

ZK Arguments of Knowledge via hidden order groups

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Abstract

We study non-interactive zero- knowledge (HVZK) arguments of knowledge for commitments in groups of hidden order. We provide protocols whereby a Prover can demonstrate certain properties of and relations between committed sets/multisets, with succinct zero-knowledge proofs that are publicly verifiable against the constant-sized commitments.

If the underlying group of hidden order is an appropriate imaginary quadratic class group or a genus three Jacobian, the argument systems are transparent. Furthermore, since all challenges are public coin, the protocols can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. This is a follow-up to our recent work ([Th20]).

1 Preliminaries

We first state some definitions and notations used in this paper.

Notations: We denote the security parameter by λ and the set of all polynomial functions by $\text{poly}(\lambda)$. A function $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is said to be *negligible* - denoted $\epsilon(\lambda) \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$ - if it vanishes faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial. An algorithm \mathcal{A} is said to be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm if it is modeled as a Turing machine that runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda)$. We denote by $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x)$ the process of running \mathcal{A} on input x and assigning the output to y . For a set S , $\#S$ or $|S|$ denote its cardinality and $x \xleftarrow{\$} S$ denotes selecting x uniformly at random over S . For a positive integer n , we write $[n] := \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$. $\text{NextPrime}(n)$ denotes the smallest prime $\geq n$. For statements \mathbf{A} , \mathbf{B} we say that \mathbf{A} implies \mathbf{B} with overwhelming probability (denoted by $\mathbf{A} \xRightarrow{\text{o.p.}} \mathbf{B}$) if

$$1 - \Pr[\mathbf{B} \mid \mathbf{A}] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

$\text{H}_{\text{FS}, \lambda}$ denotes the hashing algorithm used by the Fiat-Shamir-heuristic. It generates λ -bit primes.

1.1 Argument Systems

An argument system for a relation $\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{W}$ is a triple of randomized polynomial time algorithms $(\text{PGen}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$, where PGen takes an (implicit) security parameter λ and outputs a common reference string (CRS) pp . If the setup algorithm uses only public randomness we say that the setup is transparent and that the CRS is unstructured. The prover \mathcal{P} takes as input a statement $x \in \mathcal{X}$, a witness $w \in \mathcal{W}$, and the CRS pp . The verifier \mathcal{V} takes as input pp and x and after interactions with \mathcal{P} outputs 0 or 1. We denote the transcript between the prover and the verifier by $\langle \mathcal{V}(\text{pp}, x), \mathcal{P}(\text{pp}, x, w) \rangle$ and write $\mathcal{V}(\text{pp}, x), \mathcal{P}(\text{pp}, x, w) = 1$ to indicate that the verifier accepted the transcript. If \mathcal{V} uses only public randomness we say that the protocol is *public coin*.

We now define soundness and knowledge extraction for our protocols. The adversary is modeled as two algorithms \mathcal{A}_0 and \mathcal{A}_1 , where \mathcal{A}_0 outputs the instance $x \in \mathcal{X}$ after PGen is run, and \mathcal{A}_1 runs the interactive protocol with the verifier using a state output by \mathcal{A}_0 . In a slight deviation from the soundness definition used in statistically sound proof systems, we do not universally quantify over the instance x (i.e. we do not require security to hold for all input

instances x). This is due to the fact that in the computationally-sound setting the instance itself may encode a trapdoor of the common reference string, which can enable the adversary to fool a verifier. Requiring that an efficient adversary outputs the instance x prevents this. In our soundness definition the adversary \mathcal{A}_1 succeeds if he can make the verifier accept when no witness for x exists. For the stronger argument of knowledge definition we require that an extractor with access to \mathcal{A}_1 's internal state can extract a valid witness whenever \mathcal{A}_1 is convincing. We model this by enabling the extractor to rewind \mathcal{A}_1 and reinitialize the verifier's randomness.

Definition 1.1. We say an argument system $(\text{PGen}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ for a relation \mathcal{R} is **complete** if for all $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$,

$$\Pr[\langle \mathcal{V}(\text{pp}, x), \mathcal{P}(\text{pp}, w) \rangle = 1 : \text{pp} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PGen}(\lambda)] = 1.$$

Definition 1.2. We say an argument system $(\text{PGen}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ is **sound** if \mathcal{P} cannot forge a fake proof except with negligible probability.

Definition 1.3. We say a sound argument system is an **argument of knowledge** if for any polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists an extractor \mathcal{E} with access to \mathcal{A} 's internal state that can, with overwhelming probability, extract a valid witness whenever \mathcal{A} is convincing.

Definition 1.4. An argument system is **non-interactive** if it consists of a single round of interaction between \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} .

The Fiat-Shamir heuristic ([FS87]) can be used to transform interactive public coin argument systems into non-interactive systems. Instead of the Verifier generating the challenges, this function is performed by a public hashing algorithm agreed upon in advance.

1.2 Cryptographic assumptions

The cryptographic protocols make extensive use of groups of unknown order, i.e., groups for which the order cannot be computed efficiently. Concretely, we require groups for which two hardness assumptions hold. The Strong RSA Assumption ([BP97]) roughly states that it is hard to take arbitrary roots of random elements. The much newer Adaptive Root Assumption ([Wes19]) is the dual to the Strong RSA Assumption and states that it is hard to take random roots of arbitrary group elements. Both of these assumptions are believed to hold in generic groups of hidden order ([Wes18], [BBF19], [DGS20]).

Assumption 1.1. We say that the **adaptive root** assumption holds for a group \mathbb{G} if there is no efficient probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary $(\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$ that succeeds in the following task. \mathcal{A}_0 outputs an element $w \in \mathbb{G}$ and some state. Then a random prime ℓ is chosen and $\mathcal{A}_1(\ell, \text{state})$ outputs $w^{1/\ell} \in \mathbb{G}$.

Assumption 1.2. For a set \mathcal{S} of rational primes, we say \mathbb{G} satisfies the **\mathcal{S} -strong RSA** assumption if given a random group element $g \in \mathbb{G}$ and a prime $\ell \notin \mathcal{S}$, no PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} is able to compute (except with negligible probability) the ℓ -th root of a chosen element $w \in \mathbb{G}$. When $\mathcal{S} = \emptyset$, it is called the **strong RSA** assumption.

Assumption 1.3. We say \mathbb{G} satisfies the **low order** assumption if no PPT algorithm can generate (except with negligible probability) an element $a \in \mathbb{G} \setminus \{1\}$ and an integer $n < 2^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ such that $a^n = 1 \in \mathbb{G}$.

Assumption 1.4. For a set \mathcal{S} of rational primes, we say \mathbb{G} satisfies the \mathcal{S} -fractional root assumption if for a randomly generated element $g \in \mathbb{G}$, no PPT algorithm can output $h \in \mathbb{G}$ and $d_1, d_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that

$$g^{d_1} = h^{d_2} \wedge \gcd(d_1, d_2) = 1 \wedge d_2 \text{ has a prime divisor outside } \mathcal{S}$$

except with negligible probability. When $\mathcal{S} = \emptyset$, it is called the **fractional root** assumption.

Clearly, if $\mathcal{S}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{S}$, the \mathcal{S}_0 -fractional root assumption implies the \mathcal{S} -fractional root assumption. For instance, class groups of imaginary quadratic fields are believed to fulfill the $\{2\}$ -fractional root assumption although they do not fulfill the (stronger) fractional root assumption. This is because there is a well-known algorithm to compute square roots in imaginary quadratic class groups ([BS96]). The assumptions bear the following relations:

$$\{\text{Adaptive root assumption}\} \implies \{\text{Low order assumption}\},$$

$$\{\text{Low order assumption}\} \wedge \{\mathcal{S}\text{-Strong-RSA assumption}\} \implies \{\mathcal{S}\text{-Fractional root assumption}\}.$$

We refer the reader to the appendix of [BBF19] for further details.

Definition 1.5. For elements $a, b \in \mathbb{G}$ and a rational $\alpha \in \mathbb{Q}$, we say $a^\alpha = b$ with respect to a PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} if \mathcal{A} can generate integers $d_1, d_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that:

- $\alpha = d_1 d_2^{-1}$
- $a^{d_1} = b^{d_2}$
- $|d_1|, |d_2| < 2^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$.

Note that if a PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} generates an element $a \in \mathbb{G}$ and distinct rationals $d_1 d_2^{-1}, d_3 d_4^{-1}$, ($d_i \in \mathbb{Z}$) such that

$$a^{d_1 d_2^{-1}} = a^{d_3 d_4^{-1}} \in \mathbb{G},$$

then $a^{d_1 d_4 - d_2 d_3} = 1$ and $d_1 d_4 - d_2 d_3 \neq 0$. So the low order assumption implies that \mathcal{A} cannot generate such a tuple $(a, d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}^4$, except with negligible probability. Furthermore, by Shamir's trick, $a^\alpha = b$ is equivalent to \mathcal{A} being able to generate an element $a_0 \in \mathbb{G}$ and co-prime integers d_1, d_2 such that

$$\alpha = d_1 d_2^{-1}, \quad a_0^{d_2} = a, \quad a_0^{d_1} = b,$$

1.2.1 Generic group models for hidden order groups

We will use the generic group model for groups of unknown order as defined by [DK02] and [BBF19]. The group is parametrized by two integer public parameters A, B . The order of the group is sampled uniformly from the interval $[A, B]$. The group \mathbb{G} is defined by a random injective function $\sigma : \mathbb{Z}_{|\mathbb{G}|} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ for some $n \gg \log_2(|\mathbb{G}|)$. A generic group algorithm \mathcal{A} is a probabilistic algorithm. Let \mathcal{L} be a list that is initialized with the encodings given to \mathcal{A} as input. The algorithm can query two generic group oracles:

- \mathcal{O}_1 samples a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbb{G}}$ and returns $\sigma(r)$, which is appended to the list \mathcal{L} of encodings.
- When \mathcal{L} has size q , the second oracle $\mathcal{O}_2(i, j, \pm)$ takes two indices $i, j \in \{1, \dots, q\}$ and a sign bit and returns $\sigma(x_i \pm x_j)$ which is appended to \mathcal{L} .

1.3 Multiset notations and operations

We first recall/introduce a few basic definitions and notations concerning multisets. For a multiset \mathcal{M} , we denote by $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M})$ the underlying set of \mathcal{M} . For any element x , we denote by

$\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x)$ the multiplicity of x in \mathcal{M} . Thus, $\mathcal{M} = \{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})\}$. For brevity, we write

$$\Pi(\mathcal{M}) := \prod_{x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x)}.$$

For two multisets \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} , we have the following operations:

- The sum $\mathcal{M} + \mathcal{N} := \{(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) + \text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x)) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \cup \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})\}$
- The union $\mathcal{M} \cup \mathcal{N} := \{\max(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x), \text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x)) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \cup \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})\}$
- The intersection $\mathcal{M} \cap \mathcal{N} := \{\min(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x), \text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x)) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \cup \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})\}$
- The difference $\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{N} := \{\min(\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) - \text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x), 0) \times x : x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \cup \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})\}$.

The function $\Pi(\cdot)$ clearly has the following properties:

- $\Pi(\mathcal{M} + \mathcal{N}) = \Pi(\mathcal{M}) \cdot \Pi(\mathcal{N})$
- $\Pi(\mathcal{M} \cup \mathcal{N}) = \text{lcm}(\Pi(\mathcal{M}), \Pi(\mathcal{N}))$
- $\Pi(\mathcal{M} \cap \mathcal{N}) = \text{gcd}(\Pi(\mathcal{M}), \Pi(\mathcal{N}))$
- $\Pi(\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{N}) = \Pi(\mathcal{M}) / \Pi(\mathcal{M} \cap \mathcal{N})$

Multiset Commitments: For a multiset \mathcal{M} represented by λ -bit primes and a hidden order group \mathbb{G} , a \mathbb{G} -commitment to a multiset \mathcal{M} is a pair $(g, h) \in \mathbb{G}^2$ such that $g^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})} = h$. The hardness of the discrete logarithm problem implies that this commitment is *hiding* in the sense that no PPT algorithm can compute \mathcal{M} from the pair $[g, h]$. The low order assumption implies that it is *binding* in the sense that no PPT algorithm can compute another multiset \mathcal{M}' with the same commitment.

1.4 Cryptographic Accumulators

A cryptographic accumulator [Bd94] is a primitive that produces a short binding commitment to a set (or multiset) of elements together with short membership and/or non-membership proofs for any element in the set. These proofs can be publicly verified against the commitment. Broadly, there are three known types of accumulators at the moment:

- Merkle trees
- pairing-based (aka bilinear) accumulators
- accumulators based on groups of unknown order, which we study in this paper.

Let \mathbb{G} be a group of hidden order and fix an element $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Let \mathcal{M} be a multiset of λ -bit primes. For each $x \in \mathcal{M}$, let $\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x)$ denote the multiplicity of x in \mathcal{M} . The *accumulated digest* or *accumulated state* of \mathcal{M} is given by

$$\mathbf{Acc}(\mathcal{M}) := \mathbf{Com}(g, \mathcal{M}) = g^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})} \in \mathbb{G},$$

where

$$\Pi(\mathcal{M}) := \prod_{x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x)}.$$

Let \mathcal{M}_0 be a multiset contained in \mathcal{M} , so that $\text{mult}(\mathcal{M}_0, x) \leq \text{mult}(\mathcal{M}, x) \forall x$. The element

$$w(\mathcal{M}_0) := g^{\prod_{x \in \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})} x^{\text{mult}(\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_0, x)}} \in \mathbb{G}$$

is called *the membership witness* of \mathcal{M}_0 . Given this element, a Verifier can verify the membership of \mathcal{M}_0 in \mathcal{M} by verifying the equation

$$w(\mathcal{M}_0)^{\Pi(\mathcal{M}_0)} \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{Acc}(\mathcal{D}) \in \mathbb{G}.$$

When the multiset \mathcal{M}_0 is large, this verification can be sped up using Wesolowski's *Proof of Exponentiation* (PoE) protocol ([Wes18]).

Shamir's trick allows for aggregation of membership witnesses in accumulators based on hidden order groups. This is not possible with Merkle trees, which is the primary reason other families of accumulators have been explored as authentication data structures for stateless blockchains. With bilinear accumulators, aggregation of membership witnesses has a linear runtime complexity, which is impractical for most use cases. Thus, accumulators based on hidden order groups have a major advantage in this regard.

These accumulators also allow for non-membership proofs ([LLX07]). In [BBF19], the authors used a non-interactive argument of knowledge to compress batched non-membership proofs into constant-sized proofs, i.e. independent of the number of elements involved. This yields the first known Vector Commitment with constant-sized openings as well as constant-sized public parameters.

Hashing the data to primes: The security of cryptographic accumulators and vector commitments hinges on the assumption that for disjoint data sets \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{E} , the integers $\Pi(\mathcal{D}), \Pi(\mathcal{E})$ are relatively prime. The easiest way to ensure this is to map the data elements to distinct λ -bit primes. This is usually done by hashing the data to λ -bit integers and subjecting the output to a probabilistic primality test such as the Miller-Rabin test. The prime number theorem states that the number of primes less than n is $\mathbf{O}(\frac{n}{\log(n)})$ and hence, implies that the expected runtime for finding a prime is $\mathbf{O}(\lambda)$.

Dirichlet's theorem on primes in arithmetic progressions combined with the prime number theorem implies that for relatively prime integers k, r and an integer n , the number of primes less than n that are $\equiv r \pmod{k}$ is roughly $\frac{n}{\log(n)\phi(k)}$. Thus, we can modify the hashing algorithm so that for any element inserted into the accumulator, the prime reveals the position in which it was inserted. We proceed as follows.

1. Fix a prime p of size $\frac{\lambda}{2}$.
2. For a string inserted in position i , we map the string to the first prime of size λ which is $\equiv i \pmod{p}$. This (pseudo-)prime is obtained by subjecting the integers $\{pk + i : k \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ to the probabilistic Miller-Rabin test.

The number of such primes is roughly $\frac{2^\lambda}{\lambda(p-1)}$ and hence, the expected runtime is $\mathbf{O}(\lambda)$.

2 HVZK Proofs

We first briefly review the protocol ZKPoKE from [BBF19], which we will need repeatedly in the subsequent protocols.

Protocol 2.1. *Zero knowledge proof of the knowledge of the Exponent (ZKPoKE):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Inputs: Elements $u, w \in \mathbb{G}$, $B > 2^{2\lambda}|\mathbb{G}|$

Claim: The Prover possesses an integer x such that $u^x = w$.

1. The Prover chooses random $k, \rho_x, \rho_k \in [-B, B]$ and sends (z, A_g, A_u) to the Verifier, where $z := g^x h^{\rho_x}$, $A_g := g^k h^{\rho_k}$, $A_u := u^k$.
2. The Verifier generates a random λ -bit integer c and a random λ -bit prime ℓ and sends them to the Prover.

3. The Prover computes the integers q_x, q_ρ, r_x, r_ρ such that

$$k + c \cdot \rho_k = q_x \cdot \ell + r_x, \quad \rho_k + c \cdot \rho_x = q_\rho \cdot \ell + r_\rho$$

and sends $Q_g := g^{q_x} h^{q_\rho}$, $Q_u := u^{q_x}$ and r_x, r_ρ to the Verifier.

4. The Verifier accepts if and only if $r_x, r_\rho \in [\ell]$ and the equations $Q_g^\ell \cdot g^{r_x} h^{r_\rho} = A_g z^c$, $Q_u^\ell \cdot u^{r_x} = A_u w^c$ hold. \square

The protocol ZKPoKE is an HVZK protocol PoKE is an argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{PoKE}} := \{((u, w) \in \mathbb{G}); x \in \mathbb{Z} : w = u^x \in \mathbb{G}\}.$$

We now start out with a fairly simple protocol. We show how a Prover could probabilistically demonstrate that two discrete logarithms are equal, with a constant-sized proof. In other words, the protocol allows a Prover to show that two pairs $[a_1, b_1], [a_2, b_2]$ of \mathbb{G} -elements are commitments to the same set/multiset. We provide an argument of knowledge for the following relation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{EqDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2) \\ d \in \mathbb{Z} : \\ (b_1, b_2) = (a_1^d, a_2^d) \end{array} \right\}$$

The protocol hinges on the observation that for two integers d_1, d_2 , if we have $d_1 \equiv d_2 \pmod{\ell}$ for a randomly generated λ -bit prime ℓ , then with overwhelming probability, $d_1 = d_2$.

Protocol 2.2. *Zero knowledge proof of equality of discrete logarithms (ZKPoEqDLog):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Inputs: Elements $a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{G}$, $B > 2^{2\lambda} |\mathbb{G}|$

Claim: The Prover possesses an integer d such that $a_1^d = b_1$, $a_2^d = b_2$.

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} chooses random integers $k, \rho_k, \rho_d \in [-B, B]$ and sends the group elements

$$\tilde{g} := g^d h^{\rho_d}, \quad A_g := g^k h^{\rho_k}, \quad \hat{a}_1 := a_1^k, \quad \hat{a}_2 := a_2^k \in \mathbb{G}$$

to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. The hashing algorithm $\text{H}_{\text{FS}, \lambda}$ generates λ -bit primes γ, ℓ .

3. \mathcal{P} computes the integers q_d, r_d, q_ρ, r_ρ such that

$$d\gamma + k = q_d \cdot \ell + r_d, \quad \rho_d \cdot \ell + \rho_k = q_\rho \cdot \ell + r_\rho, \quad r_d, r_\rho \in [\ell]$$

and sends r_d, r_ρ to \mathcal{V} .

4. \mathcal{P} computes

$$Q_g := g^{q_d} h^{q_\rho}, \quad Q_1 := a_1^{q_d}, \quad Q_2 := a_2^{q_d} \in \mathbb{G}$$

and sends Q_g, Q_1, Q_2 to \mathcal{V} .

5. \mathcal{V} verifies that $r_d, r_\rho \in [\ell]$ and the equations

$$Q_g^\ell g^{r_d} h^{r_\rho} \stackrel{?}{=} \tilde{g}^\gamma A_g \quad \bigwedge \quad Q_1^\ell a_1^{r_d} \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{a}_1 b_1^\gamma \quad \bigwedge \quad Q_2^\ell a_2^{r_d} \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{a}_2 b_2^\gamma.$$

He accepts if and only if all three equations hold. \square

We provide an HVZK argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{Prod}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3) \in \mathbb{G}^2); \\ (d_1, d_2, d_3) \in \mathbb{Z}^3 : \\ b_i = a_i^{d_i} \ (i = 1, 2, 3) \ \wedge \ d_1 d_2 = d_3 \end{array} \right\}$$

Protocol 2.3. *Zero knowledge proof of product of discrete logarithms (ZKPoProd):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Inputs: Elements $a, b_1, b_2, b_3 \in \mathbb{G}$, $B > 2^{2\lambda}|\mathbb{G}|$

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_i ($i = 1, 2, 3$) such that $a_i^{d_i} = b_i$ and $d_1 d_2 = d_3$.

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes

$$b_{1,2} := a_1^{d_2}, \ b_{1,3} := a_1^{d_3} \in \mathbb{G}$$

and sends them to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with non-interactive proofs for $\text{ZKPoEqDLog}[(a_1, b_2), (a_2, b_{1,2})]$ and $\text{ZKPoEqDLog}[(a_1, b_3), (a_3, b_{1,3})]$.

2. \mathcal{P} generates a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoEqDLog}[(a, b_1), (b_{1,2}, b_{1,3})]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{V} accepts if and only if all three proofs are valid. □

We can also generalize the protocol ZKPoEqDLog as follows. For a public polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$, an honest Prover can provide a constant-sized ZK proof that he possesses integers d_1, d_2 such that

$$a_1^{d_1} = b_1, \ a_2^{d_2} = b_2, \ f(d_1) = d_2.$$

We provide an HVZK argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{PolyDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), f] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2, f \in \mathbb{Z}[X]); \\ (d_1, d_2) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : \\ b_1 = a_1^{d_1} \ \wedge \ b_2 = a_2^{d_1} \ \wedge \ d_2 = f(d_1) \end{array} \right\}$$

The non-ZK argument of knowledge for this relation ([TH20B]) is fairly simple. The Prover sends the remainders $r_i := d_i \pmod{\ell}$ for a randomly chosen λ -bit prime challenge ℓ . He verifiably shows that $r_i \equiv d_i \pmod{\ell}$ by sending the ℓ -th roots of $b_i a_i^{-r_i}$. The Verifier verifies the exponentiations and the equation $r_2 \equiv f(r_1) \pmod{\ell}$.

The zero-knowledge variant is a bit more subtle since it requires a blinding factor. The Prover can no longer send over the remainders $r_i := d_i \pmod{\ell}$ since such a protocol is inherently not zero-knowledge. However, the protocol can be made zero-knowledge with a modification that hinges on the observation that the following are equivalent with overwhelming probability.

1. $d_2 = f(d_1)$
2. $f(d_1) \equiv d_2 \pmod{\gamma}$ for a randomly generated λ -bit prime γ .
3. $d_2 \equiv f(d + k\gamma) \pmod{k\gamma}$ for an integer k chosen by the Prover and a randomly generated λ -bit prime γ .

Protocol 2.4. *Zero knowledge proof of polynomial relation between discrete logarithms (ZKPoPolyDLog):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Inputs: Elements $a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{G}$; a public univariate polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$; $B > 2^{2\lambda}|\mathbb{G}|$

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_i ($i = 1, 2$) such that $a_i^{d_i} = b_i$ and $f(d_1) = d_2$.

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $b_{1,2} := a_1^{d_2}$ and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoEqDLog}[(a_1, b_{1,2}), (a_2, b_2)]$.

2. \mathcal{P} chooses a random $k \in [-B, B]$ and sends $A_1 := a_1^k$ to \mathcal{V} .
3. The hashing algorithm $\text{H}_{\text{FS}, \lambda}$ generates a λ -bit prime γ .
4. \mathcal{P} computes $A_2 := a_1^{f(d_1+k\gamma)} \in \mathbb{G}$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
5. The hashing algorithm $\text{H}_{\text{FS}, \lambda}$ generates a λ -bit prime ℓ .
6. \mathcal{P} computes the integers q, r such that

$$d_1 + k\gamma = q_1 \cdot \ell + r_1, \quad f(d_1 + k\gamma) = q_2 \cdot \ell + r_2, \quad r, r_1 \in [\ell]$$

and sends $Q_1 := a_1^{q_1}, Q_2 := a_1^{q_2} \in \mathbb{G}$ to \mathcal{V} .

7. \mathcal{P} generates a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoKE}[A_1^\gamma, A_2 \cdot b_{1,2}^{-1}]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
8. \mathcal{P} chooses random $\rho_d, \rho_k \in [-B, B]$ and sends $z := g^d h^{\rho_d}, A_g := g^k h^{\rho_k} \in \mathbb{G}$ to \mathcal{V} .
9. The hashing algorithm $\text{H}_{\text{FS}, \lambda}$ generates λ -bit primes c, ℓ_0 .
10. \mathcal{P} computes the integers q_d, r_d, q_ρ, r_ρ such that

$$c \cdot d_1 + k = q_d \cdot \ell_0 + r_d, \quad c \cdot \rho_d + \rho_k = q_\rho \cdot \ell_0 + r_\rho, \quad r_\rho, r_d \in [\ell_0]$$

and sends $r_d, r_\rho, Q_g := g^{q_d} h^{q_\rho}, Q := a_1^{q_d}$ to \mathcal{V} .

11. \mathcal{V} verifies that $r_d, r_\rho \in [\ell_0], r_1 \in [\ell]$ and computes $r_2 := f(r_1) \pmod{\ell}$.
12. \mathcal{V} verifies the equations

$$Q_1^\ell a_1^{r_1} \stackrel{?}{=} b_1 \cdot A_1 \quad \bigwedge \quad Q_2^\ell a_2^{r_2} \stackrel{?}{=} A_2 \quad \bigwedge \quad Q_g^{\ell_0} g^{r_d} h^{r_\rho} \stackrel{?}{=} A_1 z^c \quad \bigwedge \quad Q^{\ell_0} a_1^{r_d} \stackrel{?}{=} A_1 b_1^c.$$

He accepts if and only if all four equations hold and the proof for $\text{ZKPoKE}[A_1^\gamma, A_2 \cdot b_{1,2}^{-1}]$ is valid. \square

2.1 Containment of the underlying sets of committed multisets

Let a_1, a_2 be elements of \mathbb{G} . Let \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} be multisets of rational primes. Let

$$A_1 := \text{Com}(g, \mathcal{M}) = a_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})}, \quad A_2 := \text{Com}(g, \mathcal{N}) = a_2^{\Pi(\mathcal{N})} \in \mathbb{G}$$

be the commitments to \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} with bases $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{G}$.

Clearly, the relation $\mathcal{N} \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ can be demonstrated by the protocol $\text{PoKE}[A_2, A_1]$. We now show that the protocol PolyDLog allows a Prover to succinctly demonstrate the following relations between the underlying sets of \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} , the proofs for which can be publicly verified against the commitments to \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} .

1. $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$.
2. $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \not\subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$.
3. $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) = \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$

Before we describe the protocols, we note a few basic facts. Clearly, we have

$$\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) = \text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \iff \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \quad \bigwedge \quad \text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{M}).$$

Furthermore, with notations as before, we have

$$\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \iff \exists N \in \mathbb{Z} : \Pi(\mathcal{M})^N \equiv 0 \pmod{\Pi(\mathcal{N})}.$$

Likewise, to show that $\text{Set}(\mathcal{M}) \not\subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{N})$, it suffices to show that there exists an integer p such that

$$p \notin \{-1, 1\} \quad \bigwedge \quad \Pi(\mathcal{M}) \equiv 0 \pmod{p} \quad \bigwedge \quad \text{gcd}(\Pi(\mathcal{N}), p) = 1.$$

Protocol 2.5. *Protocol for the containment of underlying sets (PoConSets).*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Input: Elements $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{G}$; commitments $A_1 := \text{Com}(a_1, \mathcal{M}) = a_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})}$, $A_2 := \text{Com}(a_2, \mathcal{N}) = a_2^{\Pi(\mathcal{N})}$ to multisets \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} .

Claim: $\text{Set}(\mathcal{N}) \subseteq \text{Set}(\mathcal{M})$.

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $N := \max\{\text{mult}(\mathcal{N}, x) : x \in \mathcal{N}\}$ and

$$A_3 := a_1^{\Pi(\mathcal{M})^N} \in \mathbb{G}.$$

He sends A_3 and N to the Verifier \mathcal{V} .

2. \mathcal{P} generates a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoPolyDLog}[(a_1, A_1), (a_2, A_3), X^N]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
3. \mathcal{P} generates a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoKE}[A_2, A_3]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{V} verifies the two proofs and accepts if and only if both are valid. □

3 Disjointness of sets

The goal of this section is to provide a protocol for demonstrating disjointness of multiple data sets/multisets. The proofs can be publicly verified against the succinct commitments to these multisets. To that end, we first describe a protocol whereby an honest Prover can show that the GCD of two discrete logarithms equals a third discrete logarithm while keeping the communication complexity constant. One obvious application is proving disjointness of sets/multisets in accumulators instantiated with hidden order groups. We formulate an HVZK argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{GCD}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \{((a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z}) : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \text{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = d_3\}.$$

We construct a protocol that has communication complexity independent of the elements a_i, b_i . The protocol rests on the basic fact that

$$d_3 = \text{gcd}(d_1, d_2) \iff (d_1 \equiv d_2 \equiv 0 \pmod{d_3}) \bigwedge (\exists (x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : d_3 = x_1 d_1 + x_2 d_2).$$

Protocol 3.1. *Zero knowledge proof of the greatest common divisor (ZKPoGCD):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Input: Elements $a_1, a_2, a_3, b_1, b_2, b_3 \in \mathbb{G}$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, d_2, d_3 such that:

- $a_1^{d_1} = b_1, a_2^{d_2} = b_2, a_3^{d_3} = b_3$
- $\text{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = d_3$

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $b_{1,2} := a_1^{d_2}, b_{1,3} := a_1^{d_3} \in \mathbb{G}$ and sends them to the Verifier \mathcal{V} . 2. \mathcal{P} generates non-interactive proofs for $\text{ZKPoEqDLog}[(a_2, b_2), (a_1, b_{1,2})]$, $\text{ZKPoEqDLog}[(a_3, b_3), (a_1, b_{1,3})]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
3. \mathcal{P} generates non-interactive proofs for $\text{ZKPoKE}[b_{1,3}, b_1]$ and $\text{ZKPoKE}[b_{1,3}, b_{1,2}]$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{P} uses the Euclidean algorithm to compute integers e_1, e_2 such that

$$e_1 d_1 + e_2 d_2 = d_3, \quad |e_1| < |d_2|, \quad |e_2| < |d_1|.$$

5. \mathcal{P} computes

$$\tilde{b}_1 := b_1^{e_1}, \tilde{b}_{1,2} := b_{1,2}^{e_2} \in \mathbb{G}$$

and sends them to \mathcal{V} along with non-interactive proofs for $\text{ZKPoKE}[b_1, \tilde{b}_1]$ and $\text{ZKPoKE}[b_{1,2}, \tilde{b}_{1,2}]$.
 6. \mathcal{V} verifies all of the proofs he receives in addition to the equation

$$\tilde{b}_1 \cdot \tilde{b}_{1,2} \stackrel{?}{=} b_{1,3} \in \mathbb{G}.$$

He accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all of these proofs are valid. \square

Theorem 3.2. *The Protocol ZKPoGCD is an HVZK argument of knowledge for the relation \mathcal{R}_{GCD} in the generic group model.*

Proof. \square

An important special case is where $\mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1$. In this case, Step 3 is redundant and hence, the proof size is smaller. We call this special case the Protocol for *Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms* or **RelPrimeDLog** for short:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{RelPrimeDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \{((a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z}) : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1\}.$$

Protocol 3.3. *ZK Proof of Relatively Prime Discrete Logarithms (ZKPoRelPrimeDLog):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Input: Elements $a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{G}$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, d_2 such that:

- $a_1^{d_1} = b_1, a_2^{d_2} = b_2$
- $\mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1$

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $b_{1,2} := a_1^{d_2}$ and sends it to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoEqDLog}[(a_2, b_2), (a_1, b_{1,2})]$.
2. \mathcal{P} uses the Euclidean algorithm to compute integers e_1, e_2 such that $e_1 d_1 + e_2 d_2 = 1$.
3. \mathcal{P} computes

$$\tilde{b}_1 := b_1^{e_1}, \tilde{b}_{1,2} := b_{1,2}^{e_2} \in \mathbb{G}$$

and sends them to \mathcal{V} along with non-interactive proofs for $\text{ZKPoKE}[b_1, \tilde{b}_1]$ and $\text{ZKPoKE}[b_{1,2}, \tilde{b}_{1,2}]$.

4. \mathcal{V} verifies the equation $\tilde{b}_1 \cdot \tilde{b}_{1,2} \stackrel{?}{=} a_1 \in \mathbb{G}$ and the proofs for $\text{ZKPoEqDLog}[(a_2, b_2), (a_1, b_{1,2})]$, $\text{ZKPoKE}[b_1, \tilde{b}_1]$ and $\text{ZKPoKE}[b_{1,2}, \tilde{b}_{1,2}]$. He accepts the validity of the claim if and only if all of these proofs are valid. \square

Proposition 3.4. *The Protocol ZKPoRelPrimeDLog is a HVZK argument for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RelPrimeDLog}}$ in the generic group model.*

Proof. This is a special case of Proposition 3.2. \square

It is easy to see that the protocols ZKPoGCD may be combined with the protocol ZKPoProd to provide an HVZK argument of knowledge for the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{LCM}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \{((a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z}) : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{lcm}(d_1, d_2) = d_3\}.$$

This argument of knowledge can demonstrate that for data sets/multisets $\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2, \mathcal{D}_3$, we have

$$\mathcal{D}_3 = \mathcal{D}_1 \cup \mathcal{D}_2$$

by setting

$$d_i = \prod_{d \in \mathcal{D}_i} x \quad (i = 1, 2, 3).$$

Protocol 3.5. *Zero knowledge proof of the least common multiple (ZKPoLCM):*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Input: Elements $a, b_1, b_2, b_3 \in \mathbb{G}$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, d_2, d_3 such that:

- $a^{d_1} = b_1, a^{d_2} = b_2, a^{d_3} = b_3$
- $\text{lcm}(d_1, d_2) = d_3$

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $b_{\text{gcd}} := a^{\text{gcd}(d_1, d_2)} \in \mathbb{G}$ and sends to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoGCD}[(a, b_1), (a, b_2), (a, b_{\text{gcd}})]$.
2. \mathcal{P} computes $b_{\text{prod}} := a^{d_1 d_2} \in \mathbb{G}$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoProd}[(a, b_1), (a, b_2), (a, b_{\text{prod}})]$.
3. \mathcal{P} generates a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoProd}[(a, b_{\text{gcd}}), (a, b_3), (a, b_{\text{prod}})]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
4. \mathcal{V} verifies the three proofs and accepts if and only if they are all valid. □

Protocol 3.6. *ZK Protocol for multiset differences (ZKPoDiff)*

Parameters: $\mathbb{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GGen}(\lambda)$, $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $\langle g \rangle = \langle h \rangle$.

Input: Elements $a, b_1, b_2, b_3 \in \mathbb{G}$.

Claim: The Prover possesses integers d_1, d_2, d_3 such that:

- $a^{d_1} = b_1, a^{d_2} = b_2, a^{d_3} = b_3$
- $d_1 = d_3 \cdot \text{gcd}(d_1, d_2)$

1. The Prover \mathcal{P} computes $b_{\text{gcd}} := a^{\text{gcd}(d_1, d_2)} \in \mathbb{G}$ and sends to the Verifier \mathcal{V} along with a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoGCD}[(a, b_1), (a, b_2), (a, b_{\text{gcd}})]$.
2. \mathcal{P} generates a non-interactive proof for $\text{ZKPoProd}[(a, b_{\text{gcd}}), (a, b_3), (a, b_1)]$ and sends it to \mathcal{V} .
3. \mathcal{V} verifies the three proofs and accepts if and only if they are all valid. □

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A List of Protocols:

The following is a list of the protocols in this paper and the relations that the protocols are HVZK arguments of knowledge for, in the generic group model. In each of the protocols, we may replace \mathbb{Z} by the localization $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathcal{S}}$ at any set \mathcal{S} of rational primes.

1. ZKPoEqDLog (*Proof of equality of discrete logarithms*)

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{EqDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2) \\ d \in \mathbb{Z} : \\ (b_1, b_2) = (a_1^d, a_2^d) \end{array} \right\}$$

2. ZKPoPolyDLog (*Proof of polynomial relation between (two) discrete logarithms*)

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{PolyDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), f] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2, f \in \mathbb{Z}[X]); \\ (d_1, d_2) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : \\ b_1 = a_1^{d_1} \wedge b_2 = a_2^{d_2} \wedge d_2 = f(d_1) \end{array} \right\}$$

3. ZKPoProd (*Proof of Product*)

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{Prod}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \{((a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z} : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, d_1 d_2 = d_3\}$$

4. ZKPoGCD (*Proof of GCD*)

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{GCD}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \{((a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z} : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = d_3\}$$

5. ZKPoRelPrimeDLog (*Proof of relatively prime discrete logarithms*; special case of PoGCD)

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{RelPrimeDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \{((a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z} : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1\}.$$

6. ZKPoLCM (*Proof of LCM*)

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{LCM}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_3)] = \{((a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z} : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{lcm}(d_1, d_2) = d_3\}$$

7. ZKPoRelPrimeDLog (*Proof of relatively prime discrete logarithms*; special case of PoGCD)

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{RelPrimeDLog}}[(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)] = \{((a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{G}); d_i \in \mathbb{Z} : b_i = a_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{gcd}(d_1, d_2) = 1\}.$$

8. Zero-knowledge proof of the containment/non-containment of the underlying sets

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{ConSets}}[(a_1, A_1), (a_2, A_2)] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a_1, a_2, A_1, A_2 \in \mathbb{G}; \\ (d_1, d_2, N) \in \mathbb{Z}^3 : \\ a_1^{d_1} = A_1 \wedge a_2^{d_2} = A_2 \\ \wedge d_2^N \equiv 0 \pmod{d_1} \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{NonConSets}}[(a_1, A_1), (a_2, A_2)] = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a_1, a_2, A_1, A_2 \in \mathbb{G}; \\ (d_1, d_2, p) \in \mathbb{Z}^3 : \\ a_1^{d_1} = A_1 \wedge a_2^{d_2} = A_2 \wedge \\ p \mid d_2 \wedge p \mid d_1 \wedge p \neq \pm 1 \end{array} \right\}$$