

# RPKI

# Authentication for BGP

Sebastian Spies

DENOG3 – 20.10.2011

NIST BGPSEC Project

O.Borchert, K.Lee, D.Montgomery, K.Sriram, O.Kim




**Homeland  
Security**  
Science and Technology

# Problem

- BGP Prefix Hijacking (for decades)
  - Youtube Incident
  - Table Leak of Chinanet (AS23734), ~37k routes
  - Pilosov/Kapela MITM Attack, many more
- BGP provides no way to
  - determine authorization of an AS to announce a prefix
  - validate path of a BGP update

# What is Prefix Hijacking?




Invalid Announcement of prefix  $10.1.0.0/16$  cuts off AS6 – AS9

Invalid Announcement of more specific  $/17$  prefix affects AS2-AS9

# IETF SIDR WG


## Proposed Solution

- Resource PKI (RPKI) enables routers to validate if the origin AS of a BGP update is correct (Route Origin Authorization, ROA)
- BGPSEC (with the help of RPKI) enables routers to cryptographically ensure, that a BGP update has traversed the ASNs in the path
- Take origin validation and BGPSEC to secure the control plane




**I E T F<sup>®</sup>**

# What is the RPKI



# From the Repositories to the Router



- Remote Synchronize the RPKI repositories into a local repository
- Validate ROAs with regards to expiry, sub-allocation, CRLs, etc.
- Translate valid ROAs into a prefix/origin list
- Communicate it to the router
- Validation tools from ISC, RIPE, BBN

# Protocols

- Resource Cert Provisioning Protocol
  - aka “up/down” protocol
  - Cert request, issuance, revocation and status info
  - HTTP POSTs of CMS signed-objects containing XML
  - Content-Type application/rpki-updown
- Publication Protocol
  - Like provisioning
  - For configuration of repository server and publish/withdraw certs to/from repository
  - Content-Type application/rpki-publication
- RPKI/RTR Protocol
  - Validation Cache sends prefix/originAS pairs to router
  - Incremental Updates
  - Transport Protocol
    - unprotected, TCP AO (preferred), SSH Transport Proto, TCP MD5, IPsec, TLS

# RPKI/RTR Protocol

Cache	Router
~	~
<----- Reset Query ----->	R requests data
	(or Serial Query)
----- Cache Response ----->	C confirms request
----- IPvX Prefix ----->	C sends zero or more
----- IPvX Prefix ----->	IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix
----- IPvX Prefix ----->	Payload PDUs
----- End of Data ----->	C sends End of Data
	and sends new serial
~	~
----- Notify ----->	(optional)
<----- Serial Query ----->	R requests data
----- Cache Response ----->	C confirms request
----- IPvX Prefix ----->	C sends zero or more
----- IPvX Prefix ----->	IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix
----- IPvX Prefix ----->	Payload PDUs
----- End of Data ----->	C sends End of Data
	and sends new serial

from draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-18



# Origin Validation States of a Route

- **VALID**

*ROA found, that matches routes' prefix and origin AS and satisfies maxlength*

- **INVALID**

*There was at least one ROA, that matches prefix (regardless of maxlength), but none of them matches routes' origin AS and fits into maxlength*

*(i.e. ROA 10.2.0.0/16-19 ASN5,*

*Update 10.2.2.0/24 Origin AS5*

*Update 10.2.2.0/17 Origin AS6)*

- **UNKNOWN/NOT FOUND**

*There is no ROA, that matches the prefix of the route*

# BGPSEC Overview

- Assumes ROA and RPKI
- Cryptographic assurance of AS\_PATH
- Router signs BGP updates
- Put AS number and router id into RPKI certs and deploy keys to routers
- (Unresolved) Issues
  - Optimization needed
  - Route Servers (transparent AS in path)
  - Proxy Aggregation (AS\_SETs deprecated)
  - Rebeaconing (due to expiry time)
  - Only one prefix per update (NLRI unpacking)
  - Multiple Crypto Algorithms (RSA-2048, ECDSA-224, ECDSA-256)

# BGPSEC Path Attribute Signature

Sequence of Octets to be Signed  
when originating a route


```
+-----+
| Expire Time (8 octets)          |
+-----+
| Target AS Number (4 octets)     |
+-----+
| Origin AS Number (4 octets)     |
+-----+
| Algorithm Suite Identifier (1 octet) |
+-----+
| NLRI Length (1 octet)           |
+-----+
| NLRI Prefix (variable)          |
+-----+
```

Sequence of Octets to be Signed  
when advertising a learned route

```
+-----+
| Most Recent Signature Field (fixed by algorithm suite) |
+-----+
| Target AS Number (4 octets)          |
+-----+
```

from draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-00

# BGPSEC RIB Size Estimation



ECDSA-256

# NIST Tools to Foster RPKI/BGPSEC Development

- BGP Secure Routing Extension (BGP-SRx)
  - Open Source Reference Implementation for RPKI processing within a router
  - Current stage – Prototype 0.2
    - BGP-SRx Server: Implementation talking to a validation cache using RPKI/RTR protocol
    - BGP-SRx API: Allows integration into BGP routers, policy modules, etc.
    - QuaggaSRx: Integrates BGP-SRx API into Quagga 0.99.16
- BGP RPKI Interoperability Tester and Evaluator (BRITE)
  - Web-based system, that tests
    - ROA Validation caches
    - BGP Routers, that use ROA Validation results using RPKI to router protocol


# BGP-SRx Overview

- **Open Source Reference Implementation**


- Software router with extensions for: RPKI cache maintenance, ROA and BGPSEC processing of updates, BGP route policies based upon new security tools.
- BGP Secure Routing Extension (BGP-SRx) is designed as extension for Quagga routing platform. Designed to support other platforms (e.g., XORP, etc.)
- Designed to support experimentation with different architectural configurations of SRx and RPKI components,

- **Status**


- BGP-SRx framework with RPKI and ROA processing implemented.
- Hooks for BGPSEC Path Validation ....



# BGP-SRx System Architecture



# Quagga SRx Integration





# Quagga SRx Policy Set

- Activation of BGP-SRx Evaluation
  - no srx evaluation
  - srx evaluation (origin\_only|bgpsec)
- Ignore Policies
  - [no] srx policy ignore-unknown
  - [no] srx policy ignore-invalid
  - [no] srx policy ignore-undefined
- Local Preference Policies
  - [no] srx policy local-preference valid <int> (add|subtract)
  - [no] srx policy local-preference unknown <int> (add|subtract)
  - [no] srx policy local-preference invalid <int> (add|subtract)
- Prefer Policies
  - [no] srx prefer-valid


# BRITE Overview

- **BGPSEC / RPKI Interoperability Test & Evaluation**
  - Distributed test and evaluation framework for:
    - RPKI / BGP Security implementation testing,
    - Configuration and deployment testing.
  - Flexible XML based test / scenario scripting language.
  - Can test all components / interfaces of BGPSEC system.
    - RPKI Validating Caches
    - Cache to Router Protocol
    - ROA Processing in BGP Router
- **Distributed / automated test system.**
  - Webinterface to BRITE
  - Multi-user distributed architecture and interface
  - Real time test monitoring & reporting
  - Other diagnostics – log files, traffic traces available for download


# Intention of BRITE

- BRITE is intended for
  - Developers of ROA validation/BGPSEC software as test bed
  - Early adopters to assess implications on their infrastructure
  - Operators
    - to verify test configuration settings
    - to be able to evaluate different RPKI/BGPSEC software packets
  - Researchers to study real-world behavior and stress test system configurations

# BRITE Design Overview



# Demo – Simulated Topology



## Test Event:

@t1: BGP: AS7 Originates 129.6.0.0/16  
@t2: BGP: AS49 Originates 129.6.0.0/16  
@t3: RPKI: Add ROA {129.6.0.0/16-24, 49}  
@t5: RPKI: Delete ROA {129.6.0.0/16-24, 49}

## Test Goals (@collector):

@t1+: G1: BGP Ann. (129.6.0.0/16, AS7)  
@t3+: G2: BGP Ann. (129.6.0.0/16, AS49)  
@t5+: G3: BGP Ann. (129.6.0.0/16, AS7)

Thank you!

**BGP – SRx**


<http://www-x.antd.nist.gov/bgpsrx>

**BRITE**

<http://brite.antd.nist.gov>

Questions ?

# XML Test Script Entities



Remarks: Local definitions overwrite parents definition (local scope);

# BRITE Web Interface (1)

**BRITE Area**

Testruns  
Testcases  
XML Testfiles  
Users  
Logout

**Listing testcases**

Testcase Name	ID	Created by	From file	State	Description	
Simple BGP Test	tst_bgpsimple	sspies	bgpsimple_test.xml	OK	This test allows to test the RPKI CACHE and RPKI implementation of the BG...	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
My first TEST	tst_1	sspies	my_test.xml	OK	This test allows to test the RPKI CACHE and RPKI implementation of the BG...	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
Simple XML Test	tst_xmltest	sspies	xml_test.xml	OK	This test allows to test the RPKI CACHE and RPKI implementation of the BG...	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
Demonstration Test 3	tst_demo3	sspies	demonstration_test3.xml	OK	This test is for demonstration purposes.	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
Demonstration Test 4	tst_demo4	sspies	demonstration_test4.xml	OK	This test is for demonstration purposes.	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
Demonstration Test 5	tst_demo5	sspies	demonstration_test5.xml	OK	This test is for demonstration purposes.	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
Demonstration Test 6	tst_demo6	sspies	demonstration_test6.xml	OK	This test is for demonstration purposes.	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
Demonstration Test 7	tst_demo7	sspies	demonstration_test7.xml	OK	This test is for demonstration purposes.	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
Demonstration Test 8	tst_demo8	sspies	demonstration_test8.xml	OK	This test is for demonstration purposes.	<a href="#">Run this test</a>
Simple BGP Test 2	tst_bgpsimple2	sspies	bgpsimple_test2.xml	OK	This test allows to test the RPKI CACHE and RPKI implementation of the BG...	<a href="#">Run this test</a>

Logged in as borichert  
NIST BRITE - 2011

Tests available to the User.

Select a test to be started



# BRITE Web Interface (2)


The screenshot displays the BRITE Web Interface in a Mozilla Firefox browser window. The interface is divided into several sections:

- Test Progress:** A horizontal timeline at the top right showing the progress of the test. It includes markers for 'M' (Multiple), 'A' (Activation), 'B' (BGP), and 'W' (Whitelist).
- Test Timeline:** A vertical timeline on the right side showing the sequence of events.
- Events:** A list of events in the center, including 'Goal created', 'Job created', 'Timeline briteStartDate', and 'Change state of [RuntimeGoal goal.getId()=gol\_1, goal.getType()=bgp, currentState=(State type=OPENED)]'.
- Experiment Log:** A log of events at the bottom, including 'Running test Simple BGP Test 2 from BriteContext from: http://localhost:3000/testfiles/bgpsimple\_test2.xml'.
- Goal Tree:** A tree structure on the left showing the hierarchy of goals. It includes 'GoalSet gts\_1', 'GoalSet gts\_simple', 'Goal gol\_1[?]', 'Goal gol\_2[?]', and 'Goal gol\_3'.
- Wait to be activated:** A label pointing to the 'Goal gol\_1[?]' node in the Goal Tree.
- Currently processing:** A label pointing to the 'Goal gol\_2[?]' node in the Goal Tree.
- Finished successful:** A label pointing to the 'Goal gol\_3' node in the Goal Tree.

Arrows from the labels point to the corresponding elements in the interface:

- Test Progress** points to the horizontal timeline.
- Test Timeline** points to the vertical timeline.
- Events:** points to the list of events.
- Experiment Log** points to the log of events.
- Goal Tree** points to the tree structure.
- Wait to be activated** points to the 'Goal gol\_1[?]' node.
- Currently processing** points to the 'Goal gol\_2[?]' node.
- Finished successful** points to the 'Goal gol\_3' node.

# QuaggaSRx (1)

A terminal window titled "Terminal — telnet — 73x11" displays the output of the "show srx-config" command in a Quagga router. The output lists various SRx configuration settings. A light blue arrow points from the text below to the prompt line of the terminal output.

```
bgpd(config-router)# show srx-config
SRx configuration settings:
  server.....: localhost
  port.....: 17900
  proxy-id.....: 1
  keep-window...: 900
  evaluation...: origin_only (prefix-origin processing)
  policy.....: ignore-invalid
                prefer-valid
  connected.....: true
bgpd(config-router)#
```

Configuration information related to SRx integration and origin / path processing!

# QuaggaSRx (2)

```
Terminal — telnet — 97x23

bgpd> show ip bgp
BGP table version is 0, local router ID is 129.6.140.89
Status codes: s suppressed, d damped, h history, * valid, > best, i - internal,
               r RIB-failure, S Stale, R Removed
Validation:    v - valid, u - unknown, i - invalid, ? - undefined
SRx Status:    I - route ignored, D - SRx evaluation deactivated
SRxVal Format: validation result (origin validation, path validation)
Origin codes: i - IGP, e - EGP, ? - incomplete

  Ident      SRxVal SRxLP Status Network      Next Hop      Metric  LocPrf Weight Path
*> 22E78C18  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0      129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 359C985B  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/9     129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 7EE7F996  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/10    129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 476AC553  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/11    129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 5011D110  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/12    129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 3470BCD9  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/13    129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 230BA89A  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/14    129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 1A86945F  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/15    129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 76FD453E  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/16    129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i
*> 6186517D  u(u,-)          10.0.0.0/17    129.6.141.46      0         0 46 i

Total number of prefixes 10
bgpd
```


Validation Result  
Final(origin, path)

Local Preference  
variable (+-) or fixed

Indicates the status  
of this update

Update Identifier

# QuaggaSRx (3)



```
Terminal — telnet — 70x17
bgpd> show ip bgp network 10.0.0.0/8
% [BGP] Unknown command: show ip bgp network 10.0.0.0/8
bgpd> show ip bgp 10.0.0.0/8
BGP routing table entry for 10.0.0.0/8
Paths: (1 available, best #1, table Default-IP-Routing-Table)
  Not advertised to any peer
  46
    SRx Information:
      Update ID: 0x22E78C18
      Validation:
        prefix-origin: unknown
        path processing disabled!
  129.6.141.46 from 129.6.141.46 (129.6.141.46)
    Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external, best
    Last update: Sat Jan  3 11:37:38 1970
bgpd> 
```

BGP-SRx Information embedded in  
BGP network information