

# Public Key Cryptography

## Lecture 12

### Elliptic Curve Cryptography

- 1 Elliptic Curves
- 2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol (ECDH)
- 3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

# Elliptic Curves - Motivation

- **Problem:**

Asymmetric schemes like RSA and ElGamal require exponentiations in integer rings and fields with parameters of more than 1000 bits.

High computational effort on CPUs with 32-bit or 64-bit arithmetic.

Large parameter sizes critical for storage on small and embedded ones.

- **Motivation:**

Smaller field sizes providing equivalent security are desirable.

- **Solution:**

Elliptic Curve Cryptography uses a group of points (instead of integers) for cryptographic schemes with coefficient sizes of 160-256 bits, reducing significantly the computational effort.

- Elliptic curves are polynomials that define points based on the (simplified) Weierstrass equation:


$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

for parameters  $a, b$  that specify the exact shape of the curve.

- Elliptic curves cannot just be defined over the real numbers  $\mathbb{R}$ , but over many other types of finite fields.

# Elliptic Curves (cont.)

On the real numbers and with parameters  $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ , an elliptic curve looks like this:



Example:  $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 3$  over  $\mathbb{R}$

# Elliptic Curves in Cryptography

In cryptography, we are interested in elliptic curves modulo a prime number  $p > 3$ :

## Definition

*An elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  is the set of all pairs  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p$  which fulfill*

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \bmod p$$

*together with an imaginary point at infinity  $\theta$ , where  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \not\equiv 0 \bmod p$ .*

The last condition on  $a$  and  $b$  ensures that the elliptic curve is non-singular, that is, the plot has no self-intersections or vertices.

# Computations on Elliptic Curves

Some special considerations are required to convert elliptic curves into a group of points:

- In any group, a special element is required to allow for the identity operation, i.e., given  $P \in E$ :


$$P + \theta = P = \theta + P.$$

This identity point (which is not on the curve) is additionally added to the group definition.

This (infinite) identity point is denoted by  $\theta$ .

- Elliptic curves are symmetric along the  $x$ -axis.  
Up to two solutions  $y$  and  $-y$  exist for each quadratic residue  $x$  of the elliptic curve.  
For each point  $P = (x, y)$ , the inverse or negative point is defined as  $-P = (x, -y)$ .

# Computations on Elliptic Curves (cont.)







# Computations on Elliptic Curves (cont.)

- Generating a *group of points* on elliptic curves based on point addition operation  $P+Q = R$ , i.e.,  
 $(x_P, y_P) + (x_Q, y_Q) = (x_R, y_R)$
- Geometric Interpretation of point addition operation
  - Draw straight line through  $P$  and  $Q$ ; if  $P=Q$  use tangent line instead
  - Mirror third intersection point of drawn line with the elliptic curve along the  $x$ -axis
- Elliptic Curve Point Addition and Doubling Formulas

$$x_3 = s_2 - x_1 - x_2 \bmod p \quad \text{and} \quad y_3 = s(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \bmod p$$

where

$$s = \begin{cases} \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \bmod p & ; \text{ if } P \neq Q \text{ (point addition)} \\ \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} \bmod p & ; \text{ if } P = Q \text{ (point doubling)} \end{cases}$$



# Computations on Elliptic Curves - Example

Consider the elliptic curve

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2 \pmod{17}$$

and the point  $P = (5, 1)$ .

Let us compute  $2P = P + P = (x_1, y_1) + (x_2, y_2)$ . We have:

$$2P = P + P = (5, 1) + (5, 1) = (x_3, y_3).$$

Compute:

$$s = \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} = (2 \cdot 1)^{-1}(3 \cdot 5^2 + 2) = 2^{-1} \cdot 9 = 9 \cdot 9 = 13 \pmod{17}.$$

$$x_3 = s^2 - x_1 - x_2 = 13^2 - 5 - 5 = 159 = 6 \pmod{17}.$$

$$y_3 = s(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 = 13 \cdot (5 - 6) - 1 = -14 = 3 \pmod{17}.$$

Finally, we have  $2P = (5, 1) + (5, 1) = (6, 3)$ .

# Computations on Elliptic Curves (cont.)

The points on an elliptic curve and the point at infinity  $\theta$  form cyclic subgroups

$$2P = (5,1) + (5,1) = (6,3)$$

$$3P = 2P + P = (10,6)$$

$$4P = (3,1)$$

$$5P = (9,16)$$

$$6P = (16,13)$$

$$7P = (0,6)$$

$$8P = (13,7)$$

$$9P = (7,6)$$

$$10P = (7,11)$$

$$11P = (13,10)$$

$$12P = (0,11)$$

$$13P = (16,4)$$

$$14P = (9,1)$$

$$15P = (3,16)$$


$$16P = (10,11)$$

$$17P = (6,14)$$

$$18P = (5,16)$$

$$19P = \theta$$

*This elliptic curve has order  $\#E = |E| = 19$  since it contains 19 points in its cyclic group.*



# Number of Points on an Elliptic Curve

- How many points can be on an arbitrary elliptic curve?
  - Consider previous example:  $E: y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2 \pmod{17}$  has 19 points
  - However, determining the point count on elliptic curves in general is hard
- But Hasse's theorem bounds the number of points to a restricted interval

**Definition: Hasse's Theorem:**

Given an elliptic curve module  $p$ , the number of points on the curve is denoted by  $\#E$  and is bounded by

$$p + 1 - 2\sqrt{p} \leq \#E \leq p + 1 + 2\sqrt{p}$$

- **Interpretation:** The number of points is „close to“ the prime  $p$
- **Example:** To generate a curve with about  $2^{160}$  points, a prime with a length of about 160 bits is required

# Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

- Cryptosystems rely on the hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)

**Definition: Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)**

Given a primitive element  $P$  and another element  $T$  on an elliptic curve  $E$ .

The ECDL problem is finding the integer  $d$ , where  $1 \leq d \leq \#E$  such that

$$\underbrace{P + P + \dots + P}_{d \text{ times}} = dP = T.$$

- Cryptosystems are based on the idea that  $d$  is large and kept secret and attackers cannot compute it easily
- If  $d$  is known, an efficient method to compute the point multiplication  $dP$  is required to create a reasonable cryptosystem
  - Known Square-and-Multiply Method can be adapted to Elliptic Curves
  - The method for efficient point multiplication on elliptic curves: Double-and-Add Algorithm

# Double-and-Add Algorithm for Point Multiplication

## Double-and-Add Algorithm

**Input:** Elliptic curve  $E$ , an elliptic curve point  $P$  and a scalar  $d$  with bits  $d_i$

**Output:**  $T = dP$

**Initialization:**

$$T = P$$

**Algorithm:**

FOR  $i = t-1$  DOWNT0 0

$$T = T + T \bmod n$$

IF  $d_i = 1$

$$T = T + P \bmod n$$


RETURN ( $T$ )

**Example:**  $26P = (11010_2)P = (d_4d_3d_2d_1d_0)_2 P$ .

Step		
#0	$P = 1_2P$	initial setting
#1a	$P+P = 2P = 10_2P$	DOUBLE (bit $d_3$ )
#1b	$2P+P = 3P = 10^2 P + 1_2P = 11_2P$	ADD (bit $d_3=1$ )
#2a	$3P+3P = 6P = 2(11_2P) = 110_2P$	DOUBLE (bit $d_2$ )
#2b		no ADD ( $d_2 = 0$ )
#3a	$6P+6P = 12P = 2(110_2P) = 1100_2P$	DOUBLE (bit $d_1$ )
#3b	$12P+P = 13P = 1100_2P + 1_2P = 1101_2P$	ADD (bit $d_1=1$ )
#4a	$13P+13P = 26P = 2(1101_2P) = 11010_2P$	DOUBLE (bit $d_0$ )
#4b		no ADD ( $d_0 = 0$ )

# Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol (ECDH)


- Given a prime  $p$ , a suitable elliptic curve  $E$  and a point  $P=(x_P, y_P)$
- The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is defined by the following protocol:



- Joint secret between Alice and Bob:  $T_{AB} = (x_{AB}, y_{AB})$
- Proof for correctness:
  - Alice computes  $aB = a(bP) = abP$
  - Bob computes  $bA = b(aP) = abP$  since group is associative
- One of the coordinates of the point  $T_{AB}$  (usually the x-coordinate) can be used as session key (often after applying a hash function)

# Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol (ECDH) (cont.)

- The ECDH is often used to derive session keys for (symmetric) encryption
- One of the coordinates of the point  $T_{AB}$  (usually the x-coordinate) is taken as session key




- In some cases, a hash function (see next chapters) is used to derive the session key




# ECDH - Security Aspects

- Why are parameters significantly smaller for elliptic curves (160-256 bit) than for RSA (1024-3076 bit)?
  - Attacks on groups of elliptic curves are weaker than available factoring algorithms or integer DL attacks
  - Best known attacks on elliptic curves (chosen according to cryptographic criterions) are the Baby-Step Giant-Step and Pollard-Rho method
  - Complexity of these methods: on average, roughly  $\sqrt{p}$  steps are required before the ECDLP can be successfully solved
- Implications to practical parameter sizes for elliptic curves:
  - An elliptic curve using a prime  $p$  with 160 bit (and roughly  $2^{160}$  points) provides a security of  $2^{80}$  steps that required by an attacker (on average)
  - An elliptic curve using a prime  $p$  with 256 bit (roughly  $2^{256}$  points) provides a security of  $2^{128}$  steps on average




# Implementations in Hardware and Software

- Elliptic curve computations usually regarded as consisting of four layers:
  - Basic modular arithmetic operations are computationally most expensive
  - Group operation implements point doubling and point addition
  - Point multiplication can be implemented using the Double-and-Add method
  - Upper layer protocols like ECDH and ECDSA
- Most efforts should go in optimizations of the modular arithmetic operations, such as
  - Modular addition and subtraction
  - Modular multiplication
  - Modular inversion



# Implementations in Hardware and Software (cont.)

- Software implementations
  - Optimized 256-bit ECC implementation on 3GHz 64-bit CPU requires about 2 *ms* per point multiplication
  - Less powerful microprocessors (e.g. on SmartCards or cell phones) even take significantly longer ( $>10$  *ms*)
- Hardware implementations
  - High-performance implementations with 256-bit special primes can compute a point multiplication in a few hundred microseconds on reconfigurable hardware
  - Dedicated chips for ECC can compute a point multiplication even in a few ten microseconds



# Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

The ECDSA standard is defined for elliptic curves over  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  and Galois fields  $GF(2^m)$ , the former being often preferred in practice.

## Key Generation for ECDSA

1. Use an elliptic curve  $E$  with

- modulus  $p$
- coefficients  $a$  and  $b$
- a point  $A$  which generates a cyclic group of prime order  $q$

2. Choose a random integer  $d$  with  $0 < d < q$ .

3. Compute  $B = dA$ .

The keys are now:

$$k_{pub} = (p, a, b, q, A, B)$$

$$k_{pr} = (d)$$

Similar to DSA, the cyclic group has an order  $q$  which should have a size of at least 160 bit or more for higher security levels.

## ECDSA Signature Generation

1. Choose an integer as random ephemeral key  $k_E$  with  $0 < k_E < q$ .
2. Compute  $R = k_E A$ .
3. Let  $r = x_R$ .
4. Compute  $s \equiv (h(x) + d \cdot r) k_E^{-1} \bmod q$ .

## ECDSA Signature Verification

1. Compute auxiliary value  $w \equiv s^{-1} \bmod q$ .
2. Compute auxiliary value  $u_1 \equiv w \cdot h(x) \bmod q$ .
3. Compute auxiliary value  $u_2 \equiv w \cdot r \bmod q$ .
4. Compute  $P = u_1 A + u_2 B$ .
5. The verification  $ver_{k_{pub}}(x, (r, s))$  follows from:

$$x_P \begin{cases} \equiv r \bmod q \implies \text{valid signature} \\ \not\equiv r \bmod q \implies \text{invalid signature} \end{cases}$$

# ECDSA - Proof of Verification

*Proof.* Consider the hash value  $h(x)$  of the message  $x$ . We show that  $(r, s)$  verifies the condition  $r = x_P \pmod q$ . We have:

$$s = (h(x) + dr)k_E^{-1} \pmod q,$$

which is equivalent to:

$$k_E = s^{-1}h(x) + ds^{-1}r \pmod q.$$

and further to:

$$k_E = u_1 + du_2 \pmod q.$$

Since the point  $A$  generates a cyclic group of order  $q$ , we can multiply both sides of the equation with  $A$  and we get:

$$k_E A = (u_1 + du_2)A = u_1 A + du_2 A = u_1 A + u_2 B.$$

But this is the condition that we check in the verification process by comparing the  $x$ -coordinates of  $P = u_1 A + u_2 B$  and  $R = k_E A$ .

Note that finding an elliptic curve with good cryptographic properties is a nontrivial task.

Bob wants to send a message to Alice, signed with ECDSA. He chooses the elliptic curve:

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2 \pmod{17}.$$

Because all points of the curve form a cyclic group of prime order 19, there are no subgroups and hence in this case  $q = \#E = 19$ .

## Bob - key generation:

- Choose  $E$  with  $p = 17$ ,  $a = 2$ ,  $b = 2$ , and  $A = (5, 1)$  with  $q = 19$ .
- Choose  $d = 7$ .
- Compute  $B = dA = 7 \cdot (5, 1) = (0, 6)$ .
- Send  $(p, a, b, q, A, B) = (17, 2, 2, 19, (5, 1), (0, 6))$  to Alice.

## Bob - signature:

- Compute the hash of a message  $x$ , say  $h(x) = 26$ .
- Choose ephemeral key  $k_E = 10$
- Compute  $R = 10 \cdot (5, 1) = (7, 11)$ , so  $r = x_R = 7$ .
- Compute  $s = (26 + 7 \cdot 7) \cdot 2 = 17 \pmod{19}$ .
- Send  $(x, (r, s)) = (x, (7, 17))$  to Alice.

## Alice - verification:

- Compute  $w = 17^{-1} = 9 \pmod{19}$ .
- Compute  $u_1 = 9 \cdot 26 = 6 \pmod{19}$ .
- Compute  $u_2 = 9 \cdot 7 = 6 \pmod{19}$ .
- Compute  $P = 6 \cdot (5, 1) + 6 \cdot (0, 6) = (7, 11)$ .
- Check  $x_P = r \pmod{19}$ , so it is a valid signature.



# Conclusions

- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is based on the discrete logarithm problem. It requires, for instance, arithmetic modulo a prime.
- ECC can be used for key exchange, for digital signatures and for encryption.
- ECC provides the same level of security as RSA or discrete logarithm systems over  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  with considerably shorter operands (approximately 160-256 bit vs. 1024-3072 bit), which results in shorter ciphertexts and signatures.
- In many cases ECC has performance advantages over other public-key algorithms.
- ECC is slowly gaining popularity in applications, compared to other public-key schemes, i.e., many new applications, especially on embedded platforms, make use of elliptic curve cryptography.

# Selective Bibliography



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[www.crypto-textbook.com](http://www.crypto-textbook.com)



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