well. But things in relation to something *have* been shown to be unreal. Therefore demonstration too will be something unreal.

k. Dogmatic counter-argument to the effect that skeptical arguments are self-refuting (463–469)

(463) Well then, these are the kinds of things said in favor of there being no demonstration; but let us also look at the opposing argument. For the dogmatic philosophers think that the argument[132] maintaining that there is no demonstration is turned about by itself, and determines demonstration[133] by the very means by which it does away with it. Hence, setting themselves against the skeptics, they say: "The person who says that demonstration is nothing says that demonstration is nothing either with the use of a bare and undemonstrated assertion, or by demonstrating this with an argument. **(464)** And if it is with the use of a bare assertion, none of those receiving the demonstration[134] will believe him, since he is using a bare assertion, but he will be stopped by the opposing assertion, when someone says that there is demonstration. But if it is by demonstrating that there is no demonstration (their words), he has right away agreed that there is demonstration; for the argument that shows that there is no demonstration is a demonstration of there being demonstration. **(465)** And generally the argument against demonstration either is a demonstration or is not a demonstration; and if it is not a demonstration it is untrustworthy, while if it is a demonstration, there is demonstration."

(466) And some people also put forward the following argument: "If there is demonstration, there is demonstration; if there is not demonstration, there is demonstration. But either there is demonstration or there is not; therefore there is demonstration." And in fact, the attractiveness of the premises of this argument is obvious. For the first conditional – "If there is demonstration, there is demonstration" – being a differentiated proposition,[135] is true; for its second component follows from its first, since it is not distinct from it. And the second conditional – "If there is not demonstration, there is demonstration" – is again sound. For from

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[132] With Heintz I retain *logon* (present in one manuscript – the others have *logoi*, bracketed by Mutschmann) but transpose it to after *ton axiounta mē einai apodeixin*.

[133] I.e., establishes (contrary to the argument's proponents) that there *is* such a thing.

[134] A misleading choice of term, since the argument presents demonstration and bare assertion as alternatives.

[135] Cf. 108–109 and n. 49.

there not being demonstration, which is the leader, there being demonstration follows; **(467)** for the very argument showing that there is not demonstration, since it is demonstrative, confirms that there is demonstration. And the disjunction "Either there is demonstration or there is not demonstration," since it is a disjunction of contradictories – there being demonstration or there not being – ought to have one component true and for this reason be true. So that since the premises are true, the consequence is also drawn. **(468)** It is also possible to teach in another way that it follows from them. For if the disjunction is true when it has one of its components true, whichever of these we suppose is true, the consequence will be drawn. Let us suppose first that the component that is true is there being demonstration. Then, since this is the leader in the first conditional, the finisher in the first conditional will follow from it; but it finished with "There is demonstration," which is also the consequence. Therefore if it is a given that there being demonstration is true in the disjunction, the consequence of the argument will follow. **(469)** And the same mode of persuasion applies in the case of the remaining proposition, there not being demonstration; for it led in the second conditional <and>[136] had the consequence of the argument following from it.

l.   Skeptical replies to the counter-argument (470–481)
(470) This is what the dogmatists' opposition is like; and the skeptics' way of meeting it is brief. For they will say: if it is not possible to answer the question in which they asked whether the argument against demonstration is a demonstration or not a demonstration, they ought to be considerate if they are not in a position to answer such an intractable question. **(471)** But if what they are ordering the skeptics to do is easy, let them do this thing that they treat as easy, and answer as to whether they say that the argument against demonstration is a demonstration or not a demonstration. For if it is not a demonstration, it is not possible to teach from it that there is demonstration, nor to say that, because this argument is a demonstration, there will be demonstration; for they have agreed that it is not a demonstration. **(472)** But if it is a demonstration, undoubtedly it has its premises and consequence true; for it is with the truth of these that demonstration is conceived. But its consequence is that there

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[136] With Kochalsky I add the supplement *kai*, which is the minimum needed to complete the sense. But Mutschmann may be right that a longer passage has been lost. In any case the general purport of this section is clear.