**Discussion**

*Some cool introductory sentence*

why is 2015 a turning point in immigration opinion dynamics?

Several results pointed at 2015 being a pivotal year for immigration dynamics across Europe. This can be explained by the fact that that year was the height of the European refugee crisis. During that year, over one million people arrived by sea, mainly fleeing conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, and especially Syria (Almustafa, 2021; Piguet, 2024). Previous research shows that the 2015 refugee crisis placed strain on European institutions and politics, leading to increased party competition and polarization. Political elites and parties shifted their positions, with right-wing and populist movements gaining traction by emphasizing national sovereignty and stricter immigration controls. The crisis acted as a catalyst for movements and parties that challenged the existing political order, often using xenophobic rhetoric (e.g., Izak, 2021; Hutter & Kriesi, 2021; Yaseen et al., 2025). However, there were regional differences as the crisis sparked different reactions in Eastern and Western Europe, with trust in domestic and EU institutions playing a key role in shaping attitudes. While some regions saw a rise in xenophobia and support for extreme right parties, others maintained more stable or nuanced views (Peshkopia, Bllaca & Lika, 2018).

why is there an increase in avg. deviation from neutrality in for all 3 variables in europe?

We found evidence for an ongoing shift away from a neutral opinion stance about immigration. The framing of immigration by political actors and the media can contribute to the differentiation and sometimes polarization of public opinion (Lahav, 2004; Kehrberg, 2007). Interestingly, it seems to be the distinguishment between the words “immigrant” and “refugee” which can already lead to more nuanced, but also polarized, attitudes. People generally hold more positive views toward refugees than immigrants, and attitudes vary further based on ethnicity, country of origin, and economic background of newcomers (Kehrberg, 2007).

However, while some countries experienced more restrictive opinions in response to increased immigration flows and political framing, overall shifts in public opinion across Europe have been relatively mild, with significant variation between countries (Hatton, 2016).

Why is, for Germany, "imbgeco" increasing in terms of avg. deviation from neutrality?

For example, in Germany, we only found an increasing polarization with regards to economic considerations as per an increasing average deviation from neutrality value with the “imbgeco” variable. In fact, the sentiment of Germans about immigration can be shaped by both economic self-interest such as concerns about personal finances and job security (Van Hauwaert & Vegetti, 2025). Germans with neoliberal economic views are more likely to see immigrants as a drain on the welfare state, while those with left-leaning economic views are more likely to see immigrants as beneficial (Grdešić, 2019). While we found economic factors to be the divisive force of immigration opinion shaping with the metric, others report more of a mix of factors. According to Fetzer (2000), cultural marginality and ethnocentrism are often stronger predictors of anti-immigration sentiment than economic self-interest, especially in West Germany.

Why is PC1 explaining more and more across Europe / Germany / Hungary

To the polarization metrics described in literature, we added a new one in the form of the explained variance of the first principal component (PC1) of the PCA using the three immigration variables. We interpreted an increase of the proportion of explained variance of PC1 as an increase in issue alignment – the synchronization of opinions towards a specific topic. For example, if a person would agree that immigrants are good for the cultural life of a country, with increasing issue alignment, it would be increasingly likely that that person would also consider immigrants to be good for the economy. This is exactly what we found - averaged across Europe, but also on the country-level for both Germany and Hungary. Indeed, individuals who view immigrants positively in one domain, such as cultural life, are often more likely to hold positive views in other domains such as economic contributions (Van Hauwaert, S., & Vegetti, F., 2025). According to our findings, the ongoing trends of issue alignment were roughly equally fast for both Germany and Hungary after 2015. Germany generally has a more positive opinion about immigration than Hungary (see below. Also, Bocskor, 2018; Heath & Richards, 2019; Bíró-Nagy, 2021). However, other research suggests that the alignment of positive opinions is more likely among those with higher political tolerance, stronger European identity, and better information about immigration (Lahav, 2004; De Coninck, 2020; Van Hauwaert & Vegetti, 2025). Meaning we would have expected a faster rate in Germany than in Hungary.

Why is moderate divergence increasing across Europe / Germany / Hungary

Why identified two moderate groups based on Lorenz’s (2017) research: The moderate acceptors and the moderate opponents. Our results suggest an increase in moderate divergence across Europe, but also distinctively in Germany and Hungary. In Germany, the presence of both pro- and anti-immigration stances within moderate parties, such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has led to internal divisions and conflicting messages on immigration policy, reflecting broader divergences among moderate voters (Schmidtke, 2024). Indeed, studies show a clear antagonism between supporters and opponents of immigration within the German electorate, including among those who identify as moderate or centrist. This divide is especially visible on the issue of immigration (Hebenstreit, 2022). In Hungary, on the other hand, the government’s intensive anti-immigration campaigns, especially during and after the 2015 migration wave, significantly influenced public opinion. These campaigns made anti-immigration sentiment widespread across the political spectrum - including among moderates (Bocskor, 2018). Before the crisis, differences in anti-immigrant attitudes between political groups, including moderates, were minor. However, after the crisis and the government’s campaign, these differences became more pronounced, with party preference playing a larger role in shaping attitude (Barna & Koltai, 2019).

Why is in Germany the moderate group consensus decreasing for all variables?

When moderate divergence increases, moderate consensus should logically decrease – which is what we found for Germany and Hungary after 2015. Interestingly, in comparison to Germany, the moderate group consensus for Hungary fluctuated much stronger. This indicates that the opinions about immigration of moderate voters in the Hungary are much more volatile in comparison with Germany. Our finding here is directly contradictory to other research which states that immigration preferences among the public tend to remain stable over time. However, it could be changes in the frequency of the salience of immigration as a political issue, which can drive temporary increases in support for far-right parties when immigration is highly visible in public debate, which might be a hidden driver here (Magistro & Wittstock, 2021; Cools, Finseraas & Røgeberg, 2021)

Why is moderate size parity decreasing across Europe for imbgeco and imueclt?

Averaged across Europe, we found evidence for a decreasing moderate size parity for “imbgeco” and “imueclt”, indicating a decrease in polarization among the moderate voters when it comes to economic and cultural factors. This is contradictory to other research which reports stability of attitudes across Europe as a whole, finding only little evidence for significant divergence or convergence between pro and anti-immigration groups, including the moderate voters (Hatton, 2016). However, Di Lillo (2018) reports significant spatial clustering of anti-immigrant attitudes. Nonetheless, this clustering would not necessarily reflect a Europe-wide shift in the balance between moderate pro- and anti-immigrant groups. And indeed, we found substantial evidence for Hungary being one of these anti-immigration hotspots.

Why is moderate size parity increasing for all variables in Germany?

For Germany, we found increases in moderate size parity for all three variables after 2015, meaning the group sizes of the moderate acceptors and moderate opponents are becoming more equal. In this context, this means an increase in polarization among the moderately opinionated individuals. Current research does not provide clear evidence of a sustained trend toward parity between these groups after 2015, meaning our finding here provides a novel insight.

Why is moderate size parity increasing (not as much) for Hungary, why were the values so small in hungary in 2015?

Though not as pronounced as in Germany, we found similar increases in moderate size parity for all three variables in Hungary after 2015, following years of decreasing size parity (meaning years of decreasing polarization among the moderate groups). This evidence shows how even members of the moderate groups can be influenced by state-driven anti-immigrant propaganda in either direction. Strikingly, for all the variables, the moderate size parity ended up at a value smaller than 0.1, indicating that the group sizes were extremely imbalanced at this point. There seems to be no clear prior research that suggests that the group sizes of moderate pro- and moderate anti-immigrant opinionated citizens in Hungary were extremely unequal. Indeed, available research and survey data do not indicate a dramatic imbalance between these groups prior to the 2015 migration crisis (e.g., Schneider, 2007). This means that our findings here might provide another novel insight.

Why is non-neutrality increasing across Europe/Germany/Hungary

We found clear evidence for the non-neutrality increasing both averaged across Europe and zoomed in on Hungary, but only very weakly in Germany. Meaning there is an ongoing trend of a shifting away from a neutral stance across Europe, but perhaps to varying degrees. Indeed, after 2015, many European countries experienced a shift away from neutral stances, with public opinion becoming more divided and, in some cases, more negative toward immigration, especially in countries where the debate was framed around security concerns (e.g., Cichocki & Jabkowski, 2019; Torres, 2019).

Considering Germany, we found only very weak evidence for increasing non-neutrality following the 2015 refugee crisis. Indeed, prior research suggests that some specific events such as the 2015-16 New Year’s Eve sexual assaults in Germany or 2016 Berlin terror attack might have led to temporary negative (i.e., non-neutral) shifts in attitudes toward refugees, but these changes would often be short-lived and usually wouldn’t translate into a long-term trend (Vollmer & Karakayali, 2018, Schmidt-Cantra & Czymara, 2020).

For Hungary, we found a clearer increase in non-neutrality after 2015. Reason being the aforementioned governmental anti-immigration campaigns. However, shortly after that increase, we found a period of decreasing non-neutrality, meaning more people moved again towards a neutral stance between 2016 and 2020. After 2020, we again saw a stark increase in non-neutrality. This volatility was found for other metrics as well, indicating that many Hungarians tend to change their minds about immigration rather quickly. This is contradicting other research that states that Hungarian opinions on immigration during this period were stable and strongly anti-immigration, rather than volatile or quickly changing (e.g., Bajomi-Lázár, 2019; Bíró-Nagy, 2021).

Why is there, overall, an increasing in the likert-opinion values in Europe?

Looking at the raw Likert-opinion values, we actually found positives trends for the average opinion, moving slightly above the neutral five at least since 2010. This is especially visible for “imbgeco” and “imwbcnt”, while “imueclt” did not change substantially after 2015. Meaning that despite all media coverage and government-run campaigns fueling fear against immigrants run by certain countries, the average European does still have a slightly positive view on immigration, and especially when it comes to economic potential and overall quality of life considerations. Other research points out that there has been a gradual shift toward more positive attitudes about immigrants in Western EU countries since the 2000s, mainly due to younger generations being more open. However, this positive trend appears to be slowing, as the newest cohorts are not significantly more positive than previous ones (Schmidt, 2021). Yet, our results show only “imueclt” stalling, while “imbgeco” and “imwbcnt” are going strong.

Why is there a growing body of people who think that immigrants might be good for the economy, yet, at the same time, there is a body of people who believe that immigrants might negatively impact the cultural life?

Considering the raw likert-scale opinion values, we found that in Germany, there seems to be a growing body of people who think that immigrants might be good for the economy, yet, at the same time, there is a body of people who believe that immigrants might negatively impact the cultural life after 2015. In fact, In Germany, immigration is widely recognized as having positive economic effects, particularly by addressing labor shortages and supporting economic growth. Historically, immigration has helped Germany tackle demographic challenges, such as an aging population and labor shortages, by providing both high- and low-skilled workers. This has boosted productivity, innovation, and overall economic growth (Higgins & Klitgaard, 2019; Grajdeanu, 2023). While a common concern, most studies find little to no negative impact of immigration on native employment or wages (Prantl & Spitz-Oener, 2020). Yet at the same time, while immigrants clearly can contribute to cultural diversity (Giovanis, Akede & Ozdamar, 2021), there are ongoing debates and concerns among some groups about the potential for cultural change or loss of traditional values. Some native-born Germans become less supportive of welfare programs as the proportion of immigrants increases, especially during periods of high unemployment. This reflects concerns about social cohesion and resource allocation, particularly in the early phases of immigration wave (Schmidt-Catran & Spies, 2016).

Why is there a trend of an overall resentment towards immigration in Hungary?

In contrast to the mixed trends in Germany, there is an overall trend of increasing resentment towards immigration in Hungary. The Hungarian government, especially under Viktor Orbán, has run intensive anti-immigration campaigns since 2015, framing immigration as both an economic and security threat. These campaigns conflated migrants with terrorists and criminals, and presented the government as the defender of Hungarian and Christian values (Bocskor, 2018; Bajomi-Lázár, 2019). The media environment in Hungary is highly politicized, with limited pluralism and critical voices. This has amplified government messaging and reduced the visibility of alternative or critical perspectives on immigration (Farkas, 2021). Thus, this trend is largely the result of deliberate political strategies that portray immigration as a danger to Hungarian values and identity, especially since 2015.

*Some cool conclusion*

Limitations

* Only two countries considered besides European averages
* Not this method used that identifies trend in time series (find smart arguments against it, e.g., too few data points or something)