# **Group Key Management in WSN**

Using a modified version of GDH.3 protocol



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### **Group key management**

- Computational group key secrecy
- Decisional group key secrecy
- Key independence
  - Forward secrecy
  - Backward secrecy

#### Problems in WSN

We still need to ensure the presented security requirements, but:

- The protocol must require less computational power and less energy consumption as possible
- The amount of work must be equally distributed between all the group member

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## A modified GDH.3 protocol

This protocol need a hierarchical WSN composed by:

- Base Station
- Group Leader
- Simple Nodes

## **Key agreement (Step 1)**

Given n nodes, where  $M_1$  is the group leader, the key agreement is composed by two steps:

• Every nodes generates a secret  $k_i$ .  $M_1$  selects a point P (using ECC) and sends to  $M_2$   $Q_1 = k_1 P$ .  $M_2$  sends to  $M_3$   $Q_2 = k_2 Q_1 = k_2 k_1 P$ . This process is repeated until the node  $M_n$  is reached.  $M_n$  generates  $Q_n = k_1 \dots k_n P$  the shared secret. For each node  $M_i$ ,  $k_i$  is the private key and  $Q_i$  is the public key.

## **Key agreement (Step 2)**

•  $M_n$  encrypts  $Q_n$  with  $M_{n-1}$  public key  $Q_{n-1}$  and sends it to  $M_{n-1}$ , that can decrypt the message and acquire  $Q_n$ . Then it can repeat the procedure and sends the secret key to  $M_{n-2}$ , and so on so forth until every nodes receive the secret key.

### **Group formation**

- It is used a distributed depth-first algorithm traversal algorithm to visit all nodes at least once.
- In this way it is created a virtual depth-first spanning tree that include all nodes. We need to maintain the tree balanced to guarantee the correctness of the protocol.

## Join group

- When a node  $M_{n+1}$  wants to join the group, it must first authenticate with the base station, that assign to him an ID and contacts to the group leader.
- $M_1$  sends  $Q_n$  to the new node, that generate its private key  $k_{n+1}$  and the new secret key  $Q_{n+1} = k_{n+1}Q_n$  and sends it back to  $M_1$ .
- The group leader inform all nodes about the new key with and UPDATE message containing the new shared secret.

### Leave group

When a node leaves the group the group leader  $M_1$  generates a random value  $k'_n$  and computes the new shared key  $Q'_n = k'_n Q_n$ . Then it sends to all the nodes in the group the new key using the UPDATE message.

### Merge groups

• A group M' wants to join M,  $M_1$  send the shared key to  $M'_1$  that becomes  $M_{n+1}$  and it starts the process to generates a new key among the nodes of M'.

 When the last node is reached it generates the new shared key and sends it back to all nodes like in Step 2 already discussed.

### **Partition group**

When a partition group event occurs, the protocol simply reconstruct the depth-first search spanning tree of each group and a new key agreement is issued for the two resulting groups

### **Group maintenance**

In order to handle the event of join, leave, merge and partition the virtual tree can degenerate into a spanning tree that no longer fulfills the depth-first search criteria.

In order to balance the tree and guarantee key freshness the group leader periodically restarts the depth-first search and generates a new shared key.

## Judgment (1/2)

 The amount of work is distributed equally among all the nodes (only the group leader must do a bit of extra work).

 ECC used, optimal wrt computational power and so energy consumptions

# Judgment (2/2)

- The periodical update of the shared key can be expensive if the number of nodes is high
- It can be possible to perform the update of key using an approach like the one used when a node leaves the group?
- Yes, but the periodical update of the key done like the initial key agreement ensure to maintain balanced the tree

### Feasibility in LoRaWAN network (1/2)

With the actual architecture direct communication between devices can be an issue.

Star topology to connect devices, and they are authenticated with the Network Server and the Application Server.

## Feasibility in LoRaWAN network (2/2)

With the architecture proposed in [2] we can use the the *concentrator* as base station, because it is provided a method to authenticate the single device with the gateway.

So in this case we can implement a more feasible communication between devices and use the proposed protocol to perform a group key agreement.

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#### Conclusion

- The protocol covered every aspects of the group key management, and it is optimized for WSN.
- But it can be improved trying to avoid the use of the depth-first search tree, in a way in which we do not need to maintain balanced the tree.
- To implement the protocol in a LoRaWAN network we need to modify the actual architecture.

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#### References

[1] Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis, Elisavet Konstantinou, Vasiliki Liagkou, and Paul Spirakis. "Design, analysis and performance evaluation of group key establishment in wireless sensor networks." *Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science* 171, no. 1 (2007): 17-31.

[2] Chatzigiannakis, Y., V. Liagkou, and P. Spirakis. "Providing end-to-end secure communication in low-power wide area networks (LPWANs)." In 2nd International Symposium on Cyber Security Cryptography and Machine Learning (CSCML 2018). 2018.