
CVE-2022-22954_VMware_Workspace_ONE_Access_SSTI_RCE 漏洞


前言

4月6日和5月18日,VMware 官方发布的两则安全公告中显示,关乎旗下产品的 CVE 漏洞多达 10 个,其中不乏有 CVSSv3 评分 9.8 的高危漏洞!如此高频的出洞速率,吸引了笔者注意。在继上篇 CVE-2022-22972 VMware Workspace ONE Access 身份认证绕过漏洞分析之后,笔者将对 CVE-2022-22954 VMware Workspace ONE Access SSTI RCE 漏洞进行细致分析。



漏洞描述

根据 4 月 6 日 VMware 官方发布的安全公告,官方已更新解决了多个产品的安全问题。其中 CVE-2022-22954,CVSS 评分为 9.8,危害等级为严重。该漏洞是由于 VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager 包含一个服务器端模板注入漏洞,导致具有网络访问权限的恶意攻击者可进行远程代码执行。



利用范围

- VMware Workspace ONE Access 21.08.0.1, 21.08.0.0, 20.10.0.1, 20.10.0.0
- VMware Identity Manager (vIDM) 3.3.6, 3.3.5, 3.3.4, 3.3.3
- VMware vRealize Automation(vIDM) 7.6
- VMware Cloud Foundation (vIDM) 4.x

漏洞分析

根据 freemarker 官网文档中给出了安全问题的提示

使用内置函数将字符串计算为 FTL 表达式, FTL 表达式可以访问变量, 并调用 Java 方法, 例如 "1+2"?eval 将返回数字 3, 所以?eval 前的字符串因来自不受信任的来源, 可能就会成为攻击媒介。

eval

This built-in evaluates a string as an FTL expression. For example "1+2"?eval returns the number 3. (To render a template that's stored in a string, use the interpret built-in instead.)

▲ Warning!

Do not use this to evaluate JSON! For that use the eval_json built-in instead. While FTL expression language looks similar to JSON, not all JSON is valid FTL expression. Also, FTL expressions can access variables, and call Java methods on them, so if you ?eval strings coming from untrusted source, it can become an attack vector.

The evaluated expression sees the same variables (such as locals) that are visible at the place of the invocation of eval. That is, it behaves similarly as if in place of s?eval you had the value of s there. Except, it can't use loop variable built-ins that refer to a loop variable that was created outside s.

Regarding the configuration settings that affect the parsing (like syntax) and evaluation the rules are the same as with the interpret built-in.

在 Vmware 中的 endusercatalog-ui-1.0-SNAPSHOT-classes.jar 自带的模板 customError.ftl 就调用了 freemarker 引擎的 eval 函数来渲染 errObj,这就导致了本次 SSTI 注入漏洞

环境搭建

可参考 CVE-2022-22972 VMware Workspace ONE Access 身份认证绕过漏洞分析

本次漏洞分析源码所在位置: /opt/vmware/horizon/workspace/webapps/catalog-portal/WEB-INF/lib

```
| configurate | /opt//morrs/horizon/workspace/webaps/catalog-portal/RES-INF/LID | # 18 | accessors-suntrel-rest-nedia-0.31. | ar | ass-java-sdk-servicedates/severy-1.11.398. | ar | jaxh-nutiae-2.3.1. | jar | ja
```


动态调式

已经定位到安全问题所在,接下来寻找渲染 customError.ftl 模板的相关代码 在 com.vmware.endusercatalog.ui.web.UiErrorController#handleGenericError 函数中

```
| Index-bub filds | 193 | 194 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195
```

errorObj 由参数传入

查找 handleGenericError 函数的被调用关系发现



handleGenericError 函数受如上图所示的两个 requestMapping 所在的控制器 UiErrorController 调用

跟进其中出现的 getErrorPage 函数,位于

com.vmware.endusercatalog.ui.web.UiErrorController#getErrorPage

```
Reader Mode

private boolean isErrorTypeUnauthorized(int errCd) { return errCd == HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED.value(); }

private boolean isErrorTypeUnauthorized(int errCd) { return errCd == HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED.value(); }

private String getErrorPage(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, MapcString, Object> model, int errorCode, String arrorMessage, S

Exception exp = request.getAttribute("javax.servlet.error.exception") instanceof Exception ? (Exception)request.getAttribute("javax.servlet.error.exception") instanceof Exception ? (Exception)request.getAttribute("javax.servlet.error.exception.exception ? (Exception)request.getAttribute("javax.servlet.error.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exception.exceptio
```

除了直接用 handleGenericError 函数拿到需要渲染的模板,还存在 handleUnauthorizedError 函数通过条件判断,只有一个分支进入 handleGenericError

如何构造参数?

在两个 requestMapping 中,其中的/ui/view/error 为 API 接口,直接访问无法从请求中提取 javax.servlet.error.message,从而无法控制 error0bj。

寻找/ui/view/error 的其他调用,位于

com.vmware.endusercatalog.ui.web.UiApplicationExceptionResolver#resolveException 函数


存在对 javax.servlet.error.message 赋值的过程

查看 resolveException 函数的被调用关系,受上方 handleAnyGenericException 函数调用

```
### Strong Land Control of Project Control of Control o
```

其中@ExceptionHandler 表明,该处为异常处理器,当程序直接抛出 Exception 类型的异常时会进入 handleAnyGenericException,再通过调用 resolveException 函数,进行赋值,最终都会返回/ui/view/error

而在 handleAnyGenericException 中,进入 resolveException 时会根据异常的类型传入不同的参数,如果异常类不是 LocalizationParamValueException 子类的话则传入 uiRequest.getRequestId(),所以我们需要构造参数可控的地方还需要抛出 LocalizationParamValueException 异常类或其子类异常,这样 errorObj所需 Attribute errorJson 来自 LocalizationParamValueException 异常的getArgs



在 LocalizationParamValueException 函数,如果可以控制抛出异常的参数,就可以把 payload 传入 errorObj

```
package com.vmware.endusercatalog.localization;

package com.vmware.endusercatalog.localization;

public class LocalizationParamValueException extends RuntimeException {

private final Object[] args;

private Map<String, Object> map;

public LocalizationParamValueException(Throwable throwable, Object... args) {

super(throwable);

this.args = args;
}

public LocalizationParamValueException(Throwable throwable, Map<String, Object> entries, Object... args) {

this(throwable, args);

this.map = entries;
}

public Map<String, Object> getAddnlErrorInfo() { return this.map; }

public Object[] getArgs() { return Objects.isNull(this.args) ? null : (Object[])this.args.clone(); }
}
```

在 endusercatalog-auth-1.0-SNAPSHOT.jar 中
com.vmware.endusercatalog.auth.InvalidAuthContextException,存在一个
InvalidAuthContextException 异常,继承于
LocalizationParamValueException

```
Reader Mode

package com.vmware.endusercatalog.auth;

package com.vmware.endusercatalog.auth;

package com.vmware.endusercatalog.auth;

provided import ...

provided import ...
```

在 com.vmware.endusercatalog.auth.AuthContext 构造函数中抛出异常

```
AuthContext(AuthContext.Builder builder) {

if (!StringUtils.hasText(builder.tenantCode)) {

throw new InvalidAuthContextException(new Object[8]);

} else {

this.deviceType = StringUtils.hasText(builder.deviceType) ? builder.deviceType : null;

this.deviceType = StringUtils.hasText(builder.deviceType) ? builder.deviceType : null;

this.tenantCode = StringUtils.hasText(builder.deviceType) ? builder.authorizationToken : null;

this.authorizationToken = StringUtils.hasText(builder.authorizationToken) ? builder.authorizationToken : null;

this.authorizationTokenPevoked = builder.authorizationTokenRevoked;

this.authorizationTokenPevoked = builder.authorizationTokenRevoked;

this.userAgent = builder.userAgent;

this.locale = builder.locale;

this.authAdapter = builder.authAdapter;

this.authAdapter = builder.
```

生成 AuthContext 对象的地方在 AuthContextPopulationInterceptor 拦截器中,而且各项参数均是从请求中获取,这里可构造注入点。

但正常情况下,在 endusercatalog-auth-1.0-SNAPSHOT.jar 中的拦截器类无法

访问到类。

但在 com.vmware.endusercatalog.ui.UiApplication,使用 @ComponentScan 注解声明自动将 com.vmware.endusercatalog.auth 包的类装配进 bean 容器

```
Scoring con remove endostroctaleq.ut;

Import ...

Scoring con remove endostroctaleq.ut;

Import ...

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excluse - (Mexiconting praties ...)

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Section of the remove endostroctaleq.color.

Section of the remove endostroctaleq.color.

Ton remove endostroctaleq.
```

在包中 com.endusercatalog.ui.config.WebConfig 可查找到。

```
| Management | Man
```

可进行构造的 url

```
public class Mebbonfig implements WebMvcConfigurer {
    private static final String FIL_TEMPLATES_PATH = "\templates/";
    private static final String[] UL_URES = new String[]4"/u1", "/hub-u1", "/hub-u1/byob", "/logout", "/u1/oauth/verify"};
    private static final String[] AUTHENTICATEO_URES = new String[]4"/u1", "/hub-u1", "/hub-u1/byob"};
    private static final String[] ALUMED_STATIC_FILE_FILE_PATH_PATHERNS;
    private static final String[] ALUMED_STATIC_FILE_PATH_PATHERNS;
    private static final String[] ALUMED_STATIC_FILE_PATH_PATHERNS;
```

通过如上分析,可构造 payload,进行命令执行

漏洞复现



修复建议

参考漏洞影响范围进行排查,目前官方已发布修复补丁

https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/88099