

Arguments of Knowledge in hidden order groups

Steve Thakur

Abstract

We study non-interactive arguments of knowledge (AoKs) in groups of hidden order. We provide protocols to aggregate the knowledge of the discrete logarithms between multiple elements and to prove certain relations between multiple discrete logarithms. This is equivalent to proving relationships between committed multisets that can be publicly verified against the constant-sized commitments to the multisets. In particular, we provide AoKs for disjointness of sets in cryptographic accumulators, with a view toward applications to sharded blockchains and verifiably outsourcing data storage.

Recent work ([DGS20]) suggests that the hidden order groups need to be substantially larger in size than previously thought, in order to ensure 128-bit security. Thus, in order to keep the communication complexity between the Prover and the Verifier to a minimum, we have designed the protocols so that the proofs consist of a constant number of group elements, independent of the number of discrete logarithms, i.e. independent of the number of the committed multisets. We build on the techniques from [BBF19].

1 Introduction

Finite abelian groups of hidden order have gained prominence within cryptography in the last few years. The adaptive root assumption in such groups yields a cryptographic accumulator which is universal and dynamic with batchable membership and non-membership proofs. One of the best known verifiable delay functions is that constructed in [Wes18], which can be instantiated with any group of unknown order in which the adaptive root assumption holds. Such groups also form the basis for the transparent polynomial commitment constructed in [BFS19]. This is a polynomial commitment with logarithmic sized proofs and verification time and can be instantiated with any group of hidden order.

In this paper, we explore non-interactive arguments of knowledge in groups of hidden order. Our primary goal is to provide protocols for proofs of disjointness of sets in accumulators. The primary use case for these AoKs is potential applications to sharded blockchains.

Recent work ([DGS20]) suggests that the hidden order groups need to be substantially larger in size than previously thought, in order to ensure 128-bit security. Thus, with a view toward keeping the communication complexity between the Prover and the Verifier to a minimum, we have designed the protocols so that the proofs consist of a constant number of group elements, independent of the number of exponents (i.e. committed sets/multisets) involved. At times, this comes at the cost of a higher (but superlinear in the size of the data) computational burden on the Prover.

1.1 Candidates for hidden order groups

At the moment, there are only three known families of finite abelian groups of unknown order. We briefly discuss them here.

1. **RSA groups:** For distinct 1536-bit primes p, q , define $N := pq$. The group $(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})^*$ has order $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ which can only be computed by factorizing N . The strong-RSA assumption is believed to hold in the RS group. However, the group does contain the element $-1 \pmod{N}$ of a known order 2. For the adaptive root assumption to hold, the group has to be replaced by its quotient group $(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})^*/\{\pm 1\}$ of order $\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{2}$.

The RSA groups suffer from the need for a trusted setup. In practice, this is usually mitigated by a secure multi-party computation. At the moment, a 3300-bit RSA modulus yields a security level of 128-bits.

2. **Class groups:** Computing the class group of a number field is a long-standing problem in algorithmic number theory. Hence, class groups are a candidate for hidden order groups. At the moment, the only class groups that allow for efficient group operations are those of imaginary quadratic fields.

For a square-free integer $d > 0$, the field $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-d})$ has a class group of size roughly \sqrt{d} . This group is believed to fulfill the strong-RSA assumption. Furthermore, if d is a prime $\equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, the 2-torsion group is trivial, which eliminates the possibility of known elements of order 2. Such a group is believed to fulfill the adaptive root assumption.

A 6656-bit discriminant d yields a security level of 128-bits at the moment. Unlike RSA groups, class groups allow for a transparent (trustless) setup. The downside is that for the same level of security, the group operations are roughly 10 times slower than modular multiplication.

3. **Jacobians:** Recently, the group of \mathbb{F}_p -valued points of the Jacobian of a genus three hyperelliptic curve over a prime field \mathbb{F}_p has been proposed as a candidate ([DGS20]). While this idea needs more scrutiny, it seems promising because of the transparent setup, the smaller key sizes and the fact that the group operations are 28 times faster than those in class groups for the same level of security.

For an irreducible polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$ of degree 7 with Galois group S_7 and a prime p such that $f(X) \pmod{p}$ is separable, the hyperelliptic curve $C : Y^2 = f(X)$ over \mathbb{F}_p yields a Jacobian that is resistant to the known attacks. At the moment, such a genus three hyperelliptic Jacobian over a prime field \mathbb{F}_p of bit-size 1100 allows for a security level of 128-bits. This group $\text{Jac}(C)(\mathbb{F}_p)$ is roughly of size p^3 .

1.2 Cryptographic assumptions

Definition 1.1. We say that the **adaptive root assumption** holds for a group \mathbb{G} if there is no efficient probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$ that succeeds in the following task. \mathcal{A}_0 outputs an element $w \in \mathbb{G}$ and some state. Then a random prime l is chosen and $\mathcal{A}_1(l, \text{state})$ outputs $w^{1/l} \in \mathbb{G}$.

Definition 1.2. We say \mathbb{G} satisfies the **strong-RSA** assumption if no PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} is able to compute (except with negligible probability) the l -th root of a chosen element $w \in \mathbb{G}$ for some randomly chosen prime l .

Definition 1.3. We say \mathbb{G} satisfies the **low order assumption** if no PPT algorithm can generate (except with negligible probability) an element $a \in \mathbb{G} \setminus \{1\}$ and an integer $n < 2^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ such that $a^n = 1$.

Definition 1.4. We say \mathbb{G} satisfies the **fractional root assumption** if for a randomly generated element $g \in \mathbb{G}$, a PPT algorithm cannot output $h \in \mathbb{G}$ and $d_1, d_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that

$$g^{d_1} = h^{d_2} \wedge d_2 \nmid d_1$$

except with negligible probability.

The assumptions bear the following relations:

$$\{\text{Adaptive root assumption}\} \implies \{\text{Low order assumption}\} \implies \{\text{Fractional root assumption}\},$$

$$\{\text{Strong-RSA assumption}\} \implies \{\text{Fractional root assumption}\}.$$

We refer the reader to the appendix of [BBF19] for further details.

1.3 Argument Systems

Definition 1.5. We say an argument system $(\text{Pgen}, ; \text{P}, \text{V})$ is *sound* if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$, the probability of \mathcal{A} forging a fake proof is negligible.

Definition 1.6. An argument system is *non-interactive* if it consists of a single round of interaction between the Prover and the Verifier.

This subsection needs to be completed

1.4 Multiset notations

We first recall/introduce a few basic definitions and notations concerning multisets. For a multiset \mathcal{M} , we denote by $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M})$ the underlying set of \mathcal{M} . For any element x , we denote by $\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x)$ the multiplicity of x in \mathcal{M} . Thus, $\mathcal{M} = \{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})\}$. For brevity, we write

$$\Pi(\mathcal{M}) := \prod_{x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x)}.$$

For two multisets \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} , we have the following operations:

- The sum $\mathcal{M} + \mathcal{N} := \{(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) + \text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x)) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \cup \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})\}$
- The union $\mathcal{M} \cup \mathcal{N} := \{\max(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x), \text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x)) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \cup \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})\}$
- The intersection $\mathcal{M} \cap \mathcal{N} := \{\min(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x), \text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x)) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \cup \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})\}$
- The difference $\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{N} := \{\min(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) - \text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x), 0) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \cup \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})\}.$

The function $\Pi(\cdot)$ clearly has the following properties:

- $\Pi(\mathcal{M} + \mathcal{N}) = \Pi(\mathcal{M}) \cdot \Pi(\mathcal{N})$
- $\Pi(\mathcal{M} \cup \mathcal{N}) = \text{lcm}(\Pi(\mathcal{M}), \Pi(\mathcal{N}))$
- $\Pi(\mathcal{M} \cap \mathcal{N}) = \text{gcd}(\Pi(\mathcal{M}), \Pi(\mathcal{N}))$
- $\Pi(\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{N}) = \Pi(\mathcal{M}) / \Pi(\mathcal{M} \cap \mathcal{N})$

1.5 Cryptographic Accumulators

A cryptographic accumulator [Bd94] is a primitive that produces a short binding commitment to a set (or multiset) of elements together with short membership and/or non-membership proofs for any element in the set. These proofs can be publicly verified against the commitment. Broadly, there are three known types of accumulators at the moment:

- Merkle trees
- pairing-based (aka bilinear) accumulators
- accumulators based on groups of unknown order, which we study in this paper.

Let \mathbb{G} be a group of hidden order and fix an element $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Let $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathbf{m}_1 \times d_1, \dots, \mathbf{m}_m \times d_m\}$ be a multiset, where $\{d_1, \dots, d_m\}$ is the underlying set $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M})$ of \mathcal{M} and \mathbf{m}_i is the multiplicity of d_i . Using an appropriate hashing algorithm, we may assume the elements d_i are distinct λ -bit primes. The **accumulated digest** of \mathcal{M} is given by

$$\mathbf{Acc}(\mathcal{M}) := g^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})},$$

where

$$\Pi(\mathcal{M}) = \prod_{x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x)}.$$

Let \mathcal{M}_0 be a multiset contained in \mathcal{M} , so that $\mathbf{m}_{0,i} \leq \mathbf{m}_i \forall i$. The element

$$w(\mathcal{M}_0) := g^{\prod_{x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) - \text{mult}(\mathcal{M}_0, x)}} \in \mathbb{G}$$

is called *the membership witness* of \mathcal{M}_0 . Given this element, a Verifier can verify membership of \mathcal{M}_0 in \mathcal{M} by verifying the equation

$$w(\mathcal{M}_0)^{\Pi(\mathcal{M}_0)} \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{Acc}(\mathcal{D}).$$

When the multiset \mathcal{M}_0 is large, this verification can be sped up using Wesolowski's *Proof of Exponentiation* (PoE) protocol ([Wes18]).

Shamir's trick allows for aggregation of membership witnesses in accumulators based on hidden order groups. This is not possible with Merkle trees, which is the primary reason other accumulators have been explored as authentication data structures for stateless blockchains. With bilinear accumulators, aggregation of membership witnesses has a linear runtime complexity, which is impractical for most use cases. Thus, accumulators based on hidden order groups have a major advantage in this regard.

These accumulators also allow for non-membership proofs [LLX07]. In [BBF19], the authors used a non-interactive argument of knowledge to compress batched non-membership proofs into constant-sized proofs, i.e. independent of the number of elements involved. This yields the first known Vector Commitment with constant-sized openings as well as constant-sized public parameters.

Hashing the data to primes: The security of cryptographic accumulators and vector commitments hinges on the assumption that for disjoint data sets \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{E} , the integers $\Pi(\mathcal{D}), \Pi(\mathcal{E})$ are relatively prime. The easiest way to ensure this is to map the data elements to distinct λ -bit primes. This is usually done by hashing the data to λ -bit integers and subjecting the output to a probabilistic primality test such as the Miller-Rabin test. The prime number theorem states that the number of primes less than n is $\mathbf{O}(\frac{n}{\log(n)})$ and hence, implies that the expected runtime for finding a prime is $\mathbf{O}(\lambda)$.

Dirichlet's theorem on arithmetic progressions combined with the prime number theorem implies that for relatively prime integers k, r and an integer n , the number of primes less than n that are $\equiv r \pmod{k}$ is roughly $\frac{n}{\log(n)\phi(k)}$. Thus, we can modify the hashing algorithm so that for any element inserted into the accumulator, the prime reveals the position in which it was inserted. We proceed as follows.

1. Fix a prime p of size $\frac{\lambda}{2}$.
2. For an string inserted in position i , we map the string to the first prime of size λ which is $\equiv i \pmod{p}$. This (pseudo-)prime obtained by subjecting the integers $p\mathbb{Z} + i$ to the probabilistic Miller-Rabin test.

The number of such primes is roughly $\frac{2^\lambda}{\lambda(p-1)}$ and hence, the expected runtime is $\mathbf{O}(\lambda)$.

1.6 Aggregating and disaggregating membership witnesses

Shamir's trick: Given elements $a_1, a_2, A \in \mathbb{G}$ and integers $d_1, d_2 \geq 1$ such that $a^{d_1} = a^{d_2} = A$, Shamir's trick allows us to compute the $\text{lcm}(d_1, d_2)$ -th root of A as follows.

1. Compute integers e_1, e_2 such that

$$e_1 d_1 + e_2 d_2 = \text{gcd}(d_1, d_2).$$

2. Set $a_{1,2} := a_1^{e_2} a_2^{e_1}$.

Then

$$a_{1,2}^{d_1 d_2} = A^{d_2 e_2 + d_1 e_1} = A^{\text{gcd}(d_1, d_2)}$$

and hence,

$$a_{1,2}^{\text{lcm}(d_1, d_2)} = A.$$

More generally, given elements a_1, \dots, a_n such that

$$a_1^{d_1} = \dots = a_n^{d_n} = A,$$

we can use Shamir's trick repeatedly to compute an element $a \in \mathbb{G}$ such that

$$a^{\text{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n)} = A.$$

The runtime for this algorithm is $\mathbf{O}(n \log(n))$.

The most important special case is when A is the accumulated digest $g^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})}$ for a multiset \mathcal{M} and w_1, \dots, w_n are membership witnesses for multisets $\mathcal{M}_1, \dots, \mathcal{M}_n \subseteq \mathcal{M}$. Shamir's trick allows us to compute a membership witness for the union $\bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{M}_i$.

The RootFactor Algorithm: Given elements $a, A \in \mathbb{G}$ and integers d_1, \dots, d_n, D such that

$$D = \prod_{i=1}^n d_i, \quad a^D = A,$$

the RootFactor algorithm ([BBF19], [STY01]) allows us to compute elements a_1, \dots, a_n such that

$$a_1^{d_1} = \dots = a_n^{d_n} = A$$

in runtime $\mathbf{O}(\log(D) \log(\log(D)))$. Naively, this would take runtime $\mathbf{O}(\log^2(D))$.

1.7 $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ -integers and the equivalence relation (\equiv_λ)

Definition 1.7. For elements $a, b \in \mathbb{G}$ and a rational $\alpha \in \mathbb{Q}$, we say $a^\alpha = b$ with respect to a Prover \mathcal{P} if \mathcal{P} verifiably possesses integers $d_1, d_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\alpha = \frac{d_1}{d_2}$ and $a^{d_1} = b^{d_2}$.

Note that if there exists an element $a \in \mathbb{G}$ and distinct rationals $\frac{d_1}{d_2}, \frac{d_3}{d_4}$ ($d_i \in \mathbb{Z}$) such that

$$a^{\frac{d_1}{d_2}} = a^{\frac{d_3}{d_4}},$$

then $a^{d_1 d_4 - d_2 d_3} = 1$ and $d_1 d_4 - d_2 d_3 \neq 0$. So the adaptive root assumption implies that a PPT algorithm cannot generate such a tuple (a, d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4) except with negligible probability. Furthermore, by Shamir's trick, the condition is equivalent to the Prover \mathcal{P} being able to compute an element $a_0 \in \mathbb{G}$ and co-prime integers d_1, d_2 such that

$$\alpha = \frac{d_1}{d_2}, \quad a_0^{d_2} = a, \quad a_0^{d_1} = b,$$

Definition 1.8. An integer is said to be λ -**smooth** if all of its prime divisors are $\leq 2^\lambda$. An integer is said to be λ -**rough** if all of its prime divisors are $> 2^\lambda$.

The properties of λ -smoothness and λ -roughness are clearly preserved under products, greatest common divisors and least common multiples. Furthermore, any positive integer n is uniquely expressible as a product $n_{\lambda,s}n_{\lambda,r}$ of a λ -smooth integer $n_{\lambda,s} \geq 0$ and a λ -rough integer $n_{\lambda,r} \geq 0$.

Definition 1.9. For a security parameter λ , we denote by $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ the integral domain obtained by localizing \mathbb{Z} away from all primes $\geq 2^\lambda$.

Thus,

$$\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)} = \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{\beta} : \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}, \mathbf{gcd}(\alpha, \beta) = 1, \beta \text{ is } \lambda\text{-smooth} \right\}.$$

Note that $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ inherits the structure of a principal ideal domain. The group of units of $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ is given by

$$\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}^\times := \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{\beta} : \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}, \mathbf{gcd}(\alpha, \beta) = 1, \alpha, \beta \text{ are } \lambda\text{-smooth} \right\}.$$

The prime ideals of $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ are the principal ideals generated by rational primes larger than 2^λ .

Definition 1.10. For $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ -integers d_1, d_2 we say $d_1 \equiv_\lambda d_2$ if $\frac{d_1}{d_2}$ is a unit in $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$.

This is clearly a homomorphic equivalence relation.

Definition 1.11. For $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ -integers d_1, d_2 , we denote by $\mathbf{gcd}_\lambda(d_1, d_2)$ the largest λ -rough integer that divides both d_1 and d_2 in the principal ideal domain $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$. Similarly, we denote by $\mathbf{lcm}_\lambda(d_1, d_2)$ the smallest λ -rough integer divisible by d_1 and d_2 in $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$.

Let d_1, \dots, d_n be $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ -integers and write $d_i = \tilde{d}_i \frac{\alpha_i}{\beta_i}$ with \tilde{d}_i a λ -rough integer and α_i, β_i co-prime λ -smooth integers. Clearly, for each pair i, j , we have the equivalence

$$\mathbf{gcd}(\tilde{d}_i, \tilde{d}_j) = 1 \iff d_i, d_j \text{ co-prime in } \mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}.$$

Definition 1.12. For elements a, b in a hidden order group \mathbb{G} , we say

$$a \equiv_\lambda b$$

with respect to a Prover \mathcal{P} if \mathcal{P} verifiably possesses relatively prime λ -smooth integers d_1, d_2 such that $a^{d_1} = b^{d_2}$.

Because of Shamir's trick, this is equivalent to \mathcal{P} being able to generate an element $a_0 \in \mathbb{G}$ and relatively prime λ -smooth integers d_1, d_2 such that

$$a_0^{d_2} = a, a_0^{d_1} = b.$$

It is easy to see that this is an equivalence relation.

Proposition 1.1. The relation (\equiv_λ) is an equivalence relation.

Proof. Since the reflexivity and the symmetry are obvious, it suffices to show that the relation is transitive.

(Transitivity): Suppose $a \equiv_\lambda b$ and $b \equiv_\lambda c$ for elements $a, b, c \in \mathbb{G}$. Then \mathcal{P} possesses λ -smooth integers d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4 such that

$$a^{d_1} = b^{d_2}, b^{d_3} = c^{d_4}, \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = \mathbf{gcd}(d_3, d_4) = 1.$$

Now,

$$a^{d_1 d_3} = b^{d_2 d_3} = c^{d_2 d_4}$$

and clearly, the integers $d_1 d_3, d_2 d_4$ are λ -smooth. Set $d := \mathbf{gcd}(d_1 d_3, d_2 d_4)$ and $e_1 := d_1 d_3 / d, d_2 d_4 / d$. Then e_1, e_2 are co-prime and λ -smooth and

$$a^{e_1} = c^{e_2}.$$

Thus, $a \equiv_\lambda c$. □

For elements $a, b \in \mathbb{G}$ the following are equivalent:

1. $a^d \equiv_\lambda b$ for some integer d .
2. $a^d \equiv_\lambda b$ for some λ -rough integer d .
3. $b = a^{d_1}$ for some $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ -integer d_1 .

Furthermore, if a PPT algorithm is able to output an element $a \in \mathbb{G}$ and integers d_1, d_2 such that $a^{d_1} \equiv_\lambda a^{d_2}$, then with overwhelming probability, $\frac{d_1}{d_2} \in \mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}^\times$. In particular, no PPT algorithm can output an element $a \in \mathbb{G}$ and distinct λ -rough integers d_1, d_2 such that $a^{d_1} \equiv_\lambda a^{d_2}$.

We note, however, that the relation (\equiv_λ) is not homomorphic, meaning that $a_1 \equiv_\lambda a_2, b_1 \equiv_\lambda b_2$ does not imply $a_1 a_2 \equiv_\lambda b_1 b_2$. But the relation is *partly* homomorphic in the sense that for any integer d ,

$$a \equiv_\lambda b \iff a^d \equiv_\lambda b^d.$$

Non-membership proofs in accumulators: The best-known application of the knowledge of exponent protocol is constant-sized batched non-membership proofs in accumulators ([BBF19]). We discuss the implications of replacing equality of \mathbb{G} -elements with the equivalence relation \equiv_λ in this regard.

Let $g \in \mathbb{G}$ denote the genesis state of the accumulator, \mathcal{D} the inserted data set and $A = g^{\prod_{d \in \mathcal{D}} d}$ the accumulated digest. For brevity, we write $D := \prod_{d \in \mathcal{D}} d$. Given a data set \mathcal{D}_0 disjoint with \mathcal{D} and the product $D_0 := \prod_{d \in \mathcal{D}_0} d$, the Prover demonstrates non-membership for all elements of \mathcal{D}_0 by sending the following to the Verifier:

- Elements $w, A_1 \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $w^{D_0} A_1 = g$.
- A non-interactive proof for $\text{PoKE}[A, A_1]$.

Suppose, instead of $\text{PoKE}[A, A_1]$, the Prover proves the weaker statement that he possesses an integer k such that $A^k \equiv_\lambda A_1$. By definition, there exist an integer k and a λ -smooth integer e such that $\mathbf{gcd}(k, e) = 1$ and $A^k = A_1^e$.

Write $w = g^x$. Then

$$x D_0 + \frac{k D}{e} = 1$$

and hence,

$$e x D_0 + k D = e.$$

Thus, $\mathbf{gcd}(D_0, D)$ divides e which is a λ -smooth integer. Since each element of \mathcal{D} is a λ -bit prime, it follows that $\mathcal{D} \cap \mathcal{D}_0 = \emptyset$, despite $\frac{k}{e}$ possibly not being an integer.

1.8 Some preliminary lemmas

We will need the next two lemmas repeatedly in the subsequent protocols.

Lemma 1.2. *Let p be a prime and let $f(X)$ be a univariate degree n polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}[X]$ such that not all coefficients are divisible by p . For a randomly generated integer γ , the probability that $f(\gamma) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^{n\lambda}}$ is $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. Let F be a splitting field of $f(X)$ and let

$$f(X) = \prod_{i=1}^n (X - \alpha_i)$$

be the factorization of $f(X)$ over F . Let $\mathfrak{p}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{p}_g$ be the distinct primes of F lying over p . Since the extension F/\mathbb{Q} is Galois, we have

$$p\mathcal{O}_F = \prod_{i=1}^g \mathfrak{p}_i^e = \bigcap_{i=1}^g \mathfrak{p}_i^e$$

where $e \geq 1$ is the ramification degree and the Galois group $\text{Gal}(F/\mathbb{Q})$ acts transitively on the set $\{\mathfrak{p}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{p}_g\}$.

We note that for any integer $k \geq 1$, $\mathfrak{p}_1^{ek} \cap \mathbb{Z} = p^k \mathbb{Z}$. The inclusion $p^k \mathbb{Z} \subseteq \mathfrak{p}_1^{ek} \cap \mathbb{Z}$ is obvious. For the reverse inclusion, let $x \in \mathfrak{p}_1^{ek} \cap \mathbb{Z}$. For any index i , there exists an automorphism $\sigma_i \in \text{Gal}(F/\mathbb{Q})$ such that $\sigma_i(\mathfrak{p}_1) = \mathfrak{p}_i$. So $x = \sigma(x) \in \mathfrak{p}_i^e$. Hence, $x \in \bigcap_{i=1}^g \mathfrak{p}_i^{ek} = p^k \mathbb{Z}$.

For any two integers $x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$, we have

$$x_1 - x_2 \in \mathfrak{p}_1^{e\lambda} \iff x_1 - x_2 \in \mathfrak{p}_1^{e\lambda} \cap \mathbb{Z} = p^\lambda \mathbb{Z}.$$

Hence, the set

$$S_\lambda := \{x + \mathfrak{p}_1^{e\lambda} : x \in \mathbb{Z}\} \subseteq \mathcal{O}_F/\mathfrak{p}^{e\lambda}$$

has cardinality p^λ . Now, for any integer γ ,

$$f(\gamma) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^{n\lambda}} \iff f(\gamma) \equiv 0 \pmod{\mathfrak{p}_1^{en\lambda}} \implies \gamma \equiv \alpha_i \pmod{\mathfrak{p}_1^{e\lambda}} \text{ for at least one index } i.$$

Since γ is randomly generated, $\gamma \pmod{\mathfrak{p}_1^{e\lambda}}$ is randomly and uniformly distributed over the set S_λ . Hence,

$$\mathbf{Prob}(f(\gamma) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^{n\lambda}}) \leq \frac{n}{p^\lambda} = \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

which completes the proof. \square

Lemma 1.3. 1. *For rationals $d_1, \dots, d_n \in \mathbb{Q}$ and a randomly generated λ -bit integer γ , if*

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma^i \in \mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)},$$

with overwhelming probability, $(d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}^n$.

2. *For rationals $d_1, \dots, d_n \in \mathbb{Q}$ and a randomly generated λ -bit integer γ , if*

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \in \mathbb{Z},$$

with overwhelming probability, $(d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$.

Proof. **1.** Let D be the least common denominator for d_1, \dots, d_n and write $d_i = \frac{c_i}{D}$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$. Suppose, by way of contradiction that $(d_1, \dots, d_n) \notin \mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}^n$. Then D is divisible by some prime $p > 2^\lambda$ and

$$\sum_{i=1}^n c_i \gamma^i \equiv 0 \pmod{p}.$$

Now, the polynomial $\sum_{i=1}^n c_i X^i \in \mathbb{F}_p[X]$ has at most n distinct zeros in \mathbb{F}_p and since γ is uniformly distributed modulo p , the probability of this occurring is $\text{negl}(\lambda)$, a contradiction.

2. Let D be the least common denominator for d_1, \dots, d_n and write $d_i = \frac{c_i}{D}$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$. Suppose, by way of contradiction that $(d_1^{n\lambda}, \dots, d_n^{n\lambda}) \notin \mathbb{Z}^n$ and let p be a prime dividing D . Then

$$\sum_{i=1}^n c_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \equiv 0 \pmod{p^{n\lambda}}.$$

Now, the polynomial $f(X) := \sum_{i=1}^n c_i^{n\lambda} X^i$ has degree n and by the preceding lemma,

$$\mathbf{Prob}(h(\gamma) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^{n\lambda}}) = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Thus, with overwhelming probability, the rationals $d_i^{n\lambda}$ are integers, which in turn implies that the d_i are integers. \square

In particular,

$$\mathbf{Prob}((d_1, \dots, d_n) \notin \mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}^n \mid \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma^i \in \mathbb{Z}) = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Similarly,

$$\mathbf{Prob}((d_1, \dots, d_n) \notin \mathbb{Z}^n \mid \sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \in \mathbb{Z}) = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

In a setting where the Verifier is not satisfied with the elements d_1, \dots, d_n being $\mathbb{Z}_{(\lambda)}$ -integers and needs a probabilistic proof that they are, in fact, rational integers, the Prover could demonstrate that $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \in \mathbb{Z}$. The resulting trade-off is a higher computational burden for the Prover. Computing

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i$$

entails

$$\mathbf{O}(\log(\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i)) = \mathbf{O}(n \log(n) \lambda \max\{\log(d_i)\})$$

exponentiations in \mathbb{G} . On the other hand, computing $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma^i$ entails

$$\mathbf{O}(\log(\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma^i)) = \mathbf{O}(\log(n) \max\{\log(d_i)\})$$

group exponentiations.

Given a randomly generated element $g \in \mathbb{G}$, if the Prover outputs an element $\tilde{g} = g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}$, then the fractional root assumption implies that $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \in \mathbb{Z}$ except with negligible probability. The lemma 1.4 then implies that with overwhelming probability, $(d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$.

2 Arguments of Knowledge

We briefly review the protocol PoKE from [BBF19].

Protocol 2.1. *Proof of Knowledge of the Exponent* (PoKE)

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$

Inputs: $u, w \in \mathbb{G}$.

Claim: The Prover possesses an integer x such that $u^x = w$

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $z := g^x$ and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit prime l .

3. \mathcal{P} computes the integers q, r such that

$$x = ql + r, \quad r \in [l].$$

4. \mathcal{P} computes $Q := u^q$, $Q' = g^q$ and sends (Q, Q', g^x, r) to \mathcal{V} .

5. \mathcal{V} accepts if and only if

$$r \in [l], \quad Q^l u^r w, \quad Q^l g^r = z.$$

□

The part where \mathcal{P} computes g^x and sends it to \mathcal{V} *before* receiving the challenge l is necessary for the security of the protocol. Without this step, a malicious Prover could convince the Verifier that x is an integer, which might not necessarily be the case.

Clearly, the relation *Knowledge of the Exponent* is transitive in the sense that for elements $a_1, a_2, a_3 \in \mathbb{G}$, if a prover \mathcal{P} possesses integers d_1, d_2 such that $a_1^{d_1} = a_2$, $a_2^{d_2} = a_3$, then he possesses the integer $d_1 d_2$ which fulfills the equation $a_1^{d_1 d_2} = a_3$. Henceforth, we denote the proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm between $a, b \in \mathbb{G}$ by $\text{PoKE}[a, b]$.

In the following protocol, we show how a Prover could probabilistically demonstrate that two discrete logarithms are equal without revealing anything about the common discrete logarithm other than residues modulo a prime challenge. We provide an argument of knowledge for the following relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{EqDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)) \in \mathbb{G}^2 \\ d \in \mathbb{Z} : \\ (b_1, b_2) = (a_1^d, a_2^d) \end{array} \right\}$$

Protocol 2.2. *Proof of equality of discrete logarithms* (PoEqDLog) :

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: $a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{G}$.

Claim: The Prover possesses an integer d such that $a_1^d = b_1$ and $a_2^d = b_2$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} sends $\tilde{g} := g^d$ to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit prime l .

3. \mathcal{P} computes the integers q, r such that $d = ql + r$, $r \in [l]$ and the group elements

$$Q_1 := a_1^q, \quad Q_2 := a_2^q, \quad \check{g} := g^q.$$

He sends (Q_1, Q_2, \check{g}, r) to \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{V} verifies the equations

$$r \in [l], \quad Q_1^l a_1^r \stackrel{?}{=} b_1, \quad Q_2^l a_2^r \stackrel{?}{=} b_2, \quad (\check{g})^l g^r \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g}.$$

He accepts if and only if all equations hold. \square

Thus, the proof consists of four \mathbb{G} -elements and one λ -bit integer.

Proposition 2.3. *The protocol $\text{EqDLog}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)]$ is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{EqDLog}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. Since the protocol PoKE is secure ([BBF19]), the validity of the equations

$$Q_1^l a_1^r \stackrel{?}{=} b_1, \quad Q_2^l a_2^r \stackrel{?}{=} b_2, \quad (\check{g})^l g^r \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g}$$

proves that \mathcal{P} possesses the discrete logarithms between a_1, b_1 and a_2, b_2 . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that these discrete logarithms are distinct and denote them by d_1, d_2 respectively. The adaptive root assumption implies that with overwhelming probability,

$$d_1 \equiv r \equiv d_2 \pmod{l}.$$

But since the λ -bit prime l is randomly generated, the integer $d_1 - d_2$ is randomly and uniformly distributed modulo l and hence,

$$\mathbf{Prob}(d_1 \equiv d_2 \pmod{l} \mid d_1 \neq d_2) = \frac{1}{l} = \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

a contradiction. \square

We now show how to generalize the last protocol for multiple discrete logarithms while keeping the communication complexity constant-sized and independent of the number of discrete logarithms. We call the following protocol the *Aggregated Equality of Discrete Logarithms* or **AggEqDLog** for short. We provide an argument of knowledge for the following relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggEqDLog}}[(a, b), (\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (\mathcal{A} = (a_1, \dots, a_n), \mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ d \in \mathbb{Z} : \\ b_i = a_1^d \forall i \end{array} \right\}$$

Protocol 2.4. *Proof of Aggregated Equal Discrete Logarithms (PoAggEqDLog) :*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda), g \in \mathbb{G}.$

Inputs : $a, b \in \mathbb{G}, (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n, (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n.$

Claim: The Prover possesses an integer d such that $a^d = b$ and $a_i^d = b_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$.

Step. 1. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit integer γ .

2. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes the elements

$$\tilde{a} := \prod_{i=1}^n a_i^{\gamma^i}, \quad \tilde{b} := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma^i} \in \mathbb{G}.$$

3. \mathcal{P} generates a non-interactive proof for $\text{EqDLog}[(a, b), (\tilde{a}, \tilde{b})]$ and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

4. \mathcal{V} independently computes the elements \tilde{a}, \tilde{b} and accepts if and only if the proof for $\text{EqDLog}[(a, b), (\tilde{a}, \tilde{b})]$ is valid. \square

Thus, the proof consists of four \mathbb{G} -elements and one λ -bit integer. In particular, it is constant-sized and independent of the cardinalities $|\mathcal{A}|, |\mathcal{B}|$.

Proposition 2.5. *The protocol AggEqDLog is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggEqDLog}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) With notations as in the Protocol, \mathcal{V} accepts if and only if \mathcal{P} proves possession of an integer d such that

$$a^d = b, \quad \tilde{a}^d = \tilde{b}$$

through the Protocol $\text{PoEqDLog}[(a, b), (\tilde{a}, \tilde{b})]$. Now, since the challenge γ is randomly generated, it follows that

$$\mathbf{Prob} \left((a_1^d, \dots, a_n^d) \neq (b_1, \dots, b_n) \mid \tilde{a}^d = \tilde{b} \right) \in \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Since the Protocol $\text{EqDLog}[(a, b), (\tilde{a}, \tilde{b})]$ is secure under the strong-RSA and adaptive root assumptions, it follows that the Protocol $\text{AggEqDLog}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)]$ is also secure under these assumptions. \square

We can also generalize the protocol EqDLog in another direction. For a public polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$, an honest Prover can provide a constant-sized proof that he possesses integers d_1, d_2 such that

$$a_1^{d_1} = b_1, \quad a_2^{d_2} = b_2, \quad f(d_1) = d_2.$$

We provide an argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{PoPolyDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), f] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2, f \in \mathbb{Z}[X]); \\ (d_1, d_2) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : \\ b_1 = a_1^{d_1} \wedge b_2 = a_2^{d_2} \wedge d_2 = f(d_1) \end{array} \right\}$$

Protocol 2.6. *Proof of Polynomial equation between discrete logarithms (PoPolyDLog) :*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda), g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Elements $a_1, b_1, a_2, b_2 \in \mathbb{G}$, a public polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, d_2 such that:

$$-a_1^{d_1} = b_1, \quad a_2^{d_2} = b_2$$

$$-f(d_1) = d_2$$

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes \tilde{g}_1, \tilde{g}_2 and sends them to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit prime l .

3. \mathcal{P} computes elements q_1, q_2, r_1, r_2 such that

$$d_1 = q_1 l + r_1, \quad d_2 = q_2 l + r_2, \quad r_1, r_2 \in [l].$$

4. \mathcal{P} computes the elements $Q_1 := a_1^{q_1}, Q_2 := a_2^{q_2}, g_1 := g^{q_1}, g_2 := g^{q_2} \in \mathbb{G}$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} along with the integer r_1 .

5. The Verifier verifies that $r_1 \in [l]$. He independently computes $r_2 := f(r_1) \pmod{l}$.

6. \mathcal{V} verifies the equations

$$Q_1^l a_1^{r_1} \stackrel{?}{=} b_1 \quad \bigwedge \quad Q_2^l a_2^{r_2} \stackrel{?}{=} b_2 \quad \bigwedge \quad (g_1)^l g^{r_1} \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g}_1 \quad \bigwedge \quad (g_2)^l g^{r_2} \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g}_2$$

and accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all equations hold. \square

Thus, the proof consists of six elements of \mathbb{G} and one λ -bit integer.

Proposition 2.7. *The protocol PoPolyDLog is an argument of knowledge in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) The Verifier independently computes $r_2 := f(r_1) \pmod{l}$ in Step 6. Hence, the equations

$$Q_1^l a_1^{r_1} \stackrel{?}{=} b_1 \quad \bigwedge \quad Q_2^l a_2^{r_2}$$

imply that with overwhelming probability, the Prover possesses rationals d_1, d_2 such that

$$a^{d_1} = b_1, \quad a_2^{d_2} = b_2, \quad d_2 \equiv f(d_1) \pmod{l}.$$

Furthermore, the equations

$$(g_1)^l g^{r_1} \stackrel{?}{=} g^{d_1} \quad \bigwedge \quad (g_2)^l g^{r_2} \stackrel{?}{=} g^{d_2}$$

imply that with overwhelming probability,

$$\tilde{g}_1 = g^{d_1} \quad \bigwedge \quad \tilde{g}_2 = g^{d_2}.$$

The fractional root assumption now implies that with overwhelming probability, $d_1, d_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$. \square

In the next section, we will generalize this protocol to multivariate polynomial relations for multiple discrete logarithms. We briefly discuss an application of the last protocol.

Multiset accumulators: Let a_1, a_2 be elements of \mathbb{G} . Let

$$\mathcal{M} = \{\mathbf{m}_1 \times d_1, \dots, \mathbf{m}_m \times d_m\}, \quad \mathcal{N} = \{\mathbf{n}_1 \times e_1, \dots, \mathbf{n}_n \times e_n\}$$

be multisets, where $\mathbf{m}_i, \mathbf{n}_j$ are the multiplicities of the elements. For brevity, we write

$$\Pi(\mathcal{M}) := \prod_{i=1}^m d_i^{\mathbf{m}_i}, \quad \Pi(\mathcal{N}) := \prod_{j=1}^n e_j^{\mathbf{n}_j}.$$

Let

$$A_1 := g^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})}, \quad A_2 := g^{\Pi(\mathcal{N})}$$

be the commitments of \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} .

Clearly, the relation $\mathcal{N} \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ can be demonstrated by the protocol PoKE[A_2, A_1]. We now show that the protocol PolyDLog allows a Prover to succinctly demonstrate the following relations between the underlying sets of \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} , the proofs for which can be publicly verified against the commitments to \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} .

1. $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$.
2. $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \not\subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$.
3. $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) = \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$

Before we describe the protocols, we note a few basic facts. Clearly, we have

$$\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) = \text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \iff \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \quad \bigwedge \quad \text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}).$$

Furthermore, with notations as before, we have

$$\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \iff \exists N : \Pi(\mathcal{M})^N \equiv 0 \pmod{\Pi(\mathcal{N})}.$$

Likewise, to show that $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \not\subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$, it suffices to show that there exists an integer p such that

$$p \notin \{-1, 1\} \quad \bigwedge \quad \Pi(\mathcal{M}) \equiv 0 \pmod{p} \quad \bigwedge \quad \gcd(\Pi(\mathcal{N}), p) = 1.$$

Protocol 2.8. *Protocol for the containment of underlying sets.*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Input: Elements $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{G}$; commitments $A_1 = a_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})}$, $A_2 = a_2^{\Pi(\mathcal{N})}$ to multisets \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} .

Claim: $\text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})$.

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $N := \max\{n_j : 1 \leq j \leq n\}$ and

$$A_3 := a_2^{\left(\prod_{i=1}^m d_i^{m_i}\right)^N}.$$

He sends A_3 and N to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{PoPolyDLog}[(a_1, A_1), (a_2, A_3), X^N]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{PoKE}[A_2, A_3]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

4. \mathcal{V} verifies the two proofs and accepts if and only if both are valid.

Protocol 2.9. *Protocol for the non-containment of underlying sets.*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Input: Elements $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{G}$; commitments $A_1 = a_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})}$, $A_2 = a_2^{\Pi(\mathcal{N})}$ to multisets \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} .

Claim: $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \not\subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$.

1. The Prover chooses an integer p such that $p \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \setminus \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$. and computes $b_1 := a_1^p$. He sends b_1 to the Verifier \mathcal{V} long with a non-interactive proof for $\text{PoKE}[b_1, A_1]$.

2. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{RelPrimeDLog}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, A_2)]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{V} verifies that $b_1 \notin \{a_1, a_1^{-1}\}$ and the proofs for $\text{PoKE}[b_1, A_1]$, $\text{RelPrimeDLog}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, A_2)]$. He accepts if and only if both proofs are valid.

2.1 Aggregating the knowledge of multiple exponents

We call the following protocol the *Proof of Aggregated Knowledge of the Exponent 1* or **AggKE-1** for short. We provide an argument of knowledge for the relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggKE-1}}[a, \mathcal{B}] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a \in \mathbb{G}, \mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ b_i = a^{d_i} \forall i \end{array} \right\}$$

Protocol 2.10. *Proof of Aggregated knowledge of exponents 1 (PoAggKE-1):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Elements $a \in \mathbb{G}$, $(b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$ for some integer $n \geq 1$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, \dots, d_n such that $a^{d_i} = b_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$

Step. 1. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates λ -bit challenge γ .

2. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $\tilde{g} := g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{\lambda} \gamma^i}$ and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} computes

$$b := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma^i} \in \mathbb{G}.$$

4. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit prime l .

5. \mathcal{P} computes the integers $r_i := d_i \pmod{l}$ and the integers $q, r, \tilde{q}, \tilde{r}$ such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma^i = ql + r, \quad \sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i = \tilde{q}l + \tilde{r}, \quad r, \tilde{r} \in [l]$$

and

$$Q := a^q, \quad \tilde{g} := g^{\tilde{q}}.$$

He sends $Q, \tilde{g}, (r_1, \dots, r_n)$ to the Verifier.

6. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit challenge γ_0 .

7. \mathcal{P} computes integers q_0, r_0 such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma_0^i = q_0 l + r_0, \quad r_0 \in [l].$$

He computes $Q_0 := a^{q_0}$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

8. \mathcal{V} verifies that $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \in [l]^n$ and independently computes

$$b := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma^i}, \quad b_0 := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma_0^i},$$

$$\tilde{r} := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad r := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad r_0 := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma_0^i \pmod{l}.$$

9. \mathcal{V} verifies the equations

$$Q^l a^r \stackrel{?}{=} b \bigwedge (Q_0)^l a^{r_0} \stackrel{?}{=} b_0 \bigwedge (\tilde{g})^l g^{\tilde{r}} \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g}.$$

He accepts if and only if all equations hold. \square

Thus, the proof consists of three \mathbb{G} -elements and n λ -bit integers. In particular, the number of \mathbb{G} -elements is constant-sized and independent of the number of exponents. For the security of the protocol, it is necessary that the challenge γ_0 is generated *after* the remainders r_1, \dots, r_n have been committed. In a non-interactive setting, this means the hashing algorithm that generates γ_0 takes the set of remainders modulo l as one of its inputs. Hence, the remainders $r_i := d_i \pmod{l}$ must be honestly computed to succeed at the additional task of computing the element $Q_0 \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $(Q_0)^l a^{r_0} = b_0$.

Proposition 2.11. *The protocol PoAggKE-1 is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggKE-1}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) The equation $Q_0^l a^{r_0} = b_0$ implies that \mathcal{P} possesses rationals d_1, \dots, d_n such that $r_i \equiv d_i \pmod{l}$ and $a^{d_i} = b_i$. Furthermore, we have $\tilde{g} = (\tilde{g})^l g^{\tilde{r}}$ and hence, the adaptive root assumption implies that with overwhelming probability,

$$\tilde{g} = g^{(\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i) + lk}$$

for some integer k . Since the λ -bit prime l is randomly generated, the discrete logarithm between g, \tilde{g} is randomly and uniformly distributed modulo l . Hence, the Schwartz-Zippel lemma implies that with overwhelming probability,

$$\tilde{g} = g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}.$$

Now, the fractional root assumption implies that with overwhelming probability, $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \in \mathbb{Z}$. From Lemma 1.3, it follows that with overwhelming probability, $(d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$. \square

In the next protocol, we generalize the protocol **PolyDLog** to multiple discrete logarithms. We provide an argument of knowledge for the relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{MultPolyDLog}}[a, (b_1, \dots, b_n), f] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a \in \mathbb{G}, (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ f \in \mathbb{Z}[X_1, \dots, X_n]; \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ b_i = a^{d_i} \forall i \wedge f(d_1, \dots, d_n) = 0 \end{array} \right\}$$

The soundness of the protocol hinges on the Schartz-Zippel lemma for multivariate polynomials, which we state here.

Lemma 2.12. (Schwartz-Zippel) : *Let F be a field and let $f \in F[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ be a polynomial. Let r_1, \dots, r_n be selected randomly and uniformly from a subset $S \subseteq F$. Then*

$$\mathbf{Prob}[f(r_1, \dots, r_n) = 0] \leq \frac{\deg(f)}{|S|}.$$

Protocol 2.13. *Proof of multivariate polynomial relation between discrete logarithms*
(PoMultPolyDLog) :

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda), g \in \mathbb{G}.$

Inputs: Elements $a \in \mathbb{G}, (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$ for some integer $n \geq 1$; a public n -variate polynomial $f(X_1, \dots, X_n) \in \mathbb{Z}[X_1, \dots, X_n].$

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, \dots, d_n such that:

- $a^{d_i} = b_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, n.$
- $f(d_1, \dots, d_n) = 0.$

Step. 1. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit integer $\gamma.$

2. \mathcal{P} computes $\tilde{g} := g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}$ and sends it to the Verifier $\mathcal{V}.$

3. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit prime $l.$

4. \mathcal{P} computes the integers $r_i := d_i \pmod{l}$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$) and the integers $\tilde{q}, q, \tilde{r}, r$ such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i = \tilde{q}l + \tilde{r}, \quad \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma^i = ql + r, \quad \tilde{r}, r \in [l].$$

5. \mathcal{P} computes $Q := a^q, \check{g} := g^{\tilde{q}}$ and sends $Q, \check{g}, (r_1, \dots, r_n)$ to $\mathcal{V}.$

6. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit challenge $\gamma_0.$

7. \mathcal{P} computes the integers q_0, r_0 such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma_0^i = q_0 l + r_0, \quad r_0 \in [l].$$

He computes $Q_0 := a^{q_0}$ and sends Q_0 to $\mathcal{V}.$

8. \mathcal{V} verifies that $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \in [l]^n$ and independently computes

$$\tilde{r} := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad r := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad r_0 := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma_0^i \pmod{l}.$$

9. \mathcal{V} computes

$$b := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma_i}, \quad b_0 := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma_0^i}.$$

10. \mathcal{V} verifies the equations

$$Q^l a^r \stackrel{?}{=} b \bigwedge (Q_0)^l a^{r_0} \stackrel{?}{=} b_0 \bigwedge (\tilde{g})^l g^{\tilde{r}} \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g} \bigwedge f(r_1, \dots, r_n) \stackrel{?}{=} 0 \pmod{l}.$$

He accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all equations hold. \square

Thus, the proof consists of five \mathbb{G} -elements and n λ -bit integers. We note that the additional challenge γ_0 is necessary for the security of the protocol. A malicious Prover \mathcal{P}_{mal} could forge a fake proof as follows.

1. \mathcal{P}_{mal} computes integers $r_1, \dots, r_n \in [l]$ such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{\gamma_i} \gamma_i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n r_i^{\gamma_i} \gamma_i \pmod{l}, \quad f(r_1, \dots, r_n) \equiv 0 \pmod{l}.$$

but $d_i \not\equiv r_i \pmod{l}$ for some or all indices i . The malicious Prover can succeed in this task with non-negligible probability.

2. \mathcal{P}_{mal} then sends r_1, \dots, r_n to the Verifier.

3. The Verifier is thus tricked into believing that $f(d_1, \dots, d_n) = 0$, which might not necessarily be the case.

Now, in our protocol, γ_0 is randomly generated by the Fiat-Shamir heuristic *after* the Prover sends (r_1, \dots, r_n) . In a non-interactive setting, this means the hashing algorithm that generates the challenge γ_0 takes the λ -bit integers (r_1, \dots, r_n) as one of its inputs. Hence, we have

$$\mathbf{Prob}\left(\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma_0^i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma_0^i \pmod{l} \mid d_i \not\equiv r_i \pmod{l} \text{ for some } i\right) = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Hence, the elements (r_1, \dots, r_n) must be honestly computed in order to succeed at the additional task of computing the element \hat{Q}_0 such that

$$(\hat{Q}_0)^l a^{\hat{r}_0} = \prod_{i=1}^n a_i^{\gamma_0^i}$$

with a non-negligible probability.

An important special case is where f is the $(n+1)$ -variate polynomial

$$f(X_1, \dots, X_n, X_{n+1}) := \left(\prod_{i=1}^n X_i\right) - X_{n+1}.$$

We will need this case for one of the subsequent protocols.

Proposition 2.14. *The protocol PoMultPolyDLog is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{MultPolyDLog}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) Since the equation $Q_0^l a^{r_0} = \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma_0^i}$ holds, the adaptive root assumption implies that with overwhelming probability, the Prover possesses rationals d_1, \dots, d_n such that:

- $a^{d_i} = b_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$ and

$$- \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma_0^i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma_0^i \pmod{l}.$$

Since γ_0 is randomly generated after the Prover has committed (r_1, \dots, r_n) , γ_0 is randomly and uniformly distributed modulo l . Hence, it follows that with overwhelming probability, $d_i \equiv r_i \pmod{l}$ for every index i . Now,

$$\mathbf{Prob} \left(f(d_1, \dots, d_n) \equiv 0 \pmod{l} \mid f(d_1, \dots, d_n) \neq 0 \right) = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Thus, with overwhelming probability, $f(d_1, \dots, d_n) = 0$. Furthermore, the equation

$$\tilde{g} = (\tilde{g})^l g^{\tilde{r}}$$

implies that $\tilde{g} = g^{lk + \sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}$ for some integer k . Since l is randomly generated *after* the Prover sends \tilde{g} , the adaptive root assumption implies that with overwhelming probability, $\tilde{g} = g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}$. The fractional root assumption implies that with overwhelming probability, $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \in \mathbb{Z}$ and hence, with overwhelming probability, $d_1, \dots, d_n \in \mathbb{Z}$. \square

We now discuss a relation that is a dual to the relation **AggKE-1**. We provide an argument of knowledge for the following relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggKE-2}}[\mathcal{A}, A] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (\mathcal{A} = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n, A \in \mathbb{G}) \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ A = a_i^{d_i} \forall i \end{array} \right\}$$

Given elements a_1, \dots, a_n such that

$$A = a_1^{d_1} = \dots = a_n^{d_n}$$

where the integers d_i are known to the Prover, the Prover can efficiently compute $d := \mathbf{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n)$ and using Shamir's trick, an element $a \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $a^d = A$ in runtime $\mathbf{O}(n \log(n))$. Now, the protocol **PoAggKE-1** $[a, (a_1, \dots, a_n)]$ and **PoKE** $[a, A]$ would demonstrate that the Prover possesses the discrete logarithms between a_i and A for every i . However, these protocols do not prove that these discrete logarithms are, in fact, integers. To that end, a Prover needs to demonstrate that the rationals d/d_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$) are integers.

Unlike the protocol **PoAggKE-1**, the proof for **AggKE-2** is not constant-sized. Although the number of group elements is indeed constant, our proof contains n λ -bit integers arising from the remainders modulo the challenge.

Protocol 2.15. *Proof of Aggregated knowledge of exponents 2 (PoAggKE-2):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$

Inputs: $(a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$, $A \in \mathbb{G}$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, \dots, d_n such that $a_i^{d_i} = A$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes the integers

$$D := \mathbf{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n), \hat{d}_i := D/d_i \ (i = 1, \dots, n).$$

Using Shamir's trick, he computes an element $a \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $a^D = A$. He sends a to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive **PoKE** $[a, A]$.

2. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit integer γ .

3. \mathcal{P} computes

$$\tilde{g} := g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}$$

and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

4. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\mathbf{AggKE-1}[a, \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

5. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit prime l .

6. \mathcal{P} computes $R := D \pmod{l}$ and $\check{a} := a^{(D-R)/l}$. He sends \check{a}, R to \mathcal{V} .

7. \mathcal{P} computes the integers $\hat{r}_i := \hat{d}_i \pmod{l}$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$) and the integer \hat{q}, \hat{r} such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{d}_i \gamma^i = \hat{q}l + \hat{r}, \quad \hat{r} \in [l].$$

He computes $\hat{Q} := a^{\hat{q}}$ and sends $\hat{Q}, (\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_n)$ to \mathcal{V} .

8. \mathcal{P} computes the integers $r_i := d_i \pmod{l}$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$) and the integers $q, r, \tilde{q}, \tilde{r}$ such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma^i = ql + r, \quad \sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i = \tilde{q}l + \tilde{r}, \quad r, \tilde{r} \in [l]$$

He computes $Q := a^q, \check{g} := g^{\tilde{q}}$ and sends Q, \check{g} to \mathcal{V} .

9. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit challenge γ_0 .

10. \mathcal{P} computes the integers \hat{q}_0, \hat{r}_0 such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{d}_i \gamma^i = \hat{q}_0 l + \hat{r}_0, \quad \hat{r}_0 \in [l].$$

He computes $\hat{Q}_0 := a^{\hat{q}_0}$ and sends \hat{Q}_0 to \mathcal{V} .

11. \mathcal{V} verifies that $(\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_n, R) \in [l]^{n+1}$ and independently computes $r_i \equiv \hat{r}_i^{-1} R \pmod{l}$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$) and

$$\hat{r} := \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{r}_i \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad \tilde{r} := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad \hat{r}_0 := \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{r}_i \gamma_0^i \pmod{l}$$

12. \mathcal{V} verifies the equations

$$(\check{a})^l a^R \stackrel{?}{=} A \bigwedge (\hat{Q})^l a^{\hat{r}} \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{i=1}^n a_i^{\gamma^i} \bigwedge (\hat{Q}_0)^l a^{\hat{r}_0} \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{i=1}^n a_i^{\gamma_0^i} \bigwedge (\check{g})^l g^{\tilde{r}} \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g}.$$

He accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all equations hold and the proofs for $\mathbf{PoKE}[a, A]$, $\mathbf{AggKE-1}[a, \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}]$ are valid. \square

We note that the additional challenge γ_0 is necessary for the security of this protocol. Note that the Prover commits the integer $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i$ by computing $\tilde{g} := g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}$ and sending it to the Verifier *before* the challenge l is generated by the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. However, a malicious Prover \mathcal{P}_{mal} could forge a fake proof as follows:

1. \mathcal{P}_{mal} chooses integers e_1, \dots, e_n and sends $g^{\sum_{i=1}^n e_i \gamma^i}$ to the Verifier instead of $g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}$

2. \mathcal{P}_{mal} chooses integers $r_1, \dots, r_n \in [l]$ such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n (Dd_i^{-1})\gamma^i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n (Dr_i^{-1})\gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad \sum_{i=1}^n e_i\gamma^i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n r_i\gamma^i \pmod{l},$$

but $d_i \not\equiv r_i \pmod{l}$ for some or all indices i . The Prover \mathcal{P}_{mal} can do so with non-negligible probability.

3. Thus, the Verifier is tricked into believing that $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{\lambda}\gamma^i$ is an integer, which might not necessarily be the case. In fact, even if the Fiat-Shamir heuristic outputs the additional challenge γ_0 before the remainders (r_1, \dots, r_n, R) are committed, \mathcal{P}_{mal} can forge a fake proof with non-negligible probability.

Now, in our protocol, γ_0 is randomly generated by the Fiat-Shamir heuristic *after* the Prover sends $(\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_n, R)$. Hence, we have

$$\mathbf{Prob}\left(\sum_{i=1}^n d_i\gamma_0^i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n r_i\gamma_0^i \pmod{l} \mid d_i \not\equiv r_i \pmod{l} \text{ for some } i\right) = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Hence, the elements (r_1, \dots, r_n) must be honestly computed in order to succeed at the additional challenge of computing the element \hat{Q}_0 such that

$$\hat{Q}_0^l a^{\hat{r}_0} = \prod_{i=1}^n a_i^{\gamma_0^i}$$

with non-negligible probability.

Proposition 2.16. *The protocol PoAggKE-2 is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggKE-2}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) The subprotocol PoAggKE-1 $[a, \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}]$ demonstrates that with overwhelming probability, the Prover possesses integers $\hat{d}_1, \dots, \hat{d}_n$ such that

$$a_i = a^{\hat{d}_i} \quad (i = 1, \dots, n)$$

Furthermore, since γ_0 is randomly generated and the equation

$$\hat{Q}_0^l a^{\hat{r}_0} = \prod_{i=1}^n a_i^{\gamma_0^i}$$

holds, the adaptive root assumption implies that with overwhelming probability,

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{r}_i \gamma_0^i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{d}_i \gamma_0^i \pmod{l}.$$

Hence, with overwhelming probability, $\hat{r}_i \equiv \hat{d}_i \pmod{l}$ (Schwartz-Zippel).

The equation $(\check{a})^l a^R = A$ implies that with overwhelming probability, the Prover possesses a rational $D \equiv R \pmod{l}$ such that $a^D = A$. Thus, with overwhelming probability, the rationals $D\hat{d}_1^{-1}, \dots, D\hat{d}_n^{-1}$ satisfy

$$a_i^{D\hat{d}_i^{-1}} = A \text{ for every } i.$$

Now, the Verifier independently computes

$$r_i := R\widehat{r}_i^{-1} \equiv D\widehat{d}_i^{-1} \pmod{l} \quad (i = 1, \dots, n), \quad r := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma^i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n D\widehat{d}_i^{-1} \pmod{l},$$

$$\widetilde{r} := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n (D\widehat{d}_i^{-1})^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \pmod{l}.$$

Hence, the equation $(\widetilde{g})^l g^{\widetilde{r}} = \widetilde{g}$ implies that with overwhelming probability,

$$\widetilde{g} = g^{\sum_{i=1}^n (D\widehat{d}_i^{-1})^{n\lambda} \gamma^i} g^{kl}$$

for some integer k . Since the prime l is randomly generated, the Schwartz-Zippel lemma implies that with overwhelming probability,

$$\widetilde{g} = g^{\sum_{i=1}^n (D\widehat{d}_i^{-1})^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}.$$

The fractional root assumption implies that $\sum_{i=1}^n (D\widehat{d}_i^{-1})^{n\lambda} \gamma^i$ is an integer and by lemma 1.3, it follows that with overwhelming probability, the rationals $D\widehat{d}_i^{-1}$ are integers. \square

In what follows, we provide an argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{EqDLogPairs}}[(a_1, \mathcal{B}), (a_2, \mathcal{C})] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, a_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2 \\ \mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_n), \mathcal{C} = (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n; \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ b_i = a_1^{d_i}, c_i = a_2^{d_i} \forall i \end{array} \right\}$$

Protocol 2.17. *Proof of equalities of pairs of discrete logarithm (PoEqDLogPairs) :*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs : $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{G}$, $(b_1, \dots, b_n), (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, \dots, d_n such that $a_1^{d_i} = b_i$, $a_2^{d_i} = c_i$.

Step. 1. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit challenge γ .

2. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $\widetilde{g} := g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i}$ and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} computes the elements

$$B := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma^i}, \quad C := \prod_{i=1}^n c_i^{\gamma^i} \in \mathbb{G}.$$

4. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit prime l .

5. \mathcal{P} computes $r_i := d_i \pmod{l}$ and the integers $q, \widetilde{q}, r, \widetilde{r}$ such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i = \widetilde{q}l + \widetilde{r}, \quad \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma^i = ql + r, \quad r, \widetilde{r} \in [l]$$

6. \mathcal{P} computes $\check{g} := g^{\widetilde{q}}$, $Q := a_1^q$ and sends $\check{g}, Q, (r_1, \dots, r_n)$ to \mathcal{V} .

7. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{EqDLog}[(a_1, B), (a_2, C)]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

8. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit challenge γ_0 .
9. \mathcal{P} computes integers q_0, r_0 such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \gamma_0^i = q_0 l + r_0, \quad r_0 \in [l].$$

He computes $Q_0 := a_1^{q_0}$ and sends Q_0 to \mathcal{V} .

10. \mathcal{V} verifies that $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \in [l]^n$ and independently computes

$$\tilde{r} := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad r := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad r_0 := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \gamma_0^i \pmod{l}.$$

11. \mathcal{V} independently computes the elements

$$B := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma^i}, \quad B_0 := \prod_{i=1}^n b_i^{\gamma_0^i}, \quad C := \prod_{i=1}^n c_i^{\gamma^i} \in \mathbb{G}.$$

12. \mathcal{V} verifies the equations

$$Q^l a_1^r \stackrel{?}{=} B \bigwedge (Q_0)^l a_1^{r_0} \stackrel{?}{=} B_0 \bigwedge (\tilde{g})^l \tilde{g}^{\tilde{r}} \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g}.$$

He then accepts the validity of the claim if and only if the proof for $\text{EqDLog}[(a_1, B), (a_2, C)]$ is valid and all equations hold. \square

3 Protocols for arguments of disjointness

The goal of this section is to provide protocols for demonstrating disjointness of multiple data multisets. The proofs can be publicly verified against the succinct commitments to these multisets. To that end, we first describe a protocol whereby an honest Prover can show that the GCD of two discrete logarithms equals a third discrete logarithm without revealing any further information about them. One obvious application is proving disjointness of sets in accumulators instantiated with hidden order groups. We formulate an argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{GCD}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \{((a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z}) : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \text{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = d_3\}.$$

We construct a protocol that has communication complexity independent of the elements a_i, b_i . The protocol rests on the observation that

$$d_3 = \text{gcd}(d_1, d_2) \iff (d_1 \equiv d_2 \equiv 0 \pmod{d_3}) \wedge (\exists (x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : d_3 = x_1 d_1 + x_2 d_2).$$

Protocol 3.1. *Proof of the greatest common divisor (PoGCD):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{GGen}(\lambda), g \in \mathbb{G}.$

Inputs: Elements $a_1, a_2, a_3, b_1, b_2, b_3 \in \mathbb{G}.$

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, d_2, d_3 such that:

- $a_1^{d_1} = b_1, a_2^{d_2} = b_2, a_3^{d_3} = b_3$
- $\text{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = d_3$

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $b_{1,2} := a_1^{d_2}, b_{1,3} := a_1^{d_3}$ and sends them to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. He computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{EqDLog}[(a_2, b_2), (a_1, b_{1,2})], \text{EqDLog}[(a_3, b_3), (a_1, b_{1,3})]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{PoKE}[b_{1,3}, b_1]$ and $\text{PoKE}[b_{1,3}, b_{1,2}]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{P} uses the algorithm **Bezout** to compute integers e_1, e_2 such that $e_1 d_1 + e_2 d_2 = d_3$.
5. \mathcal{P} computes

$$\tilde{b}_1 := b_1^{e_1}, \quad \tilde{b}_{1,2} := b_{1,2}^{e_2}$$

and sends them to \mathcal{V} . He computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{PoKE}[b_1, \tilde{b}_1]$ and $\text{PoKE}[b_{1,2}, \tilde{b}_{1,2}]$. He sends these proofs to \mathcal{V} .

6. \mathcal{V} verifies all of the proofs he receives in addition to the equation $\tilde{b}_1 \tilde{b}_{1,2} \stackrel{?}{=} b_{1,3}$. He accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all of these proofs are valid. \square

An important special case is where $\mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1$. In this case, Step 3 is redundant and hence, the proof size is smaller. We call this special case the Protocol for *Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms* or **RelPrimeDLog** for short:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{RelPrimeDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \{((a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z}) : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1\}.$$

Protocol 3.2. *Proof of Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms (PoRelPrimeDLog):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda), g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Elements $a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{G}$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, d_2 such that:

- $a_1^{d_1} = b_1, a_2^{d_2} = b_2$
- $\mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1$

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $b_{1,2} := a_1^{d_2}$ and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{EqDLog}[(a_2, b_2), (a_1, b_{1,2})]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} uses the algorithm **Bezout** to compute integers e_1, e_2 such that $e_1 d_1 + e_2 d_2 = 1$.

4. \mathcal{P} computes

$$\tilde{b}_1 := b_1^{e_1}, \quad \tilde{b}_{1,2} := b_{1,2}^{e_2}$$

and sends them to \mathcal{V} .

5. \mathcal{P} computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{PoKE}[b_1, \tilde{b}_1]$ and $\text{PoKE}[b_{1,2}, \tilde{b}_{1,2}]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .

6. \mathcal{V} verifies the equation $\tilde{b}_1 \tilde{b}_{1,2} \stackrel{?}{=} a_1$ and the proofs for $\text{EqDLog}[(a_2, b_2), (a_1, b_{1,2})]$, $\text{PoKE}[b_1, \tilde{b}_1]$ and $\text{PoKE}[b_{1,2}, \tilde{b}_{1,2}]$. He accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all of these proofs are valid. \square

Proposition 3.3. *The Protocols PoGCD, PoRelPrimeDLog are arguments of knowledge for the relations $\mathcal{R}_{\text{GCD}}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{RelPrimeDLog}}$ respectively in the generic group model.*

Proof. Since the relation **RelPrimeDLog** is a special case of the relation **GCD**, it suffices to show that the protocol **PoGCD** is correct and sound. Furthermore, since we showed that **PoEqDLog** is correct and sound, we may assume without loss of generality that - with notations as in the protocol **PoGCD** -

$$a_1 = a_2 = a_3, \quad b_{1,2} = b_2, \quad b_{1,3} = b_3.$$

Now, the protocols $\text{PoKE}[b_3, b_1], \text{PoKE}[b_3, b_2], \text{PoKE}[a_1, b_3]$ imply that with overwhelming probability, the Prover \mathcal{P} possesses integers d_1, d_2, d_3 such that

$$a_1^{d_1} = b_1, \quad a_1^{d_2} = b_2, \quad a_1^{d_3} = b_3, \quad \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) \equiv 0 \pmod{d_3}.$$

Furthermore, the Prover \mathcal{P} sends elements $\tilde{b}_1, \tilde{b}_2 \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\tilde{b}_1 \tilde{b}_2 = b_3$ along with the non-interactive proofs for $\text{PoKE}[b_1, \tilde{b}_1]$, $\text{PoKE}[b_2, \tilde{b}_2]$. Hence, with overwhelming probability, the Prover possesses integers e_1, e_2 such that $e_1 d_1 + e_2 d_2 = d_3$. Hence, it follows that with overwhelming probability, $d_3 = \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2)$. \square

It is easy to see that the **PoGCD** may be combined with the protocol **PoMultPolyDLog** to provide an argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{LCM}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \{((a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z}) : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{lcm}(d_1, d_2) = d_3\}.$$

This argument of knowledge can demonstrate that for data multisets $\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2, \mathcal{D}_3$, we have

$$\mathcal{D}_3 = \mathcal{D}_1 \cup \mathcal{D}_2$$

by setting

$$d_i = \prod_{d \in \mathcal{D}_i} x \quad (i = 1, 2, 3).$$

Multiplicities in multiset commitments: As before, let g be a randomly generated element in a hidden order group \mathbb{G} . Let \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} be multiset and let

$$\text{Com}(\mathcal{M}) := g^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{M}} x^{\text{mult}(x, \mathcal{M})}}, \quad \text{Com}(\mathcal{N}) := g^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{N}} x^{\text{mult}(x, \mathcal{N})}}$$

be the commitments to \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} respectively.

For a set \mathcal{D} , a Prover can use the protocol **PoGCD** to demonstrate that every element of \mathcal{D} occurs with a higher multiplicity in \mathcal{M} than in \mathcal{N} . This proof is public verifiable against the commitments to \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} and \mathcal{D} .

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes

$$\text{Com}(\mathcal{D}) := g^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{D}} x}$$

and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with a PoE for this exponentiation.

2. \mathcal{P} computes the multiplicities m_x, n_x of every element $x \in \mathcal{D}$ in \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} respectively.
3. \mathcal{P} computes

$$a_1 := g^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{D}} x^{n_x}}, \quad a_2 := g^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{D}} x^{n_x + 1}}$$

and sends them to \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{EqDLog}[(g, \text{Com}(\mathcal{D})), (a_1, a_2)]$.

4. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{PoGCD}[(g, a_2), (g, \text{Com}(\mathcal{N})), (g, a_1)]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
5. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{PoKE}[a_2, \text{Com}(\mathcal{M})]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
6. \mathcal{V} verifies the three proofs and accepts if and only if they are all valid.

3.1 Protocols for aggregated arguments of disjointness

We now use the protocols **AggKE-1** and **AggKE-2** to generalize the protocol **RelPrimeDLog** to multiple discrete logarithms. Consider a setting where we have n accumulators $\mathbf{Acc}_1, \dots, \mathbf{Acc}_n$ instantiated in the same group \mathbb{G} and with the common genesis state $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Let \mathcal{D}_i denote the data inserted into \mathbf{Acc}_i and let A_i denote the accumulated digest of \mathbf{Acc}_i . Thus,

$$A_i = g^{\Pi(\mathcal{D}_i)}.$$

Suppose a Prover needs to demonstrate to a Verifier (with access to the accumulated digests) that the data sets \mathcal{D}_i are pairwise disjoint, while keeping the communication complexity to a bare

minimum. In particular, the Verifier should not need to access the data sets \mathcal{D}_i . A straightforward way would be to provide the $\binom{n}{2}$ proofs of pairwise disjointness. But this would entail $\mathbf{O}(n^2)$ group elements and $\mathbf{O}(n^2)$ λ -bit integers, which we would like to avoid. Instead, we provide a protocol whereby the Prover can demonstrate the pairwise disjointness with a constant number of \mathbb{G} -elements and $2n$ λ -bit integers.

We call the next protocol the *Aggregated Knowledge of Relatively Prime Exponents-1* or **AggRelPrimeDLog-1** for short. We provide an argument of knowledge for the following relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-1}}[a, \mathcal{A}] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a \in \mathbb{G}, \mathcal{A} := (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ a_i = a^{d_i} \forall i, \text{ gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1 \forall i \neq j \end{array} \right\}$$

The protocol rests on the following elementary lemma.

Lemma 3.4. *Let d_1, \dots, d_n be non-zero integers. Set*

$$D := \prod_{i=1}^n d_i, \hat{d}_i := \frac{D}{d_i} \ (i = 1, \dots, n), \hat{D} := \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{d}_i.$$

Then

$$\text{gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1 \ \forall i \neq j \iff \text{gcd}(D, \hat{D}) = 1.$$

Proof. First, suppose there exists a pair i, j such that $\text{gcd}(d_i, d_j) > 1$. Then $\text{gcd}(d_i, d_j)$ divides \hat{d}_k for every index k and in particular, $\text{gcd}(d_i, d_j)$ divides \hat{D} . Hence, $\text{gcd}(D, \hat{D})$ is divisible by $\text{gcd}(d_i, d_j)$.

Conversely, suppose $\text{gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1 \ \forall i \neq j$. Then for every index i , $\hat{D} \equiv \hat{d}_i \pmod{d_i}$ and hence, $\text{gcd}(\hat{D}, d_i) = \text{gcd}(\hat{d}_i, d_i) = 1$. Thus, $\text{gcd}(D, \hat{D}) = 1$. \square

Recall that given integers d_1, \dots, d_n and elements $a, A \in \mathbb{G}$ such that

$$a^D = a^{\prod_{i=1}^n d_i} = A,$$

the **RootFactor** algorithm allows us to compute elements a_i such that $a_i^{d_i} = A$ in runtime $\mathbf{O}(n \log(n))$. Thus, a Prover can compute the element $\hat{A} := \prod_{i=1}^n a_i$ in runtime $\mathbf{O}(\log(D) \log(\log(D)))$ with the **RootFactor** algorithm followed by n group multiplications.

Protocol 3.5. *Proof of Aggregated Knowledge of Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms 1* (**PoAggRelPrimeDLog-1**) :

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Element $a \in \mathbb{G}$, $(a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, \dots, d_n such that:

- $a^{d_i} = a_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$.
- $\text{gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1$ for every pair $i \neq j$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes the integers

$$D := \prod_{i=1}^n d_i, \hat{D} := \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{D}{d_i}.$$

2. \mathcal{P} computes $A := a^D$, $\hat{A} := a^{\hat{D}}$ (the latter using the **RootFactor** algorithm) and sends A, \hat{A} to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .
3. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{AggKE-1}[a, (a_1, \dots, a_n)]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{MultPolyDLog}[a, (a_1, \dots, a_n, A), f]$ where

$$f(X_1, \dots, X_{n+1}) := \left(\prod_{i=1}^n X_i \right) - X_{n+1}$$

and sends the proof to \mathcal{V} .

5. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{MultPolyDLog}[a, (a_1, \dots, a_n, \hat{A}), \hat{f}]$ where

$$\hat{f}(X_1, \dots, X_{n+1}) := \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \prod_{\substack{1 \leq j \leq n \\ j \neq i}} X_j \right) - X_{n+1}$$

and sends the proof to \mathcal{V} .

6. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{RelPrimeDLog}[(a, A), (a, \hat{A})]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
7. \mathcal{V} verifies the four proofs and accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all proofs are valid. \square

Thus, the proof consists of a constant number of \mathbb{G} -elements and $2n$ λ -bit integers.

Proposition 3.6. *The protocol $\text{PoAggRelPrimeDLog-1}$ is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-1}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) The two MultPolyDLog proofs imply that with overwhelming probability, \mathcal{P} possesses integers $D, \hat{D}, d_1, \dots, d_n$ such that

$$D = \prod_{i=1}^n d_i, \hat{D} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{D}{d_i}, a^{d_i} = a_i \forall i, a^D = A, a^{\hat{D}} = \hat{A}.$$

Furthermore, the proof for $\text{RelPrimeDLog}[(a, A), (a, \hat{A})]$ implies that $\text{gcd}(D, \sum_{i=1}^n D/d_i) = 1$. Hence, by the preceding lemma, the integers d_i are pairwise co-prime. \square

Given elements $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{G}$ and equations

$$a_1^{d_1} = b_1, \dots, a_1^{d_m} = b_m, a_2^{e_1} = c_1, \dots, a_2^{e_n} = c_n,$$

a Prover may provide a proof that he possesses the integers

$$d_1, \dots, d_m, e_1, \dots, e_n$$

and that every pair d_i, e_j is relatively prime. Clearly, the latter part is equivalent to showing that the integers

$$d := \text{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_m), e := \text{lcm}(e_1, \dots, e_n)$$

are relatively prime. Our approach is to compute elements $B = a_1^d$, $C := a_2^e$. We then use the procols AggPoKE-1 and AggPoKE-2 to provide arguments of knowledge that d, e are divisible by $\{d_1, \dots, d_n\}$, $\{e, \dots, e_n\}$ repectively. We then use the procol RelPrimeDLog to show that $\text{gcd}(d, e) = 1$.

We call the next protocol the *Aggregated Knowledge of Relatively Prime Exponents 2* or AggRelPrimeDLog-2 for short. We provide an argument of knowledge for the following relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-2}}[a_1, a_2, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, a_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2, \\ \mathcal{B} := (b_1, \dots, b_m) \in \mathbb{G}^m, \mathcal{C} := (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ ((d_1, \dots, d_m) \in \mathbb{Z}^m, (e_1, \dots, e_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n) : \\ (b_i = a_1^{d_i} \wedge c_j = a_2^{e_j} \wedge \text{gcd}(d_i, e_j) = 1) \forall i, j \end{array} \right\}$$

Protocol 3.7. *Proof of Aggregated Knowledge of Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms 2*
(PoAggRelPrimeDLog-2) :

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Elements $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{G}$, Elements $\mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_m)$, $\mathcal{C} = (c_1, \dots, c_n)$ of \mathbb{G}^n .

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, \dots, d_m , e_1, \dots, e_n such that:

- $a_1^{d_i} = b_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, m$.
- $a_2^{e_j} = c_j$ for $j = 1, \dots, n$.
- $\text{gcd}(d_i, e_j) = 1$ for every pair i, j .

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes

$$d := \prod_{i=1}^m d_m, \quad e := \prod_{j=1}^n e_n.$$

2. \mathcal{P} computes $B := a_1^d$, $C := a_2^e \in \mathbb{G}$ and sends B, C to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{MultPolyDLog}[a_1, (b_1, \dots, b_m, B), (\prod_{i=1}^m X_i) - X_{m+1}]$,
 $\text{MultPolyDLog}[a_2, (c_1, \dots, c_n, C), (\prod_{j=1}^n X_j) - X_{n+1}]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .

4. \mathcal{P} computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{AggKE-1}[a_1, \mathcal{B}]$ and $\text{AggKE-1}[a_2, \mathcal{C}]$ and sends them to the Verifier.

5. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{RelPrimeDLog}[(a_1, B), (a_2, C)]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

6. \mathcal{V} accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all of these proofs are valid. \square

Remark: The proof consists of the element $B, C \in \mathbb{G}$, two **AggKE-1** proofs, two **MultPolyDLog** proofs and one **RelPrimeDLog** proof. Each of these proofs consists of a constant number of \mathbb{G} -elements and hence, the same is true regarding our proof for the Protocol

AggRelPrimeDLog-2[(a_1, \mathcal{B}), (a_2, \mathcal{C})]. However, the **AggKE-1** and **PoMultPolyDLog** proofs result in $2(m+n)$ λ -bit integers in the proof. Hence, the size of the proof is $\mathbf{O}(m+n)$.

Proposition 3.8. *The Protocol AggRelPrimeDLog-2 is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-2}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) Since each of the subprotocols was shown to be correct and sound in the preceding section, this follows immediately. \square

An example: We discuss an example of an application of this last protocol. Consider two families

$$\mathcal{A}_1 = \{\mathbf{Acc}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{Acc}_{1,m}\}, \quad \mathcal{A}_2 = \{\mathbf{Acc}_{2,1}, \dots, \mathbf{Acc}_{2,n}\}$$

of accumulators instantiated using the same group \mathbb{G} of hidden order. As usual, each data element is represented by a λ -bit prime. Let g_1, g_2 be the genesis states for all accumulators in \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 , respectively.

As usual, each data element is represented by a distinct λ -bit prime. Let $\mathcal{D}_{1,i}$ ($\mathcal{D}_{2,j}$) denote the data set inserted into the accumulator $\mathbf{Acc}_{1,i}$ (respectively, $\mathbf{Acc}_{2,j}$) and write

$$\mathcal{D}_1 := \bigcup_{i=1}^m \mathcal{D}_{1,i} \quad , \quad \mathcal{D}_2 = \bigcup_{j=1}^n \mathcal{D}_{2,j}.$$

Suppose a Verifier (with access to the accumulated digests) wants to verify that the unions are disjoint, i.e. $\mathcal{D}_1 \cap \mathcal{D}_2 = \emptyset$. An honest Prover could simply provide a non-interactive proof for the protocol $\mathbf{AggRelPrimeDLog-2}[(g_1, \mathcal{D}_1), (g_2, \mathcal{D}_2)]$. In particular, the proof can be verified without access to the data sets $\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2$.

Consider a setting where we have data multisets $\mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_n$ in an accumulator. Let A denote the accumulated digest, w_i the witness for \mathcal{D}_i and d_i the product of all elements of \mathcal{D}_i .

Suppose a Prover needs to demonstrate that the multisets \mathcal{D}_i are pairwise disjoint to a Verifier who has access to the witnesses w_1, \dots, w_n but not the data sets. A straightforward approach would be to provide a proof for $\mathbf{RelPrimeDLog}[(w_i, A), (w_j, A)]$. But such a proof would contain $\mathbf{O}(n^2)$ \mathbb{G} -elements and $\mathbf{O}(n^2)$ λ -bit integers.

Instead, we provide a protocol whereby the proof consists of a constant number of \mathbb{G} -elements and n λ -bit integers. The protocol rests on two simple observations. First, note that for integers d_1, \dots, d_n ,

$$\mathbf{gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1 \quad \forall i \neq j \iff \prod_{i=1}^n d_i = \mathbf{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n),$$

as can be easily proved by induction. Secondly, if an element $w \in \mathbb{G}$ can be expressed in the form

$$w = \prod_{i=1}^n w_i^{x_i}, \quad (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n,$$

then

$$w^{\mathbf{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n)} = A^k$$

for some integer k . More precisely,

$$k = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \frac{\mathbf{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n)}{d_i}.$$

Furthermore, the Prover can efficiently compute the integers

$$d := \prod_{i=1}^n d_i = \mathbf{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n), \quad \widehat{d}_i := \prod_{\substack{1 \leq j \leq n \\ j \neq i}} d_j \quad (i = 1, \dots, n), \quad \widehat{d} := \sum_{i=1}^n \widehat{d}_i.$$

Now, d is relatively prime to \widehat{d} . Hence, the Prover can efficiently compute integers e, \widehat{e} such that

$$de + \widehat{d}\widehat{e} = 1, \quad A^e \left(\prod_{i=1}^n w_i \right)^{\widehat{e}} = w.$$

In particular, since $\prod_{i=1}^n w_i$ is publicly computable, the Prover can demonstrate, with constant communication complexity, that w is expressible as a product $\prod_{i=1}^n w_i^{x_i}$ where the x_i are integers known to him. If the Prover can also demonstrate that

$$w^{\prod_{i=1}^n d_i} = A,$$

(with a subprotocol virtually identical to `MultiPolyDLog`), then this implies that

$$\text{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n) \equiv 0 \pmod{\prod_{i=1}^n d_i},$$

which forces equality. In what follows, we provide an argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-3}}[(w_1, \dots, w_n), A] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (A \in \mathbb{G}, (w_1, \dots, w_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ ((d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n) : \\ w_i^{d_i} = A \ \forall i \\ \text{gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1 \ \forall i, j : i \neq j \end{array} \right\}$$

Protocol 3.9. *Proof of Aggregated Knowledge of Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms 3* (`PoAggRelPrimeDLog-3`):

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Elements $(w_1, \dots, w_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$, $A \in \mathbb{G}$

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, \dots, d_n such that:

- $w_i^{d_i} = A$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$.
- $\text{gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1$ for every pair $i \neq j$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes the integers

$$D := \prod_{i=1}^n d_i, \quad \hat{d}_i = \prod_{\substack{1 \leq j \leq n \\ j \neq i}} d_j \ (i = 1, \dots, n), \quad \hat{D} := \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{d}_i.$$

2. Using Shamir's trick, \mathcal{P} computes an element $w \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $w^D = A$ and sends w to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} uses the algorithm `Bezout` to compute integers e, \hat{e} such that $eD + \hat{e}\hat{D} = \text{gcd}(D, \hat{D}) = 1$.

4. \mathcal{P} computes

$$A_0 := A^e, \quad W := \left(\prod_{i=1}^n w_i \right)^{\hat{e}}.$$

He sends A_0, W to \mathcal{V} along with non-interactive proofs for `PoKE`[A, A_0] and `PoKE`[$(\prod_{i=1}^n w_i), W$].

5. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit challenge γ .

6. \mathcal{P} computes $\tilde{g} := g^{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n-\lambda} \gamma^i}$ and sends \tilde{g} to \mathcal{V} .

7. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit prime l .

8. \mathcal{P} computes

$$R := D \pmod{l}, \quad \tilde{w} := w^{(D-R)/l}$$

and sends \hat{w} to \mathcal{V} .

9. \mathcal{P} computes the integers

$$\hat{r}_i := \hat{d}_i \pmod{l}, \quad r_i := d_i \pmod{l}$$

and sends (r_1, \dots, r_n) to \mathcal{V} .

10. \mathcal{P} computes the integers $\tilde{q}, \hat{q}, \tilde{r}, \hat{r}$ such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i = \tilde{q}l + \tilde{r}, \quad \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{d}_i \gamma^i = \hat{q}l + \hat{r}, \quad r, \hat{r} \in [l].$$

11. \mathcal{P} computes

$$Q := w^q, \quad \hat{Q} := w^{\hat{q}}, \quad \check{g} := g^{\tilde{q}}$$

and sends Q, \hat{Q}, \check{g} to \mathcal{V} .

12. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic generates a λ -bit challenge γ_0 .

13. \mathcal{P} computes the integers \hat{q}_0, \hat{r}_0 such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{d}_i \gamma^i = \hat{q}_0 l + \hat{r}_0, \quad \hat{r}_0 \in [l]$$

He computes $\hat{Q}_0 := w^{\hat{q}_0}$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

14. \mathcal{V} verifies that $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \in [l]^n$. He independently computes

$$R := \prod_{i=1}^n r_i \pmod{l}, \quad \hat{r}_i = R r_i^{-1} \pmod{l} \quad (i = 1, \dots, n),$$

$$\tilde{r} := \sum_{i=1}^n r_i^{n\lambda} \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad \hat{r} := \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{r}_i \gamma^i \pmod{l}, \quad \hat{r}_0 := \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{r}_i \gamma_0^i \pmod{l}.$$

15. \mathcal{V} verifies the equations

$$(\hat{Q})^l w^{\hat{r}} \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{i=1}^n w_i^{\gamma^i} \bigwedge (\hat{Q}_0)^l w^{\hat{r}_0} \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{i=1}^n w_i^{\gamma_0^i} \bigwedge A_0 W \stackrel{?}{=} w \bigwedge (\check{w})^l w^R \stackrel{?}{=} A \bigwedge (\check{g})^l g^{\tilde{r}} \stackrel{?}{=} \check{g}.$$

16. \mathcal{V} verifies the two PoKEs from Step 4. He accepts if and only if all equations hold and all proofs are valid. \square

Proposition 3.10. *The protocol PoAggRelPrimeDLog-3 is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-3}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) The equations verified in step 15 imply that with overwhelming probability, there exist integers d_1, \dots, d_n, D such that

$$D = \prod_{i=1}^n d_i, \quad A = w^D, \quad A = w_i^{d_i} \forall i.$$

Furthermore, since we have $A_0 W = w$ and the proofs for $\text{PoKE}[A, A_0]$ and $\text{PoKE}[(\prod_{i=1}^n w_i), W]$, it follows that, in particular, w is expressible as a product

$$w = \prod_{i=1}^n w_i^{x_i}, \quad (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n.$$

Hence,

$$w^{\text{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n)} = A^k$$

for some integer k . Thus, $\text{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_n)$ is divisible by the product $\prod_{i=1}^n d_i$. Hence, the integers d_i are pairwise co-prime. \square

Next, we discuss a dual to the Protocol **AggRelPrimeDLog-2**. Given elements $B, C \in \mathbb{G}$ and subsets

$$\mathcal{B} = \{b_1, \dots, b_m\} \in \mathbb{G}^m, \quad \mathcal{C} = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\} \in \mathbb{G}^n,$$

an honest Prover may provide a proof that he possesses integers

$$\{d_1, \dots, d_m\}, \{e_1, \dots, e_n\}$$

such that $b_i^{d_i} = B$, $c_j^{e_j} = C$ and every pair d_i, e_j is relatively prime. We call this relation the *Aggregated Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms 4* or **AggRelPrimeDLog-4** for short. We provide an argument of knowledge for the following relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-4}}[\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, B, C] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((B, C) \in \mathbb{G}^2, \\ \mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_m) \in \mathbb{G}^m, \mathcal{C} = (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ ((d_1, \dots, d_m) \in \mathbb{Z}^m, (e_1, \dots, e_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n) : \\ (B = b_i^{d_i}, C = c_j^{e_j} \wedge \mathbf{gcd}(d_i, e_j) = 1) \forall i, j \end{array} \right\}$$

An example: Consider the case where B, C are accumulated digests for accumulators **Acc**₁ and **Acc**₂ respectively. Let $\mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_m$ and $\mathcal{E}_1, \dots, \mathcal{E}_n$ be data sets inserted into the two accumulators. Let w_i, u_j denote the membership witnesses for $\mathcal{D}_i, \mathcal{E}_j$ and let d_i, e_j denote the products of elements of $\mathcal{D}_i, \mathcal{E}_j$ respectively ($1 \leq i \leq m, 1 \leq j \leq n$). Then

$$w_i^{d_i} = B, \quad u_j^{e_j} = C.$$

Suppose a Prover needs to prove the disjointness of the unions

$$\mathcal{D} := \bigcup_{i=1}^m \mathcal{D}_i, \quad \mathcal{E} := \bigcup_{j=1}^n \mathcal{E}_j$$

to a Verifier with access to the witnesses

$$\mathcal{W} := \{w_1, \dots, w_m\}, \quad \mathcal{U} := \{u_1, \dots, u_n\}.$$

A straightforward approach would be to provide mn distinct proofs that $\mathbf{gcd}(d_i, e_j) = 1$ for every pair d_i, e_j . But such a proof would entail $\mathbf{O}(mn)$ elements of \mathbb{G} in addition to $\mathbf{O}(mn)$ λ -bit integers. Instead, the Prover could simply send a non-interactive proof for **AggRelPrimeDLog-4**[(\mathcal{W}, B), (\mathcal{U}, C)]. The proof consists of a constant number of \mathbb{G} -elements and $(m+n)$ λ -bit integers.

Protocol 3.11. *Proof of Aggregated Knowledge of Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms 4* (**PoAggRelPrimeDLog-4**) :

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda), g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Elements $B, C \in \mathbb{G}$, $\mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_m) \in \mathbb{G}^m$, $\mathcal{C} = (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$

Claim: The Prover possesses integers $d_1, \dots, d_m, e_1, \dots, e_n$ such that:

- $b_i^{d_i} = B$ for $i = 1, \dots, m$.
- $c_j^{e_j} = C$ for $j = 1, \dots, n$.
- $\mathbf{gcd}(d_i, e_j) = 1$ for every pair i, j .

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes

$$d := \mathbf{lcm}(d_1, \dots, d_m), \quad e := \mathbf{lcm}(e_1, \dots, e_n).$$

2. Using Shamir's trick, \mathcal{P} computes elements $b, c \in \mathbb{G}$ such that

$$b^d = B, \quad c^e = C$$

and sends b, c to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{AggKE-2}[\mathcal{B}, B]$ and $\text{AggKE-2}[\mathcal{C}, C]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{P} computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{AggKE-1}[b, \mathcal{B}]$ and $\text{AggKE-1}[c, \mathcal{C}]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
5. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{RelPrime}[(b, B), (c, C)]$ and sends the proof to \mathcal{V} .
6. \mathcal{V} verifies all of these proofs and accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all proofs are valid. \square

Thus, the proof for AggRelPrimeDLog-4 consists of a constant number of \mathbb{G} -elements and $m + n$ λ -bit integers arising from the proofs for $\text{AggKE-2}[\mathcal{B}, B]$ and $\text{AggKE-2}[\mathcal{C}, C]$.

Proposition 3.12. *The protocol AggRelPrimeDLog-4 is an argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-4}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. (Sketch) The proofs for $\text{AggKE-2}[\mathcal{B}, B]$ and $\text{AggKE-1}[b, \mathcal{B}]$ imply that, with overwhelming probability, there exist integers $d, d_1, \dots, d_m, \hat{d}_1, \dots, \hat{d}_m$ such that

$$b^d = B, \quad b^{\hat{d}_i} = b_i, \quad b_i^{d_i} = B \quad \forall i.$$

Similarly, the proofs for $\text{AggKE-2}[\mathcal{C}, C]$ and $\text{AggKE-1}[c, \mathcal{C}]$ imply that with overwhelming probability, there exist integers $e, e_1, \dots, e_n, \hat{e}_1, \dots, \hat{e}_n$ such that

$$c^e = C, \quad c^{\hat{e}_j} = c_j, \quad c_j^{e_j} = C \quad \forall j.$$

Finally, the proof for $\text{RelPrimeDLog}[(b, B), (c, C)]$ implies with overwhelming probability, that $\text{gcd}(d, e) = 1$. Hence, $\text{gcd}(d_i, e_j) = 1 \quad \forall i, j$. \square

4 Applications

4.1 Verifiably outsourcing storage

The protocols we have developed so far allow us to build a mechanism whereby a client can verifiably outsource data multisets to a server node. The client stores constant-sized commitments to these multisets and can query the server for information regarding these data sets. The server node, in turn, submits this information with proofs that can be publicly verified against the constant-sized commitments stored by the client.

As before, \mathbb{G} is a group of hidden order in which we assume the adaptive root and strong-RSA assumptions to hold. The (fixed) element $g \in \mathbb{G}$ is a randomly generated element of \mathbb{G} . For a multiset \mathcal{M} , the commitment to \mathcal{M} is given by the element

$$\text{Com}(g, \mathcal{M}) := g^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})} \in \mathbb{G}$$

where $\Pi(\mathcal{M})$ is the product of all elements of \mathcal{M} , with the appropriate multiplicities.

Proof of storage: To ask the server \mathcal{P} to prove that he is storing the data multiset \mathcal{M} , the client \mathcal{V} can generate a random element $g_1 \in \mathbb{G}$ and ask the server to provide the element

$$\text{Com}(g_1, \mathcal{M}) := g_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})} \in \mathbb{G}$$

along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{EqDLog}[(g, \text{Com}(g, \mathcal{M})), (g_1, \text{Com}(g_1, \mathcal{M}))]$. The communication complexity is constant and in particular, is independent of the size of \mathcal{M} .

Updates: When the data mutiset is to be updated, the client sends the changes to the server. The server stores these changes and sends back the updated commitment to the multiset, along with a non-interactive proof of exponentiation (PoE) so that the client can verify that the new commitment is the correct one.

Consider a setting where a client \mathcal{V} who stores commitments $A_i := \text{Com}(g, \mathcal{M}_i)$ for data multisets $\mathcal{M}_1, \dots, \mathcal{M}_n$ needs a commitment $\text{Com}(g, \mathcal{M}_{\text{int}})$ to the intersection

$$\mathcal{M}_{\text{int}} := \bigcap_{i=1}^n \mathcal{M}_i.$$

The server can verifiably send the intersection to the client through the following protocol, which is a minor generalization of PoGCD. It hinges on the observation that

$$d = \gcd(d_1, \dots, d_n) \iff (d | d_i \forall i) \bigwedge (\exists (e_1, \dots, e_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \sum_{i=1}^n e_i d_i = d).$$

Protocol 4.1. *Protocol for intersection of multisets.*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Commitments $A_i := g^{\Pi(\mathcal{M}_i)}$ for multisets \mathcal{M}_i ; an element $A_{\text{int}} \in \mathbb{G}$

Claim: $A_{\text{int}} = \text{Com}(g, \bigcap_{i=1}^n \mathcal{M}_i) := g^{\Pi(\bigcap_{i=1}^n \mathcal{M}_i)}$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes the integers

$$d_i := \Pi(\mathcal{M}_i) \ (i = 1, \dots, n)$$

and integers e_1, \dots, e_n such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n d_i e_i = \gcd(d_1, \dots, d_n).$$

2. \mathcal{P} computes $\tilde{A}_i := g^{d_i e_i}$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$) and sends $\tilde{A}_1, \dots, \tilde{A}_n$ to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with non-interactive proofs for $\text{PoKE}[A_i, \tilde{A}_i]$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$).
3. \mathcal{P} computes a non-interactive proof for $\text{PoAggKE-1}[A_{\text{int}}, (A_1, \dots, A_n)]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{V} verifies the n PoKEs, the PoE and $\text{PoAggKE-1}[A_{\text{int}}, (A_1, \dots, A_n)]$. He verifies the equation

$$\prod_{i=1}^n \tilde{A}_i \stackrel{?}{=} A_{\text{int}}.$$

He accepts if and only if all proofs are valid and the equation holds. \square

The proof consists of $2n$ \mathbb{G} -elements and $2n$ λ -bit integers. If the client also needs the intersection $\bigcap_{i=1}^n \mathcal{M}_i$ rather than just the commitment, the server can include a non-interactive PoE for the exponentiation

$$A_{\text{int}} = g^{\prod_{i=1}^n \mathcal{M}_i}.$$

Similarly, for multisets $\mathcal{M}_1, \dots, \mathcal{M}_n$, the server node can verifiably send the client the commitment A_{prod} for the sum

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \mathcal{M}_i = \{(\sum_{i=1}^n \text{mult}(\mathcal{M}_i, x)) \times x : x \in \bigcup_{i=1}^n \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}_i)\}$$

using the Protocol

$$\text{PoMultPolyDLog}[(g, A_1), \dots, (g, A_n), (g, A_{\text{prod}}), (\prod_{i=1}^n X_i - X_{n+1})].$$

The proof consists of a constant number of \mathbb{G} -elements and n λ -bit integers.

Using the Protocol **PoLCM**, the server node can verifiably send the commitment for the union

$$\bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{M}_i = \{\max(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}_i, x)) \times x : x \in \bigcup_{i=1}^n \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}_i)\}.$$

The proof would consist of $\mathbf{O}(n)$ \mathbb{G} -elements and $\mathbf{O}(n)$ λ -bit integers.

For multisets \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} , the difference $\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{N}$ has commitment

$$\text{Com}(g, \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{N}) = g^{\prod_{x \in \text{Set } \mathcal{M}} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) - \text{mult}(\mathcal{M} \cap \mathcal{N}, x)}}.$$

Thus, the Prover can use the Protocols **PoGCD** and **PoMultPolyDLog** to verifiably send the commitment to $\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{N}$.

So, to summarize, the protocols in this paper allow the server node to verifiably send the client succinct commitments to unions, intersections, sums (and combinations thereof) of multisets for which the client holds commitments. The proofs that the commitments are the correct ones can be publicly verified against the succinct commitments that the client holds.

Frequencies of elements: As before, let $\mathcal{M}_1, \dots, \mathcal{M}_n$ be data multisets and let

$$A_i := g^{\prod(\mathcal{M}_i)} \quad (i = 1, \dots, n)$$

be the commitments. Suppose the server storing the data needs to identify the data multiset with the highest frequency of a data set \mathcal{D} . The protocols we have developed so far allows him to do so with a proof that the client can verify against the commitments A_1, \dots, A_n .

Protocol 4.2. *Protocol for frequency of sets in multisets 1.*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Commitments $A_i := g^{\prod(\mathcal{M}_i)}$ for multisets \mathcal{M}_i ; a data set \mathcal{D} .

Claim: Each element of \mathcal{D} occurs with a higher frequency in \mathcal{M}_1 than in $\mathcal{M}_i \forall i \geq 2$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes

$$\hat{A}_1 := g^{\prod(\bigcup_{i=2}^n \mathcal{M}_i)}$$

and sends it to the verifier \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive proof for **AggKE-2** $[(A_2, \dots, A_n), \hat{A}_1]$.

2. The Prover computes the integer

$$\hat{d} := \prod_{x \in \mathcal{D}} x^{\text{mult}\left(\bigcup_{i=2}^n \mathcal{M}_i, x\right)}$$

and the group elements

$$B_1 := g^{\hat{d}}, B_2 := B_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}.$$

3. \mathcal{P} sends B_1, B_2 to \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive PoE for the equation $B_2 = B_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}$.
4. \mathcal{P} compute non-interactive proofs for $\text{PoKE}[B_2, A_1]$, $\text{PoGCD}[(g, \hat{A}_1), (g, B_2), (g, B_1)]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
5. \mathcal{V} verifies the three proofs and accepts if and only if all of them are valid. \square

Similarly, the following protocol allows the server to prove that every element of a certain data set \mathcal{D} occurs with a lower frequency in \mathcal{M}_1 than in any of the multisets $\mathcal{M}_2, \dots, \mathcal{M}_n$.

Protocol 4.3. *Protocol for frequency of sets in multisets 2.*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Commitments $A_i := g^{\Pi(\mathcal{M}_i)}$ for multisets \mathcal{M}_i ; a data set \mathcal{D} .

Claim: Each element of \mathcal{D} occurs with a lower frequency in \mathcal{M}_1 than in $\mathcal{M}_i \forall i \geq 2$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes

$$B_1 := g^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{D}} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}_1, x)}}, B_2 = B_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}.$$

2. \mathcal{P} sends B_1, B_2 to \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive PoE for the equation $B_2 = B_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}$.
3. \mathcal{P} computes non-interactive proofs for $\text{AggKE-1}[B_2, (A_2, \dots, A_n)]$ and $\text{PoGCD}[(g, A_1), (g, B_2), (g, B_1)]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{V} verifies the three proofs and accepts if and only if they are all valid. \square

Protocol 4.4. *Protocol for frequency of sets in multisets 3.*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Witnesses w_i for multisets \mathcal{M}_i with respect to an accumulated digest A ; a data set \mathcal{D} .

Claim: Each element of \mathcal{D} occurs with a higher frequency in \mathcal{M}_1 than in $\mathcal{M}_i \forall i \geq 2$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} uses Shamir's trick to compute an element $\check{w}_1 \in \mathbb{G}$ such that

$$\check{w}_1^{\Pi\left(\bigcup_{i=2}^n \mathcal{M}_i\right)} = A$$

and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. \mathcal{P} computes the elements

$$\tilde{w}_1 := w_1^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{D}} x^{\text{mult}\left(\bigcup_{i=2}^n \mathcal{M}_i, x\right)}}, \tilde{w}_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})} \in \mathbb{G}$$

and sends them to \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive PoE.

3. \mathcal{P} generates a non-interactive proof for $\text{AggKE-1}[\check{w}_1, \{w_2, \dots, w_n\}]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{P} generates non-interactive proofs for $\text{PoGCD}[(\check{w}_1, A), (w_1, \tilde{w}_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}), (w_1, \tilde{w}_1)]$ and $\text{PoKE}[\tilde{w}_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}, A]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
5. \mathcal{V} verifies the three proofs and accepts if and only if they are all valid. \square

Protocol 4.5. *Protocol for frequency of sets in multisets 4.*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

Inputs: Witnesses w_i for multisets \mathcal{M}_i with respect to an accumulated digest A ; a data set \mathcal{D} .

Claim: Each element of \mathcal{D} occurs with a lower frequency in \mathcal{M}_1 than in $\mathcal{M}_i \forall i \geq 2$.

Step. 1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes an element $\hat{w}_1 \in \mathbb{G}$ such that

$$\hat{w}_1^{\prod_{i=2}^n \mathcal{M}_i} := A$$

and sends \hat{w}_1 to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{AggKE-2}[\{w_2, \dots, w_n\}, \hat{w}_1]$.

2. \mathcal{P} computes

$$\hat{A} := \hat{w}_1^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{D}} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}_1, x)}}, \hat{A}^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})} \in \mathbb{G}$$

and sends them to \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive PoE for the exponentiation $\hat{A}^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}$.

3. \mathcal{P} generates non-interactive proofs for $\text{PoKE}[\hat{w}_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}, A]$ and $\text{PoGCD}[(w_1, A), (w_1, \hat{A}^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}), (w_1, \hat{A})]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .

4. \mathcal{V} verifies the three proofs and accepts if and only if they are all valid. \square

4.2 Sharded blockchains

Consider the setting of a stateless sharded blockchain that, instead of a Merkle tree, hinges on a cryptographic accumulator instantiated with a hidden order group \mathbb{G} ([BBF19]). Let g be a randomly selected element of \mathbb{G} and S_1, \dots, S_n the distinct shards. Let \mathcal{D}_i denote the data in shard S_i and $\mathcal{D} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{D}_i$. Then the accumulated digest (the analog of the Merkle root hash) of S_i is given by

$$A_i := g^{\Pi(\mathcal{D}_i)}.$$

The accumulated digest of the blockchain is given by

$$A := g^{\Pi(\mathcal{D})}.$$

In order to demonstrate that the data sets in distinct shards are pairwise disjoint, a Prover (such as a miner or an untrusted server) can provide a proof for the relation

$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-1}}[a, \mathcal{A}]$ where $\mathcal{A} = (A_1, \dots, A_n)$.

Let $\mathcal{V}_1, \dots, \mathcal{V}_n$ be verifiers (such as light nodes) on the network. Let \mathcal{E}_i denote the data set corresponding to \mathcal{V}_i . Suppose the verifiers need to verify that the data sets \mathcal{E}_i are pairwise disjoint, but do not have access to the data sets outside their shards. A Prover \mathcal{P} (such as a miner or an untrusted server) can prove this pairwise disjointness as follows.

1. \mathcal{V}_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$) broadcasts the membership witness w_i for \mathcal{D}_i to the other $n - 1$ nodes \mathcal{V}_j ($j \neq i$).

2. \mathcal{P} computes

$$d_i := \prod_{d \in \mathcal{D}_i} d \quad (i = 1, \dots, n)$$

and generates a non-interactive proof for the protocol $\text{PoAggRelPrimeDLog-3}[(w_1, \dots, w_n), A]$.

Acknowledgements: The author thanks Benedikt Bünz and Dimitris Kolonelos for helpful feedback.

References

- [BBF19] D. Boneh, B. Bünz, B. Fisch, *Batching Techniques for Accumulators with Applications to IOPs and Stateless Blockchains*. In Alexandra Boldyreva and Daniele Micciancio, editors, *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019*, pages 561–586, Cham, 2019. Springer International Publishing.
- [BBBF18] D. Boneh, J. Bonneau, B. Bünz and B. Fisch, *Verifiable delay functions*. In Hovav Shacham and Alexandra Boldyreva, editors, *CRYPTO 2018, Part I*, volume 10991 of LNCS
- [BBF18] D. Boneh, B. Bünz, and B. Fisch, *A survey of two verifiable delay functions*. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/712, 2018. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/712>
- [BFS19] B. Bünz, B. Fisch, A. Szeponiec, *Transparent SNARKs from DARK Compilers*, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/1229, 2019. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1229>
- [BH01] Johannes Buchmann and Safuat Hamdy. *A survey on IQ cryptography*, In Public-Key Cryptography and Computational Number Theory.
- [CFGKN20] M. Campanelli, D. Fiore, N. Greco, D. Kolonelos, L. Nizzardo *Vector Commitment Techniques and Applications to Verifiable Decentralized Storage*
- [CSV20] W. Castryck, J. Sotakova, F. Vercauteren, *Breaking the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem for class group actions using genus theory*
- [Can87] D. Cantor. *Computing in the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve*. *Mathematics of computation*, 48(177):95–101, 1987.
- [Can94] D. Cantor. *On the analogue of the division polynomials for hyperelliptic curves*, *Crelle’s Journal*, 447:91–146, 1994.
- [DGS20] S. Dobson, S. Galbraith, B. Smith, *Trustless Groups of Unknown Order with Hyperelliptic Curves*, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/196>
- [FS87] A. Fiat, A. Shamir, *How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems*. In Andrew M. Odlyzko, editor, *CRYPTO’86*, volume 263 of LNCS, pages 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg, August 1987
- [LLX07] J. Li, N. Li, and R. Xue, *Universal accumulators with efficient nonmembership proofs* In Jonathan Katz and Moti Yung, editors, *ACNS 07*, volume 4521 of LNCS, pages 253–269. Springer, Heidelberg, June 2007.
- [Sut07] A. Sutherland, *Order Computations in Generic Groups*, MIT Thesis, 2007
- [STY01] T. Sander, A. Ta-Shma, M. Yung, *Blind, auditable membership proofs*, In Yair Frankel, editor, *FC 2000*, volume 1962 of LNCS, pages 5371. Springer, Heidelberg, February 2001.
- [Th20] S. Thakur, *Constructing hidden order groups using genus three Jacobians*, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/348>
- [Wes19] B. Wesolowski, *Efficient verifiable delay functions*. In Yuval Ishai and Vincent Rijmen, editors, *Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2019*, pages 379–407, Cham, 2019. Springer International Publishing.

Steve Thakur
Axoni Research Group
New York City, NY
Email: stevethakur01@gmail.com

List of symbols/abbreviations:

\mathbb{G} : a group of hidden order in which we assume the adaptive root and strong-RSA assumptions to hold.

λ : The security parameter

$\text{negl}(\lambda)$: The set of functions negligible in λ .

$[n]$: The set of integers $\{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$

PPT: Probabilistic Polynomial Time

$a \equiv_\lambda b$: The equivalence of $a, b \in \mathbb{G}$ with respect to the relation \equiv_λ

\mathcal{P} : The Prover

\mathcal{P}_{mal} : A malicious Prover

\mathcal{V} : The Verifier

$\xRightarrow{\text{o.p.}}$: Implies with overwhelming probability

$\text{Set}(\mathcal{M})$: The underlying set of a multiset \mathcal{M}

$\Pi(\mathcal{M})$: The product of all elements of a multiset \mathcal{M}

$\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x)$: The multiplicity of an element x in a multiset \mathcal{M}

PoE: Proof of Exponentiation ([Wes18], [BBF19])

PoKE: Proof of Knowledge of the Exponent ([BBF19])

List of Protocols:

The following is a list of the protocols in this paper and the relations that the protocols are arguments of knowledge for, in the generic group model.

1. PoEqDLog

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{EqDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2 \\ d \in \mathbb{Z} : \\ (b_1, b_2) = (a_1^d, a_2^d) \end{array} \right\}$$

2. PoAggEqDLog

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggEqDLog}}[(a, b), (\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a, b) \in \mathbb{G}^2 \\ \mathcal{A} = (a_1, \dots, a_n), \mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n; \\ d \in \mathbb{Z} : \\ b_i = a_i^d \forall i \end{array} \right\}$$

3. PoPolyDLog

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{PolyDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), f] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2, f \in \mathbb{Z}[X]); \\ (d_1, d_2) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : \\ b_1 = a_1^{d_1} \wedge b_2 = a_2^{d_1} \wedge d_2 = f(d_1) \end{array} \right\}$$

4. PoAggKE-1

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggKE-1}}[a, \mathcal{B}] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a \in \mathbb{G}, \mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ b_i = a^{d_i} \forall i \end{array} \right\}$$

5. PoAggKE-2

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggKE-2}}[\mathcal{A}, A] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (\mathcal{A} = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n, A \in \mathbb{G}) \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ A = a_i^{d_i} \forall i \end{array} \right\}$$

6. PoMultPolyDLog

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{MultPolyDLog}}[a, (b_1, \dots, b_n), f] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a \in \mathbb{G}, (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ f \in \mathbb{Z}[X_1, \dots, X_n]; \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ b_i = a^{d_i} \forall i \wedge f(d_1, \dots, d_n) = 0 \end{array} \right\}$$

7. PoEqDLogPairs

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{EqDLogPairs}}[(a_1, \mathcal{B}), (a_2, \mathcal{C})] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{G}; \\ (b_1, \dots, b_n), (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ b_i = a_1^{d_i}, c_i = a_2^{d_i} \forall i \end{array} \right\}$$

8. PoGCD

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{GCD}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \{((a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z} : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = d_3\}.$$

9. PoRelPrimeDLog (special case of PoGCD)

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{RelPrimeDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \{((a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z} : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1\}.$$

10. PoAggRelPrimeDLog-1

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-1}}[a, \mathcal{A}] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a \in \mathbb{G}, \mathcal{A} := (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \\ a_i = a^{d_i} \forall i, \mathbf{gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1 \forall i \neq j \end{array} \right\}$$

11. PoAggRelPrimeDLog-2

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-2}}[a_1, a_2, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, a_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2, \\ \mathcal{B} := (b_1, \dots, b_m) \in \mathbb{G}^m, \mathcal{C} := (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ ((d_1, \dots, d_m) \in \mathbb{Z}^m, (e_1, \dots, e_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n) : \\ (b_i = a_1^{d_i} \wedge c_j = a_2^{e_j} \wedge \mathbf{gcd}(d_i, e_j) = 1) \forall i, j \end{array} \right\}$$

12. PoAggRelPrimeDLog-3

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-3}}[(w_1, \dots, w_n), A] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (A \in \mathbb{G}, (w_1, \dots, w_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ ((d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n) : \\ w_i^{d_i} = A \forall i \wedge \\ \mathbf{gcd}(d_i, d_j) = 1 \forall i, j : i \neq j \end{array} \right\}$$

13. PoAggRelPrimeDLog-4

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{AggRelPrimeDLog-4}}[\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, B, C] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((B, C) \in \mathbb{G}^2, \\ \mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_m) \in \mathbb{G}^m, \mathcal{C} = (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n); \\ ((d_1, \dots, d_m) \in \mathbb{Z}^m, (e_1, \dots, e_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n) : \\ (B = b_i^{d_i}, C = c_j^{e_j} \wedge \mathbf{gcd}(d_i, e_j) = 1) \forall i, j \end{array} \right\}$$

Private Set Intersection: Consider a setting where two parties **A** and **B** have two data sets $\mathcal{D} = \{d_1, \dots, d_m\}$, $\mathcal{E} = \{e_1, \dots, e_n\}$ and need to compute the intersection $\mathcal{D} \cap \mathcal{E}$. A design goal is for the parties to know as little as possible about the elements not in the intersection. To this end, we may proceed as follows.

Let \mathbb{G} be a hidden order group in which we assume the strong-RSA, adaptive root and Diffie-Hellman assumptions to hold. Let g be a randomly generated element of \mathbb{G} . We represent the data elements by 2λ -bit primes, where λ is the security level.

1. **A**, **B** choose integers α, β respectively and broadcast the elements g^α, g^β .
2. **A**, **B** compute and broadcast the commitments

$$\text{Com}(\mathcal{D})^\alpha := g^{\alpha \prod_{d \in \mathcal{D}} d}, \text{Com}(\mathcal{E})^\beta := g^{\beta \prod_{e \in \mathcal{E}} e}$$

respectively.

3. **A** computes the set $\mathcal{D}_\alpha := \{g^{d\alpha} : d \in \mathcal{D}\}$ and sends it to **B** along with a non-interactive proof for

$$\text{PoMultPolyDLog}[g^\alpha, (g^{d_1\alpha}, \dots, g^{d_m\alpha}, \text{Com}(\mathcal{D})^\alpha), (\prod_{i=1}^m X_i) - X_{m+1}].$$

4. **B** computes the set $\mathcal{E}_\beta := \{g^{e\beta} : e \in \mathcal{E}\}$ and sends it to **A** along with a non-interactive proof for

$$\text{PoMultPolyDLog}[g^\beta, (g^{e_1\beta}, \dots, g^{e_n\beta}, \text{Com}(\mathcal{E})^\beta), (\prod_{i=1}^n X_i) - X_{n+1}].$$

5. **B** computes the set $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta} := \{g^{d\alpha\beta} : d \in \mathcal{D}\}$ and sends it to **A** along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{PoAggEqDLog}[(g, g^\beta), \mathcal{D}_\alpha, \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}]$.
6. **A** computes the set $\mathcal{E}_{\beta\alpha} := \{g^{e\alpha\beta} : e \in \mathcal{E}\}$ and the intersection $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta} \cap \mathcal{E}_{\beta\alpha}$. He uses it to compute the intersection $\mathcal{D} \cap \mathcal{E}$ and the element

$$g_0 := g^{\prod_{x \in \mathcal{D} \cap \mathcal{E}} x}.$$

7. **B** computes the set $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta} := \{g^{d\alpha\beta} : d \in \mathcal{D}\}$ and the intersection $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta} \cap \mathcal{E}_{\beta\alpha}$. He uses it to compute the intersection $\mathcal{D} \cap \mathcal{E}$ and the element g_0 .
8. **A** sends **B** non-interactive proofs for

$$\text{PoKE}[(g_0^\alpha, \text{Com}(\mathcal{D})^\alpha), \text{PoEqDLog}[(g, g^\alpha), (g_0, g_0^\alpha)]).$$

9. **B** sends **A** non-interactive proofs for

$$\text{PoKE}[(g_0^\beta, \text{Com}(\mathcal{E})^\beta), \text{PoEqDLog}[(g, g^\beta), (g_0, g_0^\beta)]).$$