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
VOLUME ONE
LOGIC AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

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WALTER BURLEY
CONSEQUENCES

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Introduction

Walter Burley was born around 1275, probably in Yorkshire,
England. He was a master of arts by 1301/2, and a fellow of
Merton College, Oxford, by 1305. By 1310 he was in Paris
studying theology, and in 1327 Edward III appointed him an envoy
to the papal court. The remainder of his career was devoted to
diplomatic service as well as philosophical writing. He died soon
after 1344.

Burley was a prolific writer. He wrote commentaries on most of
Aristotle's works on natural philosophy, sometimes more than one
commentary on the same work, and he also composed some
influential treatises on philosophical considerations growing out of
the intensification and diminution of qualities (the intension and
remission of forms) and out of the assignment of first or last
instants to a thing's or an event's duration. His work on the lives
of the philosophers, written in the early 1340s, was very popular.
Around the same time he finished his commentary on Aristotle's
Politics. His commentary on the *Ethics* had been completed earlier,
in 1333–4. He also commented on all of Aristotle's logical works
and wrote several logic treatises of his own. His best-known work
of this sort, *The Purity of the Art of Logic (De puritate artis logicae)*,
was published in two versions. The earlier, shorter version was
written before the appearance of Ockham's *Summa logicae* in 1324.
The second version, dating from 1325–8, is in many ways a
response to Ockham's logic. The discussion of consequences trans-
lated here is the first of the two sections comprising the shorter
version of his *De puritate*.

Under the concept of a consequence, medieval logicians under-
stood three different relationships among propositions: implication,
entailment, and argument. Burley may have been the earliest

logician to develop consequences as the basis for all logic. In his *De puritate* he subsumes the treatment of the syllogism under general rules of consequences. In this discussion of consequences Burley draws some fundamental distinctions among kinds of consequences and then offers ten general rules of consequences, each of which he discusses in detail.

For further reading on the medieval theory of consequences, see CHLMP V.15, 'Consequences.'

Consequences

The Elements of the Art of Logic

[Preface]

{199} God willing, I propose compiling a treatise on the elements of the art of logic, so that young men who are disputants in connection with any problem whatever can become practiced and quick at meeting arguments. And this little book will contain four parts. The first part lays down certain general rules that must be applied in the following parts. The second part deals with the art of sophistical reasoning, the third with the art of contentious reasoning. The fourth part briefly and succinctly presents some things regarding the art of demonstration. The first part will contain three sections. The first [section] lays down general rules of consequences; the second deals with the nature of syncategorematic words; the third briefly presents some things regarding the suppositions of terms.

[Part One: General Rules]

[Section I: General Rules of consequences]

[0. Absolute and As-of-now Consequences]

First of all, then, I present a preliminary distinction: One sort of consequence is absolute, another sort is as-of-now. An absolute

consequence is one that holds good for every time – e.g., 'A man is running; therefore, an animal is running.' An as-of-now consequence holds good for a determinate time and not always – e.g., 'Every man is running; therefore, Socrates is running,' since that consequence does not hold good always, but only while Socrates is a man.

[1. First Principal Rule]

The first rule of consequences is the following:

> [Rule 1] *In any good absolute consequence the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent.* {200}

(And so if an antecedent could be true without the consequent on the basis of positing any possible hypothesis, the consequence was not good [if it was an absolute consequence].)

> [Rule 1'] *In an as-of-now consequence, however, the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent as of now*

– viz., for the time for which the consequence holds good.
Two other rules follow from that rule. The first is this:

> [Rule 1a] *In an absolute consequence what is impossible does not follow from what is contingent.*

The second is this:

> [Rule 1b] *What is contingent does not follow from what is necessary.*

And the reason for both [of these subsidiary rules] is that what is contingent can be without what is impossible, and what is necessary can be without what is contingent.

[2. Second Principal Rule]

The second principal rule is this:

> [Rule 2] *Whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent.*

There is also another rule, almost the same:

[Rule 2'] *Whatever is antecedent to the antecedent is antecedent to the consequent.*

For those two rules always produce a good argument.

There are also two other *false* rules, which always produce a fallacy of the consequent, and they are these: [FR2a] Whatever follows from the antecedent follows from the consequent; [FR2b] Whatever is antecedent to the consequent is antecedent to the antecedent.

[2a. Consequences from the First to the Last]

It is on the basis of [Rule 2], whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent, that a consequence from the first to the last holds good when one argues on the basis of many intermediate consequences. And it must be taken into account that a consequence from the first to the last holds good only when that which is the consequent in the preceding conditional is the antecedent in the succeeding conditional. For if the antecedent in the succeeding conditional were different from the consequent in the preceding conditional, the consequence from the first to the last would not hold good; instead, there would be a fallacy of accident based on the variation of the middle [proposition]. For the consequent in the preceding conditional is the middle joining the later conditional with the earlier one, and it is for that reason that the consequent in the preceding conditional must be the same as the antecedent in the succeeding conditional.

For example, 'If it is a man, it is an animal; if it is an animal, it is a body; if it is a body, it is a substance; therefore, from the first to the last, {201} if it is a man, it is a substance.' And the consequence from the first to the last 'If it is a man, it is a substance' holds good because ((*quia/si*)) all those consequences were joined to one another in that whatever was the consequent in an earlier consequence was the antecedent in the later consequence.

On this basis it is evident that if one argues in this way – 'If there is no time, it is not day; and if it is not day and there is some time, it is night; and if it is night, there is some time; therefore, from the first to the last, if there is no time, there is some time' – the consequence from the first to the last does not hold good because

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[2b. Sophismata]

On the basis of [Rule 2], the solution to sophismata of the following sort is evident.

It is proved that

THE BIGGER (*quanto maius*) SOMETHING IS, THE SMALLER
(*tanto minus*) IT APPEARS.

The proof goes this way: 'The bigger something is, the greater the distance at which it appears; and the greater the distance at which something appears, the smaller it appears; therefore, from the first to the last, the bigger something is, the smaller it appears.'

And it is similarly proved that

THE UGLIER (*quanto magis turpis*) SOMEONE IS, THE MORE
ATTRACTIVE (*tanto magis pulcher*) HE IS,

as follows: 'The uglier you are, the more you embellish yourself; but the more you embellish yourself, the more attractive you are; therefore, from the first to the last, the uglier you are, the more attractive you are.'

In just the same way it is proved that

THE MORE THIRSTY (*quanto magis sitis*) YOU ARE, THE LESS
THIRSTY (*tanto minus sitis*) YOU ARE,

for 'The more thirsty you are, the more you drink; the more you drink, the less thirsty you are; therefore, from the first to the last, the more thirsty you are, the less thirsty you are.'

The solution is evident, since the [consequence] from the first to the last does not follow because the consequent in a preceding conditional is not the same {202} as the antecedent in the succeed-

ing conditional; for the consequent in the preceding conditional is taken with '*tanto*' and the antecedent in the succeeding conditional is taken with '*quanto*', and so it is not the same proposition.

[2c. Two Corollaries to Rule 2]

From [Rule 2], whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent, other rules follow. One is that just as in a universal proposition one can [logically] descend under the subject to any suppositum of the subject in respect of the predicate, so

> [Rule 2a] *In any good consequence one can descend under the antecedent to anything that is antecedent to it in respect of the same consequent.*

For example, the consequence 'If a man is running, an animal is running; therefore, if Socrates is running, an animal is running' is good, and so is the consequence 'If every man is running, Socrates is running; therefore, if every animal is running, Socrates is running.' And one argues for both on the basis of [Rule 2], whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent. For example, because 'A man is running' follows from 'Socrates is running,' whatever follows from 'A man is running' follows from 'Socrates is running,' so if 'A man is running; therefore, an animal is running' follows, this follows: 'If Socrates is running, an animal is running.'

There is also this other rule:

> [Rule 2b] *In a conditional whose antecedent is a universal proposition, the subject of the antecedent has immobile supposition in respect of the consequent in such a way that one cannot descend under the subject of the antecedent in respect of the consequent; but in a conditional whose antecedent is an indefinite or particular proposition, the subject has confused, distributive, mobile ((mobiliter/immobiliter)) supposition in respect of the consequent.*

For example, one cannot descend under the subject of the antecedent of a conditional whose antecedent is a universal proposition, as in 'If every man is running, Socrates is running'; for this does not follow: 'If every man is running, Socrates is running; therefore, if Socrates is running, Plato is running.' Instead, it is a fallacy of the consequent, because it is argued on the basis of the false rule [FR2a], whatever follows from the antecedent follows from the consequent. On the other hand, 'If a man is running, an

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animal is running; {203} therefore, if Socrates is running, an animal is running' follows correctly. And so in a conditional one can descend in respect of the consequent under the antecedent's subject accepted without distribution, but one cannot descend under a subject accepted with distribution.

[2d. Two More Corollaries to Rule 2]

And, further, from [Rule 2], whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent, two other rules follow, one of which is

> [Rule 2c] *Whatever follows from the consequent and from the antecedent follows from the antecedent by itself.*

The second rule is

> [Rule 2d] *Whatever follows from the consequent with some addition, follows from the antecedent with the same addition.*

The reason for [Rule 2c] is that each proposition implies itself together with its consequent. For example, this follows: 'Socrates is running; therefore, Socrates is running, and a man is running.' Therefore, since the antecedent implies the antecedent and the consequent, and [Rule 2] whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent, it follows that whatever follows from the antecedent and the consequent follows from the antecedent by itself [Rule 2c].

The reason for the second rule [Rule 2d] is this. The antecedent with some addition implies the consequent with the same addition. For this follows: 'Socrates is running, and you are seated; therefore, a man is running, and you are seated.' Therefore, since whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent [Rule 2], it must be that whatever follows from the consequent with some addition follows from the antecedent with the same addition [Rule 2d].

[2e. Counterinstances to Rule 2]

But one argues against [Rule 2], Whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent, by means of counterinstances.

[2e(i). First Counterinstance]

This is a good consequence: 'I say that you are a donkey; therefore, I say that you are an animal,' and yet something follows from the consequent that does not follow from the antecedent. For 'I say that you are an animal; therefore, I say what is true' follows, but this does not follow: 'I say that you are a donkey; therefore, I say what is true.'

Alternatively, one could prove by means of this rule that you are a donkey, because this follows: 'I say that you are a donkey; therefore, I say what is true; therefore that you are a donkey is true, and, consequently, you are a donkey.' Proof of the consequence 'If I say that you are a donkey, I say what is true': this follows: 'If I say that you are an animal, I say what is true,' but if I say that you are a donkey, I say that you are an animal; therefore, in saying that you are a donkey I say that you are an animal; therefore, if I say that you are not {204} an animal, I do not say what is true; therefore, the consequent is true. This consequence is evident because it is argued on the basis of [Rule 2], Whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent.

[2e(ii). Second Counterinstance]

Again, one argues further against the above-mentioned rule [in this way]: The disjunctive 'Socrates is running or he is not running' is a consequent of 'Socrates is not running,' and yet something follows from that disjunctive that does not follow from 'Socrates is not running.' For from the fact that Socrates is running or he is not running it follows that a man is running, but from the fact that Socrates is not running it does not follow that a man is running; for 'Socrates is not running; therefore, a man is running' does not follow.

[2e(iii). Third Counterinstance]

Again, 'Socrates is running' is a consequent of 'Only Socrates is running,' and yet something follows from the fact that Socrates is running that does not follow from the fact that only Socrates is running. For from the fact that Socrates is running it follows that a man is

running, and yet 'From the fact that only Socrates is running it follows that a man is running' is false.

[2e(iv). Fourth Counterinstance]

Again, the proposition 'Some proposition is true' is a consequent of 'Every proposition is true,' and yet something follows from the consequent that does not follow from the antecedent. For from the fact that some proposition is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey, and yet this is not true; 'From the fact that every proposition is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey,' since this follows: From the fact that every proposition is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey; therefore, from the fact that it is true that God exists it follows that it is true that you are a donkey.

Alternatively, one could prove by means of this argument that you are a donkey, since this follows: From the fact that every proposition is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey, because from 'Some proposition is true' it follows that it is true that you are a donkey. This amounts to arguing in this fashion: 'God exists; therefore, you are a donkey'; the antecedent is true; therefore, the consequent is also true. Proof of the consequence: This is true: 'From the fact that God exists is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey.' Proof: This follows: From the fact that every proposition is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey; therefore, from the fact that it is true that God exists it follows that it is true that you are a donkey. The antecedent is true; therefore, the consequent is also true. {205}

[2f. Replies to the Counterinstances]

[2f(i). Reply to the First Counterinstance]

In reply to the first of these we have to say that in virtue of equivocation, a distinction must be drawn regarding 'I say that you are an animal' because the dictum 'that you are an animal' can supposit either for the utterance or for the thing [signified]. What is signified in the first sense is that I say the utterance 'You are an animal'; what is signified in the second sense is that I say the thing

signified by means of that utterance. And in the same way a distinction must be drawn regarding each expression in which it is not denoted that an action pertaining to a mode passes into the dictum; expressions of that sort have to have such distinctions drawn because the action can pass into the dictum either by reason of the dictum or by reason of the thing [signified]. For example, when one says 'He knows that you are a man' there can be two interpretations: one, that he knows the utterance 'You are a man,' which cannot be the case unless he knows the language; the other sense is that he knows the thing signified by means of the utterance 'You are a man,' and a layman who knows no Latin knows that.

On this basis I say in reply to the case before us that if in the proposition 'I say that you are a donkey,' the action of saying passes into the dictum by reason of the utterance, then the consequence 'I say that you are a donkey; therefore, I say that you are an animal' does not hold good. If, on the other hand, it passes into the dictum by reason of the thing [signified], then the consequence 'I say that you are a donkey; therefore, I say what is true' is not valid, since the antecedent can be true without the consequent. For if I say that you are a donkey, I say that you are an animal insofar as the action of saying passes into the dictum by reason of the thing [signified], and yet in saying that you are a donkey I am not saying what is true.

[2f(ii). Reply to the Second Counterinstance]

In reply to the second argument we have to say that the proposition 'A man is running' does not follow from the disjunctive 'Socrates is running or he is not running.' And when it says that 'From the fact that Socrates is running or he is not running it follows that a man is running' is true, I say that that [proposition] is ambiguous in respect of composition and division. In the compounded sense it is false, for what is denoted is that the proposition 'A man is running' follows from the proposition 'Socrates is running or he is not running,' and that is false. In the divided sense it is true, for what is denoted is that from the fact that Socrates is running it follows that a man {206} is running or from the fact that Socrates is not running it follows that a man is running, and that disjunctive is true,

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[2f(iii). Reply to the Third Counterinstance]

In reply to the third [argument] we have to say that whatever follows from 'Socrates is running' follows from 'Only Socrates is running.' And when it says that 'From the fact that Socrates is running it follows that a man is running' is true, and that 'From the fact that only Socrates is running it follows that a man is running' is false, I say that 'From the fact that only Socrates is running, etc.' is ambiguous in respect of composition and division. In the compounded sense it is true, in the divided sense it is false.

[2f(iv). Reply to the Fourth Counterinstance]

In reply to the fourth argument we have to say that whatever follows from 'Some proposition is true' follows from 'Every proposition is true.' And when it says that from the fact that some proposition is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey, I say that that is ambiguous in respect of composition and division. In the compounded sense it is false, in the divided it is true. And in the same way a distinction must be drawn regarding this: 'From the fact that every proposition is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey'; in the divided sense it is false, and considered in that way it is universal; in the compounded sense it is true, and in that way it is singular. And in this sense this does not follow: 'From the fact that every proposition is true it follows that it is true that you are a donkey; therefore, from the fact that it is true that God exists it follows that it is true that you are a donkey.' Instead, there is a fallacy of the consequent here, since one is arguing on the basis of the false rule [FR2a], whatever follows from the antecedent follows from the consequent.

For that reason it is important to know that when a dictum serves as the subject and a mode is predicated, the whole proposition is singular. And in that case a descent need not be made under the subject, even though the subject of the dictum is distributed by means of a universal sign. And that is why this does not follow:

'That every mule is sterile is known by me; therefore, that this mule is sterile is known by me.'

It is also important to know that even though an antecedent implies a consequent, it need not be the case that that antecedent with any addition whatever implies the consequent with that addition. This is evident, since although the consequence 'I am stuck in the mud with 100 silver coins; therefore, I am stuck in the mud' is good, this does not follow: 'I would like to be stuck in the mud {207} with 100 silver coins; therefore, I would like to be stuck in the mud,' since a person who wants the antecedent need not want the consequent.

[3. Third Principal Rule]

The third principal rule is this:

> [Rule 3] *In every good nonsyllogistic consequence the [contradictory] opposite of the antecedent follows from the contradictory opposite of the consequent.*

For example, because 'A man is running; therefore, an animal is running' follows, the [contradictory] opposite of the antecedent follows from the contradictory opposite of the consequent; for this follows: 'No animal is running; therefore, no man is running.' And the opposite of [this] antecedent follows from the opposite of [this] consequent, since this follows: 'Some man is running' (the opposite of the consequent); 'therefore, some animal is running' (the opposite of the antecedent). [Moreover,] if the [contradictory] opposite of the antecedent follows from the contradictory opposite of the consequent, the original consequence was good.

The reason for this rule is that if the [contradictory] opposite of the antecedent does not follow from the contradictory opposite of the consequent, the antecedent would stand together with the opposite of the consequent; for if the one opposite does not follow, the other one stands. But whatever stands with the antecedent stands with the consequent. Therefore, if the opposite of the consequent stood with the antecedent, it would follow that the opposite of the consequent stood with the consequent; and in that case contradictories would stand together – which is impossible.

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Notice that in order that the consequence be good it is required that the contradictory opposite of the antecedent follow from the contradictory opposite of the consequent, and it is not enough that a contrary opposite of the antecedent follow from a contrary opposite of the consequent. For if that were enough, it would follow that this consequence would be good: 'Every man is an animal; therefore, every animal is a man,' since a [contrary] opposite of the antecedent follows from a contrary opposite of the consequent; for this follows: 'No animal is a man; therefore, no man is an animal.'

Notice, furthermore, that the opposite of the antecedent follows from the opposite of the consequent not in every good consequence, but only in a nonsyllogistic consequence. For in a syllogistic consequence the antecedent has no opposite, since a syllogistic antecedent {208} is more than one proposition ((*propositiones/ propositio*)) not conjoined together. Such an antecedent altogether lacks an opposite because it is neither one proposition absolutely nor one proposition conjunctively. In a syllogistic consequence, however, the opposite of one of the premises follows from the opposite of the conclusion with the other premise; and if the opposite of either premise follows from the opposite of the conclusion with the other premise, then the original syllogism was good. For it is in that way that the Philosopher proves his syllogisms – viz., by arguing from the opposite of the conclusion with one of the premises – as is apparent in *Prior Analytics* I (7, 29b1ff.).

[4. Fourth Principal Rule]

But people do not understand the nature of the contradictory of propositions in general, and so I lay down a fourth principal rule:

> [Rule 4] *The formal element that is affirmed in the one contradictory must be denied in the other.*

Thus, what is both formal and principal [in a proposition] cannot be affirmed in both contradictories but must be affirmed in the one and denied in the other. For it is because the verb linking the predicate with the subject is the formal element in assertoric propositions that the same principal verb does not remain affirmed in both contradictories; instead, in order to give the contradictory

of an assertoric affirmative proposition one must add negation to the principal verb.

In the same way, the mode is the principal and formal element of modal propositions, and so in modal propositions the contradictory is given by adding negation to the mode, as the Philosopher claims in *De interpretatione* II (12, 21a36ff.).

It is done in the same way in other kinds of propositions – in conjunctive propositions, for instance, and so on. For the principal element in a conjunctive proposition is the mark of conjunction, and so the mark of conjunction will not remain affirmed in both contradictories but must be affirmed in the one and denied in the other. It is the same for the other kinds; for in disjunctive propositions the disjunction is the principal element, in conditional propositions, the condition; in reduplicative propositions, the reduplication; and in all of them the contradiction must be given by adding negation to the [principal and] formal element.

On this basis it is evident that the contradictory of 'Socrates is running and Plato is running' is not 'Socrates is not running and Plato is not running,' because the conjunction is affirmed in both of those [conjunctive propositions], and, furthermore, they can be false together. Instead, the contradictory of 'Socrates is running and Plato is running' is 'It is not the case that Socrates is running and Plato is {209} running,' since [in this case] a single negation negates the mark of conjunction. And in this case the sense is this: The conjunctive proposition 'Socrates is running and Plato is running' is not true. (And it works the same way as regards disjunctives, conditionals, and all the others.)

[4a. Corollaries to Rule 4]

But someone might be uncertain about what the opposite of a conjunctive proposition is equipollent to, and what the opposite of a disjunctive proposition is equipollent to, and so on.

We have to lay it down as a rule that

> [Rule 4a] *The contradictory of a copulative proposition is equivalent to a disjunctive proposition that has parts that contradict the parts of the conjunctive proposition.*

For example, the contradictory of the copulative proposition 'Socrates is running and Plato is running' is equivalent to 'Either Socrates is not running or Plato is not running.'

There is another rule:

> [Rule 4b] *The contradictory of a disjunctive proposition is equipollent to a conjunctive proposition made up of the contradictories of the parts of the disjunctive proposition.*

For example, the contradictory of 'Either Socrates is running or Plato is running' is equivalent to 'Socrates is not running and Plato is not running.'

There is another rule:

> [Rule 4c] *The contradictory of a conditional ((conditionalis/conditionis)) proposition is equivalent to a proposition that signifies that the opposite of its consequent stands together with its antecedent.*

For the contradictory of 'If Socrates is running, a man is running' is 'It is not the case that if Socrates is running, a man is running,' which is equivalent to 'These stand together: "Socrates is running" and "No man is running."'

There is another rule:

> [Rule 4d] *There are two causes of a reduplicative proposition; for the contradictory of a reduplicative proposition can be true either because the consequent does not follow from the antecedent or because the antecedent is not the cause of the consequent.*

For example, the contradictory of 'Insofar as you are a donkey, you are an animal' is 'It is not the case that insofar as you are a donkey, you are an animal,' and that has two causes of its truth: either because 'You are a donkey; therefore, you are an animal' does not follow, or because the proposition 'You are a donkey' is not the cause of the proposition 'You are an animal.'

Moreover, it is important to know this rule:

> [Rule 4e] *Although one or the other of a pair of contradictories is affirmed truly of anything whatever considered absolutely, it need not be the case that one or the other of a pair of contradictories is said truly of anything whatever considered under some mode or other.*

Thus both of these are false: 'Insofar as you are a man, you are a donkey' and 'Insofar as you are not a man, you are not a donkey.'

Nor do they contradict each other, since the reduplication is affirmed in both of them.

[5. Fifth Principal Rule]

The fifth principal rule is this:

> [Rule 5] *The negation of any and every [logical] inferior follows from the negation of its [logical] superior.*

And this rule is to be understood as applying when the negated superior has personal supposition; for this {210} follows: 'Socrates is not an animal; therefore, Socrates is not a man, not a donkey, and so on.'

On this basis one can see the truth of something said in other connections – viz., that a negation negates more than an affirmation affirms. For the negation of the superior is the negation of any and every inferior, but the affirmation of the superior is not the affirmation of any and every inferior. For it is not necessary that running is affirmed of any and every man if it is affirmed of a man. Still, it must be known that primarily a negation negates the same as and no more than an affirmation affirms (as the Philosopher claims [*De interpretatione* 7, 17b38]); it is [only] consequently and secondarily that a negation negates more than an affirmation affirms.

[6. Sixth Principal Rule]

The sixth principal rule is this:

> [Rule 6] *Negation governs what follows it and not what precedes it.*

[6a. Corollaries to Rule 6]

Two other rules follow from that rule. The first is this:

> [Rule 6a] *A consequence from an inferior to its superior with negation put before does not hold good*

– as is clear, since this does not follow: 'Socrates is not a donkey; therefore, he is not an animal.'

The second:

[Rule 6b] *A consequence from an inferior to its superior using particular or indefinite propositions with negation put after is good.*

For 'A man is not running; therefore, an animal is not running' does indeed follow, as is clear because the opposite of the antecedent is inferred from the opposite of the consequent.

Furthermore, from [Rule 6a], a consequence from an inferior to its superior with negation put before does not hold good, another rule follows:

[Rule 6c] *A consequence from an inferior to its superior with a word implying negation preceding ((praecedente/praecedentem)) and affecting both the superior and the inferior does not hold good.*

And so the difference or otherness of a superior does not follow from the difference or otherness of its inferior; for this does not follow: 'Socrates differs from a donkey; therefore, Socrates differs from an animal,' nor is this valid: 'Socrates is other than a donkey; therefore, he is other than an animal.' Conversely, however, the difference or otherness of an inferior does follow from the difference or otherness of its superior; for this follows: 'Socrates is other than an animal; therefore, he is other than a donkey.'

And, since a superior taken together with distribution is inferior to itself without distribution and to any inferior of it, from the difference of a superior taken together with distribution the difference of that same superior without distribution or of any inferior does not follow. For this does not follow: 'Socrates differs from any man; therefore, he differs from a man,' nor does this follow: 'Socrates differs from any {211} man; therefore, Socrates differs from Socrates,' since the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. For 'Socrates differs from any man' is true because it is equivalent to 'Socrates is not the same as any man,' which is equivalent to 'Socrates relative to some man is not the same.' But 'Socrates relative to some man is not the same' is true, and so 'Socrates differs from any man' is true.

On that basis it is evident that these are not the same: 'You differ from any man' and 'You from any man differ,' since the first is true and the second is false. For 'You differ from any man' is true because it is equivalent to 'You relative to some man are not the same'; and 'You from any man differ' is false because it is equivalent ((*valet/valit*)) to 'You relative to no man are the same.'

It is also evident that 'You differ from anything; therefore, you differ from yourself' does not follow but is a fallacy of the consequent, as is 'You relative to something are not the same; therefore, you relative to yourself are not the same.'

[7. Seventh Principal Rule]

The seventh principle rule is this:

> [Rule 7] *A consequence from a distributed superior to its inferior taken with distribution and without distribution holds good, but a consequence from an inferior to its superior with distribution does not hold good.*

For this follows: 'Every animal is running; therefore, every man is running (and, [therefore,] a man is running),' but not vice versa.

[7a. A Corollary to Rule 7]

From that rule another rule derives – viz.,

> [Rule 7a] *When a consequence containing terms taken without distribution is good, it is good the other way around with those terms taken with distribution.*

This rule is also expressed in other words, as follows:

> [Rule 7a'] *Whenever a consequent follows from an antecedent, the distribution of the antecedent follows from the distribution of the consequent.*

'Every animal is running; therefore, every man is running' follows because 'A man is running; therefore, an animal is running' follows.

[7b. Counterinstances to Rule 7]

There are counterinstances to this rule, however.

For this follows: 'Socrates is running; therefore, a man is running,' and yet 'Every man is running; therefore, every Socrates is running' does not follow, because the consequent is unintelligible. {212}

Again, this follows: 'A man is a donkey; therefore, a man is an animal' and yet 'Every man is an animal; therefore, every man is a donkey' does not follow.

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Likewise, this follows: 'An animal is a man; therefore, a man is an animal,' and yet 'Every man is an animal; therefore, every animal is a man' does not follow.

[7c. Replies to the Counterinstances]

We have to say that the rule is true when three conditions have been presupposed. The first is that the original consequence holds good by reason of [its] noncomplex elements and not by reason of the whole complex. The second, that the terms by reason of which the original consequence held good are distributable. The third condition, that the distribution is added to those terms by reason of which the original consequence was good.

Because of a failure of the first condition, it need not be the case that if 'An animal is a man; therefore, a man is an animal' follows, then this follows: 'Every man is an animal; therefore, every animal is a man'; for the consequence 'An animal is a man; therefore, a man is an animal' holds good by reason of the whole complex and not by reason of [its] noncomplex elements.

Because of a failure of the second condition, 'Every man is running; therefore, every Socrates is running' does not follow, even though it follows the other way around without distribution.

Because of a failure of the third condition, 'Every man is an animal; therefore, every man is a donkey' does not follow, even though it does follow the other way around without distribution: 'A man is a donkey; therefore, a man is an animal.' That is because the distribution is not added to those terms by reason of which the consequence held good; for the consequence 'A man is a donkey; therefore, a man is an animal' holds good by reason of the predicates, and so if distribution were added to those predicates the consequence would hold the other way around. For this does follow: 'A man is every animal; therefore, a man is every donkey.'

[8. Eighth Principal Rule]

The eighth principal rule is this:

> [Rule 8] *A consequence from a proposition that has more than one cause of its truth to one of those [causes] does not hold good but is a fallacy of the consequent.*

For example, if you argue in this way: 'Socrates is not weak; therefore, Socrates is healthy,' there is a fallacy of the consequent, since 'Socrates is not weak' has two causes of its truth – viz., these: 'Socrates does not exist' and so is not weak, and 'Socrates is healthy' – and you are arguing to [just] one of those, and so there is a fallacy of the consequent. {213}

[8a. An Alleged Corollary to Rule 8]

On the basis of this rule some people accept a [false] rule of the following sort: [FR8] From a purely negative proposition an affirmative proposition never follows. [They do so] because a negative proposition has two causes of its truth, of which one is [just] an affirmative proposition with the opposed predicate, while the other includes the persistence of the subject. [They do so] also because a negative asserts nothing and an affirmation asserts something, and when more is asserted by means of the consequent than by means of the antecedent, the consequence does not hold good. For some say that although an affirmative proposition does not follow from a purely negative proposition, an affirmative proposition does follow from a negative proposition that includes the persistence of the subject; since although 'Socrates is not weak; therefore, Socrates is healthy' does not follow, this does follow: 'Socrates is not weak, and Socrates exists; therefore, Socrates is healthy.'

[8b. Assessment of the Alleged Corollary]

Nevertheless, that claim – that from a purely negative proposition an affirmative proposition never follows – does not hold good; for the proposition 'Some proposition is true' is affirmative, and yet it follows from every negative proposition, however negative it may be, since this follows: 'Socrates is not running; therefore, that Socrates is not running is true,' since any and every proposition asserts that it is itself true; and this follows: 'That Socrates is not running is true; therefore, some proposition is true.' Therefore, from the first to the last, 'Socrates is not running; therefore, some proposition is true.' And it works the same way with any other negative proposition – that is, any and every negative proposition implies 'Some proposition is true.'

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Again, any and every negative proposition implies a disjunctive proposition one part of which is that negative proposition; for this follows: 'Socrates is not running; therefore, Socrates is running or he is not running,' and this [disjunctive proposition] is affirmative; and so any and every negative proposition implies an affirmative proposition.

All the same, a purely negative proposition does not imply an affirmative proposition with a contrary or privative predicate in respect of the same subject unless the persistence of the subject is assumed. For this does not follow: 'Socrates is not healthy; therefore, he is sick'; it is, instead, a fallacy of the consequent because the antecedent has another cause of its truth. Neither does this follow: 'Socrates is not just; therefore, he is unjust.'

[8c. Two Doubts]

There is some doubt, however, over whether from a purely negative proposition an affirmative proposition with a contradictory predicate follows. {214}

[8c(i). First Doubt]

The first doubt is whether this follows: 'Socrates is not white; therefore, he is non-white,' and similarly in other cases – which amounts to asking whether an affirmative proposition with a non-finite predicate follows from a negative proposition with a finite predicate, and, likewise, whether an affirmative proposition with a finite predicate follows from a negative proposition with a non-finite predicate – whether, for example, this follows: 'Socrates is not white; therefore, Socrates is non-white,' and also 'Socrates is not non-white; therefore, Socrates is white.'

For it seems that from a negative proposition an affirmative proposition with a contradictory predicate always follows, since according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* IV (7, 1011b23) and V (and in many other places) regarding anything whatever, one or the other of a pair of contradictories is said [of it], but a finite and a non-finite term are contradictories; therefore, the non-finite term is attributed to anything from which the finite term is removed.

There is an argument to the contrary, since 'Socrates is not white

wood; therefore, Socrates is non-white wood' does not follow, because the antecedent is true and the consequent false. (The falsity of the consequent is obvious.) Similarly, 'Better than God is not a man; therefore, better than God is a non-man' does not follow because the antecedent is true and the consequent false. The falsity of the consequent is obvious; for this does not follow: 'Better than God is a non-man; therefore, a donkey is better than God.' The consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent.

[8c(ii). Second Doubt]

The other doubt is whether any and every affirmative proposition implies a negative proposition with a contradictory predicate – i.e., whether in general a negative proposition with a non-finite predicate follows from an affirmative proposition with a finite predicate, and whether a negative proposition with a finite predicate follows from an affirmative proposition with a non-finite predicate.

For it seems that it does not, since 'Socrates was white; therefore, Socrates was not non-white' does not follow, nor does 'Socrates is not white; therefore, Socrates is non-white,' nor does 'Socrates sees a non-man; therefore, Socrates does not see a man.'

The Philosopher seems to claim the contrary in *De interpretatione* II (10, 20a20ff.).

[8c(iii). Consideration of the First Doubt]

As for the first of these doubts, we have to say that as long as each of the two extremes is simple, both the subject and the predicate, then in general an affirmative proposition with a non-finite predicate does follow from a negative proposition with a finite predicate, and an affirmative proposition with a finite predicate does follow from a negative proposition {215} with a non-finite predicate. The reason for this is that regarding any simple negative proposition whatever one or the other of a pair of contradictories is affirmed [of it], and so one [contradictory] is attributed to any [negative proposition] of which the other is denied; but a finite and a non-finite term are contradictories.

And so I maintain that in general where simple [terms] are concerned, a negative proposition with a finite predicate implies an affirmative proposition with a non-finite predicate, and a negative

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non-just; therefore, the man is not just.'

On the other hand, if one or the other extreme, either the subject
or the predicate, is composite, it does not follow; for in that case
the negative proposition need not imply the affirmative. Here is an
example in which the compositeness occurs in the predicate:
'Socrates is not white wood; therefore, Socrates is non-white wood'
– which does not follow, since the antecedent is true and the
consequent false. Here is an example in which the compositeness
occurs in the subject: 'Better than God is not a man; therefore,
better than God is a non-man' – which does not follow, since the
antecedent is true and the consequent false. The falsity of the
consequent is obvious, since this does follow: 'Better than God is a
non-man; therefore, a non-man is better than God.' The consequent
is false; therefore, so is the antecedent.

[8c(iv). Objections to the Consideration]

But one argues in the following way against the things that were
just said. And first one proves that as regards all terms, both simple
and composite, an affirmative proposition with a non-finite predi-
cate follows from a negative proposition with a finite predicate: for,
regarding anything whatever, one or the other of a pair of contra-
dictories is said [of it]; therefore, the non-finite term must be
attributed to anything from which the finite term is removed, since
the finite and the non-finite term are contradictories.

Secondly, one proves that where simple terms are concerned an
affirmative proposition with a non-finite predicate does not follow
from a negative proposition with a finite predicate; for this does not
follow: 'Caesar is not a man; therefore, Caesar is a non-man,' since
when Caesar has been destroyed the antecedent is true and the
consequent false, because when Caesar has died he is not a man or a
non-man.

[8c(v). Replies to the Objections]

We have to reply to the first of these by replacing the rule that one
of a pair of contradictory opposites is attributed to anything from

which the other is removed; for when the predicate is composite, the argument is not based on the rule that one of a pair of [contradictory] opposites is attributed to anything from which the other is removed, because 'white {216} wood' and 'non-white wood' are not contradictories, since they are made false with regard to the same thing; for each of these is false: 'Socrates is white wood' and 'Socrates is non-white wood.' And the reason for this is that when one says 'non-white wood' the non-finite negation covers only 'white,' and so 'wood' remains affirmed, but if a non-finite negation could render the whole 'white wood' non-finite, the consequence would be good.

I also claim that an affirmative proposition does not follow from a negative proposition as long as the subject is composite and the predicate is simple. Nor does one argue on the basis of the rule that regarding anything whatever one or the other of a pair of contradictories is said [of it]. For that reason I grant that 'non-man' is attributed to anything from which 'man' is removed, and yet the consequence 'Better than God is not a man; therefore, better than God is a non-man' is not valid because 'Better than God' is something false. Thus if something were better than God, the consequence would be good.

In reply to the other argument I maintain that while Caesar does not exist 'Caesar is a non-man' is true, because a non-finite term is said both of a being and of a non-being. (Transcendental terms, such as 'something' and 'being' and terms of that sort, are also said both of a being and of a non-being.)

[8c(vi). Consideration of the Second Doubt]

As for the second doubt, I say that as long as the predicate is taken with personal supposition both in the affirmative and in the negative proposition, then the affirmative proposition always implies the negative proposition. An affirmative proposition with a finite predicate implies a negative proposition with a non-finite predicate, and an affirmative proposition with a non-finite predicate implies a negative proposition with a finite predicate – with composite as well as with simple terms, with past- and future-tense propositions as well as with present-tense propositions, with substantival as well as with adjectival verbs – nor is there a counterinstance in connec-

tion with any terms. But if the predicate has material or simple supposition, the consequence need not be valid. For if the antecedent is taken in such a way that the predicate has simple supposition, this does not follow: 'Some universal is non-universal; therefore, some universal is not a universal,' because the antecedent is true and the consequent false. If the predicate of the antecedent has personal supposition, however, the consequence will be good and the antecedent false.

As for the counterinstances on the other side, I say in reply to the first that the consequence 'Socrates was non-white; therefore, Socrates was not white' does not hold good. And [the antecedent] need not imply a negative proposition [in that way], but rather in this way: 'Socrates was non-white; therefore, Socrates at that time was not white.' This follows in the same way: 'Socrates will be non-white.' {217}

In reply to the second counterinstance I say that this does not follow: 'Socrates sees a non-man; therefore, Socrates does not see a man.' And the predicate of the antecedent ((*antecedentis/antecedens*)) is not non-finite, since in 'Socrates sees a non-man' the predicate is the whole 'sees a non-man'; and so [that proposition] need not imply a negative proposition with a finite predicate.

[9. Ninth Principal Rule]

The ninth rule is this:

> [Rule 9] *Whenever a term is used for one thing in the antecedent and for another in the consequent, the antecedent does not imply the consequent; but when the terms are used for the same things in the antecedent and the consequent, the consequence is good.*

And it is for that reason that this does not follow: 'Socrates is a good blacksmith; therefore, Socrates is good'; for in the antecedent, 'good' ((*bonus/bonitas*)) is used for goodness in the blacksmith's art, and in the consequent it is used for goodness absolutely – i.e., for moral goodness. Similarly, this does not follow: 'This housekeeper is a wife, this housekeeper belongs to you; therefore, a wife belongs to you,' nor does this: 'You have a housekeeper, and she is a wife; therefore, you have a wife,' since 'belongs' and 'have' are used for one thing in the conclusion and for another in the premises.

[9a. Divided and Conjoined Predicates]

On the basis of this rule it is evident when a conjoined predicate follows from divided predicates and when it does not, and also when divided predicates follow from a conjoined predicate and when they do not. And let us first see when a conjoined one follows from divided ones, next, when divided ones follow from conjoined ones.

[9a(i). A Conjoined Predicate Following from Divided Ones]

For the first [investigation] we have to know whether or not the divided predicates are of such a sort that one naturally determines the other. If neither naturally determines the other, it is certain that a conjoined predicate never follows from divided predicates of that sort. And so 'Socrates is a man, and Socrates is risible; therefore, Socrates is a risible man' does not follow, nor does this: 'Socrates is a man, and he is two-legged; therefore, he is a two-legged man.'

On the other hand, if the one does naturally determine the other, we have to see whether the divided predicates are used for the same things when they are used dividedly and conjointly. If they are used for the same things dividedly and conjointly, then, I maintain, a conjoined predicate always follows from the divided predicates. And it is for this reason that 'Socrates is a man, and Socrates is white; therefore, he is a white man' does follow. But if [either of them] is used for different things when they are used dividedly and when {218} they are used in the conjoined [term], the consequence is not valid. And that is why 'Socrates is good, and he is a blacksmith; therefore, he is a good blacksmith' does not follow.

[9a(ii). Divided Predicates Following from a Conjoined One]

For the second [investigation], I maintain that divided predicates always follow from conjoined predicates when the term is used dividedly for the same thing for which it is used in the conjoined [term], but that a term used dividedly does not follow from the conjoined [term] when it is not used for the same thing in the

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It is important to know, furthermore, that in *De interpretatione* II (11, 20b12ff.) the Philosopher lays down two conditions as required in order for divided predicates to follow from a conjoined predicate. The one condition is that there be no opposition in the modifiers in the conjoined predicate; the other condition is that the predication not be accidental. By an accidental predication I mean one in which a determination added to the predicate or to something determinable in the predicate position implies neither the determinable nor the opposite of the determinable. Thus there are three kinds of determination: one that implies something, one that revokes it, and one that is indifferent. An example of the first kind: 'Socrates is a white man; therefore, he is a man' – because 'white' is a determination that implies its determinable. An example of the second kind: 'Socrates is a dead man; therefore, he is a man' – this does not follow, but its opposite 'therefore, he is not a man' does follow because 'dead' is a determination that revokes, one that implies the opposite of its determinable. An example of the third kind: 'Socrates is white as regards his teeth' – from which it does not follow 'therefore, he is white,' nor, furthermore, does this follow: 'Socrates is not white'; for the determination 'as regards his teeth' is indifferent as between white and non-white and so implies neither its determinable nor the opposite. {219}

[10. Tenth Principal Rule]

The tenth rule is this:

> [Rule 10] *From every action performed there follows the action signi-*
> *fied, and vice versa.*

For this follows: 'A man is an animal; therefore "animal" is predi-
cated of "man,"' since the verb 'is' performs predication, and the
verb 'is predicated' signifies predication. And syncategorematic
words perform actions, and adjectival verbs signify actions of that
sort. For example, the sign 'every' or 'all' performs distribution,
and the verb 'distribute' signifies distribution; the word 'if' per-
forms consequence, and the verb 'follows' signifies consequence.

It is important to know, however, that an action performed does
not always imply the action signified in the same terms (and vice
versa). For although 'A most general genus is predicated truly of a
species' is true, this is false: 'A species is a most general genus.'
Nevertheless, the action performed is true for the same things for
which the signified action is true (and vice versa). For this is true:
'A most general genus is predicated of a species' because 'substance'
is predicated of 'man,' and so 'A man is a substance' is true.

[11. Syllogistic Consequences]

Now that the general rules for every consequence have been dis-
cussed, we have to say some things about syllogistic consequence
specifically.

I maintain, therefore, that there are two general rules for every
syllogism in whatever figure or mood it is made – viz., that it have
[i] one or the other premise universal and [ii] one or the other
premise affirmative; for nothing follows syllogistically from nega-
tive or from particular propositions.

In addition to those rules that are common to every figure there
are certain special rules for each figure. In connection with the first
figure there are two rules – viz., that in the moods that yield their
conclusions directly [I.i] the major premise must be universal, and
[I.ii] the minor premise must be affirmative. There are other rules
in connection with the second figure ((om. *Una*)) – viz., [II.i] the
major premise must be universal, and [II.ii] one or the other pre-
mise must be negative. In connection with the third [figure], how-

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ever, there are other rules – viz., [III.i] the minor premise must always be affirmative, and [III.ii] the conclusion must be particular. If a syllogism is made in any other way, it is not valid.

Let these things that have been said suffice as regards consequences.