

Lab this Thursday?


Why a static prior is too much of a good thing

Bayesian modelers should incorporate more realistic memory theories



Observation =
“Perception”

Temporal context calibrates interval timing


Mehrdad Jazayeri^{1,2} & Michael N Shadlen²

a**b**

Prior probability distribution

**c**

Interval Timing



Interval Timing


● “Set...”


● “Go!”





● “Ready?”

Ready-Set-Go paradigm











How to explain this data?

Information-Processing Models




(a) Pacemaker/Accumulator Internal Clock Model


IP Models Reformulated




(a) Pacemaker/Accumulator Internal Clock Model



Maximum-likelihood estimation “No Context”




Time Estimation Formalized



Default “ACT-R” timing model


Rationale of Jazayeri & Shadlen

- “*Longer intervals engender more uncertainty*”
- More uncertain measurements result in “*increased reliance on prior expectation*”




Rationale of Jazayeri & Shadlen


- “Longer intervals engender more uncertainty”
- More uncertain measurements result in “increased reliance on prior expectation”



From Stimulus to Reproduction




From Stimulus to Reproduction





$$f(t_m, \text{prior})$$


Current observation

Memory of previous durations









prior


t_m

671

847

1023

t_s





prior

t_m


t_s

t_m








prior




t_m








prior




t_m




$$\mathcal{N}(t_m, t_m \times w_m)$$




t_s



prior



t_m




671

847

1023


t_s



prior


Static Prior

t_m




Bayes least-squares Weighted Context

C




Time Estimation Formalized



Default “ACT-R” timing model



Maximum a posteriori “Binary Context”

b




Alternatively, a Bayesian observer would combine the likelihood function and the prior and use some statistic to map the resulting posterior probability distribution onto an estimate.

“cost” function:
“mode of the posterior”



Maximum a posteriori “Binary Context”


b




Alternatively, a Bayesian observer would combine the likelihood function and the prior and use some statistic to map the resulting posterior probability distribution onto an estimate.

“cost” function:
“mode of the posterior”


Empirical data




BLS Model



Time Estimation Formalized




Default “ACT-R” timing model




prior



t_m







prior

Static Prior

t_m



However...





Jones & Love (2011, BBS)



“[T]he prior can be a strong point of the model if it is derived from empirical statistics of real environments.



However, more commonly **the prior is chosen ad hoc**, providing substantial unconstrained flexibility to models that are advocated as rational and assumption-free.”

(p173-4)











Empirical data



And what about the dynamics of
memory?

Time Estimation Formalized





Default “ACT-R” timing model


Blending Model (Dikes & River)

Why not take a much simpler
approach?


Taatgen, Van Rijn & Anderson (2007)







Taatgen, Van Rijn & Anderson (2007)



Decay & Blending

- Decay:

- Strength of memory traces decreases with time

$$A_i = \sum_j a_j^{-.5}$$

A DM account of Contextual Timing

	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i
DM	-9	30			-6	34	-3	36

Decay & Blending

- Decay:
 - Strength of memory traces decreases with time

$$A_i = \sum_j a_j^{-.5}$$

$$P_i = \frac{e^{A_i/s}}{\sum_j e^{A_j/s}}$$

A DM account of Contextual Timing

	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i
DM	-9	30			-6	34	-3	36
P_i	0.25				0.31		0.44	

Decay & Blending

- Decay:

- Strength of memory traces decreases with time

$$A_i = \sum_j a_j^{-.5}$$

$$P_i = \frac{e^{A_i/s}}{\sum_j e^{A_j/s}}$$

- Blending:

- Information retrieved depends on the activation of all traces available in memory; weighted average.

$$t_e = \sum_i P_i V_i$$

A DM account of Contextual Timing

	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i
DM	-9	30			-6	34	-3	36
P_i	0.25				0.31		0.44	
$P_i \times V_i$	7.5				10.5		15.8	


A DM account of Contextual Timing

	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i
DM	-9	30			-6	34	-3	36
P_i	0.25				0.31		0.44	
$P_i \times V_i$	7.5				10.5		15.8	

$$t_e = 33.8$$

ACT-R model of JaS

- Context:
 - 500 practice trials per condition stored in DM
 - Trained with similar step function as in JaS
- Experiment:



A DM account of J&S

“Prior”

a_i

V_i

a_i

V_i

“Prior”

a_i

V_i

“Prior”

a_i

V_i

DM	-9	30			-6	34	-3	36

A DM account of J&S

“Prior” *“Likelihood”* *“Prior”* *“Prior”*
 a_i V_i a_i V_i a_i V_i a_i V_i

DM	-9	30	-1	31	-6	34	-3	36

A DM account of J&S

“Prior” *“Likelihood”* *“Prior”* *“Prior”*
 a_i V_i a_i V_i a_i V_i a_i V_i

DM	-9	30	-1	31	-6	34	-3	36
P_i	0.14				0.18		0.25	


A DM account of J&S


	“Prior”		“Likelihood”		“Prior”		“Prior”	
	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i	a_i	V_i
DM	-9	30	-1	31	-6	34	-3	36
P_i	0.14		0.43		0.18		0.25	
$P_i \times V_i$	4.2		13.3		6.1		9	


$$t_e = 32.6$$


ACT-R model of JaS

- Context:
 - 500 practice trials per condition stored in DM
 - Trained with similar step function as in JaS
- Experiment:









It's the prior, stupid!

- Likelihood-based explanation:
 - Wider likelihood distributions for longer t_m .
 - Requires the prior to be more constrained than empirically plausible
- Prior-based explanation:
 - Less precise measurements for longer t_s .
 - Non-linear time results in narrower distributions for longer durations, resulting in stronger “pull”.

Questions

STT vs Bayesian Models

Assuming the Bayesian inference theory of time perception is right, would we not still need a system for generating pulses to get the probability that a certain amount of time passed? So instead of being the Pacemaker, switch and accumulator, would the likelihood not only be the accumulator?

In the section "Integrating Bayesian inference with scalar timing theory" the authors venture to integrate two theories on contextual calibration for timing. It seems that the mapping of elements of the Bayesian framework onto elements of Scalar timing theory seems a good fit, but what other reason do the authors have to link these theories? By their own admission the theories have some key differences. In my mind this would require either one solution to be declared the best, or a new theory aspect (such as a decision rule) to be created as the best of both worlds.

The theories are different enough, it seems, to be combined. But where are the clues that they truly cooperate well?

Despite of the 3 main differences between the Scalar Timing Theory framework and the Bayesian perspective, from this paper the overall idea I got is that these are only the two sides of the same coin. So in order to provide new insights on how timing perception works I don't see how promising this approach is. This is also proven by the fact that the authors their selves at the end of the paper highlight that even relatively simple discrimination and generalization tasks are still unclear and difficult to explain. So what I'm asking is if although the Bayesian framework is able to provide some quantitatively explanations that the Scalar Timing Theory framework isn't able to do is this the correct way to approach the problem? To me it seems that it's just an integration of an already existing framework that still doesn't provide that much more explanations then the initial one. Maybe it's the initial STT framework itself to be wrong, and researchers should rethink about it and then try to apply the Bayesian approach on that.

"Integrating Bayesian inference with scalar timing theory could also be beneficial in explaining other forms of contextual calibration, including the influences of non-temporal factors (e.g., background intensity, speed/sequence structure)."

How could Bayesian inference explain non-temporal factors? How is this related to interval timing/scalar timing theory?

Are these types of models rich
enough?

Shi, Church and Meck (2013) show the impressively straightforward connection between the classic information-processing model and bayesian reasoning of interval timing. [...] The model is able to deliver explanations for phenomena - tested in extremely artificial and simplified environments – through reasonable and logic application. However, in reality interval timing does not follow a strict learning-judgement pattern, but seems to be a strongly intertwined - mostly unconscious - process in an environment of stimuli with different intensity, complexity, familiarity or emotional value, who all possibly have an influence on our subjective time perception (Matthews, & Meck, 2014).

(I) How truly probable is it then, that such a simple “centralised system model” - which already is dealing with quite complex probability judgements in artificially easy tasks - is responsible for the multitude of different timing events we perceive in a rich and immensely complex environment?

Shi, Church and Meck (2013) show the impressively straightforward connection between the classic information-processing model and bayesian reasoning of interval timing. [..]

(II) Even if components to better integrate stimulus properties will be considered. Isn't the oversimplification of these processes in such a model structure as proposed by Shi, Church and Meck (2013) in its current form, not just a possibly misguided attempt to achieve explanations at an explanatory level that may just not be suitable to describe this highly versatile process (given that explanations of timing in my opinion should supposedly inherit a high external validity due to its ubiquity in everyday life)?

Audio vs Visual

- Why are drummers also better in the visual domain?
- Could it be that the noise we now model as a 'fixed variance' across subjects is the main factor in this equation? Or at least play a bigger role than we now give it? That this noise becomes less variable as we train calibrations to become less dependent on context, that the expert drummer managed to reduce this noise function to have very little influence? This would mean less overlap in estimations, resulting in less 'gravity' between estimations, meaning a more clear distinction between them.

Bonus Question

- Bonus question: How did they do these super-fancy graphs? Awesome!