The originary in the subjective as such>

I[[65]](#footnote-65) as a man conscious of the world. Straightforwardly occupied by something, directed towards something, affected by something else, not directed towards it. Repeated reflection: retentionally still conscious the having-just-now-directed-myself. This affects me, to direct myself towards this having-just-now-been in having turned back, to currently direct. And thus ever again. This process itself becomes thematic and becomes a now current chain of acts as a recollection in its modification, and thus ever again. Thus I reflect the directing-myself, then again the being-occupied-with-something as the identical [360] Whereby, the continuously proceeding, explicating perception, etc.

I now direct myself towards this, now towards that object of my perceptional field, every act is directed towards its goal, as a unity, as the same Whereto of manifold acts, which for their part as acts have their act synthesis.

1. Primal original sphere, primal original present in the streaming with its time field. The acts emerging therein. I say “I am now in this present” active in many ways – the actions, these acts <are> primal original, and I can reflect them in the given way, instead of directing myself in them towards their unitary goals, towards them themselves as immanent unities being constituted in the present stream.
2. Presentiations emerging in this stream, the present field, and acts going through them, directions towards something presentiated.

bα) Presentiations, in which I “remember”, in which my immanent temporality is constituted. My present mental living is the “emerging” memory, my act of memory as occupying me actively with something remembered, “reviewing” it in memory, again regarding it singly, again occupied with that, as always. The remembered in the acceptance of being as Past, past present. Co-acceptance of present and of past, of the original-identically persisting in the streaming present, and of the remembered in recollection, of the reproduced, again retrieved identical. And this being-together, remainingly-being as ever again reproducible – the original in the change of originariness and identification of the same as recollectible things, to be identified in sameness and thus having been lastingly.

The acquisition of “something being” on a first step in the living, originary stream and in the institution of the to-be-remembered-again. The constitution of a temporality through the ability of recollection as “coming back” to that, which originally was a primal vivid present (which is only a circumscription of the memory’s own sense). And thus all temporalizations as modifying Becoming and as presentiation, making an appearance <as> reproduction in a primal vivid way.

Subjective time, my time, time of my immanent being. What is that, “immanent time”? And what about the identical Ego?

If we perform reduction to the primal original in the primal original stream – exclusion of all presentiations, we take them as <that>, which they are themselves in [361] the original present themselves, or rather: I do that. But this “I do” itself belongs there. I see that in a reflection, then I see through reflection the same for this reflection, nay, I am always one step ahead, and I do indeed investigate sense and I am already reflecting as that.

First of all: I put myself out of action at first as an Ego of the universal sense investigation, the reflections, and I look at my primal vivid, current being and life. I see, I hear, I judge the seen, <I have> the certainty of being prior to the predicative judgment, that which shows itself in certainty identical in many ways. But there is constantly the anticipating, the co-acceptance of something non-primal present, the joining of “presentiations”, of implicit ones.

I ask, which presentiations are presentiations of mine, of that, which makes up my own being? My being, the being constantly originally instituting itself in the vivid present, and <showing> itself as ever again identifiable in instituting, as <that>, which I may always go back to, as what belongs to me, the being one.

I am as being vividly current becoming-being and becoming as being now in my having-beenness, as a streaming Now, still always persisting as I-have-been in streamingly-sinking, which on the other hand faces a future in another becoming as always in the change towards present and through present towards the past; and in this change I am identical in temporality, I, who I now am, was, and will be. And that, which I am not myself, but what I, as consciously living, in my being, have conscious as a non-Ego. That, which is conscious therein and conscious in my primal original Now and identical There in pure originality and temporalizes itself towards its have-been, etc.

I – the subjective in its originality, but temporalizing itself in it in its streaming – time as constituting a streaming present, past, future – and thus I am the streamingly temporalizing and temporalized subjective. Correlatively: The subjective is consciousness of something non-subjective, and the temporalization is also temporalization of this non-subjective. The non-subjective core in originariness, unseparable from the subjective in the concretion, as in which it “appears” in a changing way; the appearing-of, depictions of something ont<ic>-identical, is that something subjective in the sense of my Ego? It is not ontic, but depicting.[[66]](#footnote-66)

[362] The subjective as affection, as actus, as occupation with something ont<ic>, the subjective as emotion, as mood, as universal horizon-like “sense-of life”.

The subjective as reflection of a higher step on the subjective, that is, the subjective as consciousness of something ont<ic>; as reflection on the concrete subjective, implying its objective as intentional unity, and implying in such a way, that it implies its ont<ic> presentations in corresponding ways.

The abstract subjective – the purely noetic; that is, ambiguity of the pure Ego: 1) the pure concrete Ego, understood as the concrete subjectivity, in which its ont<ic> universe is encompassed as correlate; 2) the purely subjective as the life of consciousness temporalized in the universal temporalization, the temporalized endless stream of consciousness, implied therein the presentations, appearances of the ont<ic> in their streaming shapes and coincidences of identity. But furthermore the possible potentiality of the possible appearances and unities of appearance, of the acts and syntheses lying within one’s ability, of the possible modalizings and corrections, but the facultative possibility of the bringing out and determining the same “world” in the whole system. We then had the concrete subjectivity in its de facto temporality and in its factual possibility and in its having a world, being certainty of world from factual possibility. Certainly doubtful statements.

As long as primordiality has not been won, ambiguity reigns in all of this; because everything in me is still implied, and totality of the consciousness is not only my “stream of consciousness”, but implicitly <totality> of all other streams of consciousness, etc.

No. 82

“My” subjectivity, my Ego

<a) The unity and mineness of the consciousness of myself, of the world as well as of the others>

In the awake life I am constantly aware of the world. This constancy of the having conscious is something streamingly-unitary, manifold having-conscious in this unity, in which ever new single realities and reality complexes in specialty become conscious to me, each for itself streaming in changeable special consciousnesses. But there is always a stream, [363] enclosing so to say all these special streams as its waves, and it is the unity of a consciousness, nay, of the consciousness of one and the same world as being in certainty, from which respective details and complex manifoldness “emerge” in specialty for me and again “exit”, are salient for me or ascend or become blurred or sink. This currently becoming-conscious for itself has its different modes, thus at first the “original” modes of the “intuition”, then the secondary modes of unintuitive awakening and other ones more.

The unitary constant whole stream of the consciousness also encompasses modes, in which I become conscious of myself and of my “other ones”, the other ones as other ones of my Ego and as other ones again of their other ones. I become conscious thereby of the world as the same for me and for my other ones, as world for “us all”; and I become conscious not only of my own consciousness life, but of mine as <that>, as in which I have co-conscious the respective other one’s life of consciousness and of every other one, at least implicitly, possibly also in modes of special consciousness.

Consciously encompassing the consciousness of the other ones, I become conscious through the change of their streams of consciousness and their special consciousness of the same world objects, the same things and persons, etc, of the world, or I constantly become certain of one and the same world, simply as the world of us all, as the “objective one”.

My life of consciousness as mine, in which I only have conscious other ones and their consciousness (whereby thus something like that is there for me), implies a structure invariant in its awakeness, giving its final ground to the speech of “mine”, of me as consciousness-Ego. I am always the Ego consciously living along and as that “determined” by the world conscious to me, or rather, occupied with it. As an Ego I constantly live in actions, acts, occupations with something, that is, as “stimulated” by it, “motivated”, “affected”. Conscious of the world in such a way, that respectively manifoldness of it is conscious in special ways of consciousness, I am affected by this manifoldness as an especially conscious one. It stimulates as that being conscious to me, to make me turn to it actively, to occupy myself with it. I already followed the or those details, they “motivate” me, as an Ego I am now with them (as being conscious to me with this and that sense), they are my themes, they are “objective” for me in the pregnant sense – objects of my acts.

I am always already occupied in these in the awake life, am ever again motivated by the stimuli penetrating for effective motivation, I go [364] from acts towards ever new acts afterwards, whereby the thematic objects of consciousness temporally are the same, temporally change.

I am actively “directed” towards my respective objects (my thematic objects), action is action towards the objective. On the other hand objects of consciousness, before I am occupied with them, directed towards them, they stimulate me. While specialties of consciousness streamingly become a unity in the unitary stream of consciousness, make continuously or in discrete syntheses conscious the unity of an objectivity respectively, this making conscious proceeds in this double way, in that of the affection, or rather, effective motivation of the objective details towards the “Ego”, and of the thematizing action of the “Ego” towards these unities. This means:

All my acts, all my ways of consciousness, in which I am active somehow, actively perceiving, step by step becoming aware of its peculiarities, actively remembering and following its specialties, actively directed towards the future, actively thinking, comparing, differentiating, understanding, expressing, effectively considering practical options, acting, etc. – all these activities have their unity as mine: In all their directions I, the identical Ego, am directed. Afterwards we also say: all acts have their centering in the Ego pole, from which they derive and are directed towards the respective objective thing, which is called theme of the act as the Whereto (and certainly is also called thus with respect to the thesis, the mode of taking a position, implied in every act).

The respective object for its part is a pole as well; in a differentiating way we speak of an object’s pole, namely as the identical, towards which manifold acts, and in them I, the same Ego pole, are directed or may be directed. Arriving at a synthesis in the one-after-another, the unitary consciousness of an act is constituted as the unitary one, linking the special acts simply by the same theme of these different acts. Obviously something similar holds true for all affections, or rather, for the changing ways of consciousness, the objective unities of which are conscious in the character of affecting ones. The affective rays of all objects being for me, and in whichever modes they otherwise are, have an affective direction towards me as the one Ego pole.

But now I become conscious of me myself as the center of affection and action, and conscious of my affections themselves and actions themselves; i.e. I become affective and active for me myself in these regards as well, in the last regard, I cannot only be occupied with the other ones, but also with me myself and thereby with me as being occupied with this and with that [365]. I not only am, I am also constantly being for me and as that all the time and necessarily conscious in most primal originality.

On the other hand, I am in a secondary way in my streaming life of consciousness, in the way of empathy, conscious of other Ego subjects as poles of their affections and actions. I am thereby originally conscious of my empathizing consciousness, of my empathizing activity, but within it in a secondary, non-original, “presentiating” way of the other ones.

The other ones respectively conscious to me as unities in the field of consciousness affect me, I possibly become “aware” of them, [I] am occupied with them. They become thematic for me.

If we first remain at the self-affection and self-action, the one thematizing one’s own Ego and Ego life, we then realize their fundamental peculiarity, which we call reflection.

By our being occupied with something when following some affection, we are not occupied with us ourselves as being thus affected and occupied, as that we are not our theme, not directed towards ourselves. But we can go over from the original (in this context we say: “straight”) direction into the “reflective” one; the Ego may essentially, however affected, motivated, directed, also as that be affected by itself and motivated for an Ego reflection. It holds true for us, having a constant world experience going through our whole awake life, being pregiven in the world as being ones in unbroken continuity, that we as human subjects – for me, that I as a human subject of my world experience and other experience incessantly am affected during its streaming process in my perceptional field, in other words, incessantly by myself, I in my human, my physical-sensual doing, now related to these, now to those objects in a seeing, touching, hearing, etc., way. But this affection does not need to become effective; straightforwardly viewing in an unreflected way, etc., I may remain anonymous, for me.

<b) Reflection in the originariness and in representiation>

If we now generally distinguish straight acts and reflecting acts (whereby reflection is everywhere here meant as an egoical reflection), then it is soon clear that this differentiation is at first a merely relative one. Every reflection is repeatable in endless iteration. Afterwards the “straight” activity to be questioned, thus called in relation to its [366] reflection, may itself already have sprung from reflection. But eventually we necessarily arrive at the absolute difference between non-reflective and reflective acts. The so to say absolutely straight acts are acts of the Ego, which only have thematic that in my realm of consciousness, which does not thematically encompass my Ego itself. On the other side then there are all acts, which, on which step of iteration ever, are directed towards me myself as pole of my Ego consciousness, as pole of my affections and actions. Whenever I state a *cogito*, explicitly experience an Ego in our language I think, I wish, I mean, <I> care for …, I treat this and that, then the expression implies that I judge reflectively, have conscious me and my egoical doing.

Of course all my knowledge of me, of my consciousness life, of my affections and activities, of my objects of consciousness as such rest on reflective acts. In their primal form these reflective perceptions, acts, in which I am conscious myself in the certainty of being and quite immediately (originally in the strictest sense). The acts of the reflective recollection, in which I perform reflection on me, not as a current Ego of the current recollection, but reflection “in” the remembered past on me, the Ego, that has been there as well “back then”, a subject of consciousness back then for them, do not have the most immediate and most peculiar originality of the doxic self-consciousness any more.

Each of my recollections obviously leaves open this double reflective turn: straightforwardly directed towards the recollected, e.g. a crowd in the street, I may at times be thus motivated, that I now have this “mental living” of the recollection, or I may reflect the past consciousness-Ego belonging to the remembered crowd in the street, the “back then” perceiving one, back then occupied in this and that way, the stimulated one, intervening in an active way, etc. Reflections “in” the recollection are examples for the class of non-perceiving reflections, that is, for such ones, in which <the> Ego, the reflecting one, does not perform any self-perception.

Memory, this is what reflection on it and on that which is “implied” in it teaches me, is itself a perceptual (although only in reflection on it thematically, actively perceived) mental living, in which something non-present is presentiated. But instead we may paradoxically say the contrary as well: <a mental living>, in which a present mental living, a perceptual one for me, or an even actively perceived one itself, is presentiated. Since that which is presentiated is indeed past.

[367] Past is past present, and my past present is memorably past, my perceptually have-been [present]. In the form of this consciousness, which, as proceeding in a primal original way, is present, but is a modification in itself, recollecting presentiation of present (of a present in the modified sense, past present). In this form thus the Ego as well and any egoical in a secondary way, in a modified one, becomes intuitive, and <in> their unreflected presentiations and, as implied in them, accessible through respective reflection.

That which holds true of the recollection, holds true for all presentiating intuitions, the memories in the wider and widest sense, eventually also encompassing the mere fantasy presentiations. They are all mental livings of the consciousness and actively performed acts of the Ego in the constant primal originality of the Ego, which is a primal original pole in the streaming life present. In current Ego reflection <it may> become aware thematically of itself, that is, in self perception, and all these presentiating mental processes then enter the realm of thematic perception.

All <mental livings> though admit as lying within one’s ability (in the free I-can) for those peculiar reflections “in” the presentiation, in which the primal original Ego is directed towards the ever presentiated (the past, the future of the pre-presentiated expectation, providence, etc.) and its ways of the modified intuitive Ego consciousness, modified perceiving, otherwise experiencing <consciousness>, etc.

But now the presentiations only exceptionally are actually “intuitive”, that is, repeating modifications of perceptions, somehow being in mind in such a way as if I (“again”) perceive, as if <I> (already in advance) perceive, etc. A closer consideration shows that they are modifications of perceptions in themselves indeed, but distant ones, which at first point to presentiations as to be “intuited” ones, here possibly as well in mediacy and only through it towards the perceptions, the distant modifications of which they are, and as which they show themselves. For these unintuitive presentiations as well (and all unintuitive mental livings are presentiating) the double way of reflection holds true: the one as a present mental living of the primal original Ego of the primal original present, the other one as a presentiating mental living, as, even if distant (in “intentional” mediacy), re-presentiating a primal original present in its modification, with the primal original Ego, mental living of the Ego, being-in-activity, etc.

[368] We thereby notice that primal original present is the title for the universal, streaming, primal original life of consciousness, being centered in the original Ego pole – as in the most proper sense respectively being life of the Ego actually being in the most proper sense. All respectively actual presentiations lie in this life, <in> the “streaming” being of which is particularity in the form of constant particularity. In this modification “presentiation” (and in every special mode of presentiation for itself) any way of primal original Ego-being returns in the Ego life, in Ego-affection and [Ego-] action, in the moodlike getting stimulated of the feeling Ego – in short, each and everything emerging in primal present [returns] with its[[67]](#footnote-67) primal form in the streaming as being modified. The iteration of the Ego-reflection returns as iteration of the reflection in every presentiation. The presentiation of every mode is itself again reiterational in modifications as presentiation of a presentiation and in every kind of presentiation for itself. Reiterational are the ways of intuition <and> the ways of their modifying the absence of sensuous intuitability. The ways of all primal original act syntheses thereby do not only return as presentiated, but the present I can perform activities, like the analysis, the comparing, etc., “in” the presentiation, by the presentiated as such simply affecting the constantly primal original Ego, which is the presentiating one, and motivates for a thematic directing-oneself.

The manifoldness of the reflectively to be performed acts is endless, a potentiality of reflections, lying within one’s ability, to be put into motion in the free I-can. Every single act is itself a possible starting point of an ability to reflect and an-ability-to-do-so-ever-again; every passively sinking <act> causes the following factual possibility of a view turned back and of the unintuitive recollection, then to be made intuitive, and from there the infinity of reflections in the recollection. The way the vivid present predelineates by proceeding in a primal original way, the way it already has its predelineations of a horizon as a world consciousness, leads towards the cognition of potentiality furthermore grounding itself in the streaming, still always grounded though in advance already and being reawakable for structures of presentiation that can be brought to light, for a hidden building of that, which is shown up as a lasting sensual acquisition in the consciousness life, from its passivity and activities, and in the form of awakenings and intuitive presentiations and activities to be performed at them, to be discovered and to be brought to an understanding.

[369] Under the title consciousness life and acquisition of the consciousness life infinities and infinities are about to open up, showing themselves in the area of vivid present, and transcend it as manifestations, as mediacies presentiationally showing themselves in it, staggeringly building one over the other and one within the other.

But before one may gain the methods here to master these infinities, to discover them in their systematic, to understand them in their performances of unity, it is necessary to consider more closely that, which is lying at hand, the relatively immediate. Let us go back to the relative difference between the straight forwardly directed and the reflecting acts. Hereto the essential law belongs that every act indeed is an act of the Ego, which thematically directing itself and being occupied with the Whereto <…>.

No. 83

<On the intermonadic world constitution in generativity and tradition. The connection with foreign peoples>[[68]](#footnote-68)

Monades come and go – monades as constituting a world in community, in a one-within-another through presentiation of the mode of current and possible empathy. The monadic, current one-within-the-other, in which the world is, is a process of monadic genesis, of a generating and disappearing of monades, whereby an all monadic one-within-the-other-with-one-another persists, a monadic „organism“ remaining identical, in which the all monadic past remains intentionally kept as standing monadic present and future <is> predelineated. The constant world is constituted in this process as a real one, in which the monades themselves are „realized“, constituted.

Every being monade has within itself and in community with the monades constituted for it in a secularized way its “personal” genesis, as that of a monadically concrete Ego developing its abilities, its habitualities forming its personal being. Likewise every socially connected plurality of monades. But every monade has its genesis of being as well as a generatively born and dying one. Temporalization realized in the world emerges, worldly genesis of men and animals in a certain order. Like [370] every incident in the world, this is as well implied in my absolute being; our mental world, concretely being accepted by us, for everyone his own, for every group, every people its own; and each from itself, also the all common world going beyond that; our experiential world as horizon; it is – this is the same – constituted as world of a tradition[[69]](#footnote-69), the respectively current one, the personal one, common and historical memory, the transmission of the actual persons to be derived in there from the documentations to be historically questioned, through mediacies of empathy.

But also the generative as generation of the individuals and of the organic, animal species, among them men, is co-constituted in this world.

By my performing phenomenological investigating-sense-in-the-world together with my fellow philosophers, the series of steps of absolute traditions is discovered by me and by us, in which the world is already constituted and a communicatively-social community possible for each man and woman, with its completely shaped special sense and its horizon of possible construction. In this horizon the accesses to new co-subjects and communities with their traditions, and formation of a new, further tradition, thereby growing in the unification of their and our tradition. Thus a being mental world already is already discovered for us, and already <the> other mental worlds being for other humanities – but with an all common core nature, etc. But tradition is a correlate of the performing activity, having emerged from it and ever newly built as human life. Thus indeed the process of connecting humanities is again an activity, and an enlarged tradition grows from action, etc.

The investigating sense, an activity of discovering the constituting absolute subjectivity, accessible for me as coming from the world, the being of which is accepted by me. Incrementally. Mental world as expression – as a performance of ours and of fellow men – nature, going back towards the transcendental subjectivity as some human absolute thing; the horizon of history, thus far as a unity of the mental world and its core nature related to the human monades. Thus, this is nature, the <nature> in historical tradition. Historical tradition of my people as theme of discovering, the history of its unitary shape of mind – but its connection with other peoples of different cultures, from other formations of the mind and shapes of the mind, in the connection still distinguished, but mediated through “translation”, or [371] through war as well, attributable to increasing breaks and amalgamations of foreign men, etc. – history as historicality in the formation of a closed culture of a people and people personality and in formation of an external connection of peoples with mutual other ones, as a foreign people already experiencing (but only in an indirect way, analogously and vaguely experiencing) peoples and with “proper” according to the determined individual type – not understood (and still mutually dependent) cultures – and cultures as that of the co-existing and mutually dependent, but not to be understood foreign personality of the people. Such a connection has a unity of “tradition” as well, a unity of history – in a changed sense. More concisely: Historicity of a people, knowing itself in the connection with “foreign”, “barbaric” peoples concretely not understood, being accepted by it in such a way as it understands them, and properly speaking does not understand them, and as the forces causing the proper historicity; on that a discovering history, with the history of development, change of the modes, step of the allegedly understanding one another, etc.

A single person in connection with persons, in a personal world (with a personal all-temporality, personal all-present, all-past, etc.) <persons> more or less “understanding” one another, but still “understanding” one another. Empathy as primary, as experience of the present, perceptual being there as well of other ones. Empathy, in a more indirect way, for past other ones and co-present ones, but not directly being there bodily-perceptually; indirect empathy through inductive expression. I as a man, other men; human world as expressing and actualizing human intentions. Constitution of the unity of a familiar surrounding world. Unity of an all-nation in contrast to the “not to be understood” foreign all-nation.

Men connect in their practical intents, communalizing in their acts. They generate common formations, they act together; unity of an action, in which both act in the intermingling.

This requires a layer of proper understanding necessary for the respective acting. What is meant here by proper understanding? I also understand the properly not to be understood other one as another one. And one may say: I at least understand every one, being another one for me, on the lowest level of bodily prevailing, bodily activity as a perceiving activity, as having an impact on other bodies in a bodily way (pushing, shoving). Also the acts otherwise according to the primal instincts are understood at least in rough type. All app<erception>, also the empathizing [372] one, has, as concrete as it apprehends, still its open undeterminacy and in it the common frame of its determinability. But it is exactly in the way of this determinable indeterminacy that there lies a difference of apperceptions.

No. 84

<Note on the empathy for persons of mine and other communities>

Pregiven[[70]](#footnote-70) world. Perceptional field and its horizon of perceptionality. Memory field, or rather, horizon of memorability (and of possible perceptionality from my memory past). Field of empathy, horizon of empathy, horizon in infinity of mediated empathy.

I and my primordial present.

My primordial co-present as first horizon: primordial world, my foreign subjectively mediated, intersubjective co-present. The existence of other Ego subjects with their primordial worlds – as being accepted by me as well in the certainty of being or in modalities of being, horizonlike.

I and my present world, as in which I “live”, by which I am affected, and in which I am active, as person among persons as co-subjects, having the same world for their part, living and working in the same, respectively now in private, now communicatively; this world with a “mental” sense, with a cultural sense springing from the working of this world, being with this, and basic layer, ground for new acts, new formations of the being sense. The world is in constant change as receiving contents of being sense from us.

But then co-past as well, co-future of the world as intersubjective world, as being for me by the horizon of intersubjectivity. But I have not paid attention to home-humanity and foreign humanity yet. Double sense of foreign: 1) foreign men as other ones; 2) foreign men as men of other home communities, of other cities, other peoples.

Relativity of “empathy”. Ad 1) Empathy, through which <the> unity of a normal personal community of existence is given and cor-[373]relatively an all understandable world, all familiar, through which “everyone”[[71]](#footnote-71) has the normal sense, as the one we understand or could understand, from which we could take over something being, thoughts on something being, purposes in relation to something being, etc. through co-experience or co-thinking, and thus have a common world, of which indeed we do not all know the same, but may know with the help of proper thinking and taught by others – except for contingent restrictions, among them our laziness, our lack of education, etc.

Ad 2) Empathy of a new way, empathy for foreigners in the people, acquisition of their tradition, of their people’s surrounding world with their historicity.

The constitution of the world through these forms of “experience” and experienceability – of a univocal world, constantly harmonizing through corrections, enriching, always predelineated as an idea, constantly in experiencing intuition, then also in a mediate (partly immediate, primordial, intuitive) and to be intuited [intuition], partly mediate through empathy to be intuited and with the horizon of a non intuitional foreign land, in iteration of mediate empathy. Inductive mediacies of the empathy on the way of the objective expression – symptoms and signs. One way of such a mediacy: the option of animals and of men on the other planets and in foreign galaxies, etc., mediated indicating analogies and induction of options, again made possible by them – construction of a homogenous endless spatiotemporal world.

No. 85

<Note on the remembering representiation and alternating presentiation in the world constitution>

Primal streaming[[72]](#footnote-72) – immanent life as mental living of streaming immanent-primordial time and world itself in there; world time conscious in the streaming (primordially reduced).

Primal streaming and in there all mental living as my mental living, that is, always Ego and life, which is always consciousness-of, in its modes of consciousness. But these <as> streamingly-temporalizing ones, and now Ego acts therein, etc., themselves as modes of mental living – my consciousness life in my egoical modes.

[374] I concrete – consciousness life as ego centered life, polarized-centered, my primordium as a concrete[[73]](#footnote-73) one, therein a primordial form structure (proved above).

Every remembered representiation “mirrors” a present therein, but not only an impressional one, but a whole primordium: Reflections of primordia emerge in the primordium, these reflected ones enter syntheses of identification and differentiation; constitution of immanent time, constitution of my primordial being in a second sense, which is already temporal. In the concrete primordium, the primal streaming, the second reflecting of the alteration, not self-reflecting, not self-showing, but I am the mirror for other ones, alteration (in contrast to the one assuming an independent existence, constituting the self for itself <in> the presentiation as memory).[[74]](#footnote-74)

Not[[75]](#footnote-75) “remembering representiation”, but “alteration” of primordial immanence, alternating presentiation and every way of the remembering presentiation. The foreign immanent with the foreign Ego, for me foreign conscious “world” alternates with that, the foreign-primordial conscious one. Iteration of the alteration, other ones of other ones, etc. Like I had the synthesis in the primordiality and the egoical performance however to be characterized, by which my “primordial world and time” was constituted, I now have synthesis of my primordiality with the altered one and the altered ones of the altered.

I, The transcendental Ego in my primal streaming vividness, have primordial immanence and a constituted primordial world and time (that is, showing itself in the constituted immanent primordial time) therein through impressionality and memories of presentiation, and in the same primal streaming vividness I have an altering immanence and an altered world and time therein in simple and in iterated modes, and through my synthetic performance and especially synthetic activity an objective time world is constituted for me, Ego-men therein, other men, world, in which they live, world they imagine, etc.; and it is the same world which the other ones constituted in me have (I constitute this selfness), and I constitute the communicating with others as well, the constituting world together with them as an objective one, reshaping, etc.

[375]

No. 86

<Note on phenomena of coincidence in the recollection and in fantasy>

There is the option to discover a former past in every past, then again in the discovered one and so on; but it holds true for every one, that it not only coincides with its memory, but then again coincides with the current present, but in each one in a lasting way and continuously living through it, I arrive at every later present and its objects – I recognize it; and thus I may by ever again “going back”, only remaining for some time in the respectively discovered one, i.e. instead of quasi living on, let it break through. But does the “quasi-life” really go on, only in being covered? Or does the being covered, of the actual world as well, mean a stopping of the world and re-beginning? The stream of memory is a stream not only of presented data, but of fulfillment of empty awakenings of something already accepted. The coincidences are only associative coincidences, the presented, the present sphere wakes up another present sphere, and this coincides in the form of original modification, and that which needs an explanation is the constitution of a past that may be run through as a past of memory in unity with the associating, awakening present, and from it mediately proceeding awakening from awakened presents.[[76]](#footnote-76)

But fantasy, free fantasy? Does it not rest on association, on associatively coincided having a way of fusion? How is the intuitive imagining of something green as red to be understood on the basis of the struggle on covering (which is not a struggle on acceptance, no struggle of positions, theses)? One and another one, which is otherwise almost the same in pairing, in coincidence. I posit the One, it is really there, and it has in coincidence with the green the red of the other one, otherwise coinciding in similarity – the thesis of the first one in performance, the uncovered fuses with the covering of the green into a unity of a phenomenon.[[77]](#footnote-77)

[376]

No. 87

Problems of the unconscious. <Is the sinking in the retention limited or unlimited?>

Let[[78]](#footnote-78) us now go back to the problem of the differentiation between the sphere of current retention and the sphere of the sedimented, of the unconscious in the specific sense. Does the course of retention itself imply its encompassing a limit, that the affectivity depends on the distance towards this limit, and the same necessarily needs to vanish with arriving at zero? What does the zero of retention mean? An actual stopping of the retentional change and thereby the vanishing of the mental living itself? But what may awakening then mean and option of recollection?

But if a retentional process has no end and [if] in the above attempted ways affectivity is an egoical moment belonging to it, and that this has its zero-limit, as the case may be further or less far reaching back – is the “sedimented”, i.e., the constituted in a streaming way below zero, not completely the same as all that, which is constituted in the next retentional sphere, but respectively not affecting? Nay, even more with the background of the perceptional field, which may indeed as well be quite interestless?

But how, if I at first, asking back from the concrete worldliness, mine, of the philosopher investigating sense, take me, how I find myself in the life of interest, as an Ego of remaining interests furthermore organizing themselves, of which now these, now those are actualized, going over into the form of actual doing, crossing therein from time to time, etc.; and how, if I am pushed towards the conviction that the awake life is in constancy not only an ever new activity, but that all former activity is kept in a modalized shape?

Posited, that this remaining, this more or less being distant or covered could be clarified as an intentional modification, then we had a sedimentation therein, stretching through the whole awakeness and of course through the whole synthetic system of awakenesses. But would the non-sedimented then be reduced for example to the respective real activity and the current awakenings belonging to its unity?

1. *The complete envelope of Ms. C 16 bears the deleted title:* U25 ff. U-sheets 1931/32. General. Temporalization of the stream after temporalization of the Ego. The egoical structures of the vivid present. Convolute: Emotion and primal constitution. Also the issue: Inquiry back on the vivid primal present after the epoché. Also on the doctrine of intentionality, e.g. „Is retention an „intention“ at all?, to the doctrine of „epoché“ as an act. Implied many other things. Ad epoché (in the direction of the ascending towards a primal present). C 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *The title on the envelope sheet 2/11 relates to text no. 67:* End of 1931 fundamental analysis of the vivid present according to the act’s structure; the awake (patent) and latent (unconscious), the act’s modes; also sleep and synthesis of the awake periods, etc. The concept of vivid, primal present is already presupposed here and the way is not exhibited, how, through which reduction, vivid present becomes thematic and is disclosed. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *Rb.:* On the fundamental analysis of the vivid present. On self-examination. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Rb.:* Self-examination as a moral person only as an example here. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Rb.:* Furthermore fundamental analyses on the I-act-structure of the vivid present – the awake structure and structure of the latence (something unconscious) as well as theory of the sleep. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *Rb.:* Theory of the sleep. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. This concerns the How thus, the sentence. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *The following paragraph is to be found on sheet 4a, but it is marked as an introduction into the running text on sheet 5b. Rb.:* Note p<agina> 2, 2nd page: ad 1930. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Rb.:* Memory of a will as will. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Rb.:* Waking up. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Rb.:* And in one as something standing and remaining of all acts. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Rb.:* Proper actuality, the „retentional“ still-acceptance as an act, mode of „memory“. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Rb.:* Trying to interpret the sleep. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *Rb.:* Originally temporalizing passive association as pre-association, proper association as by the already given, at which I am already awake, being reminded of something, being woken up for that. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *Sheets 12-17 of C 16 have been published in Hua XXXIV as text No. 24, 380-383. The title on the envelope sheet 18/26 only relates to text No. 67:* Ad U-sheets. 1932, May? Personal being in the togetherness. A different sense of current and non-current acts. Important. An act in living performance. The keeping in the lasting. The stopping of the act and the remaining of the acceptance in the retentional sinking. Keeping in a new sense. Transgression of the perceptual living present – the continued acceptance in the „unconscious“, act and interest, lasting interests (job), horizon of interests, horizon of the acts, horizon of acquisitions, synthesis of interests, etc. – intersubjectivity; communication of the persons – act communication and communication of interests, the social space (open universe of co-persons) the analogue of the natural space. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Rb.:* The first and second sense of habituality. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Rb.:* Stopping of the act. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *The title on the envelope 27/54 relates to texts 69-75:* Beginning of March 1932. Feeling and primal constitution. Lust and affection. Primal constitutive building up of the world in its regions of being and guidance of the primal instincts. Meaning of the distinction between primal sphere of being = nature and world of goods in the common sense.

    Not having become clear due to the bad weeks mid February until the middle of March 1932, but still important. Instinct and kinesthetic. „Curiosity“. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Rb.:* 8th March 1932; N<ota> B<ene>. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Rb.:* Supplement ad 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Rb.:* We may not say willing, and properly speaking not act. Belonging to <the> act is the aiming at something to be reached; this only enters through kinesthetic. Prior to that is the affecting in its modes as an egoical one motivating willing in its „development“. Here we abstracted from kinesthetic. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Rb.:* Supplement ad 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. *Rb.:* March 9th.1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Rb.:* But they are constantly changing ones, since the kinesthetic play their part. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. *Rb.:* Of course we can only talk of curiosity in view of an object world already having something new in contrast to something well known. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. *Rb.:* Kinesthetic, instinct, March 10th, 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *Rb.:* Only these guiding sentences are actually important; how about breathing – and breathing in sleep? [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *Rb.:* Sensation of deception always *term<inus> a quo*. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Rb.:* The further possibly not to be upheld! But at least to be considered. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Rb.: It has not been taken into account that not all kinesthetic are a single system, continuously to be run through in a process-like way, but they are spezial kinesthetic systems, so that only such a one comes into question as a single one fort he given construction. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Rb.: But this is less sufficient! It does not result in the distinction in stretches of movement and in reigning over contingent final situations, thus not the local system of the kinesthetic layers. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *Rb.:* Questionabilities, notes. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *Deleted text on the back side:* Intensity of the tone, of the sounds. Intensity of the light, intensity of the beaming of warmth and coldness. Intensity of the body temperature – intensity as affecting. Emotions of pleasure and unpleasure. Change of the apprehending the doctrine of affection, emotions only as striving towards and striving away, that is, back ground emotions as primal ones would not exist? There was only the apperception of objects as arousing emotions. The old apprehension. Does the date itself, or every mental process on the field of vivid present affect? Or primal and originally only the hyletic? Forcefulness, intrusiveness – this enters the striving towards. Thus the instinctive – the original affecting. Affecting, its answer in the turning to. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. *Rb.:* cover sheet. May 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *Rb.:* March 7th 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *Rb.:* This belongs to the fundamental theory of intentionality (consciousness-of). It is fundamental for understanding the worldly concept of experience and of consciousness (consciousness-of, meaning) as that of a constitutive result; direction towards objects. Thereby the primal impression and its change is not an „experience“. Likewise primal feeling, primal affection and the primal willing in this sense is not a consciousness-of, no intention-towards in the natural sense. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Rb.: Not continued. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Rb.: That, which constitutes itself in my living present without foreign bodies – my primordial object field, with a body, but not my IEgo. The stimuli of the hyle, I do not affect myself yet. How do I become affective for me, the foreign body, the second primordial in coincidence, what becomes affective there? Why does the foreign body affect me as a body? March 5th 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Rb.: Affection of background objects of the intuition, affection of unintuitional objects. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Sheets 55-58 from C16 are published in Hua XXXIV, pages 294-297. – Editor’s note.* [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *Rb.:* February 1932 (Transcript of a calender sheet) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. *Rb.:* N<ota> B<ene>. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. *Rb.:* Sept.27th 31. Continuation of U24. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *Rb.:* Temporalization, humanization, physicalization. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *Rb.:* Constitution of one’s own body in the primordiality. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *Rb.:* Sept. 28th 1931. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *Rb.:* Acts of the phenomenologizing Ego. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. *Rb.:* Missing: Acquisitions through apperception, association, transference and formation of a horizon of future; furthermore something being and practice, practical options, humanization. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *Rb.:* Acquiring of being! [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. *Rb.:* Sept. 29th 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. *Rb.:* And the properly acting practice, where does it differ from the cognizing one? [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *Rb.:* Sept. 30th 1931. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. *Rb.:* Emotions, moods. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. *Rb.:* All aporetic trials. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. *Rb.:* Attempt! [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. *Rb.:* But this needs to be proved reductively first! [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. *Rb.:* I and the cogitative life of the streaming present, in which world is a world of consciousness. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. *Rb.:* Touching. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. *Rb.:* Objects that are and have their own value. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Rb.: Discontinued, but cf. other Msc. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. *The title on the envelope sheet 75/99 relates to texts No.80-82:* May 1932. Importat. Phenomenological archaeology. Inquiry back towards the Ego and the subjective in the originality. Primal originality and memories – presentiations. I in my peculiarity. The Ego in its egoical habituality (decisivenesses). The persisting subject (person) for its universe of „being“. I as person for other ones, co-function of empathies. Objective temporalization in contrast to my self-temporalization.

    7sheet. Personal being in the being together; also important fort he doctrine of the acts and their different modes of actuality. On the doctrine of the interests. Interest and person.

    32: The becoming „unconscious“ and the limit of vivid present. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. *Rb.:* End of May 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. *Rb.:* Is this the place of the explication’s theory? [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Rb.: Another kind of change belongs to every perceptible thing standing within ist own line; Decomposition and composition. Insofar as the thing falls apart into things, it does not persist, and still ist parts have been within it already in the way of being undivided, and they persist in identity after the division; but they do in a certain way change, alter with the loss or gain of their independence. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. *Rb.:* May 1932. I, the subjective in originality. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. *Rb.:* Subjective in a different sense. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. *Instead of* its *Ms.* with his, with hers. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. *The sheets C16, 86-92 are published as appendix XX in Hua XV, pages 350-357, the sheets C 16, 93-98 as appendix XXI in Hua XV, pages 357-361.* [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. *Rb.:* Traditionality = horizonality. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. *Rb.:* Sing<le sheet>. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. *Rb.:* „Everyone“ in the all-familiar world. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. *Rb.:* First page. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. *Rb.:* Relativity of the primordium. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. *Rb.:* „Alteration“, selfing. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. *Rb.:* Second page. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. *Rb.:* The main thing needs to be stated thus: the activity, which emplies an acceptance, is to be differed from mere forerunners of the passive retention, etc.; Recollection is awakening and re-performance of acceptance, of still-acceptance. Mere association as passivity does not yet create temporalization as a constitution of being. Time is a form of being. Also differentiation of a struggle on coincidence and acceptance. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. *Rb.:* Ad time constitution. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. *Rb.:* Issue of the uncoscious. Sinking into retention. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)