
### Kubernetes Ochestration


Author: Nho Luong

Skill: DevOps Engineer Lead











Security is hard.

Containers are faster, but less secure?

How do you sign off on a release before it goes to production?

Not who, but what

How do you make sure that only trusted code runs in your production environments?

What about the bad guys?

**Author: Nho Luong** 

Digitally sign it!
But how do you sign a Docker image?
Enter Notary
Implements The Update Framework (TUF) Stores

trusted data ... such as Docker image digests

Author: Nho Luong



#### Daemon

Digest for ubuntu:latest, please!

Content for ubuntu@12345, please!



### Registry

12345

<stuff>

Author: Nho Luong



#### Daemon

Digest for ubuntu:latest, please!
I trust Bob...

And his signature checks out!

Content for ubuntu@12345, please!



#### **Notary**

► 12345, and it's signed by Alice, Bob, and Charlie



### Registry

<stuff>

Author: Nho Luong

# Why not use Docker Content Trust in your cluster? Who else do you trust? What about the kubelet images?

Kubernetes deserves powerful trust management


Admission Controllers


Author: Nho Luong

# Validating Admission Webhook Mutating Admission Webhook

Author: Nho Luong








```
API Server -> Webhook (AdmissionRequest)
uid: "a2e5846b-059a-4d56-a564-3b7c4fc4ccfb",
kind: {
group: "",
version: "v1",
kind: "Pod",
},
resource: {
group: "",
version: "v1", resource: "pods",
},
namespace: "default", operation: "CREATE", object: <lots-of-bytes>
```

```
API Server <- Webhook (AdmissionResponse)
uid: "a2e5846b-059a-4d56-a564-3b7c4fc4ccfb",
allowed: true,
// If !allowed give a reason to inform the user result: {
status: "Failure",
message: "Untrusted Image", code: "401",
patchType: "JSONPatch", patch: <some-bytes>
```

```
API Server <- Webhook (Patch)
operation: "replace",
path: "/spec/containers/0/image",
value: "liamwhite/kubecon@sha256:4bd87a5758f80eedb01335676a9e47347801fc",
```



# PORTIERIS

github.com/ibm/portieris

Author: Nho Luong

## Whitelist Images Fail Closed

Namespace or Cluster Wide Policies

Extensible

Author: Nho Luong

apiVersion: securityenforcement.admission.cloud.ibm.com/v1beta1 kind: ClusterImagePolicy

metadata:

name: kubecon-cluster-image-policy

spec:

repositories:

- name: "docker.io/liamwhite/kubecon" policy:

trust:

enabled: true

Author: Nho Luong

apiVersion: securityenforcement.admission.cloud.ibm.com/v1beta1 kind: ClusterImagePolicy

metadata:

name: kubecon-cluster-image-policy-pinned

spec:

repositories:

- name: "docker.io/liamwhite/\*" policy:

trust:

enabled: **true** signerSecrets:

- name: <secret\_name>

Author: Nho Luong

apiVersion: v1 kind: Secret type: Opaque metadata:

name: <secret\_name> data:

name: c2lnbmVyMQ==

publicKey: LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0...

Author: Nho Luong

apiVersion: securityenforcement.admission.cloud.ibm.com/v1beta1 kind: ImagePolicy

metadata:

name: kubecon-image-policy namespace: default

spec:

repositories:

- name: "docker.io/liamwhite/\*" policy:

trust:

enabled: **true** signerSecrets:

- name: <secret\_name>

Author: Nho Luong

